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THE

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES AND ANALYSES,

BY

EDWARD WALFORD, M.A.

WITH LIFE OF ARISTOTLE, AND INTRODUCTION

By DR. GILLIES

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PREFACE.

THE present translation of Aristotle's Politics is based on the well-known version of Ellis, in the revision of which the translation of Taylor, and the polished paraphrase of Gillies, have been consulted. The text of Bekker has been followed, and only departed from where the emendations of Goëttling and others appeared preferable. Analyses of both the Politics and Economics have been prefixed, which, it is hoped, will be found of service to the student. The valuable Introduction to the Politics by Dr. Gillies is reprinted entire, as giving, on the whole, the clearest general view of the subject.

E. W.

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
LIFE OF ARISTOTLE (by Dr. Gillies)	i
Introduction (by Dr. Gillies)	xxxiii
Analysis of the Politics	xlv
Analysis of the Economics	lxxix

POLITICS.

BOOK I.

Nature and end of a commonwealth.—Analysis thereof.—Monarchy the first form of government.—Domestic economy.—Slavery.—Accumulation of stock.—Riches, real and artificial.—Commerce.—Money.—Manufactures.—Monopolies.—Women.—Children.—Slaves.—Connexion between domestic and political economy . . 2—32

BOOK II.

Plato's Republic.—Community of wives, children, and goods.—Nature and necessity of separate property.—Plato's books of laws examined.—Schemes for equalizing property.—Their futility.—Hippodamus.—His ideal republic.—Arguments in favour of political innovation.—Stronger arguments against it.—The Spartan government.—The Cretan.—The Carthaginian.—The Athenian.—Zaleucus.—Charondas.—Philolaus.—Diocles.—Phaleas.—Pittacus.—Androgamas . . 33—81

BOOK III.

The citizen, how constituted.—Virtues of the man and of the citizen.—Their difference.—Different forms of government.—Their distinctive characters.—Pretensions of democracy—Of oligarchy—Of monarchy. Its five kinds—Arraigned—Defended . . 81—124

BOOK IV

Governments—Their classification.—Democracy—Its four kinds.—Constitutions—One thing by law, another in fact.—Materials respectively fitted for different governments.—Mixed governments.—Tests of good government.—How governments may be improved.—Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people, and the people, the nobles.—Analysis of the sovereignty.—Constitution of its different branches—Agreeably to the different spirit of different governments 124—166

BOOK V.

Causes of seditions.—Insolence and rapacity of men in power.—Secret combination of obscure factions, etc.—Particular causes in each form of government respectively.—How governments are to be preserved—By strengthening the middle ranks, etc.—Of laws relative to democracy—Oligarchy—Monarchy—Tyranny . . 166—212

BOOK VI.

Of republics of husbandmen—Of manufacturers and merchants.—Imperfections of democracy — Oligarchy. — Military and naval force.—Branches of executive magistracy.—Magistrates for protecting commerce and contracts.—Of police.—Of revenue.—Courts of record.—Controllers of public accounts.—Different orders of priests.—Superintendents of education and morals . . . 212—230

BOOK VII.

Different views of national happiness.—Fair estimate of it.—The best commonwealth.—Extent and nature of its territory.—Commerce.—Naval power.—Climate.—Constituent members.—Health.—Marriage.—Children . . . . . 231—270

BOOK VIII.

Education.—Its different branches.—How far to be cultivated.—Grammar.—Drawing.—Gymnastics.—Music.—Exercises adapted to different ages.—Doubts concerning music.—Its different kinds.—Purgation of the passions.—Conclusion . 270—286

ECONOMICS.

BOOK I.

Nature of the Economic science.—Civil society.—Conjugal and heriile relations.—Domestic management . . . 289—303

BOOK II.

Economy of four kinds.—Contrivances for gaining money . 303—325

APPENDIX. Note on Politics, Book V . . . 325—328

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE,

BY

JOHN GILLIES, L.L.D.

ARGUMENT.

Aristotle's birth-place.—His education at Atarneus.—at Athens—His residence with Hermeias.—Singular fortune of that prince.—Aristotle's residence at Lesbos—in Macedon.—Plan pursued in the education of Alexander.—Aristotle's residence in Athens.—Employment there.—Calumnies against him.—His retreat to Chalcis, and death.—His testament—sayings.—Extraordinary fate of his works.—Published at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes.—Their number and magnitude.

It is my design in the present work to give a more distinct, and, I flatter myself, a juster view, than has yet been exhibited, of the learning of an age, the most illustrious in history for great events and extraordinary revolutions, yet still more pre-eminent in speculation than it is renowned in action. A century before the reign of Alexander the Great, there sprang up and flourished in Greece a species of learning, or science, totally unlike to any thing before known in the world. This science was carried to its highest perfection by Aristotle: it decayed with the loss of his writings, and revived with their recovery. But the imperfect and corrupt state of those writings rendered them peculiarly liable to be misinterpreted by ignorance, and misrepresented by envy; his philosophy, therefore, has been less frequently inculcated or explained, than disguised, perverted, and calumniated. It has not, certainly, since his own time, received any material improvement. To the philosophical works of Cicero, though that illustrious Roman professes to follow other guides, the world at large is more indebted for a familiar notion of several of Aristotle's most important doctrines, than to the labours of all his com-

mentators[1] collectively. But how loose and feeble, and often how erroneous, is the Roman transcript, when compared with the energetic precision of the Greek original! Yet the works of Cicero are known universally to the whole literary world, while those of Aristotle (with the exception of a few short and popular treatises) are allowed to moulder away in the dust of our libraries, and condemned to a treatment little less ignominious than that which, as we shall have occasion to relate, befell them soon after their composition, when they were immured in a dungeon, and remained for near two centuries a prey to dampness and to worms. It is time once more to release them from their *second* unmerited captivity; to revive, and, if possible, to brighten the well-earned fame of an author, sometimes as preposterously admired, as at others unaccountably neglected; and whose fate with posterity is most sin-

[1] All these commentators lived many centuries after Aristotle. They are Greek, Arabic, and Latin. The first began in the age of the Antonines, in Alexander Aphrodisiensis at Rome, and Ammonius Sacchus in Alexandria; they continued to flourish through the whole succession of Roman emperors, under the once revered names of Aspasius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, the second Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Aristotle was ardently studied, or rather superstitiously adored, by the Saracens, during upwards of four centuries of their proud domination, till the taking of Bagdat by the Tartars in 1258. The names of the Arabian commentators, Alfarabius, Avicenna, and Averroes, long resounded even in the schools of Europe. But the Aristotelian philosophy, or rather logic, had early assumed a Latin dress in the translation of Boethius Severinus, the last illustrious consul of Rome, in the beginning of the sixth century. After a long interval of more than six hundred years, Latin translations and commentaries began to abound, through the industry of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the succeeding scholastics; and multiplied to such a pitch, that, towards the close of the sixteenth century, Patricius reckons twelve thousand commentators on different works of the Stagirite. (Discuss. Peripatet.) This vast and cold mass of Gothic and Saracenic dulness is now consigned to just oblivion. But even to the best of Aristotle's commentators there are two unanswerable objections: first, they universally confound his solid sense with the fanciful visions of Plato, thus endeavouring to reconcile things totally incongruous: secondly, they ascribe to their great master innumerable opinions which he did not hold, by making him continually dogmatize, where he only means to discuss. To the same objections those more modern writers are liable, who have drawn their knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy from any other than the original fountain.

gular in this, not that his authority should have been most respected in the ages least qualified to appreciate his merit, but that philosophers should have despised his name almost exactly in proportion as they adopted his opinions. The multiplied proofs of this assertion, which I shall have occasion to produce in examining his works, will not, it is presumed, appear uninteresting to men of letters. Those who know something of Aristotle, must naturally be desirous of knowing all that can be told; and of seeing, comprised within a narrow compass, the life and writings of a man, whose intellectual magnitude ought to have preserved and shown him in his proper shape to the impartial eye of history, but whose picture, beyond that of all other great characters, has been most miserably mangled.

Aristotle, who flourished in Athens when Athens was the ornament of Greece, and Greece, under Alexander, the first country on earth, was born at Stagira towards the beginning of the 99th Olympiad, eighty-five years after the birth of Socrates,[1] and three hundred and eighty-four before the birth of Christ. The city of Stagira[2] stood on the coast of Thrace, in a district called the Chalcidic region, and near to the innermost recess of the Strymonic Gulf.[3] It was originally built by the Andrians,[4] afterwards enlarged by a colony

[1] Socrates drank the hemlock, according to most authors, the first year of the 95th Olympiad; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, the first year of the 97th. Socrates therefore died at least eight years before Aristotle was born. The latter was one year older than Philip, and three years older than Demosthenes. Vid. Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammæum. This chronology is clearly ascertained by various critics. See Bayle's Dictionary, article "Aristotle." I know not therefore why Lord Monboddo and the late Mr. Harris (two modern writers who have paid great attention to Aristotle's works) should say, and frequently repeat, on no better authority than that of the Life of Aristotle ascribed to Ammonius, or Johannes Philoponus, that the Stagirite was three years a scholar of Socrates.

[2] Strabo Excerpt. ex lib. vii. p. 331. He calls the place Stageirus.

[3] Ptolemei Geograph. According to his division, Stagira was in the Amphaxetide district of Macedon.

[4] Herodot. l. vii. ch. 115; and Thucyd. l. iv. ch. c

from Eubœan Chalcis,[1] and long numbered among the Greek cities of Thrace, until the conquests of Philip of Macedon extended the name of his country far beyond the river Strymon, to the confines of Mount Rhodope.[2] Stagira, as well as the neighbouring Greek cities, enjoyed the precarious dignity of independent government; it was the ally of Athens in the Peloponnesian war, and, like other nominal allies, experienced the stern dominion of that tyrannical republic. It afterwards became subject to the city and commonwealth of Olynthus; which, having subdued Stagira and the whole region of Chalcidicé, was itself besieged by Philip of Macedon; and, with all its dependencies, reduced by the arms or arts of that politic prince, in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, and 348 years before the Christian era.[3] That the resistance of Stagira was obstinate, may be inferred from the severity of its punishment; the conqueror rased it to the ground.[4] Aristotle, who was then in his thirty-seventh year, had been removed from Stagira almost in his childhood; and he appears not, in that long interval, to have ever resided in it, and even rarely to have visited it.[5] But the misfortunes which fell on that city gave him an opportunity of showing such ardent affection for his birth-place, as is the indubitable proof of a feeling heart. Through his influence with Alexander the Great, Stagira was rebuilt;[6] both its useful defences and its ornamental edifices were restored; its wandering citizens were

[1] Justin. l. viii. c. 13.

[2] Thence the frivolous dispute among modern biographers, whether Aristotle, who was really a Greek, ought to be deemed a Macedonian or a Thracian. See Stanley and Brucker's Lives of Aristotle.

[3] Gillies' History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxv.

[4] Plutarch. adversus Colot. p. 1126; and de Exil. p. 605.

[5] Dionys. Halicarn. Epist. ad Ammæum. Ammonius and Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

[6] Plin. Nat. Hist. l. vii. c. 29; and Valer. Maxim. l. v. c. 6. Plutarch prefers to all the pleasures of the Epicurean, the delights which Aristotle must have felt when he rebuilt his native city, and placed in their hereditary seats his expatriated countrymen. Plutarch. advers. Epicur. p. 1097. He ascribes the rebuilding of Stagira to Aristotle's influence with Philip.

collected, and reinstated in their possessions; Aristotle himself regulated their government by wise laws; and the Stagirites instituted a festival to commemorate the generosity of Alexander, their admired sovereign, and the patriotism of Aristotle, their illustrious townsman.[1]

The city of Stagira indeed owes its celebrity wholly to Aristotle and his family; and, if its name is still familiar to modern ears, this proceeds merely from its having communicated to our philosopher the appellation of Stagirite.[2] His father, Nicomachus, who was the physician and friend[3] of Amyntas, king of Macedon, is said to have derived his descent, through a long line of medical ancestors, from Æsculapius, the companion of the Argonauts, whose skill in the healing art had raised him to a seat among the gods.[4] Nicomachus improved a branch of knowledge, which was the inheritance of his family, by writing six books on natural philosophy and medicine.[5] To the same illustrious origin which distinguished Nicomachus, the testimony of one ancient biographer[6] (but his only) traces up the blood of Phæstis, Aristotle's mother; who, whatever was her parentage, certainly acknowledged for her country[7] the middle district of Eubœa, which lies within twelve miles of the Attic coast. Aristotle was deprived of his parents in early youth;[8] yet it is an agreeable, and not altogether an unwarranted conjecture, that by his father, Nicomachus, he was inspired with that ardent love for the study of nature, which made him long be regarded as her best and

[1] Plutarch. advers. Colot. p. 1126; and Ammonius in Vit. Aristot.
[2] Strabo Excerp. ex lib. vii. p. 331.
[3] He was held by Amyntas, *εν φιλου χρεια*. Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.
[4] Lucian. Jupiter Tragædus; and Suidas in Nicomach. It is interesting to observe that Aristotle himself is fond of noticing physicians and their operations in his explanatory comparisons by way of illustration.
[5] Idem ibid. [6] Ammon. Vit. Aristot.
[7] Dionys. Halic. Epist. ad Ammæum.
[8] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. The biography of Aristotle in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography states that Aristotle lost his father in his seventeenth year, and that his mother seems to have died at an earlier period.

chosen interpreter;[1] while from his mother, Phæstis, he first imbibed that pure and sweet Atticism which every where pervades his writings.

Aristotle also inherited from his parents a large fortune; and their early loss was supplied and compensated by the kind attentions of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus in Mysia, who received the young Stagirite into his family, and skilfully directed his education. These important obligations our philosopher, in whose character gratitude appears to have been a prominent feature, amply repaid to Nicanor the son of Proxenus, whom he adopted, educated, and enriched.[3] At the age of seventeen,[4] the young Stagirite was attracted by the love of learning to Athens, and particularly by the desire of hearing Plato in the Academy, the best school of science as well as of morals then existing in the world; and where the most assiduous student might find competitors worthy of exciting his emulation and sharpening his diligence. Plato early observed of him, that he required the rein rather than the spur.[5] His industry in perusing and copying manuscripts was unexampled, and almost incredible; he was named, by way of excellence, "the student or reader."[6] Plato often called him the "soul of his school;"[7] and, when Aristotle happened to be absent from his prelections, often complained that he spoke to a *deaf audience*.[8] As the student advanced in years, his acuteness was as extraordinary in canvassing opinions, as his industry had been unrivalled in collecting them:[9] his capacious mind embraced the whole circle of science; and, notwithstanding his pertinacity in rejecting every principle or tenet which he could not on reflection approve,

[1] Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς φύσεως γραμματεὺς ἦν. Anonym. apud Suid. in Aristot. Literally, "Nature's secretary."
[2] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. [3] Idem ibid.
[4] Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum. Diogen. Laert. ibid.
[5] Idem ibid. [6] Diogen. Laert. ibid.
[7] Or rather, the mind or intellect, νοῦς τῆς διατριβῆς. Idem ibid.
[8] Philoponus de Eternit. Mund. advers. Proclum, vi. 27.
[9] Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

his very singular merit failed not to recommend him to the discerning admiration of Plato, with whom he continued to reside twenty years, even to his master's death; alike careless of the honours of a court, to which the rank and connexions of his family might have opened to him the road in Macedon; and indifferent to the glory of a name, which his great abilities might early have attained, by establishing a separate school, and founding a new sect in philosophy.[1]

At the same time that Aristotle applied so assiduously to the embellishment of his mind, he was not neglectful, we are told, of whatever might adorn his person. His figure was not advantageous; he was of a short stature, his eyes were remarkably small, his limbs were disproportionably slender, and he lisped or stammered in his speech.[2] For his ungracious person Aristotle is said to have been anxious to compensate by the finery and elegance of his dress; his mantle was splendid; he wore rings of great value; and he was foppish enough (such is the language of antiquity) to shave both his head and his face, while the other scholars of Plato kept their long hair and beards. To some learned men, the omission of such particulars might appear unpardonable; yet, in a life of Aristotle, such particulars are totally unworthy of being told; since his love for ostentatious finery (probably much exaggerated by his enemies) was in him merely an accessory, which neither altered his character, nor weakened that ardent passion for knowledge which reigned sole mistress of his soul. In men born for great intellectual achievements, this passion must, at some period of their lives, suppress and stifle every other; and, while it continues to do so, their real happiness is probably at its highest pitch. The pursuit of science indeed, not having any natural limitations, might be supposed to invigorate with manhood, to confirm itself through custom,

[1] οὔτε σχολὴν ἡγούμενος, οὔτε ἰδίαν πεποιηκῶς αἵρεσιν. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.

[2] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.—Plutarch, de Discrim. Adulat. et Amic. p. 53, says, "that many imitated Aristotle's stuttering, as they did Alexander's wry neck."

and to operate through life with unceasing or increasing energy. But this delightful progress is liable to be interrupted by other causes than the decline of health and the decay of curiosity; for great exertions are not more certainly rewarded by celebrity, than celebrity is punished with envy, which will sometimes rankle in secret malice, and sometimes vent itself in open reproach; wrongs will provoke resentment; injuries will be offered and retorted; and, a state of hostility being thus commenced, the philosopher, in defending his opinions and his fame, becomes a prey to the wretched anxieties incident to the vulgar scrambles of sordid interest and senseless ambition. Of this melancholy remark, both the life and the death of Aristotle, as we shall see hereafter, will afford very forcible illustrations.

Plato died in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, and 338 years before the Christian era. He was succeeded in the Academy by Speusippus, the son of his sister Potona; a man far inferior to the Stagirite in abilities; and however well he might be acquainted with the theory, not strongly confirmed in the practice, of moral virtue, since he was too often and too easily vanquished both by anger and pleasure.[1] Aristotle appears not to have taken offence that, in the succession to his admired master, the strong claim of merit should have been sacrificed to the partialities of blood. In some of the latest of his writings, he speaks of Plato with a degree of respect approaching to reverence. Soon after that philosopher's decease, Aristotle wrote verses in his praise, and erected altars to his honour:[2] and the connexions which he himself had already formed with some of the most illustrious as well as the most extraordinary personages of his own or any age, might naturally inspire him with the design of leaving Athens, after he had lost the philosopher and friend whose fame had first drawn him thither, and whose instructive society had so long retained him in that celebrated city.

One of the memorable characters with whom Aristotle

[1] Diogen. Laert. in Speusipp. [2] Idem; and Ammonius in Aris

maintained a close and uninterrupted correspondence, was Hermeias, styled, in the language of those days, tyrant of Assus and Atarneus; a man whose life forcibly illustrates the strange vicissitudes of fortune. Hermeias is called a slave and eunuch;[1] but he was a slave whose spirit was not to be broken, and a eunuch whose mind was not to be emasculated. Through the bounty of a wealthy patron, he had been enabled early to gratify his natural taste for philosophy; and, having become a fellow-student with Aristotle at Athens, soon united with him in the bands of affectionate esteem, which finally cemented into firm and unalterable friendship. Aristotle through life pursued the calm and secure paths of science, but Hermeias ventured to climb the dangerous heights of ambition. His enterprising spirit, seconded by good fortune, raised him to the sovereignty of Assus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Mysia, the former situate in the district of Troas, the latter in that of Æolis, and both of them, like most Grecian colonies on the Asiatic coast, but loosely dependent on the Persian empire. Hermeias availed himself of the weakness or distance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the resources with which his own ambition was supplied by a wealthy banker, to gain possession of those strong-holds, with all their dependencies; and endeavoured to justify this bold usurpation of the sceptre, by the manly firmness with which he held it.[2] Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Aristotle, almost immediately after Plato's death, revisited Atarneus,[3] the same city in which he had spent the happy years of his youth under the kind protection of Proxenus; and might we indulge the conjecture that this worthy Atarnean still lived, our philosopher's voyage to Æolis must have been strongly recommended by his desire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a second father, and of thus

[1] Εὐνοῦχος ὢν καὶ δοῦλος ἦρχεν Ἑρμείας. His master's name was Eubulus, a prince and philosopher of Bithynia. Suidas.

[2] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 122. [3] Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.

propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian.

Aristotle found at Atarneus the wish of Plato realized; he beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philosophy seated on a throne. In that city he resided near three years, enjoying the inexpressible happiness of seeing his enlightened political maxims illustrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-student and sovereign. But, to render his condition enviable, an essential requisite was wanting, namely, that of security. Artaxerxes, whose success against the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his most sanguine hopes, could no longer brook the dismemberment of the fair coast of Mysia, through the usurpation of a slave and a eunuch. Mentor,[1] a Greek, and kinsman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general so famous in the Persian annals, had signalized his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of those crafty and unprincipled Greeks, whom the ambitious hopes of raising a splendid fortune often drew to a standard naturally hostile to their country; and his recent merit with Artaxerxes recommended him as the fittest instrument to be employed in chastising the Mysian usurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commissioned to destroy had formerly been numbered among his friends.[2] Mentor marched with a powerful army to the western coast. He might have effected his purpose by open force; but to accomplish it by stratagem, was both more easy in itself, and more suitable to his character. He had been connected with Hermeias by the sacred ties of hospi-

[1] Aristotle himself brands with infamy this successful knave, by contrasting his profligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸς μὲν καὶ ὁ φαῦλος λέγεται, etc. "A scoundrel may be clever; for example, Mentor, who seemed to be very clever, but surely was not prudent; for it belongs to prudence to desire and prefer only the best ends, and to carry such only into execution; but cleverness implies barely that fertility in resource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purposes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and speedily accomplished." Magn. Moral. l. i. c. 25, p. 171.

[2] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 122.

tality; the sanctity of this connexion was revered by the greatest profligates of antiquity; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his master's commands. He employed his former intimacy with Hermeias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an interview: Mentor seized his person, and sent him privately to Upper Asia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor.[1] The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this tragedy. Having possessed himself of the ring which the unfortunate Hermeias usually employed as his signet, he sealed with it his own despatches, and immediately sent them to the cities that acknowledged the sovereignty of a man, whose mild exercise of power tended, in the minds of his subjects, to justify the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In these despatches Mentor signified that, through his own intercession, Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magistrates of the revolted cities easily gave credit to intelligence most agreeable to their wishes; they opened their gates without suspicion to Mentor's soldiers, who instantly made themselves masters both of those Mysian strong-holds, which might have made a long and vigorous resistance to the Persian arms, and of the powerful garrisons by which they were defended.[2] One further deception crowned the successful perfidy of Mentor. He affected to treat the conquered places with unexampled moderation. He was particularly careful to keep in their offices the same collectors of revenues and intendants who had been employed by Hermeias. Those officers, when they were first apprized of the danger which threatened their master, concealed their treasures under ground, or deposited them with their friends; but when they found themselves treated with so much unexpected generosity by the invader, they resumed their wonted

[1] Diodor. ubi supra. Helladius apud Phot. Bibliath. p. 966. Polyæn. Stratag. vi. 48.

[2] Diodor. ubi supra

confidence, and conveyed back into their own coffers their long accumulated wealth; of which circumstance Mentor was no sooner informed by his emissaries, than he seized both the effects and the persons of those too credulous collectors.[1]

The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had assumed in his first transactions at Atarneus, enabled Aristotle to avoid the punishment which too naturally fell on the ambition of his friend. By a seasonable flight he escaped to Mitylene in the isle of Lesbos, in company with Pythias, the kinswoman and adopted heiress of the king of Assus and Atarneus, but now miserably fallen from the lofty expectations in which her youth had been educated. But this sad reverse of fortune only endeared her the more to Aristotle, who married the fair companion of his flight in his thirty-seventh year;[2] which is precisely that age pointed out by himself as the fittest, on the male side, for entering into wedlock.[3] Pythias died shortly afterwards, leaving an infant daughter, whom Aristotle named after a wife tenderly beloved, and who repaid his affection with the most tender sensibility. It was her last request that, when Aristotle should die, her own bones might be disinterred, and carefully enclosed within the monument of her admired husband.[4]

The Stagirite passed but a short time in the soft island of Lesbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melancholy. During his residence in Athens, he had strengthened his hereditary friendship with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himself, who, having lived from the age of fifteen to that of two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbouring cities, ascended the throne of his ancestors in the twenty-third year of his age. The busy scenes of war and negotiation in which Philip was immediately after his

[1] We learn this particular, which is necessary to explain what follows in the text, from Aristotle himself, in his curious treatise De Cura Rei familiaris, p. 508.

[2] Comp. Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum; et Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

[3] Politic. l. vii. c. 16.

[4] Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

accession engaged by necessity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, seem never to have interrupted his correspondence with the friends of his youth; with those who either possessed his affection, or who merited his admiration.[1] In the fifth year of his reign his son Alexander was born; an event which he notified to Aristotle in terms implying much previous communication between them: "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but especially for bestowing it at the time when Aristotle lives; assuring ourselves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and worthy of inheriting our kingdom."[2] If this letter was written at the æra of Alexander's birth, it must have found Aristotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, still a diligent student in the school of Plato. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not assume the office of preceptor to the son of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening character of this young prince seemed as greatly to merit, as peculiarly to require, the assistance of so able an instructor.[3] In the second year of the 109th Olympiad, Aristotle, probably in consequence of a new invitation from Philip, sailed from the isle of Lesbos, in which he had resided near two years, escaped the dangers of the Athenian fleet, which then carried on war against Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella,[4] to undertake one of the few employments not unworthy of an author qualified to instruct and benefit the latest ages of the world.

In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite spent near

[1] Gillies' History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

[2] Aulus Gellius, l. ix. c. 3.

[3] The chronology is clearly ascertained by Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammæus; yet the accurate Quintilian, because it served to enforce his argument, says, "An Philippus, Macedonum rex," etc. "Would Philip, king of the Macedonians, have thought fit that Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of the age, should have been employed in teaching his son Alexander the first rudiments of learning, or would Aristotle himself have accepted of such an office, had he not believed it of the utmost importance to the success of our future studies, that their first foundation should be laid by a teacher of consummate skill?" Quintil. Instit. l. i. c. 1.

[4] Dionys. Halicarn. ubi supra.

eight years;[1] during which long period, in an office of much delicacy, he enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the highest satisfaction to his employers, while he excited the warmest gratitude in his pupil.[2] The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affection, loved and esteemed many; but Aristotle is the only one of his friends whose superior genius he appears unceasingly to have viewed with undiminished admiration, and whom he seems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable respect. By Philip and his proud queen Olympias, our philosopher was honoured with every mark of distinction which greatness can bestow on illustrious merit. Philip placed his statue near to his own: he was admitted to the councils of his sovereign, where his advice was often useful, always honourable; and where his kind intercession benefited many individuals, and many communities.[3] On one occasion the Athenians rewarded his good services, by erecting his statue in the citadel:[4] and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, attested his unremitting exertions in the cause of his friends and of the public, as well as his manly freedom in admonishing kings of their duty.[5] But the ruling passions of Philip and Alexander, the interested policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too strong and too ungovernable to be restrained by the power of reason, speaking through the voice of their admired philosopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root; and the peculiarities of his character had displayed

[1] The author of the very able Life of Aristotle in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, already quoted, says that "Aristotle spent seven years in Macedonia, but Alexander enjoyed his instruction without interruption for only four years." But the two statements are easily reconcilable; for he states below that even after the beginning of Alexander's regency, Aristotle continued to be the young prince's instructor, but that he probably "confined his instruction to advice and suggestion; which may possibly have been carried on by means of epistolary correspondence."

[2] Plutarch. in Alexand. tom. i. p. 668; and advers. Colot. tom. ii. p. 126.

[3] Ammonius, Vit. Aristot. [4] Pausanias Eliac.

[5] Ammonius, ibid. See also the fragments still remaining in Du Valle's edition, p. 1102, et seq.

themselves, in a very public and very important transaction, which happened several months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's Illyrian expedition, Macedon was honoured with an embassy from the great king. In the absence of his father, Alexander, at that time scarcely fourteen years old, received the ambassadors; and his conversation with those illustrious strangers, at a period in history when the public conferences of great personages consisted not merely in words of ceremony, afforded a just subject of praise and wonder. Instead of admiring their external appearance, or asking them such superficial questions as corresponded with the unripeness of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Persian government; the character of Ochus, who then reigned; the strength and composition of his armies; the distance of his place of residence from the western coast; the state of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Susa and Babylon.[1] To his premature love of aggrandizement, Alexander already added singular dexterity and unexampled boldness in his exercises, particularly in horsemanship; the most fervid affections, invincible courage, and unbending dignity.[2]

In training such a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cultivate; but he could only hope to give a new direction to passions, which it was too late to moderate or control. In his treatise on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of education best adapted to persons of the highest rank in society; and in performing the task assigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be skilfully modified, by adjusting it to the peculiar circumstances and extraordinary character of his pupil. Alexander's loftiness could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the side of virtue: if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the effect of insult, and the mark of inferiority.[3] His love for military glory

[1] Plutarch. in Alexand. [2] Idem ibid.
[3] Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the passion of the great, could neither be restrained nor moderated; but, to rival this tyrant of the breast, still more exalted affections were inspired, which rendered Alexander as much superior to conquerors as conquerors deem themselves superior to the lowest of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Aristotle's Politics which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty constitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and strengthening the bodily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one mainspring of mental energy. During this interesting period of youth, with the proper management of which the future happiness of the whole of life is so intimately connected, Aristotle observes that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too strenuously exercised, since powerful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor the habits of making them be simultaneously acquired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exercises, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency; after which, the whole bent of his mind was directed to the most profound principles of science.

It is the opinion of many, that a slight tincture of learning is sufficient for accomplishing a prince. Both Philip and Aristotle thought otherwise; and the ardent curiosity of Alexander himself was not to be satisfied with such superficial and meagre instructions as have been sometimes triumphantly published for the use of persons destined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be sharpened by whatever was most nice in distinction, and to be exalted by whatever was most lofty in speculation;[1] that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidst objects of the highest intellection, might thereby be rendered capable of comprehending ordinary matters the more readily and the more

[1] Plutarch. in Alexand.

perfectly.[1] This recondite philosophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, first to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of *acroatic;*[2] to distinguish those parts of his lectures which were confined to a select audience, from other parts called exoteric, because delivered to the public at large. It has been supposed that, in those two kinds of lectures, the Stagirite maintained contradictory doctrines on the subjects of religion and morality. But the fact is far otherwise: his practical tenets were uniformly the same in both; but his exoteric or popular treatises nearly resembled the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be explained in the following chapter) contained, in a concise, energetic style peculiar to himself, those deep and broad principles on which all solid science is built, and, independently of which, the most operose reasonings, and the most intricate combinations, are but matters of coarse mechanical practice.[3] The sublimity of this abstract and recondite philosophy admirably

[1] Aristot. de Animâ, l. iii. c. 5, 6, and Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7 and 8.

[2] This division of Aristotle's works into *acroatic* and *exoteric*, has given rise to a variety of opinions and disputes; which all have their source in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, on one hand; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Ammonius, on the other. The former writers (Plutarch. in Alexand.; and Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 4,) maintain that the acroatic, or, as they call them, the acroamatic works, differed from the exoteric in the nature of their subjects, which consisted in natural philosophy and logic; whereas the subjects of the exoteric were rhetoric, ethics, and politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely coincide) are refuted by Aristotle's references, as we shall see hereafter, from his *Ethical* to his exoteric works. The latter class of writers (Strabo l. xiii. p. 608; Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 19; and Ammonius Herm. ad Categor. Aristot.) maintain, that the acroatic works were distinguished from the exoteric, not by the difference of the subjects, but by the different manner of treating them; the former being discourses, the latter dialogues.

[3] Simplicius and Philoponus allow other writings besides the dialogues to have been exoteric, as historical disquisitions, and whatever else did not require for understanding them intense thought in the reader. Simplicius says that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroatic writings: "ut segniores ab eorum studio repellerit et dehortaretur." Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic. fol. ii. This would have have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite: but the truth is, that the obscurity of Aristotle's works proceeds from a corrupt text. When the text is pure, his writings

accorded with the loftiness of Alexander's mind; and how highly he continued to prize it, amidst the tumultuary occupations of war and government, appears from the following letter, written soon after the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in pursuit of Darius: "Alexander, wishing all happiness to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your acroatic works. Wherein shall we be distinguished above others, if the learning, in which we were instructed, be communicated to the public. I would rather surpass other men in knowledge than in power. Farewell."[1] Aristotle, not considering this letter as merely complimental, answered it as follows: "You wrote to me concerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been published. Know that in one sense this still is the case, since they can be fully understood by those only who have heard my lectures."[2] Of those much valued writings, the theological part, if at all published, was probably most involved in a sublime obscurity. To have maintained, in plain and popular language, the unity and perfections of the Deity, must have excited against the Stagirite an earlier religious persecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology Alexander was carefully instructed; as his preceptor reminded him in the midst of his unexampled victories and unbounded conquests, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition; that "those who entertain just notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than those who subdue kingdoms."[3]

Aristotle's love of philosophy did not, like that of Plato, set him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, particularly Homer; and he prepared for his pupil a correct copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a casket, whence this transcript

are as easily intelligible, as a mere syllabus of lectures on most abstruse subjects can well be rendered.

[1] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.

[2] Idem ibid. If these letters be ascribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Aristotle regarded his acroatic works; he considered them merely as text-books.

[3] Plutarch. de Tranquillitate Animi, p. 474.

was called "the Iliad of the Casket."[1] The Stagirite was not only the best critic in poetry, but himself a poet of the first eminence. Few of his verses indeed have reached modern times; but the few which remain prove him worthy of sounding the lyre of Pindar;[2] and it is not the least singularity attending this extraordinary man, that with the nicest and most suitable powers of discrimination and analysis, he united a vigorous and rich vein of poetic fancy.

Aristotle carefully instructed his pupil in ethics and politics. He wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatise on government; and exhorted him to adjust the measure of his authority to the various character of his subjects; agreeably to a doctrine which he frequently maintains in his political works, that different nations require different modes of government, respectively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of thinking.[3] From the ethical writings of Aristotle which still remain, and which are the most practically useful of any that pagan antiquity can boast, it is easy to detect that wicked calumny of his enemies, "that, for sordid and selfish purposes, he accommodated the tenets of his philosophy to the base morals of courts."[4] It may be safely affirmed, that if Alexander is distinguished above other princes for the love of knowledge[5] and virtue, he was chiefly indebted for this advantage to his preceptor: the seeds of his haughtiness and ambition were sown before Aristotle was called to direct his

[1] Plutarch. in Alexand. vol. i. p. 688.

[2] Menag. Observat. in Diogen. Laert. l. v. p. 189.

[3] Plutarch. in Alexand.

[4] This absurdity is brought forward and insisted on by Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more unintelligible than Brucker's account of Aristotle's philosophy. I have heard it said in his own country, that this laborious German did not understand Greek.

[5] See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 668. Alexander spared the house of Pindar, when he sacked Thebes; and the town of Eressus in Lesbos, in his war with the Persians, because it was the birth-place of Theophrastus and Phanias, Aristotle's disciples. In the midst of his expedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets, with the dithyrambics of Telestus and Philoxenus, and the history of Philistus.

education; his excellencies therefore may be ascribed to our philosopher;[1] his imperfections to himself, to Philip, above all to the intoxicating effects of unbounded prosperity. This is the language of antiquity, and even of those writers who are the least partial to the fame of the Stagirite.

After the most intimate communication during the space of eight years,[2] the pupil and the preceptor separated for ever, to pursue, in a career of almost equal length, the most opposite paths to the same immortal renown; the one by arms, the other by philosophy; the one by gratifying the most immoderate lust of power, the other by teaching to despise this and all similar gratifications. During his eastern triumphs, terminated in the course of ten years by his premature death, Alexander (as we shall have occasion to relate) gave many illustrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous director of his youth. One incident, and one only, seems to have occasioned some disgust between them. At leaving the court of Pella, Aristotle recommended, as worthy of accompanying Alexander in his Persian expedition, his own kinsman Callisthenes, an Olynthian; a learned and certainly an honest man, but of a morose, unaccommodating temper, pertinaciously attached to the old system of republicanism, which the father of Alexander had overturned in Greece; equally daring and inflexible in his purposes, and unseasonably bold in his speech.[3] Aristotle himself perceived and lamented his faults, and admonished him in a line of Homer, "that his unbridled tongue might occasion his early death."[4] The prophecy was fulfilled. Callisthenes, not reflecting that "he who has once condescended" (in the words of Arrian) "to be the attendant of a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageously opposed Alexander's resolution of

[1] Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ δέοντα συμβουλεύων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμος ἦν. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

[2] Dionys. Halicarn., and Diogen. Laert. ubi supra. See also note above, p. xiv. [3] Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. iv. c. 8.

[4] Ὠκύμορος δή μοι τέκος ἔσσεαι οἳ ἀγορεύεις. Il. xviii. 95.

exacting the same marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheerfully paid to him by the Persians.[1] The manner of Callisthenes's punishment and death is related more variously[2] than almost any historical event of such public notoriety; but most writers concur in opinion, that he met with the just reward of his rashness and arrogance. This transaction, it is asserted, much estranged Alexander from his ancient preceptor. The assertion however is not accompanied with any solid proof;[3] and the absurd calumny, that Aristotle not only regarded this pretended displeasure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickedness of joining in a conspiracy against Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in history, but a hearsay preserved in Plutarch,[4] and the affected credit given to the monstrous report by the monster Caracalla, for the unworthy purpose of justifying his own violence in destroying the schools of the Aristotelian philosophers in Alexandria, the burning their books, and depriving them of all those privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyptian successors.[5]

Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Aristotle returned to his beloved Athens; where he spent thirteen[6] years, almost the whole remainder of his life, instructing his disciples, and improving the various branches of his philosophy. His *acroatic* lectures were given in the morning to those who were his regular pupils.[7] A considerable part of

[1] Arrian. ubi supra.

[2] By Arrian, Curtius, Justin, Diogenes Laertius, Philostratus, and Suidas.

[3] Alexander's resentment is inferred from a vague and hasty expression in a letter to Antipater; "Τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς ἐκπέμποντας αὐτόν—I will punish the sophist (meaning Callisthenes) and those who sent him." Plutarch. in Alexand. p. 696. Alexander, it is true, sent presents to Xenocrates; but so did Antipater, who always remained Aristotle's sincere and confidential friend.

[4] "Those who say that Aristotle advised Antipater to destroy Alexander by poison, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemis, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707.

[5] Dion. in Caracall. [6] Dionys. Epist. ad Ammæum.

[7] Aulus Gellius, xx. c. 5

them is still preserved in his works, which form an abstract or syllabus of treatises on the most important branches of philosophy. His *exoteric* discourses were held after supper with occasional visitors, and formed the amusement of his evening walks;[1] for he thought "exercise peculiarly useful after table for animating and invigorating the natural heat and strength, which the too rapid succession of sleep to food seem fitted to relax and encumber.[2] Before his arrival at Athens, Speusippus was dead; and Xenocrates, whose dull gravity and rigid austerity a man of Aristotle's character could not much admire, had taken possession of the Academy.[3] The Stagirite, therefore, settled in a *gymnasium* in the suburbs, well shaded with trees, near to which the soldiers used to exercise, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whose *peripaton*, or walk, Aristotle and his followers were called Peripatetics.[4] It is reported that he opened his school, observing, "That it would be shameful for himself to be silent while Xenocrates publicly taught."[5] Aristotle is not likely to have uttered such a presumptuous boast; but if it was really made, even this arrogant speech was certainly very fully justified by the fame which the Lyceum speedily acquired, which the Stagirite himself maintained unimpaired through life, and which was ably supported by his disciple and successor Theophrastus.

Such is the genuine history of Aristotle's life, in the most important passages of which all the ancient writers,[6] who

[1] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.

[2] Plutarch. Conjug. Precept. p. 133. [3] Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat.

[4] Menagius ad Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 2.

[5] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysius Halicarn. read "Isocrates" instead of "Xenocrates." The reading in the text is the more probable, for Isocrates and Aristotle, following very different pursuits, were not naturally rivals; besides, the former is said to have died soon after the battle of Chæronæa in extreme old age, and Aristotle did not return to Athens till three years after that decisive engagement. Compare my Life of Isocrates, and the History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33

[6] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonius: the ancient Latin translation of this last, first published by Nunnesius,

have expressly treated his biography, unitedly concur. By arranging the subject, therefore, according to our present method, both my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time will be saved; for the calumnies against Aristotle will be no sooner mentioned than they will refute themselves, and they could not pass unnoticed, because they are perpetuated in the sarcasms of Lucian,[1] and the lying whispers of Athenæus,[2] which have been too often mistaken, even by the learned, for true history.

The absurd reports that Aristotle first served in the army, that he there dissipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then followed for bread the trade of an apothecary,[3] may be confidently rejected by those who know, on unquestionable authority, that he became, at the early age of seventeen, a diligent student in the Academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has seen the testimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not easily be persuaded that he could treat this revered master with the grossest brutality;[4] and let him who reads and meditates on the Ethics to Nicomachus ask his own heart, as well as understanding, whether it is likely that the author of such a treatise should, instead of restraining and correcting, have flattered[5] and fomented the vices of Alexander. Instead of further examining these wild fictions, which stand in direct contradiction

(Helmestadij, 1767,) contains some additional circumstances, but those of little value, and of doubtful authority.

[1] Lucian treats both Aristotle and his pupil with equal injustice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. et Alexand. et Alexand. et Philip.

[2] Athenæus Deipnos. l. viii. p. 354.

[3] Athenæus ubi supra, and Aristocles apud Eusebium. Their report rests on a supposititious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the assertion of Timæus of Tauromenon in Sicily; an author nicknamed Epitimæus, the Detractor. Diodorus Siculus, l. v. c. 1. Athenæus, l. vi. p. 272.

[4] Ἀριστοτέλης ἡμᾶς ἀπελάκτισε—"Aristotle has kicked at us;" a strong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. l. v. sect. 2. Ælian, Var. Histor. l. iii. c. 19, ascribes both to Plato and to Aristotle a behaviour totally inconsistent with every thing that we know of their characters. Comp. Ælian, Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 19. Photius, Biblioth. c. 279. Augustin. de Civitate Dei, l. viii. c. 12. Such contradictory reports mutually destroy each other.

[5] Lucian. Dial. Diogen. et Alexand.

to the matters of fact above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence such improbable tales could have originated; especially as this inquiry will bring us to the events which immediately preceded our philosopher's death.

From innumerable passages in the moral and political works of which we have presumed to offer the translation to the public, it will appear that Aristotle regarded with equal contempt vain pretenders to real science, and real professors of sciences which he deemed vain and frivolous. His theological opinions, also, were far too refined for the grossness of paganism. He fought only for truth, and was careless of the obstacles which stood in his way to attaining it, whether they were found in the errors of philosophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man, in such a city as Athens, where, since the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and conversed freely with all descriptions of persons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophists and sciolists, soothsayers and satirists, and that worst of banes satirical historians,[1] heaped obloquy on a character, the ornament of his own age, and destined to be the great instructor of posterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly respected, even in the turbulent democracy of Athens; and it was not till the year following the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous malignity, which had been long suppressed, burst forth against Aristotle with irresistible violence. He was accused of irreligion (ἀσεβείας) before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus, a man of weight in the republic; and both of them were instigated to this cruel prosecution by our philosopher's declared enemies.[2] The

[1] Aristocles (apud Eusebium) says, that Aristotle was attacked by a host of writers, "whose books and memories have perished more completely than their bodies." Even his fellow-student, Aristoxenus, who had treated him most respectfully while he lived, heaped the most illiberal reproaches on his memory, because he preferred to himself Theophrastus for his successor. Suidas in Aristoxen. and Aristocles apud Eusebium.

[2] Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect.

heads of the accusation were, "that Aristotle had commemorated the virtues both of his wife Pythias and of his friend Hermeias, with such ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens justly reserved for the majesty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a statue at Delphi; he also wrote an ode in his praise. Both the inscription and the ode have come down to modern times; the former simply relating "the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias;" and the latter "extolling virtue above all earthly possessions; and especially that generous patriotism, for the sake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquished the light of the sun; whose fame therefore would never be forgotten by the Muses, daughters of memory; and as often as it was sung would redound to the glory of *Hospitable Jove*, and the honour of firm friendship." [1] From the frivolousness of the accusation respecting Hermeias, which was considered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjecture that the reproach of worshipping Pythias with honours due to Eleusinian Ceres, was altogether groundless: but in a philosopher, whose intellectual rather than his moral virtues have been the object of panegyric, we may remark with pleasure both the strength of his friendship, and the sincere tenderness of his love, since both affections must have been expressed with an amiable enthusiasm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry.

It must not be dissembled that the accusation, and consequent condemnation, of Aristotle by the Areopagus, has been ascribed to a different cause from that above assigned, and referred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is said by those who have carelessly examined his works, to have denied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inefficacy of prayers and sacrifices: doctrines, it is observed, which

[1] Laertius in Aristot. Athenæus, xv. p. 697.

2431

could not but enrage the priesthood, as totally subversive of its functions, establishments, and revenues.[1] But never was any accusation urged more falsely or more ignorantly. Aristotle, as it will be shown hereafter, enumerates the priesthood among the functions or offices essentially requisite to the existence of every community. In writing to Alexander he says, that those are not entitled to be high-minded who conquer kingdoms, but rather those who have learned to form just notions of the gods ;[2] and in his life, as well as in his works, he uniformly showed his veneration for religion in general, by treating with great tenderness,[3] even that distorted image of it reflected from the puerile superstitions of his country.[4]

He is said to have written his own defence,[5] and to have inveighed, in a strong metaphor, against the increasing degeneracy of the Athenians.[6] His discourse, of which the boldness would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court : since he escaped his trial by seasonably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Eubœa, saying, in allusion to the death of Socrates, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity of sinning against philosophy.[7] He survived his retreat to the shores of the Euripus scarcely a twelvemonth ; persecution and banishment having probably shortened his days.[8]

[1] Origines contra Celsum et Brukeri, Histor. Critic. vol. i. p. 790.

[2] Plutarch. in Alexand.

[3] This tenderness, however, did not, probably, satisfy the Athenian priests ; who, as it will appear from the following analysis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretended irreligion.

[4] Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 16. But the best proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Aristotle's works.

[5] His defence, (*ἀπολογία ἀσεβείας*,) according to the biographical notice in the Dictionary above quoted, is still in existence. But its authenticity was doubted even by the ancients. Athen. xv. 16, p. 696.

[6] Laert. l. v. sect. 16. *Ὀχνη ἐπ' ὀχνῃ γηράσκει.* Homer's description of the gardens of Alcinous. "The fig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian sycophants, (*συκοφάνται*,) so called originally from informing against the exporters of figs. [7] Ælian, iii. 36.

[8] Justin (in Admon. ad Gentes) and St. Gregory Nazianzen (contra Julian.) say that he died through the uneasiness of discontent at not being

His testament, preserved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumstances related concerning his life, and practically illustrates the liberal maxims of his philosophy. Antipater, the confidential minister of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demise, is appointed the executor of this testament, with an authority paramount, as it should seem, to that of the other persons who are afterwards conjoined with him in the same trust. To his wife Herpyllis, (for he had married a second time,) Aristotle, besides other property in money and slaves, leaves the choice of two houses, the one in Chalcis, the other his paternal mansion at Stagira; and desires, that whichever of them she might prefer, should be properly furnished for her reception. He commends her domestic virtues; and requests his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would distinguish her by the kindest attention; and should she again think of a husband, that they would be careful to provide for her a suitable marriage. To Nicomachus, his son by this Herpyllis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his first wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite scholar Theophrastus.[1] He desires that his daughter, when she attained a marriageable age, should be given to Nicanor, the son of his ancient benefactor Proxenus; and failing Nicanor, that his esteemed disciple Theophrastus should accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his first wife, Pythias, he ordered to be disinterred, and again buried with his own, as she herself had requested. None of his slaves are to be sold; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to

able to explain the cause of the tides of the Euripus; upon which authority the puerile story is ingrafted of his throwing himself into that arm of the sea, saying, "You shall contain me, since I cannot comprehend you." Others say that he ended his life by poison to escape the vengeance of the Athenians. (Rapin's Comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote.) Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of observing the extreme improbability that Aristotle should have been guilty of suicide, since he always speaks of it as of shameful and cowardly crime.

[1] Strabo, xiii. 413.

be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they seem worthy of liberty; an injunction conformable to the maxims inculcated in his Politics, that slaves of all descriptions ought to be set free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a testimony of external deference at least for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the safety of Nicanor, should be presented at Stagira to Jupiter and Minerva, the saviours.

Thus lived, and thus died, in his 63rd year, Aristotle the Stagirite. His enlightened humanity was often seasoned by pleasantry. Many strokes of genuine humour, little suspected by his commentators, will be found in his political writings. His smart sayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by those who were incapable of appreciating his weightier merits. Some of these sayings, though apparently not the most memorable, are preserved in Diogenes Laertius; of which the following may serve for a specimen. Being asked, What, of all things, soonest grows old?—Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from study?—That of doing through choice what others do through fear. What is friendship?—One soul in two bodies. Why do we never tire of the company of the beautiful?—The question of a blind man! Such apophthegms would be unworthy of mention, had they not, by their perpetual recurrence in our philosopher's conversation, shown a mind free and unencumbered amidst the abstrusest studies; and, together with the most intense thought, a readiness of wit, which never failed to repel sneerers, and to abash arrogance.[1] He exhibited a character as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philosopher; inhabiting courts, without meanness and without selfishness; living in schools, without pride and without austerity;[2] cultivating with ardent affection every domestic and every social virtue, while with indefatigable industry he reared that wonderful

[1] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. et Diogen.
[2] Plutarch. de Virtut. Moral. p. 448.

edifice of science, the plan of which we are still enabled to delineate from his imperfect and mutilated writings.

The extraordinary and unmerited fate of these writings, while it excites the curiosity, must provoke the indignation of every friend to science. Few of them were published in his life-time; the greater part nearly perished through neglect; and the remainder has been so grossly misapplied, that doubts have arisen whether its preservation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Aristotle's manuscripts and library were bequeathed to Theophrastus, the most illustrious of his pupils. Theophrastus again bequeathed them to his own scholar Neleus, who, carrying them to Scepsis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undistinguished mass of his property. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and careless of books,[1] totally neglected the intellectual treasure that had most unworthily devolved to them, until they heard that the king of Pergamus, under whose dominion they lived, was employing much attention and much research in collecting a large library.[2] With the caution incident to the subjects of a despot, who often have recourse to concealment in order to avoid robbery, they hid their books under ground; and the writings of Aristotle, as well as the vast collection of materials from which they had been composed, thus remained in a subterranean mansion for many generations, a prey to dampness and to worms.[3] At length they were released from

[1] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 and 609. Bayle gives too strong a meaning to ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, when he calls them "gens idiots:" ἰδιωτης means one who confines his attention to the private affairs of life, in opposition to philosophers and statesmen. (See Pol. ii. sub fin.)

[2] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608.

[3] Athenæus, l. i. p. 3, says, that Neleus sold Aristotle's books to Ptolemy Philadelphus; and Bayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Patricius (Discuss. Peripatet. t. i. p. 29) to reconcile this account with that of Strabo, by supposing that Neleus indeed sold Aristotle's library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken the precaution of having the whole carefully copied. According to those writers, the books thus copied, and not the originals, suffered the unworthy treatment mentioned in the text. This supposition seems highly improbable; for, not to mention the difficulty of copying, in a short time, many thousand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in possession o

their prison, or rather raised from the grave, and sold for a large sum, together with the works of Theophrastus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a scholar;[1] through whose labour and expense the work of restoring Aristotle's manuscripts, though performed in the same city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfectly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writings themselves, did not a little contribute. The most considerable part of his acroatic works, which are almost the whole of those now remaining, consist of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his discourses; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from transcribers, and highly unsusceptible of conjectural emendation.

What became of Aristotle's original manuscript we are not informed; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with his whole library, seized by Sylla, the Roman conqueror of Athens, and by him transmitted to Rome.[2] Aristotle's works excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amysus in Pontus, who had been taken prisoner by Lucullus in the Mithridatic war, and insolently manumitted,[3] as Plutarch says, by Muræna, Lucullus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the

the genuine works of Aristotle, would have purchased at a high price those counterfeits, which had no other connexion with that philosopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. (Ammonius ad Categor. sub init.) Had a correct copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alexandria under the first Ptolemies, his genuine philosophy would have struck deeper root, and made further progress than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. Vossius (de Sect. Philosoph. c. xvi. p. 89) endeavours to prove that Athenæus's words (which are certainly incorrect) imply that Neleus retained Aristotle's works when he sold all the rest.

[1] Strabo says, "rather than a philosopher."

[2] Plutarch. in Sylla.

[3] Plutarch speaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who feels himself superior to the prejudices of his times: "That to give liberty by manumission to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he naturally and essentially possessed." Plutarch. in Lucull. p. 504.

manuscript by paying court to Sylla's librarian; and communicated the use of it to Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished as a philosopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pompey; and who, having undertaken the task of arranging and correcting those long-injured writings, finally performed the duty of a skilful editor.[1]

Though the works which formed the object of Andronicus's labours had suffered such injuries as the utmost diligence and sagacity could not completely repair,[2] yet in consequence of those labours the Peripatetic philosophy began to resume the lustre of which it had been deprived since the days of Theophrastus; and the later adherents to that sect, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their master, far surpassed the fame and merit of their ignorant and obscure predecessors.[3] From the æra of Andronicus's publication to that of the invention of printing, a succession of respectable writers on civil and sacred subjects (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Christian church) confirm, by their citations and criticisms, the authenticity of most of the treatises still bearing Aristotle's name; and of more than ten thousand[4] commen-

[1] Plutarch. in Syll. Porphyr. in Vitâ Plotini. Boëtius in Proœmio libri de interpret. Strabo only says that Tyrannion, in the manner mentioned in the text, got possession of the manuscript; which was copied for the Roman booksellers by careless transcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original: a negligence, he observes, too common among the transcribers both in Rome and Alexandria.

[2] Even after this publication, Aristotle's followers were obliged *τα πολλα εικοτως λεγειν δια το πληθος των αμαρτιων*, "often to guess at his meaning, through the faultiness of his text." Strabo, in the place above cited.

[3] Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609. He observes, "that the Peripatetic philosophers succeeding Theophrastus had, till this time, but few of their master's works, and those few chiefly of the exoteric kind; so that they were more conversant about words than things; and instead of reasoning accurately and profoundly, were contented with displaying their skill in dialectic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphrased the obscurity of the original *φιλοσοφειν πραγματικως* and *θεσεις ληκοθιζειν*, because Strabo, who had himself diligently studied Aristotle's philosophy, (Strabo, l. xvi. p. 757,) uses the word *πραγματικως*, most probably, in the same sense in which it occurs in Aristotle, as synonymous with *ακριβως*, *κατα αληθειαν*; and in opposition to *διαλεκτικως* and *το διαλεγεσθαι λογικως*.

[4] Patricius Discuss. Peripatet.

tators, who have endeavoured to illustrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expected, whose vanity has courted the praise of superior discernment by rejecting any considerable portion of them as spurious.[1] According to the most credible accounts, therefore, he composed above four hundred[2] different treatises, of which only forty-eight[3] have been transmitted to the present age.[4] But many of these last consist of several books, and the whole of his remains together still form a golden stream[5] of Greek erudition, exceeding four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyssey.

[1] Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Aristot., Patric. Discuss. Peripatetic., Fabricius Bibliothec. Græc., and Bruckerus Histor. Philos. artic. Aristot.

[2] Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Aristot.) makes Aristotle's volumes amount to four hundred; Patricius Venetus, a learned professor of Padua in the sixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. Discuss. Peripat.) The laborious Fabricius employs one hundred pages of his second volume in enumerating and ascertaining Aristotle's remains; which still exceed four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyssey. The whole works of Aristotle, therefore, must have contained a quantity of prose, equal to sixteen times 28,088 verses; a fact the more extraordinary, since the greater part of his writings are merely elegant and comprehensive text books, containing the heads of his lectures; laborious, but clear reasonings; and often original discoveries in the most difficult branches of science. The following passage concerning him in the French Encyclopedie, (article Aristotelisme,) must excite a smile of something more than surprise. "Le nombre de ses ouvrages est prodigieux; on en put voir les titres en Diogène Laerce . . . encore ne sommes nous pas sûrs de les avoir tous: il est même probable que nous en avons perdu plusieurs," etc.

[3] The treatises de Plantis et de Mundo are rejected by most writers. The former is, indeed, of little value; the latter, of the greatest; but I do not cite it as an authority, because it is my ambition to place my account of his philosophy beyond the reach of cavil.

[4] A very excellent table of Aristotle's works, with a brief but accurate sketch of their contents, and an account of their transmission to the present time, will be found appended to the Life of the philosopher by Professor Stahr in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography.

[5] Veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles. Cicero, Academ. ii 38.

INTRODUCTION,

BY

JOHN GILLIES, L.L.D.

THIS book embraces three subjects, the noblest and most interesting that civil science can boast: the origin of society and government; the distinction of ranks in a commonwealth; and a comparison of the best plans of political economy. On each of these topics I shall offer a few remarks, not with the presumption of interposing my own judgment, but with the hope of justifying or illustrating the decisions of my author.

In explaining the origin of political society, Aristotle writes neither the satire nor the panegyric of human nature; which, by writers of less wisdom than fancy, have been alternately substituted for plain history. In this, as in all other inquiries, his first question is, what are the phenomena? His second, what is the analogy of nature? Building on these foundations, he concludes that both society and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to scatter its seeds. Neither the cunning, cowardly principles asserted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections espoused by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, according to our author's notions, ought to be involved in the solution of the present question: since the first political societies are as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of moral determination, as the instinctive actions of plants and insects, tending to the preservation of their respective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own; even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the most consummate wisdom.

Government, then, is coeval with society, and society with

men. Both are the works of nature; and therefore, in explaining their origin, there cannot be the smallest ground for the fanciful supposition of engagements and contracts, independently of which the great modern antagonist of Aristotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding: "The original compact, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world."[1] From this maxim, which is perpetually inculcated in Locke's two treatises on government, is fairly deducible the inalienable right of mankind to be *self-governed;* that is, to be their own legislators, and their own directors; or, if they find it inconvenient to assume the administration of affairs in their own persons, to appoint representatives who may exercise a delegated sovereignty, essentially and inalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence results the new inalienable right of all mankind to be fairly represented, a right with which each individual was invested from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the least notion of the thing.[2] From this right to fair representation, there follows, by necessary consequence, the right of universal suffrage, universal eligibility, and the universal and just preponderancy of majorities in all cases whatever.

Such is the boasted and specious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux,[3] continued in those of our

[1] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185, edit. of 1714.

[2] According to the system of Locke and his followers, representatives are appointed by the people to exercise, in their stead, political functions which the people have a right to exercise in their own persons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the people; and to the people, their constituents, they always are responsible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the first or principal author. But the term representatives, in the usual and legal acceptation of the word in the English constitution, meant, and still means, persons in virtue of their election exercising political functions, which the people had not a right to exercise in their own persons, and so little responsible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their instructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with representation in the usual and only practical sense of the word, will be shown hereafter.

[3] See his Case of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113, and again, p.

Price[1] and our Priestley,[2] and carried to the utmost extravagance in those of (I wish not to say our) Rousseau,[3] Paine,[4] and the innumerable pamphleteers whose writings occasioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions.

Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumstances of the times, have produced, and are still producing, the most extraordinary effects; by arming the passions of the multitude with a false principle, fortifying them by specious arguments, and thereby stirring into action those discordant elements which naturally lurk in the bosom of every community. It is not consistent with my design, in defending the tenets of my author, to answer his political adversaries with declamation and obloquy,—(a rash and dangerous attempt! since the voice of the multitude will always be the loudest and the strongest,)—but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great master, Locke, be itself founded in truth. To prove that government is merely a matter of consent, he assumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy; what he calls a state of nature, which he defines to be "men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them."[5] But he himself seems aware that this supposed natural state of man is a state in which man never yet was found; and in which, if by violence thrust into it, he could not remain for a single day. Locke, I say, saw the difficulty, which, instead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. "Where are there," he asks, "or ever were there, any men in such a state of nature?"[6] He answers, "that since all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in the state of nature, it is plain the world never was, and never will be, without numbers of men in that state."[7] But this, I affirm, is not to answer the proposed question; for princes and rulers of independent states do not live together, nor associate and "herd," as he himself expresses it, in the same society. If they did so, they could not subsist without government: for government and

169. "I have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not consent."

[1] Observations on Civil Liberty, etc.
[2] Essay on the First Principles of Government.
[3] Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique.
[4] Rights of Man, etc.
[5] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164. [6] Ibid. p. 162. [7] Ibid.

society are things absolutely inseparable; they commence together; they grow up together; they are both of them equally natural; and so indissolubly united, that the destruction of the one is necessarily accompanied by the destruction of the other. This is the true sense of Aristotle, as understood and expressed by an illustrious defender of just government and genuine liberty. "As we use and exercise our bodily members, before we understand the ends and purposes of this exercise, so it is by nature herself that we are united and associated into political society."[1]

Locke, who so severely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, so unjustly arraigns what is called Aristotle's Metaphysics, appears to have equally mistaken his Politics. Had he understood[2] the invaluable work to which he refers in terms of commendation, this idol of modern philosophers, and especially of modern politicians, would not probably (since he was a man of great worth as well as of great wisdom) have produced a theory of government totally impossible in practice; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and sedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all history, no political fabric ever yet was reared; or if it were to be reared, could ever possibly be preserved.[3] The neglect or misapprehension of some of the most important parts of Aristotle's writings is indeed most deeply to be lamented. Of the many thousand authors who have copied or commented on his Logic, the far greater number omit his interesting chapters on language; deeming the consideration of

[1] Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priusquam didicimus cujus ea utilitatis causâ habeamus; sic inter nos nostrâ ad civilem communitatem conjuncti et consociati sumus. De Fin. Bon. et Mal. lib. iii c. 20. Conf. de Officiis, lib. i. c. 16, et seq. Cicero does not say "communitatem" simply, but "civilem communitatem," which agrees with Aristotle's definition of man, ζῶον πολιτικόν, not merely a *herding*, but a *political* animal. See the same doctrine in Polybius, lib. vi. c. 4, vol. ii. p. 460, edit. Sweigh.

[2] Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had asked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. "To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke observes, "the foundation should be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the several species of it. Aristotle is allowed a master in this science, and few enter into this consideration of government without reading his Politics." How honourable a testimony!

[3] Aristot. Polit. passim. See especially book iv. ch. , p. 126.

words below the dignity of philosophers. His profound observations concerning the nature and constitution of a family have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analysis of language has been proved to be the sole foundation of logic, so his analysis of a family, and his explanation of the causes through which its elements naturally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to discern the analogous principles—(principles continually insisted on by himself)—which have raised and upheld the great edifice of civil society; which is not a mass, but a system, and which, like every system, implies a distinction of parts; with many moral as well as physical differences, relative and reciprocal; the powers and perfections of one part supplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dignity, is an attempt not less absurd than that of composing a piece of music from one and the same note.

A difficult question follows, how far social inequality, whether civil or domestic, may be allowed to extend? It is with a trembling hand that I touch the delicate subject of slavery; an undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmost confidence in the humanity, as well as in the judgment, of my author. First of all, Aristotle expressly condemns the cruel practice, prevalent in his own days, of enslaving prisoners of war;[1] secondly, he declares, in the most explicit terms, all slaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are fitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he observes, must in all cases be limited by their capacities for receiving them; and these capacities are themselves limited by the exigencies and necessities of our present imperfect condition. The helplessness of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and

[1] Locke says on this subject, "There is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who, being captives taken in a just war, are by the rights of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in a state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 181. We should imagine that the *liberal* Locke and the *slavish* Aristotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and principles.

the urgencies attending mankind in every stage of their existence on earth, render it indispensably necessary that a great proportion of the species should be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the strenuous exertions of productive industry, and the petty tasks of domestic drudgery Nature, therefore, in whose plan and intention the system of society precedes and takes place of the parts of which it is composed, has variously organized and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without setting other bounds to this variety, than are imposed by the good of the whole system, of which individuals are not independent units, but constituent elements. According to this plan or intention, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the widest of all discriminations, and the lowest of all occupations, domestic servitude, a species of labour not employed in production, but totally consumed in use; because solely, but not unprofitably, spent in promoting the ease and accommodation of life. In the relation of master and servant, the good of the master may indeed be the primary object; but the benefit of the servant or slave is also a necessary result, since he only is naturally and justly a slave, whose powers are competent to mere bodily labour; who is capable of listening to reason, but incapable of exercising that sovereign faculty; and whose weakness and short-sightedness are so great, that it is safer for him to be guided or governed through life by the prudence of another. But, let it always be remembered, that "one class of men ought to have the qualifications requisite for masters, before another can either fitly or usefully be employed as slaves." Government, then, not only civil but domestic, is a most serious duty, a most sacred trust; a trust, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the supposed inalienable rights of all men to be self-governed.[1]

[1] Politics would not be a science, unless it contained truths, absolute, universal, and unalterable. One of these is that in the text; because it essentially springs from the nature of society and of man. Another universal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From these two premisses, it necessarily follows, that the main object of political society never can be effected on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without supposing all sovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to participate) may, under many given circumstances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large

Those rights, and those only, are inalienable, which it is impossible for one person to exercise for another: and to maintain those to be natural and inalienable rights, which the persons supposed to be invested with them can never possibly exercise, consistently either with their own safety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature;[1] of which it is the primary and unalterable law, that forecast should direct improvidence, reason control passion, and wisdom command folly.[2] I now proceed to examine Aristotle's reflections on political economy, which are not less adverse than his long misunderstood and often mistated vindication of slavery itself, both to the theories formerly prevalent, and to others which have begun recently to prevail among the civilized nations of modern Europe.

The northern conquerors who invaded and desolated the Roman empire, disdained to produce by slow industry, what they gloried in ravishing by sudden violence. War was their delight and their trade. They subsisted by rapine; and therefore cared not how far they were excelled by others in peaceful and productive arts, while gold, and all that it could purchase, might be conquered by iron. But the spoils of rapacity having supplied them with the instruments of luxury,

a control in the government. This control in all large communities can only be conveniently exercised, either by particular magistrates, or by representative assemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any necessary connexion with the origin of government, (so far from being its *only just principle*,) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be shown hereafter, that assemblies elected by the people to provide for their interests, and thence called their representatives, are not so new in the world as is commonly imagined. In some republics we shall see a double row of delegates, representatives of representatives; in others, we shall find representation and taxation regarded as correlatives; and even in some democracies, we shall meet with persons elected by the people, and representing them in the most useful sense of the word, "that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wise and good, would act for themselves."

[1] Stat ratio contra, et secretam garrit in aurem,
Ne liceat facere id, quod quis vitiabit agendo.
Publica lex hominum, naturaque continet hoc fas,
Ut teneat vetitos inscitia debilis actus. Persius, Satir. v. 96.

[2] Ἀμεινον δν ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος. Plato in Repub. ix. p. 590, D

they began to relish the pleasures of repose; and instead of courting new dangers abroad, to imitate at home those objects and conveniences which, though they had not the genius to invent, they gradually acquired the taste to approve, the vanity to display, and the desire to accumulate. Manufactures then were established: navigation was exercised for the purpose not only of war, but of traffic: an extensive commerce was introduced; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpose of all those operations was to augment in each country the quantity of gold and silver; since, with those precious metals, all other coveted objects might usually be procured. The business of each individual merchant is to get money; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reasonably have any other end in view. This false principle was regarded as the basis of all sound political arithmetic; and the most conclusive reasoning of Aristotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have sufficed to prove, that national wealth consisted not in gold and silver, had not the ruined state of Spain confirmed experimentally the same important truth.

For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations consists in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknowledge also, with him, that the precious metals, in contradistinction to other useful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of serving as the fittest instruments of exchange, and the most accurate measures of value; but that the quantity of number in which they ought to be desired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other measures or instruments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and operations which they are employed to answer or effect.[1] Yet, while they reason thus justly respecting gold and silver, the same writers have not sufficient enlargement of mind to generalize their assertion, and to perceive with our author that property itself is as much an instrument as money, though

[1] It is worthy of remark, that Locke is one of the most strenuous asserters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he considers "as the most solid and substantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy." See the passage quoted and refuted in Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 140, 8vo edit. It is time that, with regard to subjects still more important, men should return from the school of Locke to that of Aristotle.

serving for a far more complicated purpose; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpose requires, the surplus will be at best useless, most commonly pernicious; will inflame desire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and produce that long train of disorders, which made our philosopher declare, "that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Isles, unless their virtue kept pace with their external prosperity, must inevitably become the most miserable of all mankind."[1] In the fashionable systems of modern politicians, national wealth is considered as synonymous with national prosperity. To the increase of productive industry and the augmentation of public revenue, both health, education, and morals are sacrificed without apology and without remorse; since that trade is universally held to be the best, which produces most money with the least labour. But according to Aristotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the statesman's care, but the effect which the producing of that work naturally creates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praises of agriculture and a country life, our author's sentiments and expressions have been faithfully and generally copied by the most judicious writers of antiquity; many of whom mark with as much reprobation as Aristotle himself, that species of traffic which is cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain; since such a traffic, universally diffused among a people, has a tendency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their principles; to make them value as ends, things only useful as means; and to debase and corrupt every part of their character; because wherever wealth is the primary object of pursuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal source of enjoyment. In agriculture and pasturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the industry of man. They are, of all occupations, the most beneficial and most necessary, as well as the most agreeable and most salutary; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmest and happiest temperament of the mind and body: and the property acquired by them is intrinsically more valuable, because essentially more useful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewise maintains, that those natural and primeval pursuits are of all the least likely to engender sloth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices; and

[1] Polit. book vii. ch. 15.

that nations of husbandmen, in particular, afford materials susceptible of the best political form, and the least disposed to disturb, by sedition, any moderately good government under which it is their lot to live. In consideration of so many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the most favoured branch of national industry; an opinion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by false system, could venture to contradict. Yet, how far other methods of accumulating stock, beside those proposed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or discouraged and rejected, must depend on circumstances and events, the force of which the philosopher's experience could not supply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From the artifices and shifts which he explains,—(and he is the only writer that explains them,)—as practised by the republics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpose of raising money, it was impossible for him to conjecture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical government should attain such stability as would render the public revenues a safe mortgage to creditors; that the immense debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by interesting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of constituted authorities, to augment that facility itself, and thereby still further to accumulate the national debt; for discharging the interest of which, heavy taxes must necessarily, but not altogether unprofitably, be levied, since they would in some measure repay, in public security, the burdens which they impose on personal labour, or rather the sums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot possibly be raised, except in countries flourishing in such resources as agriculture and pasturage alone were never yet able to afford; resources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained on the other, by the powers of national industry, assisted and multiplied by the most complicated machinery, and an endless subdivision of allotted tasks; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterously, because each has but one, and that a small part, to perform; while the diligence of all is perpetually stimulated by the bait of gain, supplied from the exhaustless fund of an enlightened commercial spirit, as extensive as the

world, and as enterprising as those renowned adventurers who discovered and explored its remotest regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy proposed by Aristotle be in itself preferable to that which some modern nations pursue. Nations, circumstanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but must principally depend for supplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better system is now no longer in their power: the question of expediency has ceased: they must obey necessity.[1]

This seems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial system of economy; a system which has often been defended by very inclusive arguments. "Public wealth and prosperity," Mr. Hume observes, "is the end of all our wishes;" and this wealth or prosperity, both he and his follower, Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful industry; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may produce as much food as will maintain many.[2]

[1] It is not difficult to explain why the doctrines of speculative politicians, respecting the wealth and economy of nations, should also differ so materially from the theory proposed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who subdued the Roman empire, every thing most valuable and most interesting is connected with the improvement of arts, and consequent extension of commerce; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engrossed whole provinces, dissipated the superfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle servants and worthless dependents, ever ready to gratify the wildest and wickedest of their passions, to abet their insolence, to uphold their haughtiness, to encourage and second their violence and rapacity; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed aristocracies, formed the worst species of oligarchy; an oligarchy consisting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of each individual lord over his respective vassals and retainers. In such a condition of society the expensive allurements of luxury, produced by what Aristotle condemns as over-refinement in arts and manufactures, had the most direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themselves, to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to bestow consideration on the many. This particular case has been, by a very usual fallacy in reasoning, converted into a general political axiom.

[2] Hume's Essays, vol. i., "Refinement of Arts;" and Smith's Wealth of Nations, passim.

But this assertion is not true in the acceptation in which it must be taken, in order to recommend the commercial system above the agricultural. In agriculture, as we above observed, nature operates in concert with man; and though one family co-operating with nature, may, in a given piece of ground, produce as much food as will serve six, yet six families labouring the same ground, will not reap a proportional increase; and twenty families labouring the same ground, may find it barely sufficient to supply their own nourishment. The more that the land is laboured, it will be the more productive; and the more fitly and fairly it is divided,[1] (other circumstances remaining the same,) it will be the more laboured; and the same country or island will thus maintain the greater proportion of inhabitants employed in that kind of work, which, according to Aristotle, is the most favourable to health, morals, good government, the development of intellectual as well as corporeal powers, and the attainment of that measure of happiness which the general mass of mankind can ever in this world hope to reach.

[1] Does our author, therefore, propose an Agrarian law? No; he knew better. The second book of his Politics is, of all works ever written, the best adapted to prove to levellers themselves, that the measures from which they expect so much good, if carried into execution, would infallibly terminate in their own ruin and that of the community.

ANALYSIS

OF

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

INTRODUCTORY. — Aristotle, in conformity with his usual custom, commences the first Book of his treatise with a practical inquiry into the parts or elements of which the state is composed; and having laid down a brief outline of the first principles of man's social nature, and of domestic life in its various relations, he shows how these relations naturally combine into that form of social existence which is called a state. But before entering theoretically into the nature of the best state, he gives, in Book II., a brief account of, and criticism upon, the various forms of government which have been devised by philsosophers and politicians. In Book III. he proceeds to discuss in detail the state, the citizen, and the government, with its various forms, and their respective perversions and corruptions. In Book IV. he gives a brief outline of his "Polity," or perfect republic, (πολιτεία,) with an enumeration of the magistrates necessary for carrying it out: while Book V. enters philosophically into the causes which tend to overthrow it. In Book VI. he returns to the subject of democracy and oligarchy; while in the two concluding books of his treatise — (which has evidently come down to us in a mutilated condition)—he enters into an elaborate discussion of the best regulations of government in his ideal polity, descending to the comparatively minute particulars of the sites necessary for towns and houses, and the laws requisite for regulating matrimony and the education of the young, with a special view to the interests of the community. In Book VIII. he commences his inquiry into the education of the young, which breaks off most abruptly just at

the point where we should most earnestly have desired to see our author's opinions fully and fairly worked out, in the development and practical application of those principles which he has so carefully laid down.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTORY.—THE first book divides itself into three parts. (1.) Chap. i. and ii., concerning the family (οἶκος) and village (κώμη), as integral parts of the state (πόλις). (2.) Chap. iii.—vii. and xii. xiii., concerning the three domestic relations, the herile, conjugal, and paternal. (3.) Chap. viii. —xi., concerning the getting of money (ἡ χρηματιστική).

CHAP. I.—All society aims at some good end; therefore its best and highest form will aim at the best end.

Monarchical and republican governments do not differ in number alone, but also in kind.

To ascertain the nature of a state, we must first contemplate it in its component parts.

CHAP. II.—The first of domestic relations is the conjugal: this is both natural and necessary; the male being by nature formed and fitted to rule, the female to obey.

The second relation is the herile: the slave formed by nature to obey.

Yet the wife and the slave differ, (except among barbarians).

From the former of these relations springs the paternal tie:

And the combination of these three ties forms the family (οἶκος).

The gradual development of the family described, and the consequent formation of the village (κώμη), which is defined.

The antiquity of monarchical rule deduced from the fact that families were originally under one head.

The formation of the state (πόλις); and its definition; its test, αὐτάρκεια, (i. e. its power to supply its own wants).

The facts adduced here prove man to be a social creature, (πολιτικὸν ζῶον,) and the founder of political life to be the greatest of benefactors to the human race.

CHAP. III.—In domestic rule, (οἰκονομία,) the three relations of

the head as master, husband, and father, give the three kinds of government which it embraces.

These three relations further considered.

The art of getting money (*ἡ χρηματιστική*) comes partly under *οἰκονομία*.

CHAP. IV.—Possessions (*κτήματα*) are parts of a house; and hence *ἡ κτητική* is part of the economic art.

Possessions are either animate (*ἄψυχα*) or inanimate, (*ἔμψυχα*,) and relate either to *πόιησις* or to *πρᾶξις*.

A slave (*δοῦλος*) is a living instrument for practical purposes, (*ἔμψυχον ὄργανον τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν*,) and he is a part of his master, though separable (*χωριστόν*).

The description of the characteristics of a good slave.

CHAP. V.—Some are slaves by nature and birth, (*φύσει*,) as others are free and born to rule.

This point established by sundry analogies, from the soul with regard to the body, from the male with regard to the female, etc., and from inanimate things.

We infer, then, that subjection is a law of nature; and as some men are born wholly inferior to others in mental and moral endowments, it is clear that it is not only expedient but just that they should be slaves.

Mental power and energy is the test of free birth; mere bodily efficiency marks the slave, whose whole excellence (*ἀρετὴ*) lies in mere bodily activity.

CHAP. VI.—There is also a second kind of slavery, which is not natural, but by compact and agreement, (*νόμῳ*,) as for example, where prisoners taken in war are reduced to the rank of slaves.

Some persons think this slavery just, others unjust.

Aristotle attempts to reconcile the conflicting opinions by laying down, that while such slavery is abstractedly unjust, still to a certain extent it is defensible, because sanctioned by the common law of nations.

But it must be always unjust, when the war from which it results is unjust, or when persons of noble birth are enslaved.

Slaves and their masters can have an identity of interest, if they are such *φύσει*; but nothing of the kind can exist

between the conqueror and his captive, because that relation does not exist between them φύσει.

CHAP. VII.—Despotic and civil (πολιτική) rule differ; the former is over slaves, the latter over freemen.

The ruler of a household has monarchical or despotic power.

The test of political government is the alternation of power and office between the rulers and the ruled.

The science of ruling a household, so far as it relates to slaves, is of an inferior character.

CHAP. VIII.—Domestic rule is over, (1.) Persons; as wife, children, and slaves. (2.) Possessions.

Having already explained the herile relation, Aristotle postpones (to chap. xii.) the further discussion of the domestic rule over *persons*, and confines himself to that over *possessions*.

Money-getting (ἡ χρηματιστική) differs from the economic art, in that the work of the former is to *provide*, of the latter to *use* what has been already procured.

Ἡ χρηματιστική is divided into natural and artificial.

Its natural form divided "secundum vitæ, genera, et modos."

(1.) The pastoral life. (2.) The chase. (3.) Agriculture.

[The art of war (ἡ πολεμική) comes partially under the second of these heads; for it is just to hunt by war men who are born to be slaves.]

True wealth consists, not in money, but in the productions of nature.

CHAP. IX.—The artificial form of ἡ χρηματιστική considered.

Every possession has two possible uses: the one proper, the other improper, as a shoe may be used either to cover the feet or for exchange.

In the family all things were held in common; but as families and villages increased into states, a system of exchange grew up of necessity; and money was devised as the standard and common measure of this exchange.

The artificial form of ἡ χρηματιστική and the economic art differ in the fact that the former has no limit in its work of collecting money, whereas the latter is limited by the wants and necessities of man.

CHAP. X.—The money-getting art is subservient to the economic art, though not strictly a part of it.

But it is only in its natural form that this is true; for

Its artificial form (which is called *ἡ καπηλικὴ*, traffic) does not directly contribute to the ends of nature; and besides,

In its furthest development, usury, (*τοκισμός*,) it is to be abominated, as being entirely unnatural (*παρὰ φύσιν*).

CHAP. XI.—*ἡ χρηματιστικὴ practically* divided into

(1.) Natural, embracing (*α.*) agriculture and (*β.*) cattle.

(2.) *μεταβλητικὴ* or mercatorial, embracing three kinds,

α. ἐμπορία, commerce.

β. τοκισμός, usury.

γ. μισθαρνία, hiring, or contracting.

Besides these two divisions, there is a third or mixed kind, which is concerned with mining (*ἡ μεταλλευτικὴ*).

Division of labours into servile and noble.

The advantage of a practical knowledge of these matters shown by the example of the philosopher Thales.

CHAP. XII.—Aristotle here goes back to consider the conjugal and paternal relations.

In the former relation, the husband exercises political rule.

In the latter, the father exercises a despotic rule.

Where political rule prevails, the ruler for the time being is invested with external signs of dignity.

CHAP. XIII.—The master of a house should first regard the *persons* over whom he rules, next, the *possessions*.

He should strive to make each person perform his own *ἔργον* virtuously.

How a wife, a child, and a slave differ in their respective virtues (*ἀρεταί*).

Slaves must be *forced* by punishments to perform their work voluntarily; but wives and children must be virtuously *trained*.

Hence the necessity of a system of education for the women and children in every republic.

BOOK II.

(INTRODUCTORY.) This book is divided into two parts; (1.) chap. i.—viii., in which Aristotle discusses the ideal polities of Plato and of others, and (2.) chap. ix.—xii., in which he treats of the existing constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage.

CHAP. I.—In order to exhibit the best form of a state, we must examine the best existing states, and also the purely ideal state (*ἡ μάλιστα κατ' εὐχήν*).

It is necessary that there should be in every state (1.) a community of all things, or (2.) of some things only, or (3.) of nothing.

The last of these three alternatives is contradicted by the very idea of a state, as being a community, and sharing therefore in site, etc.

Ought then some things, or ought every thing, to be in common in a good state?

In Plato's Republic all things are in common among the citizens, even their children and wives. Should this be so or not?

CHAP. II.—Plato's Republic discussed.

The opinion of Socrates and Plato as to the community of wives and children refuted.

Aristotle denies that a state is best in proportion as it is more entirely one; for, (1.) the very theory of a state excludes such a unity as Plato imagines; and (2.) a state is overthrown by too complete a unity (*προϊοῦσα καὶ γιγνομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται*).

A state is composed of persons differing in species (*ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων*); and it is the just balance (*τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*) of the various elements which compose a state that preserves it.

Moreover a state must be self-dependent (*αὐτάρκης*). But all *αὐτάρκεια* would be destroyed by this Platonic unity.

CHAP. III.—But granting that this unity tends to preserve, and not to destroy a state; it does not follow that unity would be realized, though the citizens should call their property common (*ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμόν*).

For the word "all" (*πάντες*) is used in two senses; 1st, collectively, 2nd, distributively.

And as every thing, (as wives, children, etc.,) would belong to all the citizens collectively alone, and not distributively, they would not be cared for, since what is everybody's business is nobody's (*ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλέιστων κοινόν*).

Such a state of things, instead of binding families together, would do away with family affections, and so weaken the state.

CHAP. IV.—It would also give rise to incests and murders, which would be inexpiable.

Certain other difficulties and inconsistencies noticed in the Republic of Plato

How far the community of wives should be extended.

Evils arising from the interchange of children, and from the fact that nature will defeat the end proposed by Socrates, by the likeness of the children to individual citizens.

CHAP. V.—As to community of property, instead of bringing about unity, it will be the parent of discord.

It will also cause neglect, for what is everybody's business is nobody's.

It will deprive individuals of the pleasure derived from that which is *τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν*.

It will cut off opportunities of practising the virtues of temperance and liberality.

This too great unity, then, will destroy the very essence of a state, as harmony would be destroyed if all sounds were reduced to a single note.

A state then is not a mere individual, but a body composed of dissimilar parts, (*πλῆθος ἐξ ἀνομοίων*,) and its unity is to be drawn "ex dissimilium hominum consensu."

The perpetuity of the magistrates in office, which flows as a consequence from the myth in Plato concerning the three classes of citizens, in whose natures gold, silver, and brass are blended, will be a further cause of strife.

It is also absurd to attempt to make the whole state happy, while its component parts are deprived of their proper happiness.

CHAP. VI.—Plato's book of Laws discussed.

It omits all mention of many important points; such as the discipline of the citizens.

It divides the citizens into two classes or castes, but says nothing of the lower class bearing arms.

It says nothing of the education of the lower class.

It confines itself to *laws*, and says little about *government*.

Some discrepancies noticed between the "Laws" of Plato and his "Republic."

General character of the Socratic dialogues.

Absurdity of framing polities which cannot be realized; and of using vague terms;

And of enforcing equality of property.

It is better to regulate the population. Pheidon the Corinthian. Plato.

Plato's state tends to a perfect community of goods, but does not approach the true standard of excellence.

Great merits of the Spartan constitution; it blends together a variety of forms.

The monarchical form has not justice done to it in the Republic of Plato.

Prevalence of the oligarchic principle in the election of senate.

CHAP. VII.—The ideal state of Phaleas; based on equality of property, as a guarantee against discord.

We object, first, that he limits the property, but not the number of the citizens;

And further, that an equality of property does not suffice to suppress discords;

Because, if men do not contend about goods, they will for honour.

Other points are left undefined by Phaleas, as to military affairs and external policy.

CHAP. VIII.—The ideal state of Hippodamus consisted of 10,000 citizens, divided into three classes, artizans, husbandmen, and soldiery.

The land of the state to be divided into three parts, sacred, common, and private.

Three kinds of law-suits to be admitted, with one supreme tribunal of appeal; and the amount of punishment

to be settled by the sentence of the judges written on a tablet.

Honours and rewards to be given to those who have done good service to the state, and their children to be reared at the public expense.

The magistrates to be elected by the three classes of the people.

Objections of Aristotle against the system of Phaleas.

(1.) He has done wrong in giving full rights of citizens to the second and third class, though he has deprived them of arms.

(2.) The husbandmen till the land, not for themselves, but for the soldiery.

(3.) There is no class to till the public land, each being busied with its own duties.

(4.) The office of the judge is confounded with that of an arbiter.

(5.) The system of rewards tends to produce calumnies and detractions, and thus a premium is offered for innovations; but a change of laws and institutions is perilous in any state.

CHAP. IX.—In testing a constitution, we should ask, (1.) whether it is consistent with the idea of perfection or not? and (2.) whether it is consistent with itself?

All political writers agree that citizens should be exempted from illiberal arts and labours.

But they differ as to the means of effecting this end.

The Spartan constitution faulty, (1.) Because it allots the illiberal arts to strangers, and gives agriculture to the Helots.

(2.) It does not enforce authority over the women Hence the women at Sparta, and indeed in all warlike states, grow licentious, owing to the long absence of the male population who are serving in arms.

(3.) Too great a share of property is given to the women at Sparta.

(4.) The choice of Ephors from the lower ranks is objectionable.

(5.) The senators retain their office when they are too old and past their work.

(6.) The common meals are open to objection as being defrayed by private and not public cost.

(7.) The permanency of the post of admiral of the Spartan fleet is objectionable.

(8.) The end of the Spartan constitution and of the institutions of Lycurgus, namely, war, is a wrong end. As was proved by fact: for Sparta throve, as long as she was engaged in war and acquiring power; but as soon as she had gained the summit of her ambition, she fell through luxury and licentiousness.

CHAP. X.—The constitution of Crete is like that of Sparta, though less skilfully contrived.

How Lycurgus became acquainted with the legislation of Minos.

The natural advantages of the situation of Crete.

Analogy between the Spartan Helots and the Cretan serfs—common tables—the Ephors and Cosmi.

Objections against the constitution of the senates of Sparta and Crete, as irresponsible (*ἀνυπεύθυνοι*).

Practical evil consequences.

The insular position of Crete saves it from external attacks, and keeps the serfs from revolting.

CHAP. XI.—The constitution of Carthage is like the two above mentioned: but better; for it has remained a long time unchanged.

Common tables. Council of the "hundred and four," answering to the Ephors and Cosmi.

The kings or suffetes at Carthage chosen on a better principle than at Sparta.

The ruling body chosen on a good principle.

Tendency of this state to pass into an oligarchy.

Advantages of placing political power in the hands of those only who have a competency.

Two points to be remarked in the constitution of Carthage;

(1.) Admixture of oligarchic and democratical principles.

(2.) Pluralism, and its ill effects.

CHAP. XII.—Different writers on Politics, both statesmen and philosophers.

Various opinions concerning Solon. Fusion of different elements in the Athenian system.

Aristocratical tendency of the Areopagus; this was gradually diminished as the popular power increased after the Persian war.

Solon introduced a plutocracy. His different ranks.

Other legislators.

BOOK III.

THIS book naturally is divided into two parts. (1.) Chap. i.—v., in which the definition of a citizen and of a city or state is considered. (2.) Chap. vi.—xvii., which discuss successively the various forms of government.

CHAP. I.—First question, "what is a *state?*"

It is a whole body or system made up of citizens.

What then is a *citizen?* To answer this, let us first see who are *not* citizens.

Slaves, sojourners, children, degraded persons, (ἄτιμοι,) are not called citizens, because they have no share in the government.

It is this share which constitutes a man a citizen. Objection answered.

But in different states it is not always the same persons who will have the rights of citizens; (e. g. in a tyranny the people have no share.)

Hence our definition of a citizen will only apply strictly to a democracy or polity; for no one can be truly a citizen who is absolutely excluded from obtaining civil power.

CHAP. II.—The popular definition of a citizen, as a person who has one parent at least a citizen, considered.

Its absurdity shown by considering the case of the first founders of a state or a family.

The true test of citizenship is the actual right of holding office; whether justly or unjustly, it matters not.

CHAP. III.—The identity of a state is not altered, though its outward form is changed.

When may a state be said to be the same?

Its identity does not consist in mere sameness of situation.

Is it then in containing the same inhabitants; as a river or fountain is still the same, though its waters are for ever changing?

No, for the form of government may be changed, though its material part continues the same.

It consists therefore, in the same form of government being preserved.

CHAP. IV.—The good man and the good citizen are not abstractedly (ἁπλῶς) the same; nor, consequently, is the virtue of the one and of the other the same.

For the virtue of a good man is always the same, since it is the union of all the moral virtues.

But that of a good citizen differs with the form of government; and in the same state the virtue of some citizens differs from that of others.

The virtue of a ruler in a state, and of a good man, may possibly be the same; and in the best ideal state, the good citizens must also be good men.

The peculiar virtue of a ruler is φρόνησις, or prudence.

Servile occupations do not befit citizens.

In a political government, or that of equals, the citizen must learn how to obey and command; and therefore, to some extent, the virtue of a good citizen and of a good man may be identical.

CHAP. V.—Reasons for regarding mechanics as citizens, and also for excluding them from citizenship.

In the best state, mechanics and tradesmen will not be citizens.

They may be admitted, however, to civil rights in an oligarchy or democracy, especially if they become rich.

CHAP. VI.—Being about to speak concerning the various forms of government, Aristotle now proceeds to define a commonwealth (πολιτεία).

The government differs according to the number of hands in which the supreme power is lodged.

Man is a social being, and has a natural tendency to associate with others, even apart from all consideration of personal wants and mutual benefits.

The rule of a master over his slave is primarily for the benefit of himself, and accidentally for that of his slave; but the master of a house rules over his wife and children for their common good as well as his own.

Just so, in states, the ruling body, be it composed of one or of many, may regard the interest of itself only, or that of the entire community.

All those forms of government which regard the common good, are right and proper forms.

And those which do not, are perversions or corrupt forms (*παρεκβάσεις*).

CHAP. VII.—The various kinds of government.

There are three proper kinds, (1.) monarchy, (2.) aristocracy, and (3.) a commonwealth.

Corresponding to which are their three respective perversions, (1.) tyranny, (2.) oligarchy, (3.) democracy.

The latter are distinguished from the former, by their regarding the interest, not of the community in general, but of the rulers only.

CHAP. VIII.—Tyranny is a despotic monarchy: and the subjects of a tyranny are analogous to slaves.

The state is an oligarchy when power is exclusively in the hands of the rich; a democracy, when in the hands of the poor only; whether they be few or many, in either case it matters not.

Still it seldom happens that the rich in an oligarchy are many in number, or that the poor in a democracy are few.

CHAP. IX.—The Athenians held that a democracy was just; the Spartans thought in like manner of an oligarchy; the former considering that every thing should be equal, as the citizens were all equal in liberty; the latter, that things should be equal among those who were already equal in power and riches.

Now neither party are wholly right.

For firstly, individuals are bad judges in their own case.

And secondly, they are apt to confound what is relatively just with that which is so abstractedly.

Virtue and merit, not riches and liberty, ought to have supreme power in the state; and the best citizens are not the most wealthy or free, but those of the highest virtue.

This position proved from considering the end of a state; which is, not merely life, or mutual aid, or commercial intercourse, but a perfect and happy life, sufficiently supplied with external goods and which looks to virtue as its aim.

CHAP. X.—In whose hands ought the supreme power of a state to be lodged? In the hands of one or of more?

The different inconveniencies which arise under each form of government.

Under a democracy, there is danger of the poor laying violent hands on the property of the rich.

Under an oligarchy, there is danger lest the wealthy few should tyrannize over the poor.

Under an aristocracy, lest the many should be left excluded from honours and office.

Under a monarchy, lest all but the reigning sovereign should be excluded.

But if any one says that the law should be supreme, the difficulty remains the same; for the law must be administered by men, under any form of government, and must be accommodated to that form.

CHAP. XI.—It is better to lodge power in the hands of the many than of the few.

For collectively the citizens will unite many points of excellence which one individual could not possess.

It is not however safe to intrust the highest magistracies to a poor and ignorant multitude, nor yet wholly to exclude them from office. They must therefore have a share in deliberative and judicial functions.

Thus Solon gave them at Athens the right of election and of scrutiny (εὐθύνη).

A fusion of the upper and lower classes is good for both and for the state.

Brief review of the constitution of Solon.

In the professors of the arts there are three grades; the lowest grade executes practically, another prescribes, while the third and highest studies the theory; and even the lowest grade, by mere experience, comes to be a fit judge of matters within its own sphere.

Just so in political matters, the multitude, even though they know nothing of the political science, and hold no magistracy, still can form a good practical judgment upon government in general, and even a better one than those in office, who cannot see their own defects and errors.

The supreme power should rest with the laws, if they are just.

CHAP. XII.—Justice (*τὸ δίκαιον*) is the end of the political science.

But justice is a certain equality; and equality is of two kinds, like justice itself.

In distribution of honours, mere equality or inequality of things is not to be regarded.

But the end and interest of the state itself must be taken into account.

CHAP. XIII.—If a state contains the rich, the noble, the good, and the multitude, to which of these classes shall the public honours be given?

To answer this, let us first settle whether upright laws ought to regard the interest of the good, or of the multitude.

Clearly they should refer to the common good: and a citizen will be one who has a share both in governing and in being governed.

The citizen differs in each different form of government, etc.

As to men of pre-eminent and heroic virtue, if such be found, the supreme power should be given to them; for they stand in the relation of gods to their fellow-men; and it is absurd to legislate for such individuals; for they are a law to themselves.

Great pre-eminence, however, in merit or civil power, is an object of suspicion among citizens.

Ostracism devised as a remedy against this evil in free states.

Corresponding methods adopted in other states.

The principle defended from the analogy of the arts.

Pre-eminence of political power not to be tolerated; but the man who is pre-eminent in virtue should be elected king, and receive perfect submission from all.

CHAP. XIV.—Discussion concerning particular forms of government; firstly concerning the right forms, secondly concerning their perversions.

Is monarchy better adapted for practical purposes than any other form?

To answer this question, we distinguish the different kinds of monarchy

(1.) That established at Sparta; which is, in fact, a perpetual generalship.

(2.) Hereditary; as among barbarians.

(3.) Elective; called Æsymneteia in ancient Greece.

(4.) Limited monarchy, such as that of the heroic times

(5.) Absolute and paternal.

CHAP. XV.—These five kinds may be reduced to two, the absolute and the Lacedæmonian forms.

Two questions proposed; (1.) Is it for the interest of the state to have a perpetual monarchy established, as at Sparta? This question postponed.

(2.) Is it better to be under an absolute king, or under the best of laws?

The law does not enter into particular cases, but the king can do so in executing the law.

It is absurd, therefore, to go upon a mere written law.

On the other hand, the law is not affected by passion as a king is.

In the best state, the law and the king should conspire.

Is it better to leave the correction of the written law to one or to many?

Three reasons in favour of the latter.

Monarchy, as compared with aristocracy, is free from factions; though if the members of an aristocracy be good, they can be as one man; hence aristocracy is to be preferred.

Monarchy proved to be the more ancient form; for it was easier to find one good man than many; and it is only as good citizens increased, that aristocracies supplanted monarchies, and in turn were supplanted by democracies.

The love of wealth and gain next paved the way for oligarchies, which soon were turned into tyrannies, and these at length reverted to the form of democracies.

Two questions proposed; (1.) Whether upon the supposition of a monarchy being the best form, it ought to be made hereditary? (2.) Whether a king has need of arms and soldiery to support him?

The former question left unsolved: it is bad to have as kings the degenerate sons of noble parents; but it is natural for a parent to bequeath his power to his son.

The second question solved: the king ought to have a sufficient guard to enforce the laws.

CHAP. XVI.—An absolute monarchy not natural. It is better that the law should be supreme, than any citizen.

(1.) The citizens being all equal, it is unjust not to give them equal dignity.

(The law should be supreme, and the magistrates ministers of the law.)

(2.) The law is intellect free from all passions, and the supremacy of the law is but the supremacy of God under another name.

(The argument supported by the analogy of the medical art.)

(3.) Many eyes see better than one eye.

(4.) Two good men are better than one.

(5.) The policy of kings in power proves the superiority of aristocracy; for they impart a share of their power to friends.

CHAP. XVII.—Men are not all fitted to one kind of government; but some to a despotism, others to a political state.

Three kinds of government are natural; monarchy, aristocracy, and a republic; the others are unnatural.

In a true and well-constituted republic, all the citizens should have a share of rule.

Any person of pre-eminent merit ought to be chosen king; for any other arrangement will involve an inequality and absurdity.

The same course of education and training which make a good man, will also make a good citizen or king.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTORY. — THIS book contains three parts: (1.) Chap. i.—iii., which treats of states in general. (2.) Chap. v.—xiii., of their different forms. (3.) Chap. xiv.—xvi., the component parts of a free state.

CHAP. I.—The politician ought to be acquainted with four things;

(1.) What is the best ideal and abstract polity.

(2.) What is the best viewed practically.

(3.) The nature of the constitution of his own state and its means of preservation.

(4.) What government is best suited to all states.

Argument drawn from analogy of the arts and sciences.

The medical art ought to ascertain the best abstract bodily condition, the same viewed practically, and so forth.

The politician ought to study existing forms of government, and existing laws.

CHAP. II. A repetition of what was said in the last book concerning monarchy and aristocracy, and the division of governments into natural and unnatural.

We come now to consider a polity properly so called; and also to treat of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.

A tyranny is the worst perversion, as being the corruption of the best form.

And consequently a democracy is the least bad perversion.

An outline of our future method.

CHAP. III.—A variety of constituent parts causes a corresponding variety in the forms of government.

The rich and the poor, the noble and ignoble, etc., constitute these different parts.

The noble, too, may be so called, from their riches, or their birth, or their personal merit.

The error of those who reckon only two forms of government, oligarchy and democracy.

CHAP. IV.—The test of a democracy is the supreme power being vested in its poor but free citizens, as superior in numbers to the rest.

That of an oligarchy in its being vested in the wealthy citizens, though inferior in numbers.

As the various genera of animals are distinguished by the varied composition of their bodily organs, so it is in polities.

And their different genera are subdivided into various minuter species.

The component parts of a state are eight different classes.

Plato censured for introducing into his state none but such as are employed in necessary matters of daily life, omitting such as belong to the liberal arts.

Five classes of democracies; the last of which is tyrannical, because the laws are not supreme in it.

CHAP. V.—Oligarchy distinguished into its four kinds.

(1.) When its members are chosen from a high census.

(2.) When its members are chosen from a low census, to supply vacancies.

(3.) Hereditary.

(4.) When the richest individual is chosen, without regard to the law or merit. This tyrannical, and called a dynasty.

CHAP. VI.—Democracy similarly distinguished into its four kinds.

In what cases the four kinds of oligarchy are respectively found.

CHAP. VII.—A polity, properly so called, very rarely found in existence.

There are three kinds of aristocracy, to be distinguished from each other.

CHAP. VIII.—A polity or republic.

It is an admixture or fusion together of oligarchy and democracy; its offices being open, as in the former, to the rich, and to the poor, as in the latter.

And hence, it is called an aristocracy or a democracy, according as it tends to the one or the other of these extremes.

But the name of an aristocracy is not rightly given to it; for an aristocracy and an oligarchy differ very widely.

CHAP. IX.—The origin of a polity considered.

It arises from a fusion of oligarchic and democratic principles; and this in three ways.

(1.) Where a fine is laid on the rich, and pay is given to the poor.

(2.) Where the standard is moderate for the admission of citizens to political power.

(3.) Where an oligarchic principle (such as election by votes) is combined with a democratic principle (such as election of persons without an income).

The first test of a good admixture is, if you are able to call the same state by either name indiscriminately; for each extreme should be recognised in the mean.

CHAP. X.—Three kinds of tyranny. (1.) That among barbarians. (2.) The Œsymnetic.

These are not tyrannies, but monarchies, if exercised over willing subjects.

Upon this point, see above, book iii.

(3.) The last kind is that which is the most perfect counterpart to monarchy; viz. where one individual is supreme and irresponsible, and consults his own interest, and not that of his subjects.

CHAP. XI.—The best practicable form of government and the happiest state is that in which the middle ranks are very numerous.

For the upper ranks, if many, become factious and despotic: the lower classes, if they preponderate, produce fraud and malice, and tend to servility.

The middle state safest and best.

This kind of republic is rarely found, because a large middle class is rare: so democracies and oligarchies prevail.

The best form of democracy, or of oligarchy, is that which most nearly approximates to this polity: the worst, which departs furthest from it.

CHAP. XII.—The conservative element ought to have greater weight and authority in a state than the element which is given to change.

There are two things in a state, quality and quantity.

By quantity is meant numbers; by quality, wealth, nobility, etc.

Sometimes the one party excels in quantity, and the other in quality.

A democracy is best where the popular party by its quantity surpasses the quality of the nobler class; an oligarchy, where the contrary takes place.

The law to be especially directed to the interests of the middle class.

The mistakes of statesmen who seek to bend states towards aristocracy.

The riches of the wealthy more to be feared than the humble state of the poor; for the people will easily rise against a wealthy nobility.

CHAP. XIII.—The tricks used by nobles against the poor, and by the poor against the nobles.

(1.) The rich nobles cajole the lower orders in matters connected with the assembly, the magistracies, the law courts, the arms, the exercises.

(2.) On the contrary, the people have their own weapons of defence; in oligarchies they fine the rich, in democracies they pay the poor for attendance at the council.

In a polity, rightly so called, the chief power lies in the hands of the soldiery.

After the cessation of monarchy in Greece, the soldiery constituted the state; first the cavalry, and second, the foot-soldiers.

CHAP. XIV.—There are three departments in every republic: the deliberative, the executive, and the judicial.

The first of these is the chief. A share in its deliberations is either given to all citizens, (in which case it is democratic;) or else to a few only, (which renders it oligarchic;) or such a share is given to all in certain matters only; or to a select few in certain matters.

The tendency of the state affected by the mode of election. It will be aristocratic, if the election is by vote; democratic, if by lot.

Democratical and oligarchical precepts.

In democracies pay should be given to the poor for attendance; the rich should be fined for absenting themselves.

Persons to be chosen from all ranks for deliberation.

In an oligarchy, some few members of the senate should be chosen by the people.

Power of deliberation to be given to all members of the state; but of execution, only to the magistrates.

The power of pardon to be given to the many; of condemnation, to the magistrates only.

CHAP. XV.—As to the magistracy, a question arises as to what and how many they should be, perpetual or not, and from what class they should be chosen.

A magistrate defined as one who has the right of deliberation, of judging, and of ordaining, but especially the last right.

With respect to an union of more than one office in a

single magistrate, it is laid down that in large states such an arrangement is not proper, but necessary in a small one.

Different magistracies are necessary in different governments.

Magistrates to inspect the behaviour of the youths and of the women.

CHAP. XVI.—As to the judicial department, there are eight different courts and tribunals.

Courts for civil matters.

Different modes of electing judges.

What method suits a democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy

BOOK V.

INTRODUCTORY.—THIS book, (which, together with the following one, Gillies regards as supplemental to the rest, and therefore places last in order, as Books VII. and VIII.,) contains two parts: (1.) Chap. i—iv. On the causes of the preservation and overthrow of democratic states; (2.) Chap. v.—xii. On those of a monarchy or tyranny.

CHAP. I.—The origin of all sedition lies in false views of equality.

Persons are apt to think that because they are equal in one point, they are equal in all.

And hence they desire complete equality.

Others, of higher rank, desire not equality, but superiority.

How changes of governments take place.

(1.) When their form is changed into another.

(2.) When the form remains, but the ruling body is changed.

(3.) When the form and the ruling body remaining, the government departs from its own theory, or carries out its own principles to a further length.

Democracy and oligarchy are practically the most common forms of government.

Governments generally fail through being based on a wrong principle at first.

An oligarchy is less safe than a democracy, because composed of a larger number of individuals of the middle class.

CHAP. II.—The first cause of sedition is a false idea of equality,

(see chap. i.,) when citizens forget that equality is not absolute, but relative.

Another is the desire of gain and honours, with fear of their opposites.

Several other causes enumerated.

CHAP. III.—Further exposition of the eleven causes of sedition mentioned in the preceding chapter, illustrated by examples.

Origin of ostracism.

Difference of race, or of site, or of merit, tends to sedition.

Historical examples of seditions.

CHAP. IV.—Republics are sometimes disturbed by seditions on trifling matters; e. g. by love affairs.

Dissensions are the bane of all states.

The state suffers perversion by changes of party or of ranks in the state.

Two special methods of overthrowing a state; treachery and violence.

Different kinds under each method.

CHAP. V.—Thus far as to the overthrow of governments in general: now of particular kinds.

As to a democracy, it is overthrown by the petulance of mob orators.

It generally becomes changed into a tyranny, or an oligarchy, or some better or worse form of democracy.

CHAP. VI.—As to an oligarchy; it is overthrown by two especial causes:

Either by the violence of the nobles towards the lower orders; or

By the internal dissensions of its rulers.

CHAP. VII.—An aristocracy is subverted by several causes.

By reason of the fewness of those who share in honours.

Through the nobles being partly rich and partly poor.

If one of the nobles is too pre-eminent; for so he comes to aim at a tyranny.

Through a transgression of justice. This cause is common also to a polity; and it arises in either case from the fact that the constituent parts of each are not well blended together.

All states are mostly changed into that form towards which they naturally incline.

Sometimes, however, it is otherwise ; e. g. an aristocracy changes into a democracy, when the popular party are not content with having crushed the nobles, but take the entire government into their own hands.

The same happens not only by internal causes, but also by the operation of external causes ; as through the proximity of a hostile state, or the plots of a powerful enemy though distant.

CHAP. VIII.—The causes of a state's preservation.

The exact observance of the laws, and precautions against innovations.

The prudent conduct of the magistrates towards their subjects.

The vigilance and concord of the rulers.

The settlement of differences by a legislator, and not by chance hands.

A fair and equitable census. Precaution against allowing any individual to grow too powerful.

The creation of a magistrate to see that the citizens conduct themselves aright towards the state.

Care to keep the various parts of the state in due proportion.

The prevention of persons from making a gain or traffic of government.

The good treatment of the ruled by their rulers.

Due regulation of property bequeathed.

If some advantages are bestowed on those who are not in office.

CHAP. IX.—The rulers in a state should be patriots, skilled in their duties, and virtuous.

To preserve states which are themselves deflexions, mediocrity must be observed. e. g. Into a democracy some anti-democratic principle should be infused.

Danger of an unmixed oligarchy and democracy.

In a democracy the demagogues should favour the powerful ; the opposite in an oligarchy.

In every state, whether oligarchic or democratic, the

citizens should be educated and trained in a matter suited to it.

CHAP. X.—Monarchy, and the causes of its destruction.

Monarchies reduced to two kinds: monarchy proper, and tyranny.

The same causes tend to overthrow a monarchy as other states; for a monarchy follows the form of an aristocracy, a tyranny that of an oligarchy.

Hence tyranny is the worst of all bad forms of government.

Monarchy and tyranny have a different origin; a king is chosen from the good, for protection; a tyrant from the commons, for oppression.

A tyranny and a monarchy are different in their ends, objects, and circumstances.

A tyranny and an oligarchy have in common the pursuit of riches.

A tyranny and a democracy have in common their hatred towards the chiefs and leaders of the state.

The same things as those above related are the causes of the overthrow and preservation of monarchies. (See above, chap. ii. and iii.)

To the above causes we may add φιλοτιμία, or ambition.

The external and internal causes of the overthrow of tyrannies and of monarchies are different.

The causes which tend to overthrow tyrannies are the same as those which subvert extreme oligarchies and democracies.

Monarchies are seldom destroyed by external causes, but by two internal ones; viz. discord between the heirs to a throne, and the assumption of illegal powers.

CHAP. XI.—The means of preserving monarchies are the contraries to the means of their overthrow.

The first cause of preservation is due moderation.

A tyranny may be preserved by great cruelty, or by great indulgence.

(The object of a tyranny is to corrupt its subjects, and to cause them to distrust each other.)

A monarchy is rule over a willing, tyranny over an unwilling, people.

A tyranny, in order to be stable, should assume, as far as possible, the appearance of a monarchy.

It should pretend to affability, moderation, and a regard for religion and virtue.

A tyrant should try to be neither exactly good nor bad but ἡμιπονηρὸς καὶ ἡμιχρηστός, half good and half wicked.

CHAP. XII.—Of all forms of government, oligarchy and tyranny are the least stable. Reason why such is the case.

Censure of the errors of Plato concerning the changes to which states are subject.

First, Plato assigns as a cause the general flux in which all things are, and explains the reason by his theory of harmonic numbers. But numbers cannot be causes of such changes.

Some are by nature so bad that they cannot be made good by any means.

Secondly, Plato asserts that these changes take place in a fixed order and method; but states do not always change into the same kind of forms.

Thirdly, He has laid down nothing concerning tyranny.

Fourthly, He has made oligarchy not one form of government, but two.

Lastly, He asserts that an oligarchy always changes into a democracy.

BOOK VI.

INTRODUCTORY.—THIS book comprises three parts; (1.) Chap. i. Explanation of the method and matter contained. (2.) Chap. ii.—vi. Further dissertations on democracy and oligarchy, which is a kind of appendix to Book IV. (3.) Chap. vii. viii. Treating of the various kinds of magistrates.

CHAP. I.—A brief repetition of what has been already laid down in books IV. and V., concerning the senate, the magistrates, and the judicial body, as also concerning the corruption and preservation of states.

The union and fusion of the democratic and oligarchic forms of government.

Democracies are of various kinds—reasons why such is the case.

CHAP. II.—Liberty the end of democracy.

Two notes of liberty: first, a share of governing and being governed alternately.

Second, the right of living at will.

Hence these two things are the concomitants of democracy.

The institutions of a democracy are,

(1.) The election of magistrates from the whole body of citizens.

(2.) That all shall have power over each and each over all

(3. The election of magistrates by lot.

(4.) The absence of a fixed census as a qualification for office.

(5.) That no office be held twice, (6.) nor for a permanency.

(7.) That all shall have the right of judging over all causes.

(8.) The supremacy of the ecclesia, or popular assembly, over the *βουλή*, or senate.

(9.) Pay to be given to certain magistrates.

The *βουλή* will have greater power when no pay is offered to the people for their attendance in the ecclesia, or in the courts of justice.

CHAP. III.—The rights of the people in a democracy.

Is the decision of the majority, or of the leaders, or of the wealthy few, to be binding?

That which is affirmed by the majority of both rich and poor should be deemed binding.

One rich man's vote should be equal to that of two poor men.

If the votes are equal, the matter must be decided by lot, or by some other way.

CHAP. IV.—Of the four kinds of democracies, the earliest or agricultural kind is the best.

The people should have conceded to them the right of electing their magistrates and of calling them to account.

It is bad to exclude any section of the community from office, as such a proceeding tends to foster seditions.

The best method of appointing and regulating the magistrates.

Agrarian regulations—share of land held by each person to be limited by law.

Of the other kinds, that which is composed of shepherds is best.

Other kinds of democracies—the last and worst—the reason why it is not apt to be permanent.

A democracy should be strengthened by taking care that the plebs out-number the rest; by an increase in the tribes; by confiscating private sacred rights; by a general fusion of all ranks and classes; and by giving general licence to indulgence.

CHAP. V.—Care to be taken not only in appointing, but also in preserving a state.

The property of the citizens not to be confiscated, but to be consecrated.

Trials to be as few as possible—so also meetings of the popular assembly.

The people not to be suffered to sink too deeply into poverty.

Five means of preserving the people from poverty enumerated.

CHAP. VI.—As to an oligarchy, the means of preserving it are to be inferred from what has been said upon the subject of democracy.

In the best and purest oligarchy, the highest magistracies should be given to those who have the highest census, the lesser to those who are poorer.

It is for the interest of an oligarchy to confer some lesser offices on men of slender means.

In the second kind of oligarchy a higher census is to be required, so that fewer persons may be in office.

The third and worst kind is most tyrannical, and requires the greatest attention.

A large number of citizens suits a democracy, a smaller number, if well ordered, suits an oligarchy.

CHAP. VII.—The commonalty divided into four classes suited to a peaceable life, and four warlike classes.

The worst kind of oligarchy will arise where the land is suited to cavalry.

The middle kind of oligarchy, where the land is suited to foot-soldiers.

Light-armed troops and seamen suit a democracy.

Light-armed troops to be mixed with the hoplites and cavalry.

Circumstances under which the plebeians in an oligarchy may be chosen for office.

The duty of rulers in oligarchies to give sumptuous "liturgies."

CHAP. VIII.—Magistrates, civil, religious, and extraordinary.

What civil magistrates are indispensable to the existence of a state.

Six different offices enumerated.

Some other magistrates of a higher order enumerated.

Religious magistrates—priests.

Extraordinary magistrates—officers to superintend the women and children—the theatres and games—Nomophylaces.

What magistrates are suited to each respective form of government.

BOOK VII.

INTRODUCTORY.—THIS book contains three parts. (1.) Chap. i.—iv. Prefatory—concerning the best state and the best life. (2.) Chap. v.—xiii., containing certain principles as to the theoretic construction of a state. (3.) Chap. xiv.—xvii., in which Aristotle commences the practical consideration of the education, training, matrimony, etc., of the citizens of the best state, which he continues throughout the next book, to the end of his treatise, at least as it exists in its present state.

CHAP. I.—The politician should have clear views of the best life, for this and the best form of government cannot be disjoined.

The happiest life is that which is based on virtue; and our happiness is proportioned to our virtue.

That a life of virtue is best for a state may be proved

by the same arguments which prove it to be the best for individuals.

External goods come in as auxiliaries (*χορηγία*).

CHAP. II.—The chief good of the state is identical with that of the individual; viz. happiness.

Those therefore who regard happiness as consisting in riches, make riches the end of a state; and so forth.

So also with reference to virtue.

Two questions proposed: first, Whether the philosophical or political life is superior?

Secondly, What is the best form of government?

That is to be regarded as the best government, in which a man can live the best.

But as to the former question, a dispute is raised.

Some propose dominion over neighbours, as the end of states, and estimate virtue by warlike prowess.

Reasons why the latter end cannot be right, and why such a state cannot be perfect or happy.

War not to be regarded as an end, but as a means.

The duty of a politician is to consider the true interest and happiness of the citizens.

CHAP. III.—Is the political or contemplative life to be preferred?

Reasons for preferring the latter—"the life of a citizen is servile."

Reasons for entertaining the contrary opinion—"the contemplative life is indolent, and works no good."

Aristotle answers that not all obedience to government is servile.

Reasons for preferring upon the whole the political and practical life.

Mistake of politicians as to the practical life.

There are higher kinds of actions even than the carrying out of the details of government.

Philosophers, in consulting and advising, follow this higher line of action.

Character of the actions of God.

CHAP. IV.—The best and most perfect form of government requires certain external conditions, e. g. population, a fit site, climate, etc.

Only things practicable are to be desired. Hence Plato's errors.

The real power of the citizens not to be reckoned by their mere numbers; the best city will be the greatest.

Slaves, and low mechanics, etc., are not parts of the state in reality.

Too large a population not to be regarded as a sign of strength: it is not easily managed by the law.

States, like every thing besides, should have a certain definite size—the best size is one such as can be controlled by the laws, while it makes the state independent, and enables the citizens to become known to each other.

CHAP. V.—The site of the city should possess various advantages.

It should be self-sufficient in productiveness:

Inaccessible to enemies; easy of access to its own members:

Commodious for sea and land traffic.

CHAP. VI.—Commerce by sea profitable to the state.

Advantages and dangers arising from commerce.

Too large a force of sailors not to be maintained in the best state.

CHAP. VII.—The citizens of this state ought to be ingenious and brave.

The particular merits of the European and northern nations; their bravery.

Character of the Asiatics; the reasons of it.

The middle position of Greece; its advantages.

Influence of climate on national temperament.

Civil war most deadly in its character and results.

CHAP. VIII.—Many things necessary to a state, but not parts of it; e. g. food.

Things necessary for a state.

CHAP. IX.—In a democracy, different offices may be combined in one individual.

Illiberal arts and trades forbidden to the citizens of the best state.

Military power to be intrusted to the young; political to the elder.

Some amount of wealth necessary for the citizens.
The priestly order to be chosen from the upper ranks.

CHAP. X.—Things invented at the earliest date are most necessary.
The land should be partly public and partly private; and each of these divided again into two portions.
The tillers of the land should be a servile race.

CHAP. XI.—In choosing a site, regard should be had to health, to security from attack, to a good supply of water, etc.
A lofty acropolis suits a monarchy or oligarchy; a level plain suits a democracy; a quantity of strong places suits an aristocracy.
Private houses how to be arranged.

CHAP. XII.—The public tables to be held on the ramparts.
Temples of the gods to be set apart from profane uses.
The gymnasia; the forum; syssities of the priests and magistrates.
Regulations for the country districts.
Temples to be consecrated to the gods and heroes.

CHAP. XIII.—To be happy, one must choose a good end and good means.
All seek happiness; but the good need fewer things than the bad in order to attain to it.
The test of a good state is the goodness of its citizens; and men become good by nature, by habit, and by reason.

CHAP. XIV.—Internal discipline. Interchange of government requisite, except where a person of heroic virtue is found.
Obedience the best stepping-stone towards command.
War to be sought for the sake of peace. Hence the error of the Spartan constitution.

CHAP. XV.—Philosophy more necessary in the time of peace.
Moral virtues required both in peace and in war.
The body to be taken care of before the soul in order of time; but only for the sake of the soul.
The passions to be disciplined for the sake of the intellect.

CHAP. XVI.—The legislator should regulate the marriage of the citizens.

Age for marriage—time of year—state of health.
Abortion allowed as a check to population.

CHAP. XVII.—Early rearing of children—diet—manner of life.
Amusements—exercise—fables and stories.
Periods of life for a change in education; at seven; at fourteen; and at twenty-one. Manhood.

BOOK VIII.

INTRODUCTORY.—CONTAINS seven chapters, all on the instruction of the young; comprising gymnastics, grammar, painting, and music. The book, as well as the entire treatise, has come down to us in a mutilated form. See observations above, p. xvii.

CHAP. I.—The legislator ought to take cognizance of the education of the youth; this proved by expediency.
All education should be directed by the same pattern and to the same end.
And, as the part exists for the sake of the whole, this end should be the good of the state.

CHAP. II.—Children first to be taught such useful arts as are not illiberal and mean.
It is not illiberal to study the liberal arts to a certain point; but they should not be studied to excess.[1]
To study them for their own sake, or for one's own sake, or for that of one's friends, is not illiberal, but to do so for money is mercenary.

CHAP. III.—The arts to be learned by youths are, (1.) Grammar and painting.
(2.) Gymnastics.
(3.) Music for recreation, rather than as a mere diversion.
Youths to be handed over when young to the wrestler and trainer.

CHAP. IV.—Gymnastics not to be enforced so far as to injure health, and so defeat their end.
Mistake of the Spartans.
Bravery not so often to be found in fierce as in gentler creatures.

[1] Du Vallius in his Synopsis suggests as an example in point, the case of Louis XI. of France, who would not allow his son, afterwards Charles VIII., to study literature.

The same true of men.

After the fourteenth year, should follow a space of three years spent in harder exercises.

The body and the mind not to be severely exercised at once.

CHAP. V.—On what account should music be cultivated?

For recreation, and for moral improvement. The moral effects of music.

Moral effects produced by some paintings.

The Doric and Phrygian harmonies; their opposite effects.

The Pythagorean and Platonic schools identify the soul with harmony.[1]

CHAP. VI.—Youths should learn music in order to practise it hereafter, as a source of amusement.

But not to an excess, nor on all instruments.[2]

CHAP. VII.—Three kinds of harmony: the moral; the practical; and the enthusiastic.

Various ends and objects of music: purification of the affections. (See Poetics.)

All harmonies to be used, but not in the same way.

The harmony to be suited to the hearer.

The Doric is of a moral kind, as between Lydian and Phrygian.

Different harmonies suit the old and the young.[3]

[1] Aristotle refutes this opinion in his first book de Animâ.

[2] Thus Alexander the Great, we are told, was severely censured by his father Philip, because he played skilfully on the lyre, "quod eximiè fidibus caneret." Plut. in Pericle.

[3] We append here the remarks of the learned Du Vall on this last chapter. "Sic finit Politica sua Aristoteles, quibus multa deesse vel hinc apparet, quod in puerorum institutione adhuc versetur. Conatus est Cyriacus Stroza, Patricius Florentinus, ea supplere quæ deesse videbantur, duobus libris Græcè et Latinè a se ad Aristotelis miram imitationem editis; ubi agit de facultate militari, principali, et sacerdotali. In quos suos libros ipse posuit argumentum satis clarum et facile. Quanquam Hubertus Gifanius Jurisconsultus duos illos Strozæ libros non satis convenienter instituto Aristotelis scriptos esse dicat."

ANALYSIS

OF

ARISTOTLE'S ECONOMICS.

PREFATORY REMARKS.—Like "Politics," it is to be observed that the term "Economics," in the language of ancient Greek philosophy, had a much wider signification than it now bears with us. It is almost superfluous to remark that, in the language of Aristotle, it signifies the science or art (for it is both) of managing and providing for the well-being of a family, (οἶκος,) the first natural combination to which man's social nature disposes him. See Politics, Book I. chaps. i. ii. viii. and xiii. If the Politics of Aristotle have come down to us in an imperfect state, much more is this the case with his Economics, which only just introduce the subject of domestic rule. The relation in which the Economics stand to the whole system of Aristotle's moral philosophy, as holding a middle post between his Ethics and Politics, has been already sufficiently touched upon in the introductory note, prefixed above, to the first book of the Politics (page xvii.). It only remains for the editor to add, that while some critics have gone so far as to doubt the genuineness of the first book of the Economics, a much greater suspicion, in the opinion of all, hangs over the second book; and that it existed for many ages only in a Latin version, from which it was translated back again into Greek by Aretinus or Tusanus. Sylburgius regards the whole of the second book as spurious, and in fact believes the chapters of which it consists to have been "supposita ab Aretino, non conversa." However, he follows Camerarius in admitting what is generally known as the first chapter, as standing on a somewhat different footing from the rest, and accordingly he prints it as belonging to Book I. It should be observed, however, that Plutarch, in his Life of Aristotle, expressly attributes to Aristotle two books on the subject of the economic art. We have, therefore, given the whole of the so-called second book in this edition; the translation of it is entirely original,

and it is believed that no attempt has hitherto been made to present the reader with an English version.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.—Economics distinguished from Politics, (1.) By their subjects. (2.) By their objects.

The economic art is one which both provides and executes.

It is anterior in point of time to the political art or science.

CHAP. II.—A repetition of sundry arguments already given in Politics, I. chaps. i. and ii., as to the origin of civil society.

CHAP. III.—The conjugal relation ; its ends and objects.

The providence of God shown in this respect.

The share of the man and of the woman as to property, and as to the education of children.

CHAP. IV.—The husband may not injure the wife by adultery.

It is better to marry a maiden. Display in dress to be avoided.

CHAP. V.—The herile relation. A master's duty towards his slaves.

Slaves of two kinds. Liberty ought to be given as the reward of good behaviour.

CHAP. VI.—The duty of an *οἰκόνομος* is to procure, preserve, and use property.

Certain practical precepts relative to domestic economy.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.—Four kinds of economy : the monarchical, the satrapical, the political, and private or domestic.

Subdivisions of the above.

CHAP. II.—XLI.—Clever artifices by which individuals have collected large sums of money.

" Sed hac solâ indigent lectione, ut intelligantur."

END OF ANALYSIS.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

OR,

TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

POLITICS, or the political science, (as has been observed in the Analytical Introduction to the Ethics,) was understood by Aristotle, and indeed by all the ancient philosophers, not in the narrow and restricted sense to which modern ideas have confined it, but as a science investigating the subject of human good and the nature of man, not merely as an *individual*, but as a *member of the family* and *of the state*. Hence it naturally divides itself into three corresponding parts; *Ethics*, which treat of man's nature and good, apart from the social relations; and *Economics* and *Politics*, which view him under the social relations of the family (οἶκος) and the state (πόλις) respectively. Occasionally, however, the word πολιτική is used in a wider, as well as in its narrower, sense, both as embracing the two other branches, and as exclusive of them. In the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Arist. speaks of education, and shows that it is the duty of every state to educate its members, and that the study of legislation is necessary in order to qualify persons to undertake the education of others, he expresses his intention to write at length upon the subject of politics; and in the last words of the chapter, he even goes so far as to sketch out the three divisions of the present treatise, thus: "Since . . . all former authors have passed over without examination the subject of legislation, it would be better perhaps for us to examine it ourselves, and, in short, the whole subject of politics, in order that the philosophy of human nature may, as far as in our power, be completed. . . . . Let us then make a commencement." (Eth. x. ch. 9.) The present treatise is that to which he here refers; and it is divisible into three general parts, (1.) B. i. and ii. (2.) B. iii.—vi. (3.) B. vii. and viii.

The following table of the division of Philosophy in general, according to the Stoic and the Peripatetic schools respectively, will be useful. It may be observed in passing that Cicero mainly follows the former of these divisions, Aristotle the latter.

A. *Stoical division.* Of φιλοσοφία.
1. Φυσική (the laws of nature).
2. ἠθική, or πολιτική (moral or political science; that of human nature).
3. λογική (the exact sciences).

B. *Peripatetic division.* Of φιλοσοφία, followed by Aristotle.
1. θεωρητική,
   α. φυσική.
   β. μεταφυσική.
   γ. μαθηματική, including number, music, geometry, astronomy.
2. πρακτική,
   α. ἠθική.
   β. οἰκονομική.
   γ. πολιτική.

100

BOOK I.—CHAP. I.

All states aim at some good, and the highest at the highest good.

As we see that every state is a society, and that every society is established for the sake of some good end;[1] (for an apparent good is the spring of all human actions;) it is evident that all societies aim at some good or other: and this is more especially true of that which aims at the highest possible end, and is itself the most excellent, and embraces all the rest.[2] Now this is that which is called a state, and forms a political society. For those are greatly at fault, who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a domestic, and a despotic government are the same; inasmuch as they suppose that each of these differ merely in point of number, and not in kind: so that with them a despotic government is one composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still more, as if there were no difference between a large family and a small city; and they hold that a regal and political government are the same things; only that in the one, a single person is continually at the head of affairs, while in the other, each individual in his

Errors of former political writers.

[1] What Aristotle had asserted in his Ethics as true of the various faculties of man, viewed alone and by themselves, he here asserts as true of the social state; that is, of man in his various natural relations to his fellow men. Compare Eth. i. 1, "Every art and every scientific system, and in like manner every course of action and deliberate preference, seems to aim at some good; and, consequently, '*The Good*' has been defined as 'that which all things aim at.'" The word "good" is to be taken in its most extensive signification; utility, in the strict sense, constituting but one branch, and that the lowest, of "the good." See Ethics, i. and x. passim. Plato uses the word *ὠφέλιμον* nearly in the same sense. *κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον κάλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.* Plato, Repub. book v. "This is most excellently said, and will ever continue to be said, that whatever is useful is honourable, and whatever is hurtful is shameful." In his Gorgias, *τὸ καλὸν* is analyzed into pleasure and utility; the latter being different from *τὸ χρήσιμον*, which denotes merely what is good and desirable, not in itself, but as a means useful or subservient to some further end.

[2] *ἡ κυριωτάτη.* Compare ch. 2, "But when many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a state, (*πόλις,*) and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence; it is indeed first founded that men may live, but continued that they may live happily."

turn becomes a magistrate and again a private person, according to the rules of political science. Now this is not true; and what we say will be evident to any one who will consider this question after the approved method. For as, in every other subject, it is necessary to separate its component nature, till we arrive at its first elements,[1] which are the most minute parts thereof; so by viewing the first elements of which a state[2] is composed, we shall see wherein states differ from each other, and whether it is possible to arrive at any systematic knowledge concerning each of the points above mentioned.

A state or community to be considered first in its component parts.

[1] Physical analysis reduces objects to their component parts. Philosophical analysis, to their original causes. The method here adopted is the former. A state is considered as consisting of various members. Viewed philosophically, indeed, the state exists before its component parts, *πρότερον ἡ πόλις φύσει ἢ οἰκία ἢ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*. Inf. c. 2. So a house exists in the architect's mind, before he brings the materials together: but, physically speaking, the materials exist first, and the house is afterwards composed of them.

[2] As at the commencement of this book Aristotle begins his philosophical analysis of the real nature of a state, (*πόλις*, or *πολιτεία*,) it may be well to insert here a few words upon the subject, for the benefit of the English reader. "If we would picture to ourselves the true notion which the Greeks embodied in the word *πόλις*, we must lay aside all modern ideas respecting the nature and object of a state With us, practically, if not in theory, the *essential* object of a state hardly embraces more than the protection of life and property. The Greeks, on the other hand, had the most vivid conception of the state as a whole, or system, every part of which was to co-operate towards some great end to which all other duties were considered as subordinate. Thus the aim of democracy was said to be liberty: wealth, of oligarchy; and education, of aristocracy. In all governments, the endeavour was to draw the social union as close as possible; and it seems to have been with this view that Aristotle laid down a principle which answered well enough to the accidental circumstances of the Grecian states, that a *πόλις* must be of a certain size. (See below, book vii. 4, and compare Eth. Nic. ix. 10.) This unity of purpose, marked as it was in all the states of Greece, was no where so fully carried out as at Sparta." Accordingly, we cannot be surprised to find that in discussing the nature of a *πόλις*, Aristotle begins with the question, "What constitutes a citizen?" (*πολίτης*). "He defines a citizen to be one who is a partner in the legislative and judicial functions of the state. No definition, of course, will apply equally to all the different states of Greece, or to any single state at different times; but the above seems to comprehend, more or less, properly all those whom the common use of language entitled to that name. . . . Recurring to Aristotle's definition we find the essential properties of Athenian citizen-

CHAP. II.

A state viewed in its beginnings.

Necessary relations of (1.) man and wife, (2.) master and slave.

Now if any one would watch the parts of a state from the very first as they rise into existence, as in other matters, so here he would gain the truest view of the subject.[1] In the first place, then, it is requisite that those should be joined together, which cannot exist without each other, as the male and the[2] female, for the business of propagation; and this not through deliberate choice, but by that natural impulse which acts both in plants and in animals, namely, the desire of leaving behind them others like themselves. By nature too some beings command, and others obey, for the sake of mutual safety; for a being endowed with discernment and forethought is by nature the superior and governor; whereas he who is merely able to execute by bodily labour, is the inferior and a natural slave; and hence the interest of master

ship to have consisted in the share possessed by every citizen in the legislature, in the election of magistrates, in the δοκιμασία, and in the courts of justice." (See Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiq., article *Civitas*, pp. 231–236.) For further information on this subject, the reader is referred to the Analysis of the 8th book of Aristotle's Ethics prefixed to the translation of that work by Prof. R. W. Browne. (Bohn's Classical Library.)

[1] There are upon the whole two views held concerning the origin of society:—

1. That it arose by *compact*. (Hobbes.)
2. That it arose by *nature*. (Aristotle.)

In support of the theory of Aristotle, it is observed by Wachsmuth, that "to assume an agreement with a view to political society, before the commencement and trial of the same, is nearly tantamount to the proposition of Lord Monboddo, which affirms that language was the result of an agreement entered into for the purpose of calling it into existence."

[2] Compare Ethics, b. viii. ch. 12. "Between husband and wife, friendship is thought to exist by nature; for man is by nature a being inclined to live in pairs rather than in societies, inasmuch as a family is prior in point of time and more necessary than a state, and procreation is more common to him, together with animals. To other animals, therefore, community proceeds thus far only; but human beings associate, not only for the sake of procreation, but for the affairs of life." Compare also Cicero de Off. b. i. ch. 17. Nam quum sit hoc naturâ commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est, proxima in liberis; deinde una domus, communia omnia." The whole chapter is useful, as proving that Aristotle believed in the progressive expansion of human sympathies

and slave is identical. But there is a natural difference between the female and the slave; for nature does nothing meanly, like artists who make the Delphic swords; but she has one instrument for one end; for thus her instruments are most likely to be brought to perfection, being made to contribute to one end, and not to many. Yet, among Barbarians, the female and the slave are upon a level in the community; the reason for which is, that they are not fitted by nature to rule; and so their relationship becomes merely that between slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say,

"Tis meet that barbarous tribes to Greeks should bow."

as if a barbarian and a slave were by nature one and the same. Now of these two societies the domestic tie is the first, and Hesiod[1] is right when he says,

From these relations arises first the family (οἶκος), then the village (κωμη), and lastly the state (πόλις).

"First house, then wife, then oxen for the plough;"

for the ox is to the poor man in the place of a household slave. That society, then, which nature has established for daily support, is a family (οἶκος), and those who compose it are called by Charondas Ὁμοσίπυοι,[2] and by Epimenides the Cretan Ὁμόκαπνοι. But the society of many families, which was instituted for lasting and mutual advantage, is called a village (κώμη), and a village is most naturally composed of the emigrant members of one family, whom some persons call Ὁμογάλακτες,[3] the children and the children's children. And hence, by the way, states were originally governed by kings,[4] as the Barbarians now are; for they were composed of those who always were under kingly government. For every family is governed by the elder,

An οἶκος defined.

A κώμη defined.

Antiquity of regal government, and its

[1] So Exod. ch. xx., "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's *wife*, nor his *servant*, nor his maid, nor his *ox*, nor his ass," &c.

[2] ὁμοσίπυος, "feeding at the same manger;" ὁμόκαπνος, "using the same hearth;" ὁμόκαπος, "eating together," from κάπη.

[3] See Blomf. on Æsch. Agam. i. 697.

[4] If states are under kings it is a σημεῖον that the first families were under kings.

If the first families were under kings, it is an εἰκός that states should be so now. (Rhet. i. 2.)

Identity with paternal rule.

as are its branches, on account of their relationship; and this is what Homer[1] says,

"Then each his wife and child doth rule,"

for in this scattered manner they formerly lived. And the general opinion which makes the gods themselves subject to kingly government, arises from the fact that most men formerly were, and many are so now; and as they hold the gods to be like themselves in form, so they suppose their manner of life must needs be the same. But when many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a state, (πόλις,) and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence; and it is first founded that men may live, but continued that they may live happily.[2] For which reason every state is the work of nature,[3] since the first social ties are such; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house; besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident, that a state is one of the works of nature, and that man is naturally a political animal, and that whosoever is naturally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, must be either inferior or superior to man; just as the person reviled in Homer,

A πόλις defined.

Man by nature social (πολιτικός). Proof of this fact.

[1] These words occur Odyss. ix. 114, and are spoken of the Cyclopes.

[2] Aristotle's threefold division of the grades of society are οἶκος, κώμη, and πόλις; that of Dicæarchus is nearly equivalent, for he calls them φυλή, φρατρία, and πατρία. Goettling's paraphrase of this passage is as follows: "Initio reipublicæ homines in hunc finem conveniunt, ut vitam sibi invicem tueantur; sed hic non est finis veræ reipublicæ, qui in eo potius consistit, ut beatè vivant cives." See below, iii. 5, εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν ἑνέκα, ἀλλα μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. Plato Rep. ii. 359, ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκεύη τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἑνέκα. Ib. γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.

[3] 1. Civil government is natural: for
α. It is the end of the first κοινωνίαι.
β. Its end is the end of man's moral nature (αὐτάρκεια).
2 Civil government is by nature prior to all government, and to the individual; for the whole is by nature prior to its parts.

'No tribe, nor state, nor home hath he."

For he whose nature is such as this, must needs be a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey.[1] It is clear, then, that man is truly a more social animal than bees, or any of the herding cattle; for nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has reason. Speech indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, is imparted to other beings also, and thus far their nature extends; they can perceive pleasure and pain, and can impart these sensations to others; but speech is given to us to express what is useful or hurtful to us, and also what is just and unjust; for in this particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has a perception of good and evil, of justice and injustice, and it is the interchange of these common sentiments which forms a family and a city. And further, in the order of nature, the state is prior to the family or the individual; for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts; for if you take away the whole body, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains, unless by equivocation, as if any one should call a hand made of stone, a hand; for such only can it have when mutilated. But every thing is defined according to its effects and inherent powers, so that when these no longer remain such as they were, it cannot be said to be the same, but something of the same name. It is plain, then, that the state is prior to the individual,[2] for if an individual is not complete in himself, he bears the same relation to the state as other parts do to a whole; but he that is incapable of society, or so complete in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a state, but is either a beast or a god. There is then in all persons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this manner,[3] and he who first established civil society was the cause of the greatest

The πολις prior in order of nature to the οἶκος, and the latter to the individual.

No condition short of the πολις independent.

Man's natural tendency to it.

[1] The reading of Bekker here is ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς, "as in the game of draughts." We have retained the emendation proposed by Goettling, ὥσπερ ἐν πετεινοῖς—referring to the birds of prey, which are mostly solitary, or possibly to the story of the cuckoo.

[2] Goettling proposes to insert a comma after μὴ, and would render the passage thus; "For if this be not so, then each individual, being perfect in himself, will be in the same position as the other parts with respect to the whole."

[3] This shows that Arist. held civil government *to be* by nature, but

benefit; for as man, thus perfected, is the most excellent of all living beings, so without law and justice he would be the worst of all;[1] for nothing is so savage as injustice in arms; but man is born with a faculty of gaining himself arms by prudence and virtue; arms which yet he may apply to the most opposite purposes. And hence he who is devoid of virtue will be the most wicked and cruel, the most lustful and gluttonous being imaginable. Now justice is a social virtue; for it is the rule of the social state, and the very criterion of what is right.

CHAP. III.

The component parts of an οἶκος.

BUT, since it is now evident of what parts the state is composed, it will be necessary to treat first of family government,[2] for every state is made

be as it ought to be by law. He who first reduced this to system is praiseworthy, for man is born with most dangerous weapons, (*φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή*,) for *δεινότης* and *φυσικὴ ἀρετη*, which must be directed by moral science in the man, by political in the state.

[1] Eth. vii. 6, *ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔχει—μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.*

There are three reasons why we should not act carelessly as the brutes do.

1. We have certain *ὅπλα* which the brutes have not.

2. Because brutes act conformably to their whole nature in obeying their lusts; man does not.

3. Because, while brutes follow one desire only at a time, man follows several; we therefore want some guidance. See Butler's Pref. to Sermons, and Sermon i.

[2] For *οἰκίας* Goettling proposes to read *οἰκονομίας* in this place. As there is some little perplexity in what follows, it may be useful here to insert the table which he gives. It is as follows:

οἶκος is
- 1. to be ruled,
  - α. *δεσποτικῶς*, according to relation of master and slave.
  - β. *γαμικῶς*, ... husband and wife.
  - γ. *τεκνοποιητικῶς*, ... father and child.
- 2. to be maintained by *ἡ κτητική*,
  - α. *τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς κτήμασι.*
  - β. *τὸ πορίσασθαι τὰ χρήματα*, i. e. *ἡ χρηματιστική.*

(1.) *ἡ οἰκειοτάτη.* (2.) *ἡ μεταβλητική.* (3.) *ἡ μεταξύ.*

(α.) *ἡ περὶ τὰ ζῶα.* (β.) *ἡ περὶ γεωργίαν.* (α.) *ὑλοτομία.* (β.) *μεταλλευτική.*

(α.) *ἡ ἐμπορία.* (β.) *ὁ τοκισμός.* (γ.) *ἡ μισθαρνία.*

up of families, and every family has again its separate parts of which it is composed; and when a family is complete, it consists of freemen and slaves. But as in every subject we should first begin with examining into its component parts, and as the first and smallest parts of a family, are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the father and child, let us first inquire into these three relations, what each of them are, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the despotical, the conjugal, and thirdly the paternal; though these two latter relations have no peculiar established name. Let these then be considered as the three distinct parts of a family. Now there is a duty which some identify with the government of a family, while others regard it as constituting its most important part; I mean that of providing for its maintenance. Now we must inquire philosophically how the matter stands. But let us first speak of the master and the slave, that we may both understand what things are absolutely necessary, and also try if we can get to learn any thing better on this subject than what is already laid down. Some persons have thought that the power of the master over his slave is a certain science, and that the government of a family and a slave, political and regal government, are all the same things, just as we said at the beginning; but others think that despotic government is contrary to nature, and that it is custom only which makes one man a slave and another free, but that in nature there is no difference between them; for which reason that tie must be unjust, for it is founded in force.[1]

Three relations necessary in it, δεσποτική, γαμική, and τεκνοποιητική.

The relation of master and slave.

Some say that slaves are such νόμῳ but not φύσει.

CHAP. IV.

Since then a subsistence is implied in every family, the means of procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family, for without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. And as in all arts which have a definite end, they must needs have their proper instru-

Every art needs instru-

[1] This was the opinion of Milton, see Parad. Lost. b xii.

——"But man over men
He made not lord: such title to Himself
Reserving, human left from human free."

ments; and slaves are instruments in οἰκονομική.

ments if they would perfect their works, so is it in the art of managing a family. Now of instruments some are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the pilot of a ship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is a live instrument; and so too a servant is as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an instrument to living; and an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a slave is a living instrument, and every servant is an instrument more valuable than any other instrument. For if every instrument, at command, or from foreknowledge of its master's will, could accomplish its special work, (as the story goes of the statues of Dædalus,[1] or what the poet tells us of the tripods of Vulcan, how

"Self-taught they moved into the godlike course;")[2]

if the shuttle thus would weave, and the lyre play of itself; then neither would the architect want servants, nor the master slaves. Now what are generally called instruments, are the efficients of something else, but possessions are what we simply use: thus with a shuttle we make something else over and above its mere use; but we only use a cloak, or a bed: since then *making* and *using* differ from each other in kind, and they each require their own instruments, the latter also must be different from each other. Now life is a thing which we use, and not an efficient of something else; and hence the slave is a minister in matters of daily use. But a possession may be considered as a part of any thing; now a part is not only a part, but also wholly the property, of something else; and the same is true of a possession; therefore, while a master is only a master of the slave, but no part of him, the slave is not only the slave of the master, but also wholly his property. This fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what is his capacity; for that being, who by nature is not his own, but totally another's, and yet is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man is the property of another, who is his mere chattel, though he is still a man; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from the body.[3]

The slave is merely a part of the master.

[1] Mentioned by Plato: see Menexenus, ch. 39.

[2] Homer, Iliad xviii. 376.

[3] Compare the definition of the φύσει δοῦλος given below, ὁ δυνάμενος

CHAP. V.

The consideration of the justice of slavery postponed.

Slavery supported by analogies drawn from the relation of the body to the soul, of the animal creation to man, and of the female to the male.

But whether any person of such a nature exists, and whether it is right and just for any one to be a slave or no,[1] or whether all slavery is contrary to nature, must be considered hereafter. Not that it is difficult to take a philosophic view of the matter, or to infer it from matters of fact; for that some should govern and others be governed, is not only necessary but useful; and from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for the purpose of obeying, and others for ruling. There are, moreover, many species of both the governing and the governed. And the better those are who are governed, the better also is the government, as for instance that of man, rather than of a brute: for the more excellent the materials are with which the work is finished, the more excellent is the work; and wherever there is a governor and a governed, there certainly is some work produced. For whatsoever is composed of many parts, which together make up one whole, whether united or separate, evidently shows the marks of some one thing governing and another thing governed; and this is true of every living thing in all nature; nay, even in some things which partake not of life there is a principle of subjection, as in music;[2] but this matter probably belongs to

ἄλλου εἶναι. The whole train of reasoning adopted in this chapter, may serve to recall to the reader's mind a similar argument of Butler in his Analogy, part i. ch. 1, which, however, he uses for a very different purpose; namely, to show that our limbs are mere instruments and organs, and not essential parts of our actual selves.

[1] The sum is this, according to our author: "Slavery appears to me both necessary and expedient, as is shown by the existence of a ruling and a ruled principle, pervading all the orders of nature, and extending even to things inanimate. We may see a like analogy in the mind and body, and in the despotic rule exercised by the former over the latter. We see how wild animals are subjected by the tame; we see the female subject to the male; we see the well-born from their birth adapted to social life, and fit for the service of war; while the base-born are fitted only for the humble services which their bodies can render to a master. And all these analogies point to one single conclusion, viz. that slavery in some cases is in conformity with nature." With what limitations this is to be understood, will be seen in a later chapter of this book.

[2] In every chord of music there is what is technically called the "dominant note."

a disquisition somewhat foreign to our purpose. Every living thing, in the first place, is composed of soul and body, and of these the one is by nature the governor, the other the governed; now we must learn what is natural, by those things which are in accordance with nature, and not by those which are corrupted;[1] we should therefore examine into a man who is most perfectly formed both in soul and body; for in him this fact is evident; while in the depraved and vicious, the body would seem to rule rather than the soul, on account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature. Even in an animal, then, as we affirm, it is possible to discern the despotic and political government; for the soul governs the body as the master his slave;[2] but the mind governs the appetite, with a political or kingly power; which shows that it is both natural and advantageous that the body should be governed by the soul, and the seat of the passions by the mind and that part which is possessed of reason; but equality of rule, or power inverted, is hurtful to all. And this holds true not only of man, but of other animals also; for tame animals are naturally better than wild ones, and yet it is advantageous to all these that they should be subject to man; for thus they insure their own safety. So too is it naturally with the male and the female; the one is superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is governed; and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to all mankind. Whoever, therefore, are as much inferior to their fellows as the body is to the soul, or the brutes to men,—(and this is in reality the case with all whose proper use is in their bodies, and whose highest excel-

Men born with different qualities of body as well as of soul.

What shall be taken as the standard? Not the bodies of those who labour under some defect or other; for these clearly fall short of the design of nature; but we must look for our standard and pattern to those who, as it were, have reached their full growth, for in their case only nature has seen her design realized. Hence they alone can be rightly said to be *κατὰ φύσιν*.

[2] Conf. Ar. Eth. v. sub finem. *κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον.* Compare Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i. 8, 5. "When we come to observe in ourselves of what excellency are our souls in comparison of our bodies, and the diviner part in relation to the baser part of our souls, seeing that all these concur in producing human actions, it cannot be well unless the chiefest do command and direct the rest."

ence consists in this part,)—these, I say, are slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to them to be always under this kind of government, inasmuch as it is advantageous to those above-mentioned. He then is by nature formed a slave, who is fitted to become the chattel of another person, and on that account is so, and who has just reason enough to perceive that there is such a faculty (as reason), without being indued with the use of it. For other animals have no perception of reason, but obey their passions; and indeed they vary very little in their use from each other. For the advantage which we receive, both from slaves and tame animals, arises from their administering to our bodily necessities. Now it is the intention of nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different from each other, that the one should be robust for their necessary purposes, but the others erect; useless indeed for such servile labours, but fit for civil life, which is divided into the duties of war and peace;[1] though the contrary often takes place, namely, that the one have the bodies, but the others have the souls, of free citizens. For this at all events is evident, that if they excelled others as much as the statues of the gods excel the human form, every one would allow that the inferiors ought to be slaves to the others. And since this is true with respect to the body, it is still more just to determine in the same manner, when we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive the beauty of the soul as it is of the body. It is clear then that some men are free by nature, and others are slaves, and that in the case of the latter the lot of slavery is both advantageous and just.[2]

[1] Some persons, and among others the learned Schneider, have doubted the genuineness of this line; probably because they did not see its true meaning. This would seem to be as follows: "As nature has made us of two distinct forms, the free-born and the slave-born, and has given us two distinct parts, namely, our soul and our body, so are the duties of a free citizen two-fold,—the duties of war and those of peace,—the one as superior to the other as the soul to the body, or the freeman to the slave. 'Multæ res exstiterunt urbanæ majores clarioresque quam bellicæ.'" Cicero, de Off. i. 22.

[2] The meaning of Aristotle in the conclusion of this chapter may thus be paraphrased; "The slave, then, is by nature a part of his master. And as, if the whole body is sick, or if one member is sick, the other members suffer with it, so is the interest of master and slave to a certain extent coincident: but only so long as the one rules well, and the other obeys well. But all this applies to the φύσει δοῦλος alone; as to the other,

CHAP. VI.

But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for slavery and a slave have each two different senses; for there is such a being as a slave by custom; and this custom is a certain compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle, is said to be the property of the conqueror. But many persons who are conversant in law call in question this right as they would an orator, and say that it would be hard that whoever is compelled by violence should become the slave and subject of another, who has the power to compel him, and is his superior in strength; and even of those who are wise, some think one way and some another on this subject; but the source of this doubt, and that which makes this conflict of opinions, is the fact that ability when accompanied with proper means, in a certain way, is able to commit the greatest violence; for victory is always owing to some superior advantage; so that it seems that violence does not prevail without ability; and so the dispute is only concerning what is just. For on this account some persons think that justice consists in benevolence, while others think it just that the superior should govern, since in the midst of these contrary opinions, the opposite argument has nothing weighty enough to persuade us that the superior on the score of ability ought not to rule and to govern. [1] But

To solve the question, slaves divided into two classes, the φύσει δοῦλος and the νόμῳ δοῦλος.

Diversity of opinion on this point.

I consider κατὰ νόμον as equivalent to παρα φύσιν, and can only say that their interests can never be identified, and that the system of making a freeman into a slave is unnatural, and a perversion of that which, if well directed, would work well—a good system of slavery for those whom nature has adapted to such a state." These are the limitations of slavery to which we alluded in a preceding note.

[1] τίνες. The Platonists, to whom Aristotle is here alluding, allow the justice of war-slavery; but this is absurd, for the war may be unjust, and he cannot be rightly a δοῦλος who ἀναξίως δουλεύει. Consequently they exclude Greeks, and hold Barbarians only to be slaves φύσει—i. e. according to the meaning of Aristotle, they measure by the same standard of ἀρετὴ and κακία which we use, but they suppose it hereditary; but this is not practically true. It ought to be remarked here, that by the word τίνες, whenever it is used in this treatise in this connexion, our author intends to refer to the opinions of Plato.

nevertheless, some persons, clinging, as they think, to a certain plea of right, (for custom is a kind of right,) insist that slavery in war is just, but at the same time they contradict themselves.[1] For it may happen that the principle upon which the wars were commenced is unjust; and no one will say that the man who is undeservedly enslaved, is therefore a slave; for if so, men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves and the descendants of slaves, if they chance to be taken prisoners in war, and sold. And on this account they do not choose to give the name of slave to such persons, but only to barbarians. But when they say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, as we said at the first; for we must acknowledge that some persons, wherever they may be, are of necessity slaves, but that others can in no case be slaves. Thus also it is with those of noble descent; it is not only in their own country, but every where, that men esteem them as such, while barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes;

Those who say it is unjust to make slaves in war, really imply that some are φύσει δοῦλοι.

> "Who dares reproach me with the name of slave?
> When from immortal gods, on either side,
> I draw my lineage."

Those who express these sentiments show that they distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble, from each other by no test save that of their virtues and their vices; for they think it reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a good man should be descended; and

And daily speech implies the same.

[1] The whole passage may be paraphrased thus: "Those are not wrong in their judgment who hold that a captive taken in war is lawfully a slave. Some however impugn this doctrine. Now this difference of opinion all arises from the fact that they are not agreed as to what justice is. For the one party think that is just, which man's innate good-will or benevolence prompts him to do; others think that the law of might is the law of right. Now those who deny that conquest gives a man no right over another, have no arguments to support their opinion; the others follow justice in some sense, for they adhere to the law, and the law is a kind of justice."—Ἅμα δ' οὐ φασι, "and at the same time they must deny that it is just; for what if the war be undertaken in an unholy cause?"

this is what nature desires to bring about, but oftentimes cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt has no reason in it,[1] and that some persons are slaves and others freemen by the appointment of nature; and also that in some instances there are two distinct classes, for the one of whom it is expedient to be a slave, and for the other to be a master; and that it is right and just that some should be governed, and that others should exercise that government for which they are fitted by nature; and if so, then the rule of master over slave (is just also). But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave is as it were a part of the master, as though he were an animated part of his body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and friendship may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when they are placed by nature in that relation to each other; for the contrary is the case with those who are reduced to slavery by custom, or by conquest.

Some then are born slaves, others free.

To the former slavery is advantageous; but the νόμῳ δοῦλος is a perversion of nature.

CHAP. VII.

It is evident from what has been said, that a despotic and a political government are not the same; and that all governments are not identical, as some affirm; for the one is adapted to the nature of freemen, and the other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, (for every house is ruled by one head,) but a political government is composed of freemen and equals. The master is not so called from knowing how to manage his slave, but because he is such; and on the same principle the slave and the freeman respectively. There would seem to be also one sort of knowledge proper for a master, and another for a slave: that of the slave is such as the slave taught at Syracuse; for there a fellow at a stipulated

The political relation exists between equals.

The knowledge of a slave.

[1] In order to harmonize the meaning of Aristotle here with what goes before and follows, it is necessary to read the sentence thus with Goettling; Ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τινα λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον. We have accordingly retained his emendation.

sum instructed the boys in the routine business of a household slave. And the learning of such matters as these would seem to be of wide extent, as the art of cookery, and other such like services; of which some are allotted to some, and others to others; some employments being more honourable, others more necessary; according to the proverb,

"Slave excels slave, and lord surpasses lord:"

in such like services the knowledge of a slave consists. The knowledge of the master, on the other hand, is the proper use of his slaves, for the office of a master lies in the employment, not in the mere possession of them. Not that this knowledge contains any thing great or lofty; for what a slave ought to know how to do, that a master ought to know how to order. For this reason, those who have it in their power to be free from such toilsome matters, employ a steward for this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs or philosophy. [But the knowledge of procuring property[1] is different from either of the above; and this, in order to be just, must be either by war, or hunting.] And let thus much suffice as to the distinction of a master and a slave.

The knowledge of a master different from the above.

CHAP. VIII.

But since a slave was laid down to be a part of property, let us make a general inquiry into the nature of property, and the acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the first place, then, some one may question whether the getting of money is the same thing as economics,[2] or whether it is a part of it,

Is χρηματιστική the same as οἰκονομική? or part of it? or

[1] ἡ κτητική—scil. τῶν χρημάτων. Both Taylor and Ellis understand it in this sense. But probably the whole paragraph is an interpolation, and as it stands, it involves an obvious contradiction.

[2] Οἰκονομική is part of πολιτική; and κτητική, or χρηματιστική—(for the words seem to be used here loosely and indiscriminately)—is in some degree a part of οἰκονομική; e. g. that part of κτητική which provides food for the members of an οἶκος. Ἡ κτητικὴ may be thus divided:

ἡ { τῶν μὴ αὐτόφυτον ἐχόντων τὴν ἐργασίαν. { α. ἡ πολεμική. β. ἡ καπηλική.
{ τῶν αὐτόφυτον ἐχόντων τὴν ἐργασίαν. { α. ἡ νομαδικῶν. β. ἡ γεωργικῶν. γ. ἡ θηρευτικῶν.

subservient to it?

or something subservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making shuttles is to the art of weaving, or as the art of making brass to that of statue-founding; for they are not subservient in the same way; for the one supplies the tools, the other the matter; and by the matter I mean, that out of which the work is finished; as, for instance, wool is the matter of the clothier, and brass of the statuary. It is evident then that the getting of money is not the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to furnish the means, of the other to use them. For what art is there but economics, to make use of what is in the house? Still there is a doubt, whether this is a part of economics, or something of a different kind; for if it is the business of him who is to get money, to find out how riches and possessions may be procured, and if possessions and wealth embrace various parts, we must first[1] ascertain whether the art of husbandry is a part of money-getting, or something different, and whether [the same is not true of] the care and acquisition of provisions in general. But as there are many sorts of provision, so is there a variety in the lives both of men and of the brute creation: and as it is impossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes the lives of animals so different from each other. Now of beasts, some live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring themselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and others on whatsoever they light on, for nature has distinguished their course of life, so that they can with ease make choice of such things. And as the same things are not agreeable to all, but one animal likes one thing and another another, the lives of carnivorous beasts must be different from the lives of those who live on fruits; and in like manner is it with men; for their lives differ greatly from each other. Now of these, the idlest is the nomad life; for their food comes from the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they sit at ease; and as their cattle of necessity keep changing their place on account of pasture, they too are compelled to follow with them, cultivating, as it were, a living farm.

Not the same; and why.

Little matter whether we regard it as a part or as subordinate.

The different lives of men.

[1] The word ὥστε, in the text of Bekker and others, is plainly corrupt We have adopted Goettling's emendation, γνωστέον πότερον, κ. τ. λ.

Other men live by the chase, some hunting this thing, and others that; some by freebooting, and some by fishing; as for example, those who live near lakes and marshes, and rivers, or the sea itself;[1] while others are fowlers, or hunters of wild beasts. But the greater part of mankind live upon the produce of the earth, and its cultivated fruits. Such, for the most part, are the lives of those who labour for their own subsistence, and without procuring their provision by way of exchange or merchandise; such are shepherds, husbandmen, freebooters, fishermen, and hunters: some join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably, supplying those deficiencies which are wanting to make their mode of life independent. Thus, for instance, some persons will join together the life of a nomad and a freebooter, or of a husbandman and a hunter; and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life to which necessity conspires to compel them. Now such a power of providing food seems to be taught to all animals by Nature herself, as well immediately upon their first birth, as also when they are arrived at maturity. For with respect to the first of these periods, some of them, together with their young, produce nourishment which is sufficient until their new-born offspring can get food for itself; as is the case with those which are vermiparous and oviparous; and as to those which bring forth their young alive, they have within themselves the means for their subsistence for a certain time, namely, milk. It is evident then that we may conclude[2] that plants are created for the sake of animals, and all other animals for the sake of man; the tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advantage, as in order to furnish us with clothes, and the like purposes. Since, therefore, Nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these things for the sake of man. For this reason the art of war is, in some

When war is φύσει.

[1] The common reading, and that which Bekker retains, is τοιαύτην, which must be rendered, "such as is suited to their mode of life." Perhaps, however, it is better to read αὐτὴν, with Coraës.

[2] The word γενομένοις here occurs in Bekker's text. We have not retained it in our translation, as it has clearly crept into the text from the preceding line. Goëttling and others omit it as evidently a mistake of some copyist.

sense, a part of the art of acquisition;[1] for hunting is a part of it, which it is necessary for us to employ against wild beasts, and against those of mankind who, being intended by nature for slavery, are unwilling to submit to it; and on this occasion, such a war is by nature just. That species of acquisition, then, only which is according to nature, is part of economy; and this ought to be at hand, or if not, it should be immediately procured, by those whose office it is to keep in store what is useful as well for the state community as for the family. And true riches would seem to consist in these; and the independent possession of those things which are necessary for a happy life is not infinite; though Solon speaks otherwise in this verse,

One kind of κτητική, namely, that which is περὶ τροφήν, is part of οἰκονομική.

πλοῦτος defined.

"No bounds to riches can be fixed for man;"

for a bound may be fixed here, as in all other arts;[2] for the instruments of no art whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude; but riches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy. It is therefore evident that there is a natural art of acquisition, both in domestic and civil economy, and for what reason.

CHAP. IX.

χρηματιστική is a kind of κτητική, and may be either φύσει or οὐ φύσει, just as all things have a natural

THERE is also another kind of acquisition, which men specially call pecuniary, and with great justice too; and by this indeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many persons suppose, from their near relation to each

[1] Under his κτητική Aristotle classes πολεμική. This would be true in a rude age, when the rule of might was right, when pirates were gentlemen, and every one was forced to subsist by plunder (vivere rapto). Warfare would range under κτητική, when undertaken for want of slaves, for a slave is above defined as κτῆμα ἔμψυχον. But is there not a little inconsistency in this sentence? For above Aristotle has said that a captive is a νόμῳ δοῦλος, and that it is unjust to enslave the free. Here he says the same is a just war. Again, "ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσι"— This would be a sufficient claim to set them free. For the φύσει δοῦλος is defined as ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι.

[2] Money, collected merely for its own sake, has no fixed end; but when it is duly used as a means, (ὄργανον ποιητικόν,) then it is limited by the purpose for which it was intended.

other, that this is one and the same with the art just mentioned; but it is not the same as that, though not very different; for one of these is natural, the other is not, but rather arises from some art and skill. Now let us enter on our inquiry into the subject from the following point. The uses of every possession are two, both indeed essential, but not in the same manner; for the one is strictly proper to the thing, the other not; as a shoe, for instance, may be either worn or exchanged for something else; for both these are uses of the shoe; for he who exchanges a shoe with some man who wants one, for money, or provisions, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to its proper use; for shoes are not made to be exchanged. The same thing holds true of all other possessions; for barter in general had its original beginning in nature, from the fact that some men had a surplus, and others less than was necessary for them. And hence it is evident, that the selling provisions for money is not naturally a part of pecuniary science; for men were obliged to use barter as far as would supply their wants. Now it is plain that barter could have no place in the first community, that is to say, in the household; but must have begun when the number of those who composed the community came to be enlarged; for the former of these had all things the same and in common; but those who came to be separated, had in common many other things[1] which both parties were obliged to exchange as their wants arose. And this custom of barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous nations, who exchange one necessary for another, but do nothing more; for example, giving and receiving wine for corn, and the like in other such things. This sort of barter then is not contrary to nature, nor yet is it any species of money-getting; but it is necessary in order to complete that independence which is natural. From this barter however arose the use of money, as might be expected; for as the needful means for importing what was wanted, or for exporting a surplus, was often at a great distance, the use of money was of ne-

and a secondary use.

Barter (καπηλική) is a secondary use of property, and so is οὐ φύσει.

It could not exist in the οἶκος, and why.

How money arose from extended wants.

From use of money arose καπηλική.

[1] Goettling understands the words thus; οἱ δὲ, κεχωρισμένοι τούτων (scil ὧν ἕτεροι ἐκοινωνουν) πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων ἐκοινώνουν.

cessity devised.[1] For it is not every thing which is naturally useful, that is easy of carriage; and for this reason men invented among themselves, by way of exchange, something which they should mutually give and take, and which being really valuable in itself, might easily be passed from hand to hand for the purposes of daily life, as iron and silver, or any thing else of the same nature. This at first had a fixed standard simply according to its weight or size; but in process of time they put upon it a certain stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, and this stamp was affixed as a sign of its express value. Money then being devised from the necessity of mutual interchange, the second species of money-getting arose, namely, by buying and selling; and this was conducted probably at first in a simple manner, but afterwards it came to employ more skill and experience, as to where and how the greatest profit might be made. For which reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conversant about trade, and its end to be able to see where the greatest profit can be made; for it is the means of procuring abundance of wealth and possessions. For men oftentimes suppose wealth[2] to consist in the quantity of money which any one possesses, as this is that medium with which trading and trafficking are concerned: [3]others again regard it as a mere trifle, as having no value by nature, but merely by arbitrary compact; so that if those who use it should alter their sentiments, it would be worthless, and unserviceable for any necessary purpose. Thus oftentimes the man who abounds in money will want the necessary food; and it is absurd to say that wealth is a thing of such a kind that a man with plenty of it around him

True object of χρηματιστική, the supply of instruments, not of coin.

Money is not wealth.

[1] Compare Eth. v. 5, οἷον δὲ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τόννομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστι, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον.

[2] The word πλοῦτος is used by Aristotle in two different senses; the one κατὰ φύσιν, and limited, consisting in household stores and instruments for service; the other μὴ κατὰ φύσιν, consisting in coin, and unlimited. They are easily confounded, but they differ in this respect, that the latter does but provide the means by which we may attain the *wealth* which is the end of the other. Thus Horace speaks of one who was "magnas inter opes inops."

[3] The Greek text here is obscure. Tanchnitz proposes to insert the word εἷς before νόμος.

may perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish found every thing set before him turned into gold. For which reason people look about for something else by way of riches and property, and rightly too; for the mere getting of money differs from natural wealth, and the latter is the true object of economy; while trade only procures money, not by all means, but by the exchange of it; and it seems to be chiefly employed about trading, for money is the element and the regulator of trade; nor are there any bounds to be set to the wealth which is thereby acquired. For just as there are no limits to the art of medicine with respect to health, and as all other arts with respect to their ends are infinite [1]—(for these ends they desire to effect to the furthest possible extent)—but still the means used for those ends are limited, and their several ends are the limits of each; so too in the art of acquiring riches, its end has no limits, for its object is money and possessions; but economy has a boundary, though the former has not; for acquiring riches is not its real end. [2]And for this reason it should seem that some boundary should be set to riches, though in practice we see the contrary of this taking place; for all those who get riches add to their money without end. The cause of this is the near connexion of these two arts with each other, for they sometimes change employment with each other,[3] as getting of money is their common

The storing up money is οὐ κατα φυσιν.

[1] Things which are ends in themselves are infinite: as happiness, health, virtue; but things instrumental are limited by the ends to which they are means. As to the distinction between τέλος and περάς, see Goettling's notes in loco, p. 297. Τέλος, he says, is "finis idealis," περάς "finis realis." The end (τέλος) of the medical art is health; it is the end which it proposes, and which it always attains. And so what he means here by saying περάς τὸ τέλος πάσαις is this; "inasmuch as they cannot always reach the ideal end, artists in any line put up with the furthest point which they can attain, though they desire to attain the end itself."

[2] These few lines are very corrupt; but the whole scope of the passage would seem to be nearly this; ἡ χρηματιστικὴ is of two kinds, first ἡ χρηματιστικὴ proper, and second ἡ καπηλική. It is no wonder that these two are so often confounded, for they have the same use, and are exerted on the same object, ἡ κτῆσις. But their ends are different; that of the former is natural, the supply of necessary wants; that of the latter unnatural, the increase of money.

[3] To translate more literally, "for they trench on each other, in that they both use the same thing, both belonging to χρηματιστικὴ."

pursuit. For they each employ the same thing, but not in the same manner; for the end of the one is something beyond itself, but the end of the other is merely to increase it; so that some persons are led to believe that this is the proper object of economy, and think that for this purpose they ought to continue to save or to hoard up money without end. And the reason of this disposition is that they are intent upon living, but not upon living well; and this desire being boundless in its extent, the means which they employ for that purpose are boundless also. And those who set themselves to live well, often confine their view to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures; so that as this also seems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money, and hence arises the second species of money-getting; for as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek means proportionate to supply this excess of enjoyment; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all their powers to a purpose which is not according to nature. Thus, for instance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get money by; neither is this the end of the soldier's or the physician's art, but victory and health respectively. But such persons make every art subservient to money-getting, as if this was the only end, and to the end every thing ought to contribute. We have now considered that art of money-getting which is not necessary, and have said what it is, and how we come to need it, and also that which is necessary, which is different from it; for that economy which is natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not infinite like this, but has its bounds.

In the above sense *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οἰκονομική*.

CHAP. X.

THAT which was doubted at the first, is now clear, as to whether the art of getting money is the business of the head of a family or a state, or whether it is not, and yet must of necessity exist; for as the political science does not make men, but

In another sense it is not a part of *οἰκονομική*, but subservient to it.

[1] For *χρήσεως κτῆσις* Goettling suggests *κτήσεως χρῆσις*; and this would make *κτήσεως* equivalent to the *τοῦ αὐτοῦ* above; but probably the text is corrupt, though our translation gives the drift of its meaning

receiving them from the hand of nature employs them to proper purposes; thus nature, whether it be the earth, or sea, or any thing else, ought to supply them with provisions; and this it is the business of the master of the family to manage properly. For it is not the weaver's business to make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish what is good and useful from what is bad and of no service: and in like manner some one may inquire why money-getting should be a part of economy, when the art of healing is not; since it is as requisite that the family should be in health as that they should eat, or have any thing else which is necessary. Now, as it is indeed in some sense the business of both the master of the family and the ruler of a state to see after the health of those under their care, but in another sense not, but the physician's; so also as to money, in some respects it is the business of the master of the family, in others not, but of the servile art. But as we have already said, it is chiefly the part of nature; for it is her part to supply her offspring with food; for nourishment is left for every thing born, by that which gave it birth; and hence by the way, the natural riches of all men arise from fruits and from animals. But since these riches may be applied, as we have said, to two purposes, the one to make money of, the other for the service of the house; of these the first is necessary and commendable, the other, which has to do with traffic, is justly censured;[1] for it has not its origin in nature, but amongst ourselves; for usury is most reasonably detested, as the increase of our fortune arises from the money itself, and not by employing it to the purpose for which it was intended. For it was devised for the sake of exchange, but usury multiplies it. And hence usury has received the name of τόκος, or "*produce;*" for whatever is produced is itself like its parents; and usury is merely money born of money: so that of all means of money-making, this is the most contrary to nature.

For χρῆσις presupposes κτῆσις.

Unnatural character of usury (τοκισμός).

[1] Comp. Psalm xv. "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? . . . he that hath not given his money unto usury." Deut. xxiii. 19, "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon usury: unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury: that the Lord thy God may bless thee." Comp. Exod. xxii. 25; Lev. xxv. 36. See also Lord Bacon's Essay on Usury. Bohn's Standard Library edition, p. 113.

CHAP. XI.

But since we have already sufficiently considered the matter in its general principles, let us now go into the practical part of it; for the contemplation of such matters offers a liberal employment for the mind, but the application to practice is necessary. But it is an useful part in the management of one's affairs, to be skilful in the nature of cattle, as to which are most profitable, and where, and how; for instance, what is the advantage of rearing horses, or oxen, or sheep, or any other live stock. It is also necessary to be acquainted with the comparative value of these things, and which of them are worth most in particular places; for some do better in one place, and some in another. Next, as to the pursuit of agriculture, and the management of arable grounds and orchards;[1] and also as to the care of bees, and other living things, such as fish and birds, from whence any profit may arise. These are the first and most considerable parts of domestic management: but with respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method is merchandise, which is carried on in three different ways, either by sea-trading, by warehousing, or by retail-dealing; and these differ from each other in this, that some of them are more safe, while others bring in a larger return. The second method is usury. The third is the receipt of wages for work done, and this either by being employed in some illiberal art, or else in what is unscientific and serviceable merely to the body. There is also a third species of improving a fortune, between this and the first; for it has part in common with the natural method, and part with the system of exchange; and it has to do with things that are immediately from the earth, or their produce, which, though they bear no fruit, are yet useful, such as the felling of timber, and the whole art of mining: but the latter includes many different species, for there are various sorts of things dug out of the earth. Concerning each of these we have now spoken in general, but minute particulars concerning all of them, though useful

The parts of χρηματιστικὴ κατὰ φύσιν.

The parts of χρηματιστικὴ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν.

An intermediate kind.

[1] ψιλῆς τε, κ.τ.λ. the tillage of land, whether for corn (ψιλή) or for vines and the like (πεφυτευμένη)

for practical experiment, would be tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are the most excellent wherein chance has the least to do; and those are the meanest in which the body is most impaired, and those the most servile in which bodily strength alone is chiefly wanted, and those most illiberal which require least skill. But as there are books written on these subjects by some persons, as by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon husbandry and planting, and likewise by others on other matters, let those who have occasion draw out a theory therefrom: but every person should collect together whatsoever chances to be spoken at random, by means of which many who aimed at making a fortune have attained success. For all these are useful to those who set great store on money-getting; as was the money-getting contrivance of [1] Thales the Milesian, which men attributed to him on account of his wisdom, though it is one of general application. For when they reviled him for his poverty, as if the study of philosophy was useless, it is said that, while it was yet winter, he perceived by his skill in astrology, that there would be great plenty of olives that year, and that having got a supply of money, he bought on a small security all the oil-presses that were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low price, as there was no one to bid against him. When the season came for making oil, many persons wanted them, and so all at once he let them upon terms he pleased; and raising a large sum of money by that means, he convinced them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they chose it, but that this was not what they aimed at;[2] in this manner is Thales said to have shown his wisdom. It indeed is, as we have said, generally lucrative, for a person to contrive to make a monopoly of any thing; for which reason some cities also adopt this method when they want money, for they make a monopoly of their commodities. There was, too, a certain person in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was deposited in his hands in buying up all the iron from the iron works, so that after-

Relative value of the various arts.

A practical knowledge of them useful to the οἰκονόμος, and why.

[1] The story is told at length in Plutarch's Life of Solon, chap. ii., as well as by Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 49.

[2] Compare Ethics, b. vi. ch. 12, where the utility of wisdom and prudence is treated of at length.

wards, when the dealers came from the markets to purchase, no one had any to sell but himself; and though he put no great advance upon it, yet by laying out fifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius heard this, he permitted him to take his money along with him, but forbade him to continue any longer in Syracuse, as being one who contrived means for getting money, inconsistent with his interests. This man's foresight and that of Thales was exactly the same; for both of them contrived to procure a monopoly for themselves.[1]

The same knowledge useful in a higher degree to statesmen.

It is useful also for politicians definitely to understand these things; for many states want to raise money and to employ such means, as well as private families, nay more so; for which reason, some persons employed in public affairs confine themselves to this province alone.

CHAP. XII.

It was laid down, then, that there are three parts of domestic government; one, that of the master, of which we have already treated; another of the father, and a third that of the husband.

How a wife and a child are to be governed.

Now the government of the wife and children, should both be that of free persons, but not the same; for the wife should be treated as the member of a state, but the children should be under kingly rule; for the male is by nature made to rule over the female, except when something happens contrary to the usual course of nature; as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and imperfect. Now in the generality of free states, the governors and the governed alternately change place; for an equality without any preference is what nature chooses; however, when one governs and another is governed, she endeavours that a distinction shall be made between them, in forms, expressions, and honours; according to what Amasis said of his laver.[2] This then should be the established rule between the male

Difference of principle between πολιτικὴ and βασιλικὴ ἀρχή.

[1] For further instances the reader can refer to the Economics, book ii. passim.

[2] The story of Amasis and the laver, out of which a statue had been made, may be seen in Herodotus, ii. 172,—φὰς ἐκ τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος τὤγαλμα γεγονέναι· ἤδη ὦν, ἐφη λέγων, ὁμοίως αὐτὸς τῷ ποδανιπτῆρι περιηγέναι.

and the female. The government of children should be kingly; for the power of the father over the child is founded on both affection and seniority; and this is a species of kingly government; for which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter "Father of gods and men," as being the king of all of them. For it is required that a king should be of the same species with those whom he governs, though naturally superior; as is the case between the elder and the younger, and between the father and the son.

CHAP. XIII.

The οἰκονομος must look to the virtue of his household.

It is evident then that, in the due government of a family, greater attention should be paid to its several members than to the mere gaining of inanimate things; and to the virtues of the former rather than of the latter, (and this we term wealth;) and greater regard to those of freemen than of slaves. But here some one may question whether there is any other virtue in a slave than his mechanical services, and of higher estimation than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and other such like habits, or whether slaves possess none beyond mere bodily qualities. Each side of the question has its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein will they differ from freemen? and since they are men, and partakers of reason, it is absurd to say that they do not. Nay, nearly the same inquiry may be made concerning a woman, and a child, whether these also have their proper virtues, whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and whether a child can be unbridled and temperate or not;[1] and indeed this inquiry ought to be made in general, whether the virtues of those who by nature either govern or are governed, are the same, or different. For if it is necessary that both of them should partake of noble character, why is it necessary that the one should always govern, the other always be governed? Surely this difference cannot be merely one of degree; for to govern, and to be

Can a slave possess ἀρετή, beyond performance of bodily labour?

Can a wife or child?

The question put in general.

[1] Goettling (p. 303) takes a different view of Aristotle's meaning here, and says "ἀκόλαστον esse, quod vitio vertitur servo, laudabile est in puero. ἀκολασία puerilis est immatura fortitudo. Quis enim ἀνδρίαν pueri esse dicat?"

governed, are things different in species, but *more* or *less* are not. And yet it is strange that the one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if he who is to govern shall not be temperate and just, how can he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he who is intemperate and a coward, will never do what he ought. It is evident, then, that both parties ought to partake of virtue, but that there must be some difference of virtue between them, as there is between those who by nature command and those who by nature obey. This is suggested by the soul; for in this there is implanted by nature one part that rules and one that obeys; and the virtues of these we say are different, as are those of a rational and an irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be extended to the case of the others, so that there is by nature a variety of things which govern and are governed. Now a freeman governs his slave in one manner, the male governs the female in another, and in another manner the father governs his child; and all these have the different parts of the soul within them, but in a different manner. Thus a slave can have no deliberative faculty,[1] a woman but a weak one,[2] a child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral virtues; it must be supposed that all must possess them, though not in the same manner, but as is best suited to the several ends of each. Hence, by the way, he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue,—(for his business is entirely that of a master artificer, and reason is the master artificer;)—while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their station: and hence it is evident, that although moral virtue is common to all those of whom we have spoken, yet the temperance of a man and of a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, as Socrates thought;[3] for the courage of the man consists in commanding,

Different ἀρεταί of the ruler and the ruled.

The ἀρεταί of each differ according to their ἔργα.

The ἄρχων must be perfect in ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.

[1] If however this be the case with the *φύσει δοῦλος*, the question naturally arises, "why educate him at all? and how shall he be educated?" Here is clearly an inconsistency; for at the end of the present chapter Aristotle says that "slaves need education even more than children."

[2] This *ἄκυρον βουλευτικὸν* of the wife nearly corresponds to *σύνεσις*. Eth. vi. 10.

[3] Reference is here made to the opinion given by Socrates in the Re-

the woman's in obedience. And the same is true in all other particulars, and this will be evident to those who will examine the matter in detail; for those who use general terms deceive themselves, when they say that virtue consists in a good disposition of mind, or in doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those who thus define them, and hence we ought to think of all persons, as the poet says of a woman,

The ἀρετη of the wife.

"Silence is woman's ornament," [1]

but it is not the ornament of a man. But as a child is incomplete, it is evident that his virtue is not to be referred to himself, but to the full-grown man, and to him whom he obeys. In like manner, the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave is to be employed in what is wanted; so that it is clear enough that but little virtue is required in him, only just so much as that he may not neglect his work through intemperance or cowardice. Here some person may question (supposing what I have said is true) whether virtue will not be necessary for artificers in their calling; for they often neglect their work through intemperance But the difference between the two cases is very great; for a slave partakes of animal life, but the artificer is something more than this;[2] as near therefore as the artificer approaches to the slave, just so much ought he to have of the virtues of one, for a mean artificer has a certain distinctive kind of slavery; but then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are, though this is not

The ἀρετὴ of the child.

The ἀρετὴ of the slave.

The ἀρετὴ of an artificer (τεχνίτης).

public of Plato, to the effect that women are equally fit with men to undertake civil offices and duties. See Plato Rep. b. ii. ch. 5, in.

[1] This line occurs in Sophocles Ajax, l. 291. The words are spoken by the hero to his slave Tecmessa.

[2] ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον. Passow says that "no example of this form is found." It is just therefore to regard this passage with suspicion as not entirely sound. Perhaps we ought to read ἄλλ' οὐ πορρωτέρω, "but no further than this;" in other words, he enjoys ζώη but not βίος, which at once implies πρᾶξις. If however we read the passage as it stands at present, we must render it thus; "But he (the artificer, τεχνίτης) is something more."

Slaves must be trained to virtue by their masters.

equally true of a shoemaker, or of any other artist.[1] It is evident then that a slave ought to be trained to such virtue by his master; and not in the way in which a master would teach him mere servile drudgery. Those therefore are in the wrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to follow their orders, for slaves want more instruction than children; thus, then, let us determine as to this matter. But it is necessary, in a treatise upon government, to enter particularly into the relations of husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the virtues of each and their respective connexions with each other, what is right and what is wrong; and how they ought to follow the good, and avoid the evil.

We must seek the ἀρετή of the πόλις by training its individual members well.

Since then every family is part of a state, and each of those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts ought to have regard to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary to instruct both the wives and children of the community, as to the nature thereof, inasmuch as it is of some consequence to the virtue of the state that the wives and children therein should be virtuous. And of consequence it necessarily is, for the wives compose one half of the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to be born. As then we have determined these points, we will leave the rest to be considered in another place; and[2] as if the subject was now finished, let us begin again anew, and first consider the sentiments of those who have treated of the most perfect form of government.

[1] The slave then must be brought by his master to such ἀρετὴ as this, and not merely instructed according to the way that a master would teach him mere servile duties. Τὰ ἐχοντα τῶν ἔργων, "ea quæ ad servilia munera necessario pertinent."

[2] These words refer to the question discussed at greater length in b vii. and viii.—that of education in relation to the state.

BOOK II.—CHAP. I.

To find what is the best government, let us examine existing forms.

SINCE then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others best[1] for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they wish, it is necessary to examine into the polities adopted in those states which are allowed to be well governed, and in any others which may chance to have been described by writers, and appear properly regulated, in order that we may note what is right and useful in them. And as to our seeking for something beyond these states, let it not be regarded as an affectation of wisdom; but let us have the credit of setting ourselves to this systematic work, because there are great defects in those which are already established. And we must begin first with that part of the subject which naturally is the foundation of our discussion.

Now the members of every state must of necessity have all things in common, or nothing at all in common, or some things in common and not others. To have nothing in common is evidently impossible, for the social state itself is a species of community; and the first thing necessary is a common place of habitation, namely, the city; this too must be one, and every citizen must have a share in this one state. But in a

[1] Having in the first book laid down the elements of which states are composed, Aristotle proceeds next in order to discuss the question, "What is the best form of government?" and he examines it in a practical way, and with a practical object.

There are three possible ways of examining this question:

1. *Ideally.* Which is the most perfect conceivable theory, irrespective of practicability?
2. *Really.* Which is the best form of government now in existence?
3. *Practically.* Which is the best and most suitable that can be devised *for man as he is?*

It is the third of these methods which Aristotle adopts, as most entirely in accordance with his system of philosophy. Compare book iv. ch. i. "Besides . . . it is necessary to distinguish what sort of government is best fitting for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject, however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to lay down scientifically what is best, but what can be put in practice (τὶ δυνατόν). It should also be simple and easy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, they seek out only the most subtle form of government, and one which needs many things to fill it up."

state which is to be well governed, will it be best that all shall have a share in every thing which is capable of being shared, or only in some particulars, but not in others? for it is possible that the citizens may have their wives, and children, and goods in common with each other, as in Plato's commonwealth;[1] for in that, Socrates affirms that the children, the wives, and the possessions ought to be common. Which then shall we prefer? the plan which is already established, or the custom which is proposed in Plato's commonwealth?

[1] For the views of Socrates on this subject, the reader will do well to consult Plato's Republic, especially b. v. p. 458—465. Aristotle's objections to the theory of Plato may all be reduced to two heads:

1. That Plato's *end* is a wrong one.
2. That his *means* do not answer their end.

Plato's end was that the state should be as much one as possible. Compare Rep. iv. 423, B., *οὐκοῦν οὕτος ἂν εἴη κάλλιστος ὀρὸς τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡλίκῃ οὖσῃ ὅσην χωρὰν ἀφορισαμένους τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν ἐᾶν; τίς ἔφη ὁρός; οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ ἐγὼ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἀνξανομένη εἶναι μιὰ, μέχρι τοῦδε αὔξειν πέρα δὲ μή*: and also Rep. v. 452, B., *ἔχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾶ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν, ἢ ὃ ἂν ζυνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μιάν;*

Plato desired a state in which all things should be common; in which all should be as brothers, and call nothing "mine." He desired to effect a *moral* union, but he endeavoured to attain it by *physical* means.

Now to the above theory Aristotle objects that this perfect unity, so far from perfecting, would in reality destroy the essence of a state; and that which destroys its essence cannot be the end or good of any thing.

In support of this view he says, a "family is more one than a state, and an individual more than a family. For not only must a state consist of numbers, but these must be different in kind; else the state will be a mere tribe, (*ἔθνος*,) and not a *πόλις*; for even where all the citizens are equal, a fictitious difference must be preserved. This is the very essence of a *πόλις*, viz. *τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.*"

Aristotle then next sets himself to prove that a community of wives does not tend to produce the end of a state.

Plato's argument is this, in syllogistic form:

What tends to unity, tends to the end of a state;
But a community of wives tends to unity;
Therefore, it tends to preserve a state.

It will be observed that Aristotle denies *both* premises; a proceeding which possibly raises a presumption in favour of Plato's theory. For if unity be shown to be not the end of the state, and if the above community does not tend to unity, then it *does not tend* to some thing which is not the end of a community. It is one step in a negative induction towards proving that the aforesaid community does tend towards the end of a state.

CHAP. II.

Plato's Republic. Its merits canvassed.

Now a general community of wives is attended with many other difficulties; and among others, the object for which Socrates would have his government framed in this manner, does not seem to follow from his reasoning: again, it is not capable of producing that end which he says ought to be in the view of a state, as was but just now stated; nor has he given any particular directions as to how the arrangement ought to be made. Now I also am willing to admit that the state ought to be one as much as possible, (for this is the principle which Socrates adopts:)[1] and yet it is evident that if it goes on till it becomes too much one, it will be no longer a state, for the state naturally supposes a multitude; so that if we proceed in this manner, from a state it will become a family, and from a family it will become an individual: for we should say that a family is one to a greater degree than a state, and a single person than a family; so that even if this end could be obtained, it should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the state. For not only does a state consist of a large number of inhabitants, but they must also be of different sorts: for were they all alike there could be no state; for a confederacy and a state[2]

Is a perfect unity desirable or no?

[1] Aristotle refers here to Plato's Republic, (v. chap. 5,) where Socrates is represented as asking, "Is there any greater evil for a state than that which tears it to pieces, and makes it many instead of one? or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?" Pinzger, in his commentary on the Strictures of Aristotle upon Plato's Republic, asserts that Aristotle does not take the word unity in the same sense as Plato, but understands it as meaning an *individual*, (in logical phrase, *unum numero*;) while Plato takes it in the sense of *unanimity*. To prove his assertion, he quotes the well-known passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics (iv. 6); but incorrectly. But the answer which Aristotle gives below, to the effect that an excess of unity will reduce the state first to a mere family, and from that to an individual, shows that he scarcely understood or appreciated Plato's meaning. A *moral* unity is plainly something different from *physical* unity, and a moral whole from a physical whole.

[2] The three words here used by Aristotle are συμμαχία, ἔθνος, and πόλις. Of the former Goettling says, Συμμαχία est societas jure parium (τῶν ὁμοίων) sed diversorum origine. . . . . Hæc quid differat a verâ civitate, quam dicimus rempublicam, non est quod multis demonstrem." As to the second, he adds, "Post pugnam Leuctrica, Arcadum gens synedrium

are two different things; a confederacy is valuable for its numbers, though all those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this is entered into for the sake of mutual defence, just as the addition of another weight makes the scale go down. The same distinction will prevail between a state and a tribe, when the people are not collected into separate villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things by which a state should become one are of different sorts; and it is the preserving a just and equal balance of power, which is the safety of states, as has already been mentioned in our treatise on Ethics.[1] Now among freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern at the same time, but either by the year, or according to some other regulation or time.[2] By this means, it follows that every one in his turn will be in office; as if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not always be employed in the self-same calling. But as it is better that these should continue in their respective trades, so also in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the government should continue in the same hands; but where it is not—(as Nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that all should partake of it)—there it is best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are magistrates at the time;[3] since they in turn will alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different men;[4] by the same method different persons will execute dif-

There must be a distinction between the rulers and the ruled.

τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν constituit quo, quasi vinculo gens universa contineretur, *τῶν ὁμοίων sed non diversorum origine.*" On the other hand, a *πόλις* is constituted *ἐκ τῶν εἴδει διαφερόντων.*

[1] The reference is to Eth. Nicom. v. 5, *τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμενεῖ ἡ πόλις*—the state subsists by the preservation of a balance of power.

[2] See below, b. vii. 14, *ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν αἵρεσιν ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταὐτὸν, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον· ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχειν· ἀγανακτεῖ δ' οὐδεὶς καθ' ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος.*

[3] Locke says, that "A magistrate was for this purpose appointed, to give a sanction to that common measure to which reason teaches us that creatures of the same rank and species, and endowed with the same faculties, have all an equal right." See Prefatory Essay by Dr. Gillies.

[4] On this difficult and complicated passage, see Goettling's note. He suggests as a better reading, *τὸ ἐν μέρει τοῖς ἴσοις εἶκειν ὁμοίως τοὺς ἐξ*

ferent offices. From hence it is evident that a state cannot naturally be one in the manner that some persons propose, and that what has been said to be the greatest good of states, is really their destruction; though the good of any thing tends to preserve it. For another reason also it is clear, that it is not for the best to endeavour to make a state too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a single person, and a state than a family;[1] and indeed it can lay claim to the name of a state only when this sufficiency results to the members of the community. If then this sufficiency is preferable, a state which is less one, is better than that which is more nearly so.

Why a state ought not to be made too like an individual.

CHAP. III.

But admitting that it is best for the state to be one as much as possible, it does not seem to be proved that this will take place on his theory, by permitting all at once to say "this is mine," and "this is not mine," though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a state has perfect unity. For the word *all* is used in two senses; if it means *each individual*, what Socrates proposes will more nearly take place; for each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and of every thing else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. But now those who have their wives and children in common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as individuals; and likewise with regard to property, all will say so, but not as individuals; therefore, this use of the word "all," is evidently a fallacious mode of speech;[2] for the words "all" and "both" are odd and even, and are sometimes used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on ac-

Plato's theory fails when applied to practice.

ἀρχῆς. The words παρὰ μέρος in the following line, he regards as a mere gloss on the ἐν μέρει which precedes them.

[1] In other words, it is certain that by stretching this unity too far, we shall lose the independence of a state; for it will sink down first into a mere family, and from a family into an individual: and when it has gone thus far, its essence will be found to be in a great measure destroyed.

[2] This is what is commonly called a fallacy of "Compositio et Divisio." See Soph. Elench. i. 2, where among syllogisms which are παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, Aristotle enumerates those which are said to be παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν and he gives as an example the following, ὅτι τὰ πέντε ἐστὶ δυὸ καὶ τρία καὶ πεσσαρὰ καὶ ἄρτια.

count of their double meaning, and are the cause of contentious syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word "all" in its distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: while in its collective sense, it would by no means contribute to the concord of the state. Besides, there is another harm attending this proposal; for whatever is common to many is taken least care of; for all men regard most what is their own, and care less for common property, or only just as much as concerns them. For, besides other considerations, every one is more negligent of what another has to see to; as in a family, one is often worse served by many servants, than by a few. Now each citizen in the state will have a thousand children, but none of them will be as the children of any individual, but every child will be the son of every father, as chance may have it, and the parents all will alike neglect them. Besides, in consequence of this, whenever any citizen fared well or ill, every person, be the number what it would, might say, "this is my son," or "that man's son;" and in this manner would they speak, and doubtingly withal, concerning each of the thousand, or whatever number the city consisted of; for it would be uncertain to whom each child belonged, and who should preserve it when born. Now which of the two do you think is better, for every one to say "this is mine," while they apply it equally to two thousand, or ten thousand;[1] or, as we say "this is mine," under our present forms of government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that same person his brother, another nephew, or according to some other relationship, either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another regards him as one of the same brotherhood and the same tribe? For sure it is better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity, than a son after this manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are brothers and children, or fathers and mothers, to each other; for from the mutual likeness which exists between the parent

Further difficulties; confusion.

Difficulties arising from family likenesses.

[1] On the cosmopolitan theory which would merge all particular and social affections into a mere system of general benevolence, compare Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. c. 6. (p. 245,) and Newman's Sermon on St. John's Day.

and the offspring, they will necessarily obtain proofs of their mutual relationship. This circumstance, we are informed by those writers who describe different parts of the world, does sometimes happen; for some tribes of Upper Africa[1] have their wives in common, but yet their children are distinguished by their likeness to their parents. There are also some women, and some other animals too, as mares and cows, which naturally bring forth their young very like the male; such was the mare called Dicæa, in Pharsalia.[2]

CHAP. IV.

And from murders, &c.

Besides, those who contrive this plan for a community, cannot easily avoid such evils as the following; namely, blows, murders, voluntary or involuntary, quarrels and reproaches; all of which it would be impious indeed to be guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly related to us, as it is towards those who are not connected with us: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen oftener among those who do not know each other, than among those who do; and when they do happen, among those who know their relations, they admit of a legal expiation, but in the latter case, this cannot be done.[3] It is also absurd for those who make a community of children, to hinder those who love each other from sexual intercourse, while they do not restrain them from the passion itself, or from those other embraces, which are of all things

Plato's community of wives should be extended to all.

[1] For example, the Nasamones, (see Herod. iv. 172,) and the Aysenses, (ib. 180,) and the Agathyrsi, (ib. 104,) οἱ Ἀγάθυρσοι—ἐπίκοινον τῶν γυναίκων τὴν μίξιν ποιεῦνται, ἵνα κασιγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι, καὶ οἰκήϊοι ἔοντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτε ἔχθεϊ χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους. "The Agathyrsi have their women in common, that so they may be all brothers, and in virtue of their relationship, they may be free from all envy and mutual hatred." Mela (i. 8) relates the same of the Garamantes; as also does Pliny, Hist. Nat. v. 8.

[2] Compare Aristotle's Hist. Anim. vii. 6. (Schn.)

[3] It is worthy of remark here, how wide-spread among the heathen world was the doctrine of the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. On this subject, compare the remarks of Butler, Analogy, Part II. chap. v. Bohn's edition, p. 252. See also Æschylus, S. c. T. 676.

ἀλλ' ἄνδρας Ἀργείοισι Καδμείους ἄλις
εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν· αἷμα γὰρ καθάρσιον·
ἀνδρῶν δ' ὁμαίμων θάνατος ὧδ' αὐτοκτόνος,
οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τοῦδε τοῦ μιάσματος.

most improper, as between a father and a son, a brother and a brother; for mere love in such cases is wrong. It is also absurd to prevent sexual intercourse between relations, for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, while the relation of father and daughter, or of brother and sister, is held to be of no consequence at all. It seems also more advantageous, that the husbandmen[1] should have their wives and children in common, than the military class, for there will be less affection in case of a community of wives, than otherwise; for such persons ought to be under subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this would be directly contrary to the state of things which good laws ought to establish, and to insure which Socrates thinks it right to lay down his regulations concerning women and children. For we think that friendship is the greatest good which can happen to any state, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and unity

Friendship better than unity.

[1] In order to understand the allusions of Aristotle here and elsewhere, t is necessary to inform the reader that Plato divided his purely theoretic state into three classes.

1. *φύλακες*—the ruling *military class*, into whose minds and bodies precious metal had been infused.
2. *γεωργοί*, (*husbandmen*,) } called citizens, but practically excluded
3. *τεχνῖται*, (*artificers*,) } from all share in the government.

A community of wives was allowed by Plato to the ruling class only. Aristotle here says, by way of objection, that the two latter classes will not be satisfied with nominal rule; and that they too ought to be allowed a community of wives, lest they should unite too closely among themselves and rebel against the *φύλακες*. See Plato's Republic, b. iii. ch. xix. to the end. As to the community of wives and children, see Republic book v. passim. The system of Plato could only be carried out by the state ascertaining what metal was infused into each child, and classing i accordingly among the *φύλακες* or not. The point of objection on which Aristotle lays the greatest stress, is the idea that citizens—(for such the *γεωργοί* and *τεχνῖται* were in theory)—would remain quiet without hav ing any share in the government. Next he censures the idea that a com munity of goods can strengthen any body of citizens, which Plato evident ly asserted when he confined that community of goods to the *φύλακες*. In reference to the former, Aristotle says, "If there be a body of men who cannot attain to *ἀρχικὴ φρόνησις*, do not make them citizens at all; at all events do not make them nominally citizens while you practically exclude them from civil rights." And as to the second point, Aristotle says that a community of goods is no bad element in a state, if it be confined to the *γεωργοί* and *τεχνῖται*: for it will prevent them from combining together and making head against the *φύλακες*, who are intended to be the ruling body.

in a state is what Socrates commends above all things; an this appears to be, as indeed he says, the result of friendship; as we learn from Aristophanes in the Erotics,[1] who says, that those who love one another from the excess of that passion, desire to coalesce, and from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would necessarily follow, that both, or one of them, must be destroyed. But now in a state, the tie of friendship must be extremely weak on account of this community, and neither parent nor child can point to his own relative. For as a very little of what is sweet, mixed with a great deal of water, makes the mixture scarcely perceptible, so must they necessarily disregard all family connexion arising from such names, in such a community; for it is by no means necessary that a father should have any regard for a son, or a brother for his brother. For there are two things which principally inspire mankind with care and affection, namely, the sense of what is one's own, and exclusive possession;[2] neither of which can find a place in this sort of community. As for exchanging the children of the artificers and husbandmen with those of the military, and theirs in turn with these, it will occasion great confusion as to the manner in which it shall be done; for of necessity those who carry and transfer the children must know to whom they give each of them; and by this means, those evils which we have already mentioned will necessarily be the more likely to happen, as blows, incestuous love, murders, and the like; for those who are transferred to other citizens, will no longer call the military caste by the name of brothers, sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing would happen to those born among the military who were transferred to the other citizens; so that every one thus would be in fear how to act in consequence of consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a community of wives and children.

Further difficulties in practice.

[1] That is, in the "Symposium," or "Banquet" of Plato, wherein Aristophanes is introduced as a speaker. See Plato, Symp. ch. xiv. 599.

[2] Τὸ *ἀγαπητόν*. Thus in the New Testament, (and indeed generally,) *ἀγαπητός* is used as equivalent to *μονογενής*. See St. Matt. i. 25. Compare also Homer, Od. B. 365, where speaking of a son, he says, *μοῦνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητός* and Arist. Rhet. book i. ch. 7, sub fin.

CHAP. V.

Community of property.

We proceed next to consider, as to property, in what way it should be regulated among those who are to live under a state formed after the most perfect mode of government, whether it should be common or not; (for this may be considered as a separate question from what has been determined concerning wives and children;) I mean, whether it is better, (although these should be held separate, as is now the case every where,) that not only the possessions but also the produce of them should be in common; or that the soil should belong to a particular owner, but that its produce should be brought together and used as one common stock, as some nations at present do; or, on the contrary, that the soil should be common and be cultivated in common, while the produce is divided amongst individuals for their special use, as is said to be the practice among some of the barbarians; or whether both the soil and the fruit should be in common? When the husbandman and the citizen are distinct, there is another and easier method; but when they each labour at their possessions for themselves, this may occasion several difficulties; for if there be not an equal proportion between their labour and what they consume, those who labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce, will of necessity complain against those who take a large share and do but little labour. Upon the whole, it is difficult to live together as a community, and thus to have all things that man can possess in common, and especially this is the case with respect to such property. This is evident from the partnerships of those who go out to settle a colony; for nearly all of them have disputes with each other upon the most common matters, and come to blows upon trifles: we find too, that we oftenest disagree with those slaves who are generally employed in the common offices of a family. A community of property then has these and other inconveniences attending it: but the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when embellished with good morals and a system of upright laws, is far superior to it, for it will embrace the advantages of both; by "both" we mean, the advantage arising

The difficulties involved in it.

from properties being common, and from being divided also; for in some respects it ought to be common, but upon the whole private. For the fact that every man's attention is employed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual complaints; and prosperity will increase as each person labours to improve his own private property; and it will then happen that, from a principle of virtue, they will perform good offices to each other, according to the proverb, "All things are common amongst friends." And in some states there are traces of this custom to be seen, showing that it is not impracticable; and particularly in those which are best governed some things are in a manner common, and others might be so; for there, while every person enjoys his own private property, he assists his friend with some things, and others he shares in common; as in Lacedæmon, where they use each other's slaves as if they were, so to speak, their own,[1] and also their horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in a journey. It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to this mind, is the particular business of the legislator to contrive. And also with respect to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should think he has something of his own; for it is by no means to no purpose,[1] that each person has an affection for himself, for that is natural, and yet selfishness is justly censured; for we mean by that, not that he loves himself, but that he loves himself more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover; and yet all men love both money and self. Besides, it is very pleasant to oblige and assist our friends and companions, and strangers,[2] which cannot be unless property be private; but this cannot result

It destroys the practice of moral virtues.

[1] Μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην. Est modestè negantis opinio. "For possibly it may not be in vain," &c. As to self-love and selfishness, and the distinction between them, see Butler's first Sermon on Human Nature, and Analogy, Part I. chap. v.

[2] We have here almost a Christian argument against the ideal community of goods proposed by Socrates. In a state where the principle of unity is thus carried out, it will be impossible to exercise the social duties of liberality, kindness, &c., and there will be no room for the virtues of benevolence, charity, modesty, &c. But virtue cannot exist if its proper objects are withdrawn; this result, then, shows that however fair and plausible such an Utopian theory may be, it is contrary to the nature of man, and therefore false in principle.

where they make the state too entirely one. And further, they destroy the offices of two principal virtues, modesty and liberality—modesty with respect to the female sex, for it is right to abstain from her who is another's; and liberality, as it relates to private property, without which no one can appear liberal, or do any generous action; for the office of liberality consists in imparting to others what is our own.

On other grounds also impracticable.

This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good appearance, and specious pretences to humanity; and the man who hears it proposed will receive it gladly, concluding that there will be a wonderful bond of friendship between all its members, particularly when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society, as arising from property not being common; as for example, the disputes which happen between man and man, upon their contracts with each other; the judgments passed to punish perjury, and the flattering of the rich; none of which arise from properties being private, but from the corruption of mankind. For we see those who live in one community and have all things in common, disputing with each other oftener than those who have their property separate; but we observe fewer instances of strife, because of the very small number of those who have property in common, compared with those where it is appropriated. It is also but right to mention not only the evils from which they who share property in common will be preserved, but also the advantages which they will lose; for viewed as a whole, this manner of life will be found impracticable. We must suppose, then, that the error of Socrates arose from the fact that his first principle[1] was false; for we admit that both a family and a state ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely so; for there is a point, beyond which if a state proceeds towards oneness, it will be no longer a state. There is also another point at which it will still be a state, but in proportion as it approaches nearer to not being a state, it will be worse;[2] as if one should reduce the voices of those who sing

Different kinds of unity.

[1] Τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. The first principle with which he starts, "Initia et fundamenta reipublicæ." (Goettling). See below, book vi. chap. 2, ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία.

[2] The Greek text as received by Bekker and others stands thus, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ἔσται μέν, ἐγγυς δ' οὖσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι ἔσται χείρων πολις.

in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But as a state contains a multitude, it ought to be brought to unity and community, as we have already said, by education; just as property at Lacedæmon and their public tables in Crete were made common by their legislators. But yet, as we said above, he must make a state one by means of education; and he who is about to introduce education, and who thinks thereby to make his state excellent, will be absurd if he expects to fashion it by the former means, and rather than manners, philosophy, and laws.[1] And the legislator ought to know that he should consult the experience of long time and of many years, which would plainly enough inform him whether such a scheme is useful: for almost all things have already been found out; but some have been neglected, and others, which men know, they do not put into practice. But this would be most evident, if any one could see such a form of government actually established: for it would be impossible to frame such a state without dividing and separating it into its distinct parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here nothing further will be provided by the laws than to forbid the military to engage in agriculture, which is what the Lacedæmonians are at present endeavouring to do. And further, Socrates has not told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of government should be pursued with respect to the individuals who share in a community of goods; for the majority of his state will comprise a multitude of persons of different occupations, but of these he has determined nothing; whether the property of the husbandman ought to be in common, or whether each should have his share to himself; as also, whether their wives and children

Moral unity to be produced by moral means.

Many editions, however, and that of Goëttling among the number, omit the word *ἔσται*; an emendation which makes the text somewhat more intelligible. We have given what seemed upon the whole to be the simplest meaning. Compare below, book v. ch. 9, *πρῶτον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δὲ οὐδὲ πολιτείαν*. May we be allowed to suggest a very simple emendation? The only alteration required is the transposition of the single word *πόλις*. The sentence then would stand thus, *ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ἔσται μὲν πόλις, ἐγγὺς δ' οὖσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι, ἔσται χείρων*. "Erit quidem civitas, quanto autem proprius absit quin non sit omnino civitas, erit pejor."

[1] Plato, carried away by zeal for his ideal theory, forgot that a *moral* unity must be brought about by *moral*, and not by physical means. This mistake Aristotle here corrects.

ought to be in common or not. For if all things are to be alike common to all, where will be the difference between them and the military, or what will they get by submitting to their government? and upon what principles would they thus submit, unless they should establish the wise practice of the Cretans, who allowed every thing else to their slaves, but forbade them only gymnastic exercises and the use of arms?[1] But if matters are to be with them as they are in other states, what will be their terms of intercourse? For in one city there must of necessity arise two states, and those contrary to each other; for he makes the military to be the guardians of the state, and the husbandmen, artisans, and others he makes citizens; and all those quarrels, accusations, and things of the like sort, which he says are the bane of other states, will be found in his also. Notwithstanding, Socrates says that in consequence of their education they will not want many laws, but such only as may be necessary for regulating the streets, the markets, and the like; while at the same time it is the military only to whom he has granted education. Besides, he makes the husbandmen masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would be likely to make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the Helots, the Penestæ, or other slaves. Nor has he determined what is connected herewith, their polity, their education, and their laws: besides, it is of no little consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed so as to preserve the community of the military. Besides, if he makes the wives common while the property continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the same care which the man bestows upon his fields? Nor will it answer by making the property common as well as the wives: and it is absurd to draw a comparison from the brute creation, and to say, that the same principle should regulate the connexion of a woman with a man, as prevails among brutes, amongst whom there are no family ties. It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has done;[2] for he would have persons of the same

Absurdity of confining education to the military.

[1] It would seem that the treatment of the children of Israel by their Egyptian masters was somewhat similar to this.

[2] These are the philosophers as a body, though individually they rule in turn in the Republic of Plato See book vii. chap. 17, where Socrates

rank always in office; a thing which becomes a cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no account, but surely[1] more particularly amongst men who are of a courageous and warlike disposition. It is indeed evidently necessary that he should frame his community in this manner; for that golden particle which God has mixed up in the soul of man, flies not from one to the other, but always continues with the same; for he says,[2] that some of our species have gold, and others silver, blended in their composition from the moment of their birth; but those who are to be husbandmen and artists have brass and iron. Besides, though he deprives the military of happiness, he says, that the legislator ought to make the entire body of citizens happy; but it is impossible that the whole state can be happy, except all, or the greater part, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not the same as the property of even number, which belongs to two numbers added together, but to neither of them taken separately: it cannot be thus with happiness. And withal, if the military are not happy, who else are to be so? for the artisans are not, nor the multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state, then, which Socrates has described, has all these defects, and others which are not of less consequence.

The theory of Plato as to the three several ranks in his commonwealth

CHAP. VI.

Plato's "Laws" next examined.

It is also nearly the same in his treatise upon Laws,[3] which was written afterwards; and hence, by the way, it will be proper in this place briefly

speaks of them after they are fifty years of age, as "for the most part, indeed, occupying themselves with philosophy, and when it is their turn, toiling in political affairs and taking the government."

[1] See Blomf. Gloss. on Æsch. Prom. V. l. 210.

[2] See the beautiful legend given at length in the Republic of Plato book iii. sub finem.

[3] With reference to the "Laws" of Plato, it may be well here to introduce a few sentences from the "Introduction" to the Translation of Plato, (vol. v.) by G. Burges, M. A. He says that "Plato, having in his imaginary 'Republic' delineated what he conceived to be the best form of government, and prescribed the course of instruction by which the people living under such a polity might be brought up and fitted for it, has in his 'Laws' detailed some of the leading enactments which a constitution would require . . . Ast asserts that it is sufficient to read only a page of the

Too many questions left undefined.

to consider the polity there described. For Socrates has thoroughly settled but very few parts of his polity; as for instance, in what manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, and as to property, and to the manner of conducting the government. Now the whole amount of inhabitants are divided by him into two parts, the husbandmen and the soldiery; and from these he selects a third part, who are to be senators and to govern the state; but he has not said whether or no the husbandmen and artificers shall have any, and what, share in the government, or whether they shall have arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also that the women ought to go with the men to war, and have the same education as the soldiery; and as to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to education, he has only said what that of the soldiery ought to be. As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that contains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and though he desired to frame this government in states, on the principle of a more entire community, he bends it round again almost to his original form.[1] For, except the community of wives and goods, the rest he frames alike in both his governments: for the education of the citizens is to be the same in both, in both are they to live without any servile employ, and their common tables[2] are

'Laws' in order to be convinced that the treatise was never written by Plato. But the real fact is, that the scope of the two treatises is different, and that there is a consequent discrepancy between them in many points of detail. For in the 'Republic,' the enactments are all of a purely moral kind, but in the 'Laws' of a penal character likewise. In a polity such as Plato has framed in his 'Republic,' there would be no need of any laws whatsoever, for their place would be supplied by a virtuous education. Now as the 'Laws' are supposed to be written for a state not merely ideal, but one to be put in practice, we need not be surprised at finding that in it specific enactments are suggested, relating to covenants and dealings in trade, which are rejected in the 'Republic,' as being useless in a well-regulated state. For in the former treatise, the whole superstructure of a state is supposed to rest on the basis of moral habits, resulting from a correct education; in the latter the arm of the law is called upon to restrain by punishment all deviations from a correct moral conduct." (p. 7—9.)

[1] From professing to give an outline of a really practical state, he gradually brings it round to an ideal and *κατ' εὐχὴν πολιτεία*.

[2] Aristotle refers here to Plato's Laws, b. vi. 21 "The common

to be the same, excepting that in the one he says that the women also ought to have common tables, and that there should be a thousand men-at-arms, in the other that there should be five thousand.[1]

Character of the dialogues of Socrates.

All the discourses of Socrates,[2] then, contain much which is highly wrought and ingenious, new and curious; but it may probably be hard to say that all their contents are true. For now, with respect to the numbers just mentioned, it must not be concealed that he would want the country of Babylonia, or some other like it of immeasurable extent, to support five thousand idle persons, besides another and much greater number of women and servants to attend them. It is true that a man may sketch out an ideal state as he pleases, but yet it ought to be something possible. It is said that when a legislator frames his laws, he should have two things in view, the country and the people.[3] He will also do well to add to this some regard to the neighbouring states, if he intends that his community should maintain any political intercourse with them; for it is necessary that they should employ not only those weapons of war which are adapted to their own land, but those which suit foreign countries also; for even granting that no one chooses this life either in public or private, yet, nevertheless, there is occasion for the people to be formidable to their enemies, not only when they invade their country, but also when they retire out of it. It should

Policy as to neighbouring states.

tables relating to the men have been instituted in both a beautiful and, as I have said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity. But those relating to the women have by no means correctly been left unregulated by law; nor has the arrangement of their common tables been brought to light." . . . . . "This, therefore, to take up and correct, and to arrange all pursuits in common for women and men, is better for the happiness of the state."

[1] The exact number of citizens proposed in the Laws of Plato is 5040, for the somewhat curious reason that it is divisible by every number up to 12 except 11.

[2] Boeckh in Plat. Min. p. 70 and following pages, asserts that Aristotle here has mistaken for Socrates, and not for Plato, the Athenian stranger who is represented in the Laws as discussing the best form of government; but the brevity of his allusions makes it almost impossible, both here and elsewhere, to say for certain, whether he is referring to the "Republic" or the "Laws" of Plato. (Goëttling.)

[3] Comp. Rhet. i. 4, *οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι.*

also be considered, whether the quantity of property may not be settled in a different manner, and better too, by more clearly defining it; for he says that it ought to be large enough for every one to live moderately, as if any one had said "enough to live well," which is the most vague expression. Besides, a man may live moderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better have laid it down, that they should live both moderately and liberally; for unless these two conspire, luxury will follow on the one course, and wretchedness on the other; since these two habits of living are the only ones which regard the employment of our substance;[1] for it is not possible for a man to be mild or courageous in the use of his fortune; but he may be prudent and liberal; so that these uses are the only ones necessarily connected with property. It is also absurd to render property equal,

As to population.

and not to provide for the number of the citizens, but to leave the increase of population uncertain; as if it would regulate itself according to the number of women who should happen to be childless, let that be what it may, because this seems now to take place in other states. But the case of necessity would not happen with the same certainty in such a state which he proposes, as in those which now exist; for in these no one actually wants, as the property is divided amongst the whole body, be its numbers what they will; but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they are many or few, must needs have nothing at all. But one would suppose that it is even more necessary than the regulation of property, to provide, as to the increase of numbers, that not more than a certain number should become parents; and to determine this number by calculating the chances of those children who will die, and of those women who will be barren; and to neglect[2] this, as is done in several

[1] Coraës rightly reads here, *τῷ μὲν τὸ τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως*. The word *αἱρεταὶ*, which Bekker here admits, is clearly only a corruption of *ἀρεταὶ*, which has probably been added as a marginal gloss explanatory of *ἕξεις*, in accordance with the definition of moral virtue laid down in Eth. Nicom. ii. 2.

[2] *τὸ ἀφεῖσθαι*. It is suggested by Goëttling to understand this word as meaning *emigration*, "possis de emittendis coloniis intelligere." And he supports his rendering by a reference below to Aristotle's own words, b. v. chap. 5, with reference to Heraclea. It would seem that Aristotle, in objecting to Plato's scheme, on the ground that he has not proposed any

states, is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and evil. Now Pheidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest of legislators, thought that the families and number of citizens ought to continue the same; although it should happen that all at the first have allotments disproportionate to their numbers. In Plato's Laws it is however different; and we must mention hereafter[1] what we think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in this same book of Laws to point out how the governors are to be distinguished from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought the governors to be in regard to those who are governed. But since he admits[2] that all their property may be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the country to some extent? He ought also to consider whether his allotment of houses will be useful to the community, for he has[3] appointed two houses to each person, separate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a person to regulate two houses. And his whole system of government claims to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between both, which is generally called a polity,[4] for it is to be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame a state, in which more than in any other every thing should be common, he has certainly given it a right name; but if he intended it to be the next in perfection to the best theoretic state,[5] it is not

Other omissions.

measure to guard against an excess of population, has overlooked the fact that Plato in his Laws (b. v. p. 740) expressly suggests a voluntary colonization as the great safeguard against any superfluous population in his ideal city or state.

The following is the substance of the note of Goëttling, in loco: τὸ δὲ ἀφεῖσθαι. This is generally rendered as if it meant "*to neglect.*" But we might very plausibly argue in favour of understanding the words as referring to "*colonization,*" the remedy proposed by Plato as a means of carrying off the supernumerary members of the state. See Laws, book v. 10. "Moreover, should any difficulty arise concerning the inequality of the 5040 households, ... there remains the old contrivance which we have often mentioned, of friendly colonies being sent out from friends, whithersoever it may appear to be suitable."

[1] This promise Aristotle afterwards redeems in book vii.

[2] See Plato's Laws, v. 744. [3] Ibid. v. 14, 236.

[4] See below, book vii.

[5] The polity which was the original object of our inquiry—or that which is abstractedly the best and purest. This Aristotle would consider

so, for perhaps some persons will give the preference to the Lacedæmonian form of government, or some other which may more nearly approximate to an aristocracy. Now some persons say, that the most perfect government should be one composed of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of Lacedæmon; for some say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy; their kings representing the monarchical part, their gerusia the oligarchical; and that in the ephoralty may be found the democratical element, as they are taken from the body of the people. But others assert, that the ephors have absolute power, and that it is their common meals and daily course of life, in which the democratic form is represented. It is also said in this treatise of Laws, that the best form of government must be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though such a mixture no one would allow to be any government at all, or, if it is, the worst possible. Those, on the other hand, propose what is much better, who blend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is formed of many parts. But now this polity (of Plato's) shows no traces of a monarchy, but only of an oligarchy and democracy; and it seems rather to incline towards an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by lot, is common to both; but the fact that men of fortune must necessarily be members of the assembly, and elect the magistrates, and take part in the management of other public affairs, while the rest are passed over, this makes the state incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond with their fortunes. The oligarchic principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all are obliged to vote for senators out of the first class, afterwards for the same number out of the second, and then out of the third; but this compulsory voting does not extend to all of

Faults as to the composition and election of the ruling body.

o be one in which the various forms of government are blended to some extent, but inclining more nearly to an aristocracy, which, as its name implies, is based on virtue or merit (ἀρετή). See a few lines below, "Those on the other hand propose what is much better, who blend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is composed of many

the third and fourth classes, but only the first and second classes out of the entire four.[1] By this means, he says, he ought to show an equal number of each rank elected: but he is mistaken; for the majority will always consist of the first rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason, that many of the commonalty, not being obliged to it,[2] will not attend the elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist of a democracy and a monarchy, as well as from what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form of government.

Danger also will arise from the manner of choosing the senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect others; for, if a certain number choose to combine together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall according to their pleasure. Such are the points on which Plato touches, concerning his form of government, in his book of Laws.

CHAP. VII.

Other ideal polities.

THERE are also certain other forms of government, which have been proposed, some by private persons,[3] and some by philosophers and politicians, all of which come much nearer than the above to those which have been really established, or now exist: for no one else has introduced the innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for the women; but they have set out with establishing such points as are absolutely necessary.

That of Phaleas. His mode of equalizing property.

There are some who think that the first object of government should be to regulate well every thing relating to property; for they say, that herein lies the source of all seditions whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian was the first who proposed this plan, that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal. This he thought was not difficult to accomplish when

[1] Bekker reads *ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων*. But it is necessary to read *τεττάρων* in order to preserve the sense.

[2] Compare Plato's Laws, b. vii. 5. [illegible] also Goëttling's note.

[3] *ἰδιῶται*. This word must be understood as opposed not so much to *φιλόσοφοι* as to *πολιτικοί*. The class of philosophers being divided into those who have taken a practical part and share in legislation (*πολιτικοί*), and those who have not (*ἰδιῶται*).

a community was first settled, but that it was a work of much difficulty in states which had been long established; but yet that an equality might possibly be effected as follows: namely, that the rich should give marriage portions but never receive any, while the poor should always receive but never give them.

But Plato, in his treatise of Laws,[1] thinks that a difference in circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the lowest income,[2] as we have already mentioned. But one thing ought not to escape the notice of legislators who would establish this principle, though now they are apt to overlook it; that while they regulate the quantity of property belonging to each individual, they ought also to regulate the number of his children; for if the number of his family exceed the allotted quantity of property, the law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, apart from such a repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty; so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an equality of goods has some force to strengthen political society, seems to have been determined by some of the ancients; for Solon made a law to this effect; and also among certain others there is a law restraining persons from possessing as much land as they please. And upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their property, (as among the Locrians,) unless they can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They were also to preserve their ancient patrimony; and this custom being broken through among the Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for by that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune, in order to step into the magistracy. But it is possible that an equality of goods is established, and yet that this may be either too great, when it tends to luxurious living, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not enough for the legislator to establish an equality of circumstances, but he must aim at a proper medium. Besides, if any one should so regulate property, as that there should be

[1] See the Laws, book v. ch. 13.

[2] Aristotle is here quoting from memory. In the Laws of Plato, the quadruple of a single lot (κλῆρος) is laid down as the extreme limit of wealth which the legislator ought to tolerate.

a moderate sufficiency for all, it would be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizens should entertain a similarity of feelings than an equality of property; but this can never be, unless they are properly educated under the direction of the laws. But probably Phaleas may say, that this is what he himself mentions; for he thinks that states ought to possess an equality of these two things, property and education. But he should have said particularly what education he intended; nor is it of any service to have this one and the same for all; for this education may be one and the same, and yet such as will make the citizens over-greedy to grasp after honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also one of honours, occasions seditions, though in a contrary way in either case; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an equality of goods, but those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of honours; whence it is said,

> "When good and bad do equal honours share."
> Homer, Il. ix. 319.

For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only,—(for which they think an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would then have no occasion to steal for cold or hunger,)—but that they may enjoy what they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desires extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they will do any injustice to gratify them; and not only so, but, if they feel a desire, they will do the same to enjoy pleasures free from pain.[1] What remedy then shall we find for these three disorders? For the first, let every one have a moderate subsistence, and labour for his living. For the second, let him practise temperance; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure through themselves, seek for it only in philosophy; for all other pleasures want the assistance of man. Men, then, are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not from necessity; no one, for instance, aims at being a tyrant, to keep him from the cold; hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief, but a tyrant;[2] so that form of polity which Phaleas

[1] There are three motives of human actions, according to Aristotle in this passage. 1st, *Absolute want* (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀναγκαίων). 2nd, *Desire* (τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων). 3rd, *Pleasure* itself (ἰνὰ χαίρωσι).

[2] As, for instance, in the case of Harmodius and Aristogeiton at

establishes, would only be salutary to prevent little crimes. He is also very desirous to establish such rules as will tend to better the internal policy of his state; but he ought also to have done the same with respect to its neighbours, and all foreign nations; for it is necessary that every government should be well appointed as to its military force; but of this he has said nothing. So also with respect to property; it ought not only to be adapted to the exigencies of the state, but also to such dangers as may arise from without. Thus it should not be so great as to tempt those that are near and more powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to go to war with those who are quite equal to itself; of this too he has determined nothing; but it ought not to be forgotten that some amount of resources is advantageous to a state. Perhaps, then, the proper boundary is this; not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful neighbour to attack you, any more than those who have not so much as yourself. Thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider what time it would require to take the city, and then to calculate the expenses of that period; for that he would be willing for a less sum at once to quit Atarneus: his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the business, and give over the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods, to prevent seditions amongst the citizens; and yet, to say the truth, it is no very great one; for men of great abilities will be likely to feel hurt at not being reckoned at their proper worth, and hence they will very often appear ready for commotion and sedition. For the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though at first two obols might be sufficient pay, yet when once it is become customary, they continually want something more, until they set no limits to their expectations;[1] for it is the nature of our desires to be boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this

Athens, who were rewarded with extraordinary honours, for having, as was supposed, put Hipparchus to death, and so freed their city from tyranny. See Herod. v. 55 and vi. 123; and the acute comment of Thucydides (vi. 55—59) upon the story of the death of Hipparchus.

[1] An instance in point would be the "sportula," or dole-basket, at Rome, so often alluded to by Juvenal.

purpose, the first object is not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it ;[1] and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well one of the equality of goods ; for he has extended his regulation only to land, whereas a man's substance consists not only in this, but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all that variety of things which fall under the name of chattels. Now there must be either an equality established in all these, or some certain general rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his laws, that he intends to establish his state on a small scale, as all the artificers are to belong to the public, and will add nothing to the complement of citizens ; but if all those who are to be employed upon public works are to be public slaves, it should be done in the same manner as it is at Epidamnus, and as Diophantus formerly regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge whether Phaleas has said well or ill as to his community

His mistakes in legislation.

His system suited only to a very small state.

CHAP. VIII.

But Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a Milesian, the same who contrived the art of laying out towns, and who separated the Piræus, was in other respects over-eager of notoriety, and seemed to many to live in a very affected manner, with his flowing array of locks[2] and expensive ornaments, and a coarse warm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in the hot weather. And as he was very desirous of being regarded as a universal

The ideal polity of Hippodamus.

[1] Compare the last chapter of the Nicom. Ethics, b. x., where Aristotle says that the great majority of mankind, who are *φύσει φαῦλοι*, must be restrained by force (*βίᾳ*), inasmuch as but few men, comparatively, namely, *οἱ φύσει ἐπιεικεῖς*, are influenced by *λόγος*. There is but one way, according to Aristotle, by which the *φύσει φαῦλοι* can be managed, and that is by depriving them of all civil power.

[2] This *κόσμος πολυτελὴς τριχῶν* is probably the same with the *ἔνερσις χρυσῶν τεττίγων* mentioned by Thucyd. b. i. 6, as the favourite ornament of the Athenians.

philosopher, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in the management of public affairs, took in hand to lay down what sort of government was best. Accordingly he planned his state to consist of ten thousand persons, and divided into three parts, one consisting of artisans, the second of husbandmen, and the third of the military order; he also divided the lands into three parts, allotting one to sacred purposes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The first of these was to supply what was necessary for the established worship of the gods; the second was to be allotted to the support of the soldiery; and the third was to be the property of the husbandmen. He thought also that there need only be three sorts of laws, for there are only three matters on account of which actions can be brought, namely, assault, trespass, or death. He ordered also that there should be one final court of appeal, into which all causes were to be removed which seemed to have been unjustly determined elsewhere; and this court he composed out of a body of elders chosen for that purpose. He thought also that they should not pass sentence by votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on which he should write that he found the party guilty, if such was the case, but that, in case of an acquittal, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one part of the indictment, but not of the other, he should express that also on the tablet; for he disapproved of the custom already established by law, as obliging the judges to be guilty of perjury if they determined positively on the one side or the other. He also made a law, that those should be rewarded who devised any thing for the good of the city, and that the children of those who fell in battle should be educated at the public expense:[1] this law had never up to that time been proposed by any other legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in other cities.

Its numbers and divisions.

Its peculiarities. Rewards and honours.

[1] Compare the words of Pericles, (Thucydides, b. ii. 46,) *αὐτῶν τοὺ παῖδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσία ἡ πόλις μέχρις ἡβης θρέψει.* The law to which Aristotle here alludes, was introduced after the Persian war but before the year 439, B. C., when Pericles spoke the funeral oration over those who had been killed in his expedition against Samos, just as nine years later he spoke that celebrated Funeral Oration which has come down to us in the pages of Thucydides, over the bodies of those who had been killed in the first year of the Peloponnesian war.

Further, he would have the magistrates all chosen out of the people; (meaning by the people the three parts before spoken of;) and that those who were so elected, should be the particular guardians of what belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans. These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in the plan of Hippodamus. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his dividing the citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the husbandmen, and the soldiery, all are to have a share in the community, while the husbandmen are to have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that they should all partake of all the posts of honour; for the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be appointed out of the soldiery, and indeed, so to say, the most honourable magistrates; but if the others have not their share in the government, how can they be expected to be friendly disposed towards it? But it is necessary that the soldiery should be superior to the other two parts, and this will not be effected unless they are very numerous; and if they are so, why should the community consist of any other members, and have a right to elect the magistrates? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to this community? Artisans, it is true, are necessary, for these every city wants, and they can live off their business as in all other states. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiery with provisions, they would be properly part of the community; but these are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate it for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiery are themselves to cultivate that common land which is appropriated for their support, there will be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman, which the legislator intended there should be; and if there should be any others besides those who cultivate their own private property, and the military, there will be a fourth order in the state, which has no share in it, and will always be alien from it. But further, if any one should propose that the same persons should cultivate their own lands and the public land also, then there would be a deficiency of provisions to supply two families, as the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the soldiers also; all these

His system open to many objections.

Difficulties of his judicial system.

things, then, involve great confusion. Neither is his method of determining causes a good one, when he would have the judge, in deciding, split the case which comes simply before him, and thus, instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now in matters of arbitration, this is possible to a number of individuals;[1] (for they confer together upon the business that is before them;) but when a cause is brought before judges it is not so; but on the contrary, the majority of legislators take care that the judges shall not communicate their sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion in the decision, when one judge thinks a fine should be inflicted, but not so great an one as that which the suitor thinks fit; the latter proposing twenty minæ, while the judge imposes ten, or be it more or less, another four, and another five? It is evident then that in this manner they will differ from each other, some giving the whole damages sued for, and others nothing; and if so, how shall the determinations of their votes be settled? Besides, nothing compels a judge to perjure himself who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he who acquits the party, does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of twenty minæ. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury, if he sentences him to pay twenty minæ, while he believes the damages ought not to be so high. But with respect to the honours which he proposes to bestow on those who devise any thing which is useful to the community, this, though all very pleasing to the ear, is not safe for the legislator to settle, for it would occasion informers, and, it may be, commotions too in the state. And this proposal of his gives rise also to a further conjecture and inquiry; for some persons doubt whether it is useful or hurtful to alter the established laws of any country, if even it be for the better; for which reason one cannot immediately accede to what is here said, since it is not advantageous to alter them. We know indeed, that it is possible to propose a remodelling of both the laws and government as a common good; and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very proper to enter into a few particulars

Further objections and difficulties.

[1] *καὶ πλείοσιν.* On this passage Goëttling remarks, "Mihi hæc verba suspecta sunt, saltem quo pertineant non intelligo."

concerning it; for it contains some difficulties, as we have already said, and it may appear better to alter them, for it has been found useful in other sciences at all events so to do. Thus the science of physics is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so is the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and faculties; and hence, since the political science must be held to be one of them, it is clear that the same thing will necessarily hold good in its respect. And it may also be affirmed that experience itself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and barbarous; for example, the Greeks used to wear armour in common,[1] and to buy their wives of each other. And indeed all the remains of old laws which we have, are very simple; for instance, a law in Cyme relative to murder, by which if any one, in prosecuting another for murder, can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the accused person is to be held guilty of the crime. But, in a word, all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is established; and it is probable that the first of the human race, whether they sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some general calamity, were much in the same state as the vulgar and unlearned now, as is affirmed of the aborigines; so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of their rules. Nor is it moreover right to permit written laws always to remain unaltered; for as in all other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that every thing should be expressed in writing with perfect exactness; for when we commit a thing to writing we must use general terms; but in every action there is something particular to itself, which these may not comprehend; and hence it is evident, that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if we consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to be one which requires great caution; for when the advantage proposed is trifling, as the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is a bad thing, it is evidently better to pass over some faults on the part of both the legislator and the magistrates; for the alterations will not be productive of so much good, as

Change of laws and constitution a bad thing.

[1] Compare the statement of Thucydides, b. i. 6. *πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφράκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους.*

a habit of disobeying the magistrates will be of harm. Besides, the instance brought from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the one as the other. For a law derives from custom all its power to enforce obedience, and this requires long time to establish; so that to make it an easy matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the power of laws. And besides, if the laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every government or not? and shall it be the pleasure of any chance person, or of whom? Now all these particulars make a great difference; for which reason let us at present drop this inquiry, for it better suits some other occasion.

CHAP. IX.

The government of Sparta reviewed.

Two questions started.

But the considerations which offer themselves with respect to the governments established at Lacedæmon and in Crete, and indeed in all other states, are two in number; the one, whether their laws are laid down well or ill, when compared with the best form possible: the other, whether there is any thing in its principles or administration, in any way opposed to the theory proposed to them.[1] Now it is allowed that the members of every well-regulated state should be free from servile labour; but in what manner this shall be effected, is not easy to determine. For the Penestæ have very often attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots[2] the

[1] The questions to be asked here with reference to slavery are two:

a. Is the end good, in comparison with the best possible form of polity?

b. Do the means succeed in effecting their end?

[2] *The Helots.* *a.* The object of their institution is sufficiently good; viz. to enable the citizens to perform the duties of citizenship.

b. The practical working of the system is bad; for,

1. Like the Penestea of Thessaly, it breeds Helot wars. If the case be otherwise in Crete, this is to be attributed to its insular position and the prevalence of the same institution in all its towns; while Sparta was surrounded by nations who had no Helotry.

2. It is impossible to associate with them on common terms; if you oppress them, they rebel; if you treat them with kindness, they grow insolent.

Müller speaks as follows concerning the Helots. "Their name is derived (not from the town Helos, but) from ἕλω, capio—'perhaps those who were taken after resisting to the uttermost, while the Perioeci surrendered on conditions;' but more probably 'an aboriginal race, subdued

Lacedæmonians; for they in a manner continually watch an opportunity for some misfortune to befal them.[1] But no such thing has ever yet happened to the Cretans; the reason for which probably is, that although the neighbouring cities are engaged in frequent wars with each other, yet none of them are ready to enter into alliance with the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for themselves who have villains of their own. But there has been perpetual enmity between the Lacedæmonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their slaves also, from the very first, have revolted from[2] the Thessalians, while they have been engaged in wars

Difficulties arising from the Helots.

at a very early period, and passed over as slaves to the Dorian conquerors.'" Dorians, vol. ii. book iii. ch. 3.

1. *Political rights of the Helots.* *a.* They were public slaves—not alienable, even by the state—belonged to the land—had dwellings of their own—paid rent—got wealth by cultivating the soil, and by plunder in war, (Herod. ix. 80,)—had little intercourse with their masters, for the Spartans lived in town—and served as ψιλοὶ in war. At Platæa 5,000 Spartans were attended by 35,000 Helots. The Helots in battle were immediately under the king. (Herod. vi. 80, 81.) Slavery was, in Dorian states, the basis of commercial prosperity; but in time of war slaves were dangerous—ὥστε γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσι. See Thucyd. i. 100, 118; v. 14, 23.

b. They could be enfranchised. They served in the fleet with the Periœci, under the name of δεσποσιοναῦται. After some time they were called Neodamodes; and the Mothaces, or Mothones, answered to the Latin "Vernæ," were well treated, and could acquire full citizenship; for Callicratidas, Gylippus, and Lysander were all of this class.

2. *Their treatment* has probably been much misrepresented. They wore a κυνῆ—as the peasants in Homer. (See Odyss. xxiv. 230.) This has been absurdly understood as a hardship. Plutarch's story we reject as untrue; that they were compelled to get drunk as an example to the Spartan youth. The Cryptea is also misunderstood; it was not an institution for murder, but for inspection of roads and fortresses. This we gather from Plato's Laws, i. p. 633, C. Thucydides, however, (iv. 80,) seems to adhere to the popular belief.

3. *Their number.* Thucydides (viii. 40) says that the Lacedæmonians had the largest body of slaves. Now there were present at Platæa 5000 Spartans, 35,000 Helots, and 10,000 Periœci. Almost all the Spartans served in the war, but few Periœci; for the latter had 30,000 κλῆροι, the former 9000. And as there were 8000 Spartans, ἐν ὅπλοις, they were attended by 56,000 Helots, i. e. by about half their entire number.

[1] In Crete slaves of the class corresponding to the Helots were called Aphamiotæ, and at Argos, Gymnesians (Γυμνῆτες).

[2] Perhaps it would be better to read here ἐφίσταντο, as it suits better the context, and the case governed by the verb—"*risen up against.*"

with their neighbours the Achæans, the Perrhæbeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet a very troublesome business, to settle how to keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are remiss in your discipline, they grow insolent, and think themselves upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly used, they are continually plotting against you, and hate you. It is evident then, that those who happen to employ slaves, have not as yet hit upon the right way of managing them.

And from the women.

As to giving licence to the women, it is hurtful to the end of government and to the prosperity of the state; for as a man and his wife are each a part of a family, it is clear that we must suppose the city to be divided into two nearly equal parts, namely, into the number of men and of women. In whatever city, then, the women are not under good regulations, we must look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law. And this actually happened at Sparta; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a collection of warriors, most evidently accomplished his design with respect to the men, but in the mean time the women were quite neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper indulgence and luxury.[1] So that in such a state riches will necessarily be in general esteem, particularly if the men chance to be governed by their wives, which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people, except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly approve of connexion with men. And the first mythologists seem not without good reason to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of this character appear to be greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys; for which reason it was thus at Lacedæmon; and many things in their

[1] "So strange did the influence which the Lacedæmonian women exercised, as the managers of their household and mothers of families, appear to the Greeks at a time when the prevalence of Athenian manners prevented a due consideration for national customs, that Aristotle supposed Lycurgus to have attempted, but without success, to regulate the life of women as he had that of the men. . . . In accusing the women o Sparta, however, for not essentially assisting their country in times of necessity, Aristotle has . . . required of them a duty which even in Sparta lay out of their sphere, and . . . his assertion has been sufficiently contradicted by the events of a subsequent period, in the last days of Sparta, which acquired a surprising lustre from female valour. See Plutarch, Cleom. 38." Müller's Dorians vol. ii. ch. iv. 4.

state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the power is in their hands, whether the women rule, or whether the rulers themselves are influenced by their women? The same is the result in either case. And as this boldness of the women can be of no use in any matters of daily life, if it was ever so, it must be in war; but we find that the Lacedæmonian women were of the greatest disservice in this respect, as was proved at the time of the Theban invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities, but made more disturbance than even the enemy. This licence which the Lacedæmonian women enjoy is what might be expected from the first; for the men were wont to be absent from home for a long time upon foreign expeditions against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians; so that, when these wars were at an end, owing to their military life, in which there is no little virtue, they showed themselves prepared to obey the precepts of their lawgiver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus endeavoured to reduce the women also to an obedience to his laws, upon their refusal, he desisted from his purpose. The women, then, were the causes of these results, so that all the fault was theirs. But we are not now considering for whom we ought to make allowance or not, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the women are not well regulated, as we have already said, they are likely not only to occasion discord between the various parts of the community, which is disgraceful, but also to increase the love of money. In the next place, after what has been said, one might find fault with his unequal division of property; for it so happens that some have far too much, others too little, by which means the land has come into few hands; and this matter is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell his possessions, and in this he did right; but he permitted any one that chose it to give them away or bequeath them, although nearly the same consequences must needs arise from the one course as from the other. For it is supposed that nearly two parts in five of the whole country is the property of women, owing to their being so often heiresses, and having such large fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to

How this happened.

And from the unequal distribution of property.

allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now however every one is permitted to give his heiress to whomsoever he pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives her to whom he pleases.

Dearth of population.

Whence it happens that, although the country is[1] able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the number does not amount even to one thousand. And from these results it is made evident, that in this particular the state is badly regulated; for the city could not support one blow, but was ruined for want of men.[2] They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but be that true or false as it may, it is far better to increase the number of the male population by an equality of property. The law too which he made to encourage population, was by no means calculated to correct this inequality; for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as possible, he encouraged them to have as large families as possible; and to this end there is a law that he who had three children should be exempted from the night-watch, and that he who had four

[1] It has been suggested that we should here read *τρισχιλίους*, and not *τρισμυρίους*. But it is to be remembered that the Περίοικοι served as Hoplites, and at Platæa were double in number to the *Σπαρτιᾶται*. The Spartans were at one time 9000 or even 10,000 in number. The Hoplites from among the Περίοικοι in that case would have amounted to 18,000 or even 20,000. And this would make the number nearly correct as it stands here.

[2] A Spartan was degraded if he could not support himself in his proper rank. This, combined with exclusive right of marriage between true Dorians, produced the *ὀλιγανθρωπία*. Moreover, at Sparta strangers were never enfranchised, at least latterly. As to the population of Sparta, i. e. of the *Σπαρτιᾶται*, the following is the received estimate.

In early times, according to report,	10,000
In time of Lycurgus . . .	9,000
—— Herodotus . . .	8,000
—— Thucydides . .	6,000
—— Aristotle . . .	1,000
—— Agis	700

The "one blow" alluded to here was the battle of Leuctra, B. C. 371, in which the Spartan supremacy was overthrown by the Thebans under Epaminondas.

should pay no taxes:[1] though it is very evident, that while the land was divided in this manner, if the people increased, many of them must be very poor. And further, the constitution of the Ephoralty is faulty;[2] for these magistrates take cognizance of things of the last importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so that it often happens that very poor persons chance to be elected to that office, who, from that circumstance, are easily bought. There have been many instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. For certain men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin the city. And, moreover, because their power was very great and nearly tyrannical,

Objections against the Ephoralty.

How the Ephoralty was democratic.

Difficulties with regard to the kings of Sparta.

[1] Cf. Herod. i. 136. Among the Persians he is most honoured who has the largest family. And to this day the same law is said to be observed in some parts of Switzerland.

[2] The establishment of the Ephoralty has been erroneously assigned to Theopompus, and to Lycurgus, (Herod. i. 65,) but it probably existed earlier; for we find Ephors in Thera, Cyrene, etc., and under the name of Cosmi in Crete. It was an office intended to limit the authority of the kings; though perhaps, in very early times, its chief duty lay in the trial of civil causes; their very name seems to imply "inspectors,"—perhaps of the market (Herod. i. 153); for "buying and selling" was esteemed honourable, even among the Spartiatæ. Thucyd. v. 34. Herod. vi. 50.

They were elected from the whole body of the people, (*οἱ τυχόντες*,) but not by lot alone (Pol. iv. 15, *μηδεμιὰν κληρωτὴν ἀρχήν*); perhaps by lot and choice combined. (Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692, *ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς*.) Their powers gradually came to be enlarged; for in all Grecian states, the civil courts rose in power in proportion as the criminal courts declined—e. g. the Heliæa and Areopagus at Athens.

They became *κρίσεων μεγάλων κύριοι*, as Aristotle here states, when they gained the right of scrutiny (*ἐυθύνη*) into the conduct of magistrates; but they were subjected to it themselves at the end of their year of office. In time the kings became subject to the Ephors. Cleomenes was tried by them on a charge of bribery. (*δωροδοκία*. Herod. vi. 82.) They could even imprison the king, or put him to death. (Th. i. 131.) They conducted their court with great propriety. (Th. v. 63.) Agis was brought before them. They compelled Anaxandridas to marry a second wife, though polygamy was contrary to Spartan usage. (Herod. v. 39.) They fined Agesilaus. (Plutarch.)

They punished citizens for indolence, luxurious habits, etc., and probably took a part in superintending public education.

They were assessors of the kings in judicial matters, (Herod. vi. 56,) and they judged according to their own will and pleasure, or rather according to unwritten laws; for Sparta knew no others. As to their venality see some remarks in Aristotle's Rhet. iii. 18.

their kings too were obliged to flatter them, which contributed greatly to hurt the state; for it was altered from an aristocracy to a democracy. This magistracy[1] is indeed the great bond which holds the state together; for the people are easy, knowing that they have a share of the first office in it; so that whether it took place by the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by chance, this is of great service to their affairs; for in a state which aims at permanency, every member of it ought to endeavour that each part of the government may be preserved and continue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their honour; the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of virtue; and the common people, that they may support the ephors, for the latter are chosen from the entire body. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole community, but not in the way which is customary at present, for it is very ridiculous. The ephors are the supreme judges in cases of the last consequence; but, as they are persons taken at chance from the people, it is not right that they should determine according to their own opinion, but by written law or established customs.[2] Their way of life also is not consistent with the will of the city, for it is too indulgent; whereas that of the others tends to too great severity, so that they cannot support it, but privately act contrary to the law and enjoy sensual pleasures. There are also great defects in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were of a kind disposition, fitly trained to manly virtue, every one would readily admit that they would be useful to the government; but still it might be debated, whether they should continue judges for life, to determine points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the body; but as they are so brought up that even the legislator could not depend upon them as good men,[3] their power must be far

[1] The Ephoralty was established at Sparta by Lycurgus; its powers were extended by Theopompus. The Ephors were elected out of the δῆμος, and to a great extent resembled the Tribunes of the people in the Roman commonwealth.

[2] In defence of the Dorian policy, Müller says that there were no written laws at all at Sparta.

[3] The reference of Aristotle here is evidently to some particular occasion and person, but what it may be we are unable to ascertain.

from safe: for it is known that the members of that body have been guilty of taking bribes, and of much partiality in public affairs. For this reason it had been much better if they had been made responsible for their conduct, which they are not. But it may be said that the ephors seem to have a check upon all the magistrates. This power indeed is far too great a privilege; but I affirm that they should not be intrusted with this control in the manner in which they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of at the election of their senators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one about to be elected to office to solicit a place; for every person who is fit to hold office, whether he chooses it or not, ought to be elected. But his intention was evidently the same in this, as in the other parts of his government. For making his citizens ambitious after honours, he has employed persons of that disposition in the election of his senate, since no others will solicit that office; and yet the principal part of those crimes of which men are deliberately guilty, arise from ambition and avarice. We will inquire at another time whether the kingly office is useful to the state or not: but thus much is certain, that they should be chosen, not as they are now, but from a consideration of their individual conduct. But that the legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens completely virtuous, is evident from the fact, that he distrusts them as not being sufficiently good men; for he sent out enemies upon the same embassy, and thought that dissensions between the kings were the very safety of the state. Neither were their common meals, called Pheidittia,[1] well arranged by him who first established them: for the table should rather have been provided at the public expense, as at Crete: whereas at Lacedæmon every one was obliged to contribute his portion, although he might be very poor and could by no means bear the expense. By this means the contrary happened to what the legislator desired: for he intended that the appointment of those public meals should strengthen the democratic element; but arranged as it was by him, it had far from a democratic tendency; for those

Tendency of the public tables.

[1] Compare the statement of Plutarch, Lyc. 12. "The Lacedæmonians call them (their common tables) *φιδίτια*, either as connected with friendship (*φιλία*) and merriment, (*φιλοφροσύνη*,) or as tending to cheap-living and saving (*φειδὼ*)." The interchange of *d* and *l* is of course common thus *δάκρυον*, lacryma, *μελετάω*, meditor

who were very poor could not take part in them; and the limit of the state was laid down by their forefathers, that whoever could not contribute his proportion to the common tables should have no share in them. Other persons have censured his law concerning the office of High Admiral, and not without reason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the office of admiral is in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army, and being for life, becomes, as it were, a second monarchy. And in this respect, too, one might censure the theory of the legislator, as Plato has done in his Laws; the whole arrangement of the constitution is calculated only for the business of war, for it is excellent to make them conquerors. And this is the reason why the state survived as long as they were at war, but began to perish as soon as they gained sway: for they knew not how to be idle, or to engage in any other employment more proper than war. In this also they were no less mistaken, that they thought rightly enough that those things which are objects of contention, are better procured by virtue than by vice; yet they wrongfully supposed the things themselves to be preferable to virtue. Nor was the public revenue well managed at Sparta; for the state had nothing in its coffers while it was obliged to carry on extensive wars, and the subsidies were badly raised; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of country, they were obliged to look closely to each other, as to what they paid in. And thus an event took place contrary to the prudent design of the legislator; for he made the state poor, and its individual members avaricious. Let it suffice to have said thus much concerning the Lacedæmonian government; for these are the chief points in it which one would blame.

Sparta a military state, and could live only in war.

CHAP. X.

THE form of government in Crete[1] bears a near resemblance to this; in some few particulars it is not worse, but

[1] "In Crete the constitution founded on the principles of the Doric race, was first moulded into a firm and consistent shape, but even in a more simple manner than in Sparta at a subsequent period. Thus Lycurgus was able, without forcing any foreign usages upon Sparta, to take for a model the Cretan institutions, which had been more fully developed at an earlier period; so that the constitutions of Crete and Sparta had from that time, as it were, a family resemblance." Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. i. 8

in general it is less skilfully contrived. For it appears, and is said, that in most particulars the constitution of Lacedæmon was formed in imitation of that of Crete; and in general most old things are less compactly put together than new ones. For they say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilaus, he went abroad, and spent a long time with his relations in Crete. For the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians; and those who first settled there adopted that body of laws which they found already established by the inhabitants; in like manner also, those who now live near them have the very laws which they had when Minos first drew out his system of a state. This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it lies across the entire length of the sea, around which nearly all the Greeks are settled; and it is not far distant on the one side from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks toward Asia, from Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos[1] acquired the empire of the sea and of the islands, some of which he subdued, and others he colonized:[2] at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily. There is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedæmonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds for the one, the serfs for the other.[3] Both states too

The government of Crete resembles the Spartan.

[1] Comp. infr. book vii. chap. 10. [2] Comp. Thucyd. i. chap. 8.

[3] "In this island, several different classes of dependants existed. Sosicrates speaks of three classes, the public bondsmen, (*κοινὴ δουλεία*, called by Cretans *μνοία*,) the slaves of individual citizens, (*ἀφαμιῶται*,) and the Periœci (*ὑπήκοοι*). Now we know that the Aphamiotæ received their name from the cultivation of the lands of private individuals, (in Crete called *ἀφαμίαι*,) and accordingly were agricultural bondsmen. These latter are identical with the Clarotæ, (*κληρῶτοι*). . . . They were bondsmen belonging to the individual citizens, and both the Clarotæ and Aphamiotæ have therefore been correctly compared with the Helots: and as the latter were entirely distinct from the Lacedæmonian Periœci, so were the former from the Cretan, though Aristotle neglects the distinction accurately observed by Cretan writers. The *μνοία*, by more precise historians, was distinguished as well from the constitution of the Periœci as from that of private bondage, and it was explained to mean a state of public vassalage. Hence we may infer that every state in Crete was possessed of public lands, which the Mnotæ cultivated in the same relative situation to the community as that in which the Aphamiotæ, who cultivated the allotted estates, stood to the several proprietors Finally, the Periœci in Crete, as in Laconia, formed dependent and tributary communities; and their tribute, like the produce of the national lands, was partly applied to the public banquets." (Müller's Dorians, ibid.)

have their common meals, and the Lacedæmonians called these formerly not Φειδίττια, but Ἄνδρια, as the Cretans do; which proves whence the custom arose. In this particular their governments are also alike: the ephors have the same power with those who are called Cosmi in Crete;[1] with this difference only, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators are the same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There was formerly also a kingly power in Crete, but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command of their armies belongs to the Cosmi. Every one also has a vote in their public assembly; but this has only the power of confirming what has already been passed by the council and the Cosmi. The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedæmonians, for at Lacedæmon each individual was obliged to furnish what was assessed upon him; and if he could not do this, there was a law which deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned: but in Crete they were furnished by the community; for all the corn and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts, and allotted to the gods, the public services of the state, and these public meals; so that all the men, women, and children were maintained from a common stock. The legislator gave many minute regulations to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as being very useful to the citizens. In regard to the marriage of the women also, he provided that they should not be too prolific, by introducing the love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of considering.[2] But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete than at Lacedæmon is very evident. The institution of the Cosmi

The Cosmi.

The public tables.

[1] "What the Dorians endeavoured to obtain in the state was good order, or κόσμος, the regular combination of different elements. The expression of King Archidamus, (Thucyd. ii. 11,) that "it is most honourable and most secure for many persons to show themselves obedient to the same order," (κόσμος,) was a fundamental principle with this race. . . . For this reason, the supreme magistrate among the Cretans was called Cosmos. . . . Thus this significant word expresses the spirit of the Dorian government, as well as of the Dorian music and philosophy." (Müller, ubi supr.)

[2] He refers to book vii. chap. 16, sub fin. For a discussion as to the real state of the case, in regard to this matter, the reader may refer with advantage to Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. iv. 6.

was still worse than that of the ephors: for the faults incident to that magistracy belong to the former also; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be elected: but the Lacedæmonians have this advantage which the others have not, that as the election is made from the whole body, the people have a share in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state: whereas among the Cretans, the Cosmi are not chosen out of the people in general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of those who have served as Cosmi. And the same observations which have been made on the senate at Lacedæmon, may be applied to these; for their being irresponsible, and elected for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and to rule, not according to a written law, but at their own discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections, though the people share not in the management of public affairs, this is no proof of a well-constituted government, for the Cosmi have no opportunity of being bribed like the ephors, as they live in an island far from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is absurd, at variance with civil equality, and tyrannical; for very often either their fellow magistrates or some private persons conspire together and turn out the Cosmi; they are also permitted to resign their office before their time is elapsed.[1] Now it would be better if all this was done by law, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad rule to follow. But what is worst of all, is that general confusion which those who are in power often introduce, when they wish to impede the course of justice; which sufficiently shows that the government has some properties of a polity, but in reality is rather a tyranny. And it is usual with the principal persons amongst them to collect together apart some of the common people and their friends, and then to set up for themselves, and sow seditions, and to come to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if such be the case, or if the state gradually alters in process of time, and becomes no longer the same constitution? A state like this will ever be

[1] The institutions relating to the Cosmi in Crete were at variance with one leading feature in most Grecian states, inasmuch as they were not ὑπεύθυνοι, that is, they could not be called to account at the expiration of their office. Accordingly, whenever any important charge was brought against them, they used to evade punishment by resignation.

exposed to danger from those who are powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its situation preserves it, as its distance frees it from the inroads of foreigners; and for this reason the serfs still remain quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign attack has been made upon the island; and this soon proved the weakness of their laws. And thus much will suffice us to say about the government of Crete.[1]

The effect of the insular position of Crete.

CHAP. XI.[2]

The government of Carthage resembles the preceding.

THE Carthaginians, too, seem to enjoy a good form of government, and in many respects superior to the rest; and in some particulars it bears a near resemblance to the Lacedæmonians. And indeed, these three states, the Cretans, the Lacedæmonians, and the Carthaginians, are in some things very like each other; in others they differ greatly, and many of their arrangements are excellent. And this is a proof of a well-constituted government, if it admits the people to a share, and still remains unaltered in its form of polity, without any popular insurrection worth notice on the one hand, or growing into a tyranny on the other.[3] Now the

[1] On the Dorian constitution, Müller writes as follows: "An unity of this kind having been once established, their next object is to remove whatever has a tendency to destroy it, and to repress all causes which might lead to a change: yet an attempt to exclude all alteration is never completely successful; partly on account of the internal changes which take place in the national character, and partly because causes operating from without, will necessarily produce some modifications. . .Those states which never admit of innovation, will at last, after having long stood as ruins in a foreign neighbourhood, yield to the general tide of human affairs, and their destruction is commonly preceded by the most complete anarchy." Dorians, vol. ii. p. 2, 3.

[2] The reader will do well, in reading the following chapter, to consult the late Dr. Arnold's remarks on the constitution and power of Carthage, in his History of Rome, vol. ii. chap. 39. A reference also to Heeren's Historical Researches, on the African Nations, vol. i., and Kluge's Commentary on the present chapter of Aristotle, will repay the labours expended on them.

[3] In another place, however, Aristotle adduces Carthage as an instance of a country where a tyranny has been succeeded by an aristocracy (See

Carthaginians, in common with the Lacedæmonians, have public tables for those who are bound together by companionship, answering to their *Phiditia;* they have also their magistracy consisting of a hundred and four persons, similar to the ephors, but chosen on a better plan; for there they are chosen from the common herd, but at Carthage they are chosen out of those of the better sort;[1] the kings and the senate also, these answer to the kings and senate at Sparta; but it is better to appoint their kings (as at Carthage) without confining themselves to one family, or choosing from any common stock: but if there be any persons of greater merit than the rest, from these they prefer to choose rather than on account of age:[2] for as they are invested with supreme power over many things, if they are persons of no account, they become very hurtful to the state, as they have ere this been to the Lacedæmonians. Now the greater part of those points which might be blamed in their deviations, are common to all those governments which we have described; but as to this abstract form of their aristocratic polity, some parts of it incline to a democracy, others an oligarchy. For instance, the kings and the senate, if they are unanimous upon any point, can choose whether they will bring it before the people or no; but if they disagree, the people must decide. But whatever they may introduce to its notice, it belongs to the people not only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but finally to ratify it: and whosoever chooses has a right to speak against

The Hundred and Four.

The kings.

below, book v. ch. 12.) We can only reconcile the apparent discrepancy between these two statements, by understanding, with Dr. Arnold, that this tyranny, of which our author speaks, must have taken place in the earlier times of Carthaginian history, before the existence of that constitution on which the present chapter is intended to be a commentary.

[1] The number of this court is supposed by Niebuhr (vol. i. note 851) to have reference to the number of weeks in the solar year, as if there were two judges for each week. The words of the text imply only that public opinion required for the office so high a qualification in point of character, that the appointment was aristocratical in the truest sense of the word; whereas at Sparta, a lower standard being fixed for the characters of the Ephori, persons of very ordinary qualifications were often chosen, if party-feelings recommended them.

[2] See the note of Goëttling on this passage. He proposes, for the sake of clearness, to read *μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν· ἀλλ' εἴ τι διάφερον, ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.* The omission of the word *μᾶλλον* after the adjective *αἱρετούς*, he defends by other examples from Aristotle's writings.

any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not permitted in the other states. The five,[1] who are self-chosen, have supreme authority in many important matters, and these choose the hundred, who are magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than any other magistrates, for it begins before they come into office, and continues after it expires; and in these particulars the state inclines to an oligarchy: but the fact that they are not elected by lot, or permitted to take money, tends to an aristocracy; and so does any thing else of the same kind; as the determining all causes by the same magistrates, as at Lacedæmon,[2] and not different matters in different courts.

The Pentarchies, how chosen:

The constitution of Carthage, too, is now deviating from an aristocracy to an oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion favourably entertained by many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to be chosen by family only, but by fortune also; as it is impossible for those who are in bad circumstances to support their dignity, or to have leisure for public business. Accordingly, as the electing men by their fortune makes a state incline to an oligarchy, and to elect them by ability, to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of proceeding, according to which matters are regulated in the polity of Carthage; for they have an eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers, and particularly those of the highest rank, their kings[3] and their generals. One must admit that this deviation of the state from an aristocracy was a great fault in their legislator; for this is a most necessary thing to provide for from the first, that those citizens who have the best abilities may have

Their tendency.

General character of the constitution.

[1] See Polyb. x. 18, and xxxvi. 2.

[2] For an explanation of this passage, and for the reason which has led the editor to adopt the order of the words as they stand here, see Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. ch. 39, note on p. 553.

[3] These kings (βασιλεῖς) of which Aristotle speaks, were in reality the 'suffetes," an office, as observed by Dr. Arnold, (History of Rome, vol. i. ch. 39, note,) the same with that of the judges of the Old Testament. He adds that "as the 'judges' in Scripture history are distinguished from the 'kings,' and it was a great change when the Israelites, tired of their judges or suffetes, asked for a king; so it is probable that the suffetes at Carthage also were purposely so named, to show that they were not kings, and that the Greek writers, in calling them βασιλεῖς, have used a term likely to mislead."

leisure, and not be obliged to do any thing unworthy of their character, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if once you are obliged to look among the wealthy for men who have leisure to serve, the evil follows, that the greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become venal. For this principle makes riches of more account than virtue, and causes the state to grow avaricious: for whatever those who have the chief power regard as honourable, the opinion of the citizens necessarily follows in their wake; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue, there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish firmly: for it is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places [1] should make an advantage of it, when they gain their offices by purchase; as it is absurd to suppose that if a man of probity is poor, and still desires to gain something, a bad man will not wish to do the same, to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy. It would have been better if the legislator had passed over the poverty of men of merit, only taking care that in office they should have sufficient leisure to attend to public affairs. It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices, which is approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one person;[2] and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not to appoint the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state is not small, it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons to have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not only more usual, but every thing is better and sooner accomplished, when done by the same persons: and this is evident both in the army and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and is under command. But as their government inclines to an oli-

Pluralism in the state: its ill effects.

[1] We are told by Polybius, (vi. 56,) that the very suffetes and captains-general of the commonwealth of Carthage bought their places. Dr. Arnold doubts "whether this is to be understood of paying money to obtain votes, or that the fees or expenses on entering office were purposely made very heavy, to render it inaccessible to any but the rich." He thinks that the latter supposition is the more probable.

[2] Compare book i. chap. 1. "Nature makes nothing shabbily, like the Delphic sword made by workers in brass, but one thing for one end; for thus any instrument will have a better chance of being turned out perfect, if it serve one end and not many.'

garchy, they cleverly avoid its effects by always appointing some of the popular party as governors of the cities. Thus they consult this fault in their constitution, and render it stable; but this is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought so to frame his government that there can be no room for insurrections. But now, if there should be any general calamity and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is no remedy to enforce obedience by the laws. And these are the particulars of the Lacedæmonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian governments, each of which seem worthy of commendation.

CHAP. XII.[1]

Some of those persons who have written upon government are men who never had a share in public affairs, but always led a private life; and nearly every thing worthy of notice in their works we have already spoken about. Others have been legislators, some in their own cities, and some of them employed in regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them were merely composers of a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus and Solon, who were the authors both of laws and of a polity. The Lacedæmonians have already been mentioned. Some persons think that Solon was an excellent legislator, in that he dissolved a pure oligarchy, and saved the people from their state of slavery, and established the ancient democratic form of government in his country, thus blending the whole system well together. In the senate of Areopagus, the oligarchic element was preserved; by the manner of electing their magistrates, the aris-

Solon and other legislators.

The Athenian constitution combines the three elements together.

The Areopagus.

[1] Goëttling rejects the whole of this last chapter as spurious. It certainly contains a quantity of useless repetitions, and its style is very puerile; and especially is it void of all connexion. For example, the story of Philolaus and Diocles is entirely out of place, and is connected neither with what goes before nor with what follows. And the Equites (ἱππεῖς) constituted not the *third* but the second rank in the timocracy of Athens, as settled by Solon. Goëttling also remarks sundry uses of words and forms of expression, very unlike those adopted by Aristotle. And for these reasons we are at liberty to condemn the chapter as spurious; it is probably the work of some commentator, embodying some of his own *Adversaria*.

tocratic; and in their courts of justice, the democratic. Solon, too, seems not to have altered the established form of government, either with respect to the senate, or the mode of electing their magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in the state, by electing the supreme courts from all the citizens: and for this some persons blame him, as having overturned the balance of power, by making the popular assembly, chosen as it was by lot, supreme. For as soon as the latter grew strong, it became necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace: and so they brought the government to its present form of a democracy. Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagus, the latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended the courts of justice:[1] and thus every popular leader went on increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But it is evident that this was not according to the intention of Solon, but that it arose from accident; for the people, being the cause of the naval supremacy in the Persian war, grew proud, and enlisted themselves under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the citizens. Solon, indeed, seems to have intrusted the people with the most necessary part of power, the choice of their magistrates, and the right of calling them to account; for without these powers the people must have been slaves and enemies to the rest. But he elected to the magistracy none but persons of good account and property, out of those who were worth five hundred me-

Rise of the popular power.

Solon's establishment of a Plutocracy

[1] An additional inducement to attend the meetings of the Ecclesia, with the poorer classes, was the *μισθὸς ἐκκλησιαστικός*, or pay which they received for it. The originator of this practice seems to have been a person named Callistratus, who introduced it long after the beginning of the influence of Pericles. The payment itself, which was originally one obolus, was afterwards raised to three obols, by a popular favourite called Agyrrhius, of Collytus. This increase took place about the year B. C. 392, or a short time before the Ecclesiazusæ of Aristophanes came out. For the poet thus alludes to it in that play, verse 380,

B. *τριώβολον δῆτ' ἔλαβες;* X. *εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον.*

See also Boeckh's Economy of Athens, (transl.) vol. i. 307. A ticket (*σύμβολον*) appears to have been given to those who attended, on producing which, at the close of the proceedings, they received the money from one of the Thesmothetæ. (Eccles. 295.) This payment, however, was not made to the richer classes. Dict. of Gr. and Roman Antiq., Art. *Ecclesia.*

composed of four ranks.

dimni, or those who were called Zeugitæ, or those of the third rank in income, who were called horsemen. As for those of the fourth class, which consisted of mechanics, they were incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the western Locrians, as was Charondas the Catanean of his own cities, and of the Chalcidian cities also in Italy and Sicily. Some persons endeavour to prove that Onomacritus the Locrian was the first person of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, and Charondas of Zaleucus; but those who advance this, speak without due regard to chronology. Philolaus also, a Corinthian, and of the family of the Bacchiadæ, was a Theban legislator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in the Olympic games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an improper passion which his mother Alcyone had entertained for him, and settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and where they still show their tombs placed in view of each other, but so disposed, that one of them is in sight of Corinth, the other not; the reason they give for this is, that Diocles, from his detestation of his mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no one could see Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen from his: and this was the cause of their living at Thebes. As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon the rearing of children, which they call Laws of Adoption;[1] and this he did in a manner peculiar to himself, to preserve the number of families. But Charondas did nothing new, except in actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into particular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus introduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato, that for the

Other legislators.

[1] Upon the words of Aristotle (*νόμοι θετικοί*) Thirlwall remarks, that from the peculiar title given to the laws of Philolaus, "it may be collected that he aimed on the one hand at preserving the number of families in the Theban state, by some provision for the adoption of children; and on the other, at limiting the number of individuals in each family, by establishing a legal mode of relieving indigent parents from the support of their offspring." (Hist of Greece, vol. i. p. 432.)

community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables for the women; and besides the law concerning drunkenness, that the sober should preside at their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their warlike exercises, that they should acquire the habit of using both hands alike, as it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the other. There are also laws by Draco, but they were published when the government was already established, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning, except their severity on account of the greatness of their punishments. Pittacus, too, was the author of some laws, though he never drew up any form of government; a peculiar one of which was this, that if drunken men beat any person, they should be punished more than if they did it when sober; for as people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than when sober, he paid no consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded only the common benefit. Andromadas of Rhegium was also a lawgiver among the Thracian Chalcidians. There are some laws of his concerning murders, and heiresses, but these contain nothing that any one can say is his own. And let thus much be laid methodically down concerning the different sorts of governments, as well those which really exist, as those which different persons have proposed.

BOOK III.—CHAP. I.

What a state is.

EVERY one who inquires into the nature of governments, and what and of what kind are its several forms, should make this almost his first question, "What is a state?" For upon this point there is a dispute: for some persons say, the state did this or that, while others say it was not the state, but the oligarchy, or the tyrant.[1] We see, too, that the state is the only object which both the politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government is a certain ordering of those who live as

[1] Thus the Thebans (Thucyd. iii 62) plead that the rise of a dynasty in their city was a cause of their Medism.

To answer this, we must first find out what is a citizen.

members of a state. Now since a state is a collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is evident that our first point must be to inquire what a citizen is: for a state or city is a certain number of citizens.[1] So that we must consider whom we ought to call a citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one will not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for that man who would be a citizen in a republic, would very often not be one in an oligarchy. As to those who acquire this appellation by some chance means or other, as naturalized citizens, for instance, we must pass them by.

Who are not citizens.

Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this point sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him. Nor will it be sufficient that he have the privilege of the laws, and may plead or be impleaded; for this point belongs to all who have a mutual agreement upon which to associate; for these privileges are theirs also; and withal it very often happens that sojourners have not perfect rights therein, but are obliged to apply to some patron;[2] and this shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to boys, who are not yet enrolled, or old men, who are discharged from service, we admit that they are in some respects citizens, yet not completely so; but we add some qualification, for the one are not of full age, and the others are past service; nor is there any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently clear; we want a complete citizen, one in whom there is no such defect as needs to be corrected in order to make him fully so. As to those who are banished or degraded, there may be made the same

[1] What Aristotle here means is, not that a πόλις is adequately defined by the words πλῆθος πολιτῶν, but that as it is made up of certain component parts, which are citizens, we must first accurately lay down our definition of a citizen (πολίτης) before we come to discuss the definition of a state (πόλις). To apply the well-known argument of Butler, (Pref. to Sermons,) every πόλις is a system; that is, "not only a whole made up of several parts, but such a whole made up of parts which have a mutual relation to each other, and are conducive to some end." And this *end* must be taken into account before we can be said to have an adequate idea of the nature of a πόλις. See Eth. Nicom. ix. 10, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων πόλις ἔτι ἐστί.

[2] On the relation of a μέτοικος to his προστάτης at Athens, and how it differs from clientship at Rome, see the Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.

objections, and the same answers. There is nothing that more characterizes a complete citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government. With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that no person on any account is permitted to fill them twice, or else not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as that of a juryman, or a member of the popular assembly. But possibly some one may say, these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it. But grant that this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about words; as there is no general term which can be applied both to a dicast and a member of the assembly. For the sake of distinction, then, let us call it an indeterminate office: we lay it down then as a maxim, that those are citizens who have this share. Such then is the description of the citizen who comes nearest to what all those are who are called citizens. Every one also should remember, that of the component parts of those things which differ from each other in species, those which follow after the first or second remove have either nothing at all, or to a very little extent, in common. Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and that some of them are prior, others posterior in time; for it is evident, that those which have many defects and deviations in them must be in time posterior to those which are without such faults.[1] (What we mean by deviations will be hereafter explained.) Hence it is clear, that the office of a citizen must differ just as governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called a citizen is most truly a citizen in a democracy. In other forms of government he may be so indeed, but not necessarily; for in some states the people have no power; nor have they any general assembly, but a few select officers; the trial also of different causes is allotted

A citizen is one who has a share in the government of the state.

Objection.

Citizens different under different forms of government.

[1] Just as in the Nic. Ethics, (book i. ch. 6,) Aristotle disproves the existence of the abstract or ideal "good" of Plato, by asserting that priority and posteriority could not be predicated concerning it; so here, according to Aristotle, there can be no single definition given of a πολίτης, because some polities are prior and posterior to others.

to different persons; as at Lacedæmon, where all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some of the ephors, while the senate are the judges in cases of murder, some cases being heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes.[1] But our former description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some governments, the office of a dicast and of a member of the general assembly, is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen, or members of the general assembly; and this either for all causes and all public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one. This then is sufficient to show what a citizen is; for whoever has a right to take part in the judicial and executive part of government in any state, him we call a citizen of that place; and a state, in one word, is the collective body of such persons, sufficient in themselves for all the purposes of life.[2]

A state is the aggregate of such citizens.

CHAP. II.

Other opinions as to citizenship.

For common use, then, men define a citizen to be one who is sprung from citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only.[3] Others carry the matter still further, and inquire as to his ancestors,

[1] See above, note on the last chapter.

[2] In the same spirit Cicero, in the Somnium Scip. ch. 3, defines a state as "concilium cœtusque hominum jure sociati." A "civitas," or πόλις, therefore, is properly a political community, possessed of an internal principle of unity of its own, sovereign and independent. Its *αὐταρκεία* (of which Aristotle here speaks) is a property necessarily flowing from the above essential point in its constitution.

[3] Aristotle here says that, for practical purposes, it is sufficient to define a citizen as the son or grandson of a citizen. It is certain that the law required that any one enrolled as a citizen should prove that he had been born in lawful wedlock. This regulation, however, was only carried out in its utmost rigour at the time when Athenian citizenship was most valuable. In Solon's time, it is not certain that the offspring of a citizen and a foreign woman incurred any civil disadvantage; and even the law of Pericles, (Plut. Pericl. c. 37,) which enacted citizenship on the mother's side, appears to have become obsolete very soon afterwards. Our author in this place makes his test the *formal* cause of a man being a citizen, viz. the power which he actually enjoys: the other writers referred to, measured his citizenship by the efficient or *material* cause, namely, birth and hereditary descent.

for three or more generations. But some persons have questioned how the first of the family, be he third or fourth in ascent, could prove himself a citizen, according to this popular and careless definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly in jest, says, that as mortars are made by mortar-makers, and Larissæan kettles by kettle-makers, so citizens are made by citizen-makers.[1] This is indeed a very simple account of the matter; for they would be citizens if they had a share in the state, according to this definition; but this cannot apply to the first founders or inhabitants of states, who can claim no right either from their father or mother. It is probably a matter of still greater difficulty to determine their political rights, in the case of those who are enfranchised after any revolution in the state. As, for instance, at Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Cleisthenes enrolled many foreigners and city slaves amongst the tribes; the doubt with respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, but whether they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may have this further doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen, when he is illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at all, were the same: but since we see some persons govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to be governors, though not justly so, and the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices, (for such we have defined a citizen to be,) it is evident that a citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen; but whether justly or unjustly so, follows next upon the former inquiry.

That of Gorgias refuted.

A further question as to citizens unjustly created.

CHAP. III.

Some also doubt what is and what is not the act of the state; as for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy, or a tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts; as if the

Wherein consists the identity of a state?

[1] Copper kettles made at Larissa were called Larissæ, just as those made at Tanagra were called Tanagræ. Thirlwall, however, understands the word δημιουργοὶ in a different sense, and would seem inclined to identify it with the office of πολιτοφύλαξ, mentioned below, book v. 6 See Thirlwall's Greece, vol. i. p. 438, note.

right of receiving the money was in the tyrant, and not in the state, and many other things of the same nature; or as if any covenant was founded for violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, whatever is done by those who manage an established democracy, the actions of this government are to be considered as the actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny. And here it seems very proper to consider this question, when shall we say that a state is the same, and when shall we say that it is different?

Not in locality.

Now the most superficial mode of examining into this question, is to begin with the place and the people; for it may happen that the place and the people may be divided, and that some one of them may live in one place, and some in another. But this question may be regarded as no very knotty one; for, as a state is so called in a variety of senses, it may be solved many ways. And in like manner, when men inhabit one common place, when shall we say that the state is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for it would be possible to surround Peloponnesus itself with a wall, as was Babylon, and every other place which encircles rather a nation than a city; for they say that when it had been taken three days, some of the inhabitants knew nothing of it. But we shall find a proper time to determine this question; for the extent of a state, how large it should be, and whether it should consist of more than one people, these are particulars which ought not to escape the politician. This too is a matter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a state is the same while it is inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters are continually changing; or, when a similar event takes place shall we say that the men are the same, but the state is different?[1] For if a state is a community, it is a community of citizens; but if the mode of government

Nor in mere sameness of race.

[1] The definition of a πολίτης will depend upon the εἶδος of the polity itself; and in like manner whether we are able to predicate of a state at two different periods that it is the same state, will depend upon whether the εἶδος πολιτείας be the same or no. And whether an action may be justly called the action of the state will depend upon the part of it in which the supreme power is lodged (τὸ κύριον)

should alter, and become of another sort, it would seem a necessary consequence that the state is not the same; as we regard the tragic chorus as different from the comic, though it may probably consist of the same performers. Thus every other community or composition is said to be different, if the species of composition is different; as in music the same voices produce different harmony, as at one time the Doric and at another the Phrygian melody. If this is true, it is evident that when we speak of a state as being the same, we refer especially to the government there established; and it is possible to call it by the same name or any other, whether it be inhabited by the same men or by different ones. But whether or no it is right or not right to dissolve the community, when the state passes into an altered form of constitution, is another question.

But in identity of government.

CHAP. IV.

Is the virtue of a good man the same as that of a good citizen?

AFTER what has been said, it follows that we should consider, whether the virtue of a good man is the same as that of a valuable citizen, or different from it; and since this point ought to have a particular inquiry, we must first give in a general outline the virtue of a good citizen. For as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, this also we say of a citizen; although the province of one sailor may be different from that of another,—(for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain, and so on, each having their several denominations,)—it is evident, that though the most accurate description of any one good sailor must refer to his peculiar abilities, still there is some common description which will apply to the whole crew; for the safety of the ship is the common business of all of them, as this is the point at which each sailor aims. So also with respect to citizens, although different from each other, yet they have one common care, the safety of the community; for the state is a community: and for this reason, the virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state. But since there are different kinds of governments, it is evident, that those actions which constitute the virtue of an excellent citizen will not always be the same, and hence that it cannot be perfect; but we call a man good when he is of

perfect virtue; and hence it follows, that a man who is an excellent citizen may not possess that virtue which constitutes a good man. Those who are doubtful concerning this same question as to the best polity, may follow up the matter in another way; for if it is impossible that a state should consist entirely of excellent citizens, (while it is necessary that every one should do well in his calling, in which consists his excellence, and as it is impossible that all the citizens should be upon the same level,) it is impossible that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the same. For all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen, for from hence necessarily arises the perfection of the state; but that every one should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a well-regulated state should be virtuous. Besides, as a state is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of life and body; the soul, of reason and appetite; a family, of a man and his wife; property, of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a state is composed of all these, and of many other very different parts, it necessarily follows, that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the same; as the business of the leader of a chorus is different from that of a dancer. From all these proofs it is evident that the virtues of a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those virtues united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for we say that such a one is an excellent magistrate, and a prudent and good man; but prudence is necessary to all who engage in public affairs.[1] Nay, some persons affirm, that the education of those who are intended to command, should from the beginning be different from other citizens; as is shown by those who instruct the children of kings in riding and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says,

The virtue of some citizens differs from that of others.

[1] The *φρόνησις* which Aristotle requires in the private citizen is only that which will enable him to perform well his proper *ἔργον*, and differs widely from that moral *φρόνησις* properly so called, which is a master faculty, (*ἐπιστατικὴ δύναμις*,) and is requisite in the ruler only. The ruler indeed knows, or should know, how to rule and to obey, but the latter he need only know virtually, not experimentally. But the subject need only know how to rule virtually, if at all, but it is necessary that he should know practically and experimentally how to obey.

"No showy arts be mine,[1]
But what the state requires;"

as if there were some education peculiar to a ruler. But since the virtues of a good man and a good magistrate may be the same, and since a citizen is one who obeys the magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different from the virtue of the citizen. For this reason Jason declared, that were he no longer king, he should pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. Since then the virtue of a good man consists in being able to command, but that of a good citizen renders him equally fit for either post, they are not both equally praiseworthy. It appears then, that both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their separate business, and not the same; but that the citizen should be master of and take part in both these, as any one may see from the fact that in a family government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the performance of the family business of the slave.

The question decided.

There are many sorts of slaves, for their employments are various; one of these are the handicraftsmen, who, as their name imports, get their living by the labour of their hands; and amongst these all mechanics are included. For which reasons such workmen in some states were not formerly admitted into any share in the government, till at length democracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man of honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to learn these servile employments, without they have occasion for them for their own use; for otherwise the distinction between a master and a slave would be lost.

Slaves of different kinds.

Servile occupations unfit for citizens.

[1] This verse does not occur in any of the extant plays of Euripides, but is preserved among his fragments.

But there is a government of another sort, in which men govern those who are their equals in rank and freemen; and this we call a political government, in which men learn to command, by first submitting to obey; just as a good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief, must acquire a knowledge of his duty, by having been long under the command of another, and having served in command of a rank and a troop; for well is it said, that no one knows how to command, who has not himself been under command of another. The virtues of each are indeed different, but a good citizen must know how to be able to command and to obey; he ought also to know in what manner freemen ought to govern and be governed. Both too belong to the good man, even though the temperance and justice of him who commands is different in kind from that of another; for it is evident that the virtue of a good citizen cannot be the same when he is under command or free, (as justice, for instance,) but must be of a different species in either of these different situations, as the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different from each other; for a man would appear a coward, who had only that courage which would be graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a chatterer, who should take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of consequence. The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the man's business to acquire a subsistence, the woman's to take care of it. But practical wisdom is a virtue peculiar to those who govern, while all others seem to belong in common to both parties. But practical wisdom does not concern the governed, but only to entertain just notions; the latter indeed are like flute-makers, while he who governs is the musician who plays on the flutes. And thus much to show whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same, or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far different.

How far the virtue of the good man and the good citizen are identical.

CHAP. V.

Are mechanics citizens?

But with respect to the citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those only are truly so who are allowed a share in the government, or whether

mechanics also are to be considered as such. For if those who are not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same; (for these also are citizens;) and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where shall they be ranked? for they are neither sojourners, nor foreigners. Or shall we say that no absurdity will arise from their not being citizens, as neither the slaves nor the freedmen consist of those above mentioned? This is certainly true, that all are not citizens who are necessary to the existence of a state, as boys are not citizens in the same manner that men are, for the former are perfectly so, the latter under some conditions; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones. In former times indeed, among some people, the mechanics and foreigners were slaves; and for this reason many of them are so now; and indeed the best-regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue which we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed in such things by one person, are slaves; those who do them for money, are mechanics and hired servants; and hence it is evident on the least reflection what is their situation, for what I have said is self-evident, and fully explains the matter. Since the number of communities is very great, it follows necessarily that there will be many different sorts of citizens, particularly of those who are governed by others; so that in one state it may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in others it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, and where honours are bestowed on virtue and merit; for it is impossible for one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to practise a life of virtue.[1] In oligarchies also hired servants are not admitted to be citizens; because there a man's right to bear any office is regulated by the size of his fortune; but

This will be different in different states.

[1] The prescription which practically excluded from the rights of citizenship all those who gained their living by agricultural labour, or by handicraft trades, was of course derived from the old heroic times, before the rise of the dominant class which afterwards overthrew the monarchies. The force of this prescription is shown remarkably in such words as χείρων, χερὴς, etc.

mechanics are admitted, for the majority of citizens are very rich. There was a law at Thebes, that no one could have a share in the government, till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such; for these laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so, as their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last of all, they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were both free. From this it is clear that there are many sorts of citizens, and that he who shares the honours of the state may be called a complete citizen. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's treating him

"like some unhonoured stranger;" [1]

for he who shares not in the honours of a state, is as it were a stranger, or sojourner; and whenever such a thing as this is concealed, it is for the sake of deceiving the inhabitants.

The virtue of a good man may be the same as that of a good citizen when in command.

From what has been said then, it is plain whether we must lay down the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen to be the same or different; for we find that in some states it is the same, in others not, and also that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the lead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others.

CHAP. VI.

How many polities are admissible?

And since these points are determined, we proceed next to consider whether one polity only should be established, or more than one; and if more, then how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between them. Now a polity is the ordering and regulating of the state, and of all its offices, particularly of that

[1] See Homer Il. ix. 644.

wherein the supreme power is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration; but the administration itself determines the particular polity. Thus, for instance, in a democracy the supreme power is lodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We say then, that the polity in these states is different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in others. Let us first determine for whose sake a state is established, and point out the different species of rule which relate to mankind and to social life. It has already been mentioned, in the beginning of our treatise, where a definition was made as to the management of a family, and the power of a master,[1] that man is an animal naturally formed for society, and that therefore, even when he does not want any foreign assistance, he will equally desire to live with others; not but that mutual advantage also induces them to it, as far as the share of it enables each person to live agreeably. This is indeed the great object, not only to all in general, but also to each individual: and they join in society also for the sake of being able to live, (for doubtless in this, too, what is agreeable has a share,) and they also bind together civil society, even for the sake of preserving life, unless they are grievously overwhelmed with its miseries: for it is very evident, that men will endure many calamities for the sake of life, as having in itself something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy to point out the different received modes of government, and we often lay them down in our exoteric[2] discourses. The power of the master, though there is an identity of interest between him who is by nature a master and him who is by nature a slave, yet nevertheless tends especially to the benefit of the master, but accidentally to that of the slave; for if the slave is destroyed, the power of the master is at an end. But the authority which a man has over his wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic government, is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection, or else for the sake of something com-

They differ with the form of administration.

Man a social being.

Distinctions of government in domestic life.

[1] See book i. ch. 8.

[2] *διοριζόμεθα*. See the note of Goëttling. "Præsens certissimum indicium est sermonem esse de Aristotelis ratione coram auditoribus verè peripatetice disserendi." Another reading is *διωριζόμεθα*.

mon to both; but its essential object is the benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts, (in physic, for instance, and the gymnastic exercises,) but accidentally it may be for the sake of those who govern; for nothing forbids the master of the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who take exercise, as the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the master of the exercises and the steersman consider the good of those who are under their government. But when either of them becomes one of these, it is by accident that he shares in their benefits; for the one becomes a common sailor, and the other one of the wrestlers, though he is master of the exercises. Thus in all political governments, which are established upon the principle of an equality of the citizens, and according to similitude, it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural, every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should in his turn[1] serve the public, and thus administer to his private good, as he himself when in office had done for others. But now every one is desirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he derives from public business and being in office; as if offices were a never-failing remedy for sickly rulers; for if this were so, no doubt they would be eagerly sought after. It is evident, then, that all those governments which have the common good in view, are rightly established and strictly just; but that those which have in view only the good of the rulers, are all founded on wrong principles, and are widely different from what a government ought to be; for they are tyrannical; whereas a state is a community of freemen.

Governments differ according to the end which they have in view.

What governments are proper.

[1] λειτουργεῖν. For an account of the ancient λειτουργίαι, see the article under that head in the Dictionary of Grecian and Roman Antiquities. They are mentioned again in the Economics, book ii. 5, and were probably sanctioned, even if they were not first introduced, by the legislation of Solon. They were divided into extraordinary and ordinary or encyclic (ἐγκύκλιοι) liturgies; and as soon as the democratic power became fully established at Athens, they became practically a simple tax upon property, connected with personal labour and exertion.

CHAP. VII.

HAVING established these particulars, the next point is to consider how many different kinds of governments there are, and what they are; and first we must review those of them which are correct; for when we have determined this, their deflections will be evident enough.

The forms of government laid down

It is evident that every form of government or administration, (for the words are of the same import,) must contain the supreme power over the whole state, and that this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or of a few, or of the many; and that when the one, the few, or the many direct their policy to the common good, such states are well governed: but when the interest of the one, the few, or the many who are in office, is alone consulted, a perversion takes place; for we must either affirm that those who share in the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the advantages of government. Now we usually call a state which is governed by one person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the government is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it is the best form for the city, and its inhabitants. But when the citizens at large direct their policy to the public good, it is called simply a polity; a name which is common to all other governments. And this distinction is consonant to reason; for it will be easy to find one person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but most difficult to meet with the majority of a people eminent for every virtue; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour; for this exists among numbers: for which reason, in this state the military have most power, and those who possess arms will have their share in the government. Now the perversions attending each of these governments are these; a kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy, and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers only the rich, and a democracy only the

1. Monarchy.

2. Aristocracy.

3. Polity or free state.

The corruption of each several form.
1. Tyranny.
2. Oligarchy.
3. Democracy.

poor; but neither of them have the common good of all in view.[1]

CHAP. VIII.

It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each of these forms of government; and this is a matter which includes some difficulties; for he who would enter into a philosophical inquiry into their principles, and not content himself with a mere practical view of them, must pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them. A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy where one person has a despotic power over the whole community: an oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged with the rich: a democracy, on the contrary, is where it is in the hands of those who are worth little or nothing.

Difficulties resulting from the above division.

But the first difficulty that arises from the distinction laid down is this; should it happen that the majority of the inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for this is a democracy) are rich, the question is, how does this agree with what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, but from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; (for this is what they call an oligarchy:) it would seem then that our definition of the different forms of government was not correct; nay, moreover, could any one suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority rich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor, being many in number, possessed it, still there will be another difficulty; for what name shall we give to those states which we have been describing? we mean, that in

[1] In his Ethics (book viii. ch. 10) Aristotle gives a very similar divisio of governments. He there says that there are three kinds of politica constitutions, monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy; and three cor ruptions of them, namely, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of the above forms, he says that monarchy is best and timocracy worst; while, inversely, of the three corruptions, democracy is the least bad and tyranny the worst. So true is the old proverb, "Corruptio optimi pessima fit corruptio."

which the greater number are rich, and that in which the lesser number are poor, where each of these respectively possess the supreme power? If there are no other forms of government besides those we have described, it seems therefore evident to reason, that it may be a mere accident whether the supreme power is vested in the hands of many or few; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be a government of the rich; when in the hands of the many, it will be a government of the poor; since in all countries there are many poor and few rich. It is not therefore the cause that has been already assigned, namely, the number of people in power, which makes the difference between the two forms of government; but an oligarchy and a democracy differ in this from each other, namely, in the poverty of those who govern in the one, and the riches of those who govern in the other; for when the government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy. But, as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other numerous; for few enjoy riches, but all enjoy liberty; and hence will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in public affairs.

How an oligarchy and a democracy differ.

CHAP. IX.

LET us first determine what they lay down as the proper limits of an oligarchy and a democracy, and what is just in each of these forms of government. For all men have some natural inclination to justice, but they proceed therein only to a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely just. For instance, what is equal appears just, and is so, but not to all, only among those who are equals; and what is unequal appears just, and is so, but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals. This relative nature of justice some people neglect, and therefore they judge ill; and the reason of this is, that they judge for themselves, and almost every one is the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons, which are made with respect

An oligarchy and democracy limited.

Justice is relative.

to things, in the manner that I have already described in my Ethics.[1] As to the equality of the things, they are agreed; but their dispute is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason above assigned, because they judge ill in their own cause; and also because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some particulars, they say what is just on the whole. Thus, for instance, if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the whole; or on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose them equal in the whole. But they forget that which is the essential point; for if civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the state would be in proportion to his fortune; and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the hundred, along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the original money or of what was afterwards acquired. Nor was civil society founded merely in order that its members might live, but that they might live well,—(for otherwise a state might be composed of slaves, or of the animal creation; which is far from the case, because these have no share in happiness, nor do they live after their own choice;) —nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries, or for a commercial intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians, and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one state. For they have articles to regulate their imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence; yet still they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are different among different people; nor does the one take any care that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or in any degree vicious, but only that they shall not injure another confederate. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who composes it; and hence it is evident that the first care of a man who would found a state truly deserving that

Civil society, why founded.

Virtue the end of legislation.

[1] He refers to book v. chap. 5

name, and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous;[1] for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence, differing only in place from those which are made between different people. For the law is an agreement, and as the sophist Lycophron says, a pledge between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good. And it is evident that this is the fact; for could any one bring different places together, as, for instance, Megara and Corinth, within the same walls, yet they would not be one state, not even if their inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes much to combine people into one state. Besides, could we suppose a set of people living separate from each other, but within such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there were laws subsisting between each party to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings,—(one being a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and the like,)—and that their numbers were ten thousand, and still that they had nothing in common but a tariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, even so they would not constitute a state. And why in the world? Not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough; for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be alliances subsisting between each party, mutually to assist and prevent any injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted to be a

How a city or state differs from a mere confederacy.

[1] In the last chapter of the Ethics, Aristotle confesses, with regard to this point, that moral instruction has but a limited influence, being confined to those minds which are generous and liberal, and not reaching to those of the masses. And as men are to be made good in three ways, by nature, by reasoning, and by teaching; and as over nature we have no power at all, while reasoning and teaching exercise an influence only over minds duly cultivated for their reception, the moral character of the individual members of a state must be formed by education, and this education ought to be enforced by law. And as education is necessary not only while we are children, but throughout life, hence exhortations to virtue become the duty of legislators, as much as the punishment of evil-doers; and as men will acknowledge the authority of the state and of the law, though not of individuals, the state therefore ought to undertake the duty of educating its members—a duty which, if neglected by the state, in the opinion of Aristotle, falls upon the parents.

city by those who reason correctly, if they preserved the same customs when they were together as when they were separate. It is evident, then, that a state is not a mere community of place, nor established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic; but that these things are the necessary consequences of a state, although they may all exist where there is no state; but a state is a society of people joining together with their families, and their children, to live well, for the sake of a perfect and independent life; and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place, and intermarry with each other. Hence in all cities there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments, to promote friendship;[1] for a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the end for which a state is established is that the inhabitants of it may live happily; and these things are conducive to that end; for it is a community of families and villages, formed for the sake of a perfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake of living well and happily.[2] The political state therefore is founded not for the purpose of men's merely living together, but for their living as men ought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the state than either those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth, but are below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in all disputes upon forms of government each party says something that is just.

What a πόλις really is.

Its end.

CHAP. X.

Who should possess supreme power in the state.

THERE may also be a doubt as to who should possess the supreme power of the state. Shall it be the majority, or the wealthy, or a number of proper

[1] See Professor Browne's introductory remarks prefixed to the Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics, book viii.

[2] Civil rights, it is clear, will and ought to differ according to the different ends for which the state was established. In a state whose end is τὸ εὖ ζῆν, he who has the most political virtue, will have the precedence in civil rights; for it is just that the greatest power should be lodged in the hands of those who contribute most to the end for which the state was founded and continues to exist. Thus, if the state has wealth in view as its chief end, it ought to be an oligarchy.

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persons, or one better than the rest, or a tyrant? But whichever of these we prefer, some difficulty will arise. For what? if the poor, because they are the majority, may divide among themselves what belongs to the rich, is not this unjust? In sooth, by heaven, it will have been judged just enough by the multitude when they gain the supreme power. What therefore is the extremity of injustice, if this is not? Again, if the many seize into their own hands every thing which belongs to the few, it is evident that the state will be at an end. But virtue never tends to destroy what is itself virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of the state. Therefore such a law can never be right; nor can the acts of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for, from his unlimited power, he compels every one to obey his command, as the multitude oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich and few should have the supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the same rapine, and plunder the possessions of the majority, will this be just? It will be the same as in the other case; but it is evident that all things of this sort are wrong and unjust. Well then, suppose that those of the better sort shall have the supreme power, must not then all the other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing the offices of the state? for the offices of a state we call honours, and if one set of men are always in power, it is evident that the rest must be without honours. Then, will it be better that the supreme power be in the hands of that one person who is fittest for it? but by this means the power will be still more confined, for a greater number than before will continue unhonoured. But some one may say, that, in short, it is wrong that man should have the supreme power rather than the law, as his soul is subject to so many passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or a democracy, how will it help us in our present doubts? for those things will happen which we have already mentioned.

Certain difficulties considered.

1. Shall it be in the hands of the many?

2. Or of the few?

3. Or of the best?

CHAP. XI.

Of other particulars, then, let us treat hereafter; but as to the fact that the supreme power ought

Reasons for vesting the su-

Supreme power with the many.

to be lodged with the many, rather than with those of the better sort, who are few, there would seem to be some doubt, though also some truth as well[1] Now, though each individual of the many may himself be unfit for the supreme power, yet, when these many are joined together, it is possible that they may be better qualified for it, than the others; and this not separately, but as a collective body. So the public suppers exceed those which are given at one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person brings in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands, and many senses. Thus is it with respect to the character and understanding. And for this reason the many are the best judges of music and poetry; for some understand one part, some another, and all collectively the whole. And in this particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as they say those who are beautiful differ from those who are not so, and as fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting into one the several beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals, although the separate parts of individuals, as the eye or any other part, may be handsomer than in the picture. But it is not clear whether it is possible that this distinction should exist between every people and general assembly, and some few men of consequence; but, by heaven, doubtless it is clear enough that, with respect to a few, it is impossible; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes: and indeed, so to say, wherein do some men differ from brutes? But nothing prevents what I have said being true of the people in some states.

The question decided.

The doubt, then, which we have lately proposed, with that which is its consequence, may be settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen and the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but these are such as are not men of property, nor have they any reputation for virtue. And so it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of their injustice and their ignorance; from the one of which

[1] In Bekker's text the words stand thus, *δοξειεν ἀν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν*. But it is clear that the word *λύεσθαι* has crept into the text through the carelessness of some copyist. Goëttling has printed it in brackets as spurious.

they are likely to do what is wrong, from the other to make mistakes. And yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government;[1] for when there are many poor people who are excluded from office, the state must necessarily have very many enemies in it. It remains, then, that they should have a place in the public assemblies, and in determining causes. And for this reason Socrates and some other legislators give them the power of electing the officers of the state, and also of inquiring into their conduct after their term of office, but do not allow them to act as magistrates by themselves. For the multitude, when they are collected together, have all of them sufficient understanding for these purposes, and by mixing among those of higher rank are serviceable to the state; as some things which alone are improper for food, when mixed with others, make the whole more wholesome than a few of them would be; though each individual is unfit to form a judgment by himself. But there is a difficulty attending this form of government; for it seems that the same person, who himself was capable of curing any one who was then sick, must be the best judge who to employ as a physician; but such a one must be himself a physician. And the same holds true in every other practice and art: and as a physician ought to give an account of his practice to physicians, so ought it to be in other arts. But physicians are of three sorts; the first makes up the medicines; the second prescribes; the third understands the science, but never practises it. Now these three distinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts; and we have no less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the principles of the art, than of those who practise it. And with respect to elections the same would seem to hold true; for to elect a proper person in any line, is the business of those who are skilled in it; as in geometry, it is the part of geometricians, and of steersmen in the art of steering. But even if some individuals do know something of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the professors of them; so that, even upon

The people should be supreme in some things, but not in others.

An union of the many with the few, desirable.

Who should have the power of electing magistrates?

[1] Instances in point here may be found in the annals of our own country.

this principle, neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be intrusted to the many. But possibly much that has been here said may not be right; for, to resume the argument lately used, if the people are not very brutal indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when they come together they will know them better, or at least not worse: besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the best judge, as in those the works of which are understood by those who do not profess them. Thus he who builds a house is not the only judge of it, (for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better one;) thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made it, and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another that follows: for it seems absurd that greater power in the state should be lodged with the bad than with the good. Now the power of election and censure are of the very utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some states they intrust to the people; for the general assembly is the supreme court of all. And yet they have a voice in this court, and deliberate on all public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but their quæstors, generals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of high condition. This difficulty, then, may be solved upon the same principle; and here too they may be right. For the power is not in the man who is member of the assembly or council, but in the assembly itself, and in the council and people, of which each individual of the whole community forms a part, as senator, adviser, or judge. And for this reason it is very right that the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more than the property of any person, or of a few who fill the great offices of the state: and thus let us determine these points.

The question determined.

But the first question that we stated shows nothing besides so plainly, as that the supreme power should be lodged in laws duly made, and that the magistrate, or magistrates, (either one or more,) should be

Supremacy of the law.

authorized to determine those cases on which the laws cannot define particularly; as it is impossible for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon every thing that may arise. But what these laws are, which are established upon the best foundations, has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter of some question: but the laws of every state will necessarily be like the state itself, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is evident, that the laws which are framed, must correspond to the constitution of the government; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones.

Laws good or bad, a test of governments.

CHAP. XII.

SINCE in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, the greatest good is particularly the end of that which is the most excellent of all, and this is the political science: the political good is justice; for this, in other words, is the interest of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that justice is a certain equality; and up to a certain point men agree with the teaching of philosophers, when they lay down definitions of morals: for they say what is just, and to whom; and that equals ought to receive equal; but we should know how to determine of what things there is equality, and of what there is an inequality; and in this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the writer on morals. Some persons will probably say that the offices of state ought unequally to be given according to every particular excellence of each citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the rest of the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for to persons who differ from each other, justice is one thing and that which is according to worth is another. But if this is admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such advantage will be made by the superiors a means of grasping for a greater share of the public rights. But, surely, this is evidently absurd; as is clear from the other arts and sciences; for with respect to musicians who are equal in their art, the best flute is not to be given to those who are of the best family, for they will

The chief good the end of the political science.

Justice absolute and relative.

play never the better for that, but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist. But if what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still further: if there should be any one who is a very excellent player on the flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, (though each of these are more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a higher degree than that player excels others,) yet the best flutes ought to he given to him; for the superiority in beauty and fortune should have a reference to the business in hand; but these have none. Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible excellence might be brought into comparison with every other; for if some bodily strength might dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any amount of strength might do it; so that if one person excelled in size more than another did in virtue, and if, in short, bodily size was a thing more excellent than virtue, all things must then admit of a comparison with each other. For if such a size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident that another size must be equal to it. Since, however, this is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any office in the state according to every point of superiority whatsoever: for if one set of persons be slow, and another swift, neither are the one better qualified, nor the other worse, on that account; though in the gymnastic races a difference in these particulars will gain the prize; but a pretension to offices of state should be founded on those qualifications which are part of itself. And for this reason, men of family, independence, and fortune, with great propriety contend with each other for office; for those who hold office ought to be persons of independence and property: for a state can no more consist of all poor men, than it can of all slaves. But although such persons are requisite, it is evident that there is an equal need of justice and military valour. For without justice and valour, no state can be supported; just as without the former class a state cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be well governed.

A claim to office must be based on due qualification for the particular place.

CHAP. XIII

Virtue and education the means towards happiness.

It seems then requisite that all, or at least many, of these points should vie together towards the establishment of a state; but virtue and education may most justly dispute the right of being considered as the necessary means of enabling the citizens to live well, as we have already said. But as those who are equal in one particular need not therefore be equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular need not therefore be unequal in all; it follows of necessity, that all governments which are established upon such a principle are erroneous. We have already said that all the members of the community will dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and to a certain extent justly, but abstractedly not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they have the greatest landed property, and because the ultimate right to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their fidelity in contracts is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have a right to higher regard as citizens than obscure persons: for honourable descent is every where of great esteem; and further, it is reasonable to expect that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the virtue of a family. For the same reason also we shall justly say that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions; for justice, we say, is a social virtue, and all others must yield her the precedence. Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few; they may say, that if each are collectively taken and compared, the many are stronger, richer, and better than the others. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as

Rival claims to office.

Of the rich.

Of the noble.

Of the virtuous.

Of the many.

[1] This is but another form of the old proverb, ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθούς. Compare Hor. Od. IV. iv. 30—32,

"Est in juvencis, est in equis, patrum
Virtus: neque imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam."

the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every community which we have mentioned, there is no dispute as to who ought to rule; for they differ from each other in those who have the chief power. For in one state the rich enjoy it, in another the meritorious, and thus, each according to their separate manners.

Certain difficulties solved.

Let us however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the city. If the virtuous should be very few in number, how shall we then decide? shall we direct our attention to their fewness as compared with their work, if they are capable of governing the state? or should they be so many as to compose a state? There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on their fortune or their family would seem to have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon family merit; and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue; for if there is one man better than all the other men of worth, who are in the same community, it is requisite on the same plea of justice, that he should enjoy the supreme power. In like manner also, while the many suppose that they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful than the few, if one, or more than one, though it be a small number, should be found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than they. All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles are justly founded, on which these persons would establish their right to the supreme power, and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them; for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their fortune, the multitude might justly have some objection to make, which they could jointly urge against them; for nothing hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity. As to the doubt which some persons raise

and propose, we may answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator who would establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for the use of the better part of the citizens, or of the many, under the circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of any thing must be assumed to consist in its equality; that therefore which is equally right, will be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common. Now, in general, a citizen is one who shares in the government, and also in his turn submits to be governed; but his condition is different in different states; the best is that in which a man is enabled to choose both to govern and to be governed with regard to virtue during his whole life. But should there be found one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue or political abilities of the many are unable to come into comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if there be but one, with his abilities alone; such are not to be considered as part of the state; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political abilities; for it is fit that such an one should appear to them like a god amongst men.[1] Hence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men therefore are not the object of law, for they are themselves a law; and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in legislation; for probably they might say what Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares, when they harangued and demanded an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this account that democratic states have established Ostracism;[2] for of a truth equality seems the principal object of their government.

Should a legislator lay down laws for the benefit of the many, or of the few?

How to deal with the perfectly virtuous man

The real principle of ostracism.

[1] See Eth. Nicom. vii. ch. i., for an explanation of Aristotle's opinion concerning supernatural virtue, (*ἡρωϊκή τις καὶ θεία ἀρετή*,) on which he there comments at considerable length. He there admits that this *ἡρωϊκὴ ἀρετὴ* is brought about by external causes; i. e. that man cannot work himself into it, as he does into *σωφροσύνη* for example. Hence it only incidentally enters into a *practical* treatise on morals, such as the Ethics really are.

[2] Ostracism, says Suidas, and the Scholiast on Aristoph. Eq. 861, differs from *φυγή*, inasmuch as those who were banished lost their property

And for this reason they ostracise all those who are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too great weight in the government, and force them to leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the Argonauts left Hercules behind, for they were unwilling that he should command the ship Argo together with the rest, because he excelled the other sailors in valour. For which reason those who hate a tyranny, and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to Thrasybulus,[1] must not think that they are wholly right in their course. For the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger sent to him with reference to the matter of advice, but that he struck off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest, and so reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what

whereas the ostracised did not; the former also had no fixed place of abode, or time of return, but the latter had. This ostracism is supposed by some to have been instituted by Cleisthenes, after the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. It is well known, as Aristotle implies here in the text, that ostracism was not a punishment of any crime, but rather a precautionary removal of those who possessed sufficient power in the state to excite either envy or fear. Thus Plutarch says (Pericl. ch. x.) that it was a good-natured way of allaying envy, (*φθόνου παραμυθία φιλάνθρωπος*) by the humiliation of superior dignity and power. The manner of effecting it was as follows at Athens. A space in the *ἀγορὰ* was enclosed within barriers, with ten entrances for the ten tribes. By these the tribesmen entered, each with his *ὄστρακον* or piece of tile, on which was written the name of the individual whom he wished to be ostracised. The nine archons and the senate, i. e. the presidents of that body, superintended the proceedings; and the party who had the greatest number of votes against him, supposing that this number amounted to 6000, was obliged to withdraw from the city within ten days; but if the number of votes did not amount to 6000, nothing was done. The expelled was not deprived of his property . . . . some of the most distinguished men at Athens were removed by ostracism, but recalled when the city found their services indispensable. Amongst these were Themistocles, Alcibiades, Cimon, and Aristides. . . . . The last person against whom ostracism was used at Athens was Hyperbolus, a demagogue of low birth and character; but the Athenians thought their dignity compromised, and ostracism degraded by such an application of it, and accordingly discontinued the practice. (Plut. Arist. c. 7. Thucyd. viii. 73.) Ostracism prevailed in other democratical states as well as at Athens; as for instance at Argos, Miletus, and Megara; and from it was copied the Petalism (*πεταλισμὸς*) of the Syracusans, so called from the leaves (*πέταλον*) of the olive tree, on which was written the name of the obnoxious person. Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq. Art. Banishment.

[1] See the story as related in Herodotus, i. 20.

was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood from it that he must take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only, nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great. And the very same thing is done also by those who have the supreme power in the cities and separate states; as by the Athenians, with respect to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians;[1] for when suddenly they had acquired a firm sway over Greece, they brought the other states into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The king of Persia also very often has reduced the Medes and Babylonians, when they have assumed a tone of arrogance on account of their former power. And this is a principle on which all governments act, even those which are best administered: those which are corrupted do it for the sake of private utility, and this also takes place in like manner in polities which look to the common good. The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for a painter would not represent an animal with a foot large beyond proportion, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the shipwright make the prow, or any other part of the vessel, larger than it ought to be; nor will the master of the chorus permit any one who sings louder and better than the rest, to sing in concert with them. There is therefore no reason why a monarch should not act in agreement with free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there is any acknowledged disparity in the power of the citizens, the reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just. It is better indeed for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as not to want this remedy: but, in the second place, if in course of time such an inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. This certainly was not done in the states; for

The same principle prevails in tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies.

Prevention better than cure.

[1] For an account of the growth of the Athenian ἀρχή after the Persian war, see Thucyd. b. i. chap. 95, 96, and compare Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. iii. p. 46—54.

they did not regard the benefit of their respective communities, but used the ostracism for party purposes.[1] It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and useful in an individual case, though probably it is as clear that it is not absolutely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts about the use of it, not on account of the superiority which one may have in strength, riches, or friends; but when the point of superiority is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out such a person, and to banish him; neither does it seem right to subject him to control; for that would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter, and to govern him. Nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is, for all persons quietly to submit to one who is thus eminently virtuous, and to let such men be perpetually kings in the respective states.

The perfectly virtuous character to be chosen king.

CHAP. XIV.

Monarchy.

After what has been now said, it would seem proper to change our subject, and to inquire into the nature of a monarchy; for we admit this to be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And here let us consider, whether a kingly government is proper or not for a city or country which desires to be well governed, or whether some other polity is proper. But let us first determine whether this is of one kind only or more. Now it is easy enough to perceive that it consists of many different species, and that the forms of government are not the same in all states; for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by the laws;[2] for it is

Of many kinds. 1st, At Sparta.

[1] See note above, p. 109, 110

[2] With respect to the nature of the sovereignty in Doric states in general, as well as at Sparta in particular, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. ch. vi. As to the power of the kings of Sparta, Müller observes that it "derived additional strength from the fabulous notion that the conquest of the country had originated from the royal family." In war they had liberty to sacrifice, (see Herod. vi. 46,) and it consequently follows that they presided over the entire worship of the army, being both priests and princes, like the Agamemnon of Homer, or like Anius in Virgil,

"Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique sacerdos."

They considered the kingly power as proceeding from the Deity, and not as originating from the people. The constitutional powers of the kings at

not supreme in all circumstances; but when the king quits the territories of the state, he is their general in matters of war; and all religious affairs are intrusted to the king. Indeed, the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general who cannot be called to account for his conduct, and whose command is for life: for he has not the power of life and death, except as a general; as the ancients frequently had in their expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon was affronted in the council, he restrained his resentment, but when he was in the field, he had the power of life and death. At any rate, he says,

> "Whoe'er this day shall shun th' impending fight,
> To dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey;
> For in my hands is death." Il. v. 391.

This then is one species of monarchical government, in which a man is made general for life; and it is sometimes hereditary, sometimes elective. But besides this, there is also another, which is to be met with among some of the barbarians. In these states the kings are invested with powers nearly equal to those of a tyrant, yet are they nevertheless bound by the laws and the customs of their country. For as the barbarians[1] are by nature more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and those about Asia more than those in Europe, they endure a despotic government without murmuring. For this reason their governments are tyrannical; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being customary

2nd. Among barbarous tribes.

Sparta were inconsiderable, when compared with their dignity and honours. The two kings were members of the gerusia, but as such they had only single votes. The greater part of their prerogative was their power in foreign affairs. The kings of Sparta were the commanders of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and limited as was his power at home, as soon as the king had assumed the command of the army, and had crossed the boundaries, he became general with unlimited powers. It appears that the political sagacity was almost past belief with which the ancient constitution of Sparta protected the power, dignity, and welfare of the office of a king, yet without suffering it to grow into a despotism, or placing the king in any one point above the law. And so, without endangering the liberty of the state, a royal race was maintained, which, blending the pride of their own family with the national feelings, produced, for a long succession of years, monarchs of a noble and patriotic disposition. (Vol. ii. book iii. chap. 6.) See also Herod. vi. 57, and Thucyd. i. 20.

[1] Compare the statement of Aristotle above, book i. ch. 2.

and according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly government, not in a despotic one; for the guards of kings are composed of his citizens, but those of a tyrant are foreign mercenaries. The one according to law rules over willing subjects; the other arbitrarily rules over those who consent not. The one therefore is guarded by the citizens, the other against them. These, then, are two different sorts of monarchies; and another is that which, among the ancient Greeks, is called an Æsymnety;[1] which, speaking simply, is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference from that which is to be found amongst the barbarians, consists not in its not being according to law, but only in its not being according to ancient customs. Some persons possessed this power for life, others only for a particular time or purpose; as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcæus the poet. And Alcæus himself, in one of his songs, proves this fact; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and with one voice extolling him to the skies, though he was the ruin of a senseless and devoted people. These sorts of government then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies; but inasmuch as they are elective, and over willing subjects, they are also kingly. A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government, according to the laws and customs of their country.[2] For those who were at first of benefit to

3rd. Elective tyrannies in ancient Greece.

4th. The heroic.

[1] The *αἰσυμνήτης* was an individual sometimes invested with unlimited power in the Greek states. His power, according to Aristotle in this place, partook in some degree of the nature both of kingly and tyrannical authority; since he was appointed legally, and did not usurp the government like a *τύραννος*, but at the same time was not bound by any laws in his public administration. Hence Aristotle and Theophrastus call the office *τύραννις αἱρετή*. It was not hereditary, nor was it held for life; but it only continued for a certain time, or till some object was accomplished. Thus we read that the inhabitants of Mitylene appointed Pittacus to the post of *αἰσυμνήτης*, in order to prevent the return of Alcæus and the other tribes. Dionysius compares it with the dictatorship at Rome In some states, such as Cyrene and Chalcedon, it was the title bore by the regular magistrates. (Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.) The verb *αἰσυμνάω*, used in the wider and more general sense of ruling, occurs in Eurip. Medea, 19.

[2] Compare the statement of Thucyd book i. ch. 13, as to the real au

mankind either in arts or arms, or by collecting them into civil society, or by granting them possessions, became kings over a willing people, and handed on the monarchy to their successors.[1] They were also their generals in war, and presided over their sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to the priests: in addition to this they were supreme judges in lawsuits; and in this case some of them took an oath, others did not; when they did, the form of swearing was by lifting up their sceptre.[2] In ancient times the power of the kings extended to every thing whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed; so that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of presiding over the sacrifices; and even those whom it is worth while to call by that name, had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their foreign wars. These then are the four sorts of kingdoms: the first is that of the heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with limited rights in some particulars; for the king was their general, their judge, and their high priest.[3] The second, that of the barbarians; which is an hereditary despotic government, regulated by laws: the third is that which they call Æsymnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedæmonian; and this, in a few words, is nothing more than an hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is where

Kingly power gradually abridged.

Recapitulation.

ture of the ancient monarchies of Greece. *πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασίλειαι.* These *γέρατα*, it would seem, consisted chiefly in the *τεμένη*, or ground allotted to them; a right of *προεδρία* in council, and the first or the largest share at public feasts.

[1] The reader will do well here to consult the chapter on "National Institutions and Forms of Government," in Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. i., especially from page 394 to 411, (1st ed.)

[2] Thus in Homer, Iliad i. line 234, Achilles says,

Ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, τὸ μὲν οὔποτε φύλλα καὶ ὄζους φύσει—

"Yea, swear I by this sceptre, which again
Shall never bud nor shoot."

[3] A parallel to this we find in the instance of Melchisedec, of whom we are told in the book of Genesis, (ch. xiv. 18,) that he was "king of Salem," and at the same time "priest of the Most High God." Compare the words of Virgil, (Æn. iii. 80,)

"Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique sacerdos."

one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in the manner that every tribe and every state is supreme over those things which belong to the public: for as the master of a family has a kingly rule in his own house, so a king is master of his own state, and over one or more tribes.

CHAP. XV.

The four kinds may be reduced to two. The first and fourth.

Now the different sorts of kingly governments, so to say, may be reduced to two; which we must consider more particularly; that of which we have spoken, and the Lacedæmonian; for the greater part of the others lie between these, inasmuch as they have less power than an absolute monarchy, and yet more than the Lacedæmonians. So that the matter in question may be reduced to these two points; the one is, whether it is advantageous or not to the citizens to have the office of general continued in one person for life, and whether this should be by family right to the succession; the other, whether it is advantageous for one person to have the supreme power over every thing or not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office of a Lacedæmonian general, would concern a treatise on laws rather than to political science; since we know that this is what is done in all forms of governments; so that we must pass over this question. The other kind of monarchy is a regular kind of polity; and it will be necessary to examine particularly into this matter, and to run over such difficulties as may arise. Now the beginning of our consideration is this, whether it is best to be governed by the best of men, or by the best of laws? Those who prefer a kingly government think that laws only speak a general language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular circumstances; for which reason it is absurd in any science to follow a mere written rule; and even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it sooner it was at his own peril. Hence it is evident, on the very same account, that a government according to written laws is not the best; and yet general reasoning is necessary to all those who are to govern, and it will be much

The former postponed.

The latter considered.

Reasons for approving monarchy.

more perfect in him who is entirely free from passions, than in him to whom they are natural. In the law indeed this quality does not exist; while the other of necessity belongs to every human soul. But some one perchance may say, in answer to this, that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary, then, for a king to be a legislator, and that his laws should be published, but that they should have no authority where they are absurd, but that in all other cases they should have authority. But is it better for the community that those things which cannot possibly come under the cognizance of the law at all, or properly, should be under the government of every worthy citizen? for at the present day they come together, and act as judges and counsellors, and decide cases; but all their decisions are upon particular matters.[1] For one individual, be he who he will, will be found upon comparison inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but a state, as composed of many, is, as a public entertainment, better than one man's portion; for which reason the multitude judge of many things better than any one single person. The multitude are also less liable to corruption; as water is from its quantity, so are the many less liable to corruption than the few: besides, the judgment of an individual must necessarily be perverted, if he is overcome by anger, or any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be composed of freemen, who do nothing contrary to the law, except only in those cases which the law necessarily omits. But though the following may not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen to be good men, should one uncorrupt governor be preferred, or the majority who are all equally good? Is it not evident that the many should be preferred? for there may be divisions among them, but this cannot happen when there is but one. In answer to this, it may be replied that all their souls will be as much animated with virtue, as this one man's. If then a government of the many, and all of them good men, must be laid down as composing an aristocracy, and the go-

Contrary reasons.

[1] For a complete account of the *ἐκκλησία*, or popular assembly at Athens, the *βουλή*, or senate of 500, and the various *δικαστήρια*, the reader will do well to consult the admirable Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, edited by Dr. Smith.

Why an aristocracy preferable.

Why the ancient states were under monarchies.

vernment of one, as a kingly power, it is evident, that an aristocracy is to be preferred to a monarchy, whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike can be found. And for this reason probably it was, that the first governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to find a number of persons eminently virtuous,[1] more particularly as they then dwelt in small communities. Besides, kings were appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind; and such actions are peculiar to good men. But when many persons equal in virtue appeared at the same time, they brooked not a superiority, but sought after equality, and established a free state.[2] After this, when they degenerated, they made a property of the public; which probably gave rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth a mark of honour. And this was the origin of tyrannies, and these in their turn gave rise to democracies; for as the power of the tyrants continually decreased, on account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to increase, probably it was not easy for any other form of government to prevail beside a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government in a state, we ask what is to be

Gradual succession of changes in ancient governments.

[1] It is difficult, and indeed impossible, to reconcile this passage with the assertions of the First Book, as to the natural growth of the monarchical power out of domestic and paternal rule. Compare especially book i. chap. 2. "And hence, by the way, states were originally governed by kings, as the barbarians now are; for they were composed of those who were always under kingly government. For every family is governed by the elder."

[2] Upon the various stages through which the ancient governments of Greece seem to have passed, by the operation of an almost uniform law, the reader will do well here to consult the masterly sketch given by Thirlwall in his History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10. The passage would be too long to be quoted here, though much of its contents will be found embodied in the Introductory Essay prefixed to the present volume. It will be enough here to quote the author's words as to the real cause of the abolition of royalty in the early states of Greece, as indeed it was the cause of all their after-changes. "It is to be sought for," he says, "in the character of the people: in that same energy and versatility which prevented it from ever stiffening, even in its infancy, in the mould of oriental institutions; and from stopping short, in any career which it had once opened, before it had passed through every stage."

done with regard to the king's children? Is the family also to reign? But should they have such children as some persons usually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be said, that then the king, who has it in his power, will never give his kingdom to such children. But it is not easy to trust to that; for it is very hard, and requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be intrusted, whether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his government? for if he is to govern according to law, and do nothing of his own will which is contrary thereto, at the same time it will be necessary that he should have some power with which to guard the law. This matter however concerning a king may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a proper power, and such a one as will be sufficient to make the king superior to any one person, or even to a large part of the community, but inferior to the whole; just as the ancients always appointed guards for that person whom they created Æsymnete, or tyrant; and some one advised the Syracusans, when Dionysius asked for his guards, to allow him a certain number for his defence.[1]

Some limitations necessary in a monarchy.

[1] Compare here the following passage from Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10. "A *tyranny*, in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, like the monarchies of heroic ages and of many barbarous nations; nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or an Æsymnete, but on force. It did not change its character when transmitted through several generations; nor was any other name invented to describe it, when the power which had been gained by violence was used for the public good; though Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny that it is exercised for selfish ends. . . . . Most of the tyrannies which sprung up before the Persian wars, owed their existence to the cause above described, and derived their peculiar character from the occasion which gave them birth. It was usually by a mixture of violence and artifice that the demagogue accomplished his ends. A hackneyed stratagem, which however seems always to have been successful, was to feign that his life was threatened, or had even been attacked, by the fury of the nobles, and on this pretext to procure a guard for his person from the people. This band, though composed of citizens, he found it easy to attach to his own interests, and with its aid he made the first step towards absolute power by seizing the citadel; an act which might be considered as a formal assumption of the tyranny, and as declaring a resolution to maintain it by force."

CHAP. XVI.

An absolute monarchy considered.

It follows next in order to consider the absolute monarch whom we have just mentioned, who does every thing according to his own will; for a king governing under the direction of laws does not of himself constitute any particular species of government, as we have already said; for in every state whatsoever, whether an aristocracy or a democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many who intrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is the government at Dyrrachium, and the same at Opus though in a less degree. As for an absolute monarchy, as it is called, (that is to say, when the whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king,) it seems to many to be unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his fellow-citizens, when the state consists of equals; for nature requires that the same right, and the same rank, should necessarily exist amongst all those who are equal by nature; for as it would be hurtful to the body, for those who are of different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet, or clothing; so with respect to the honours of the state, it is as hurtful that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank. And for this reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command, as to assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that the law should govern, than any one of the citizens. Upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians and servants of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where all are equal, one person should continually enjoy it. But man would scarcely be able to adjust that which the law cannot determine. It may be replied, that the law having purposely laid down the best rules, leaves the rest to be adjusted by the most fair decision, and to be regulated by the magistrates; besides, it allows any thing to be altered, which experience proves may be better established. Moreover, he who bids the law to be supreme, makes God supreme, [and

How far unnatural.

Shall man or law be supreme?

the laws;[1]] but he who intrusts man with supreme power, gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; passion, too, influences those who are in power, even the very best of men; for which reason the law is intellect free from appetite. The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic; for these are not biassed by any feeling towards their patient to act contrary to the principles of their art; but when the cure is performed, they receive a pecuniary recompence: whereas those who have the management of public affairs, do many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession, he then chooses rather to apply to books for his cure. And not only this, but even physicians themselves, when they are ill, call in other physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises practise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek for a mean; now the law is a mean. Moreover, the moral law is far superior to the written law, and is conversant with far superior objects; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the written one, though he is inferior to the moral law. But as it is not easy for any one person to have an eye to every thing himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly better than one: as for instance, in Homer,

"Let two together go·"[2]

and also Agamemnon's wish;

"Were ten such faithful counsellors mine own!"[3]

[1] These words are omitted by Goëttling.
[2] Iliad x. 224. [3] Iliad ii. 371.

Not b t that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with supreme power to decide, as the judges, those things which the law cannot decide, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its jurisdiction; for of those which can, there is no doubt. Since then the laws comprehend some things, but not all, these points make it necessary to inquire, and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man, or the best law, should govern; for it is impossible to reduce to law every subject which can come under deliberation. No one then denies that it is necessary that there should be some person to decide those cases, which cannot come under the cognizance of a written law; but we say, that it is better to have many than one; for every one who decides according to the principles of the law decides justly. Yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many; for we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes, and ears, and hands, and feet; for they intrust those who are friends to themselves and their government with part of their power. If they are not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a friend is an equal, and like his friend: if then he thinks that such should govern, he thinks that those who are his equals and like himself should govern. These are nearly the objections which men usually urge in dispute against kingly power.

The law needs a living exponent.

And it is better to have many exponents than one alone.

CHAP. XVII.

Now, probably what we have said, may be true of some persons, but not of others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of a despot; others, of a king; others, again, to be citizens of a free state, sharing what is just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor is the perversion of any other government whatsoever; for they are all contrary to it. But it is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither advantageous nor right, that one person

Tyranny and the other corruptions unnatural.

should be lord over all, either where there are no established laws, but where his will is the law, or where there are laws: neither is it right that one who is good should have rule over those who are good; or one who is not good, over those who are not good; nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular manner; and this manner shall be described, though indeed it has been already mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a democratic. And first, those who are accustomed by nature to submit themselves to the political rule of a family eminent for virtue, are adapted to kingly government. For an aristocracy, those who are naturally framed to bear the rule of freemen, whose superior virtue makes them worthy of the management of others; while a people adapted to a free state is one among whom there is wont to be found a multitude formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws, which admit the poor citizens to a share of honours according to their worth. But whenever a whole family, or any one of another, shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to surpass all other persons in the community, then it is right that the kingly power should be vested in them, or if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of all. For this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent to that principle of right to which all founders of all states, whether aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard, (for they all regard excellence of some kind, though not the same excellence); but it is also agreeable to what has been already said, as it would not be right to kill or banish or ostracise such an one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper to let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to nature, that what is highest should ever be lowest; but this is the case, should such a one ever be governed by others. So that nothing else can be done, but to submit and suffer him continually to enjoy the supreme power. And with respect to kingly power in different states, whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what states, and in what manner, let thus much be laid down. Since, then, we have said that there are three kinds of regular go-

Who are best subjects for a monarchy?

For an aristocracy.

For a free state.

When it is right to choose a monarch.

vernments, and since of these the best must necessarily be that which is administered by the best men,—(and this must be that which happens to have one man, or one family, or a number of persons, excelling all the rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government will be the same,)—it is evident, that in the same manner, and by the same means, whereby a man becomes truly good, any one would compose a state in the shape of an aristocracy or monarchy; so that it will be found to be education and morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man, and that the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.[1]

The best practical form of government is an aristocracy or monarchy.

These particulars being treated of, we must next endeavour to consider what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it ought to be established. Now it is necessary that he who intends so to do, should make a proper inquiry concerning this point.

BOOK IV.[2]—CHAP. I.

The practical province of arts.

In all those arts and sciences which are not conversant with parts, but with some one genus, and are perfect, it is the business of each to determine

[1] This branch of Aristotle's inquiry is resumed below, in books vii. and viii. With the following book a new division commences.

[2] The present book does not resume the subject of the preceding ones, but it is intended to show how civil society is formed and moulded into different types and models of government, and what are the several species of government. The book itself is generally divided into seven parts. 1st, The proposed outline of the treatise, with a statement of the necessary subjects of political society. 2nd, The causes which lead to there being several kinds of polities. 3rd, The different denominations of polity, and different species under the same form. 4th, Of the Republic and the Tyranny. 5th, Of the best polity in the abstract. 6th, Of the best polity according to the particular case of individual states. 7th, Deliberative, executive, and judicial powers.

what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular exercise is fitted to a particular body, and suits it best: (for that body which is formed by nature the most beautiful and most perfectly constructed, necessarily requires the best exercise;) and also what that one kind must be, which will suit most and all bodies, for this is the business of the gymnastic art. And although any one should not desire to acquire an adequate knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master, and to instruct the youth in them, should be perfect therein. And we see that this is what happens equally in the art of healing, ship-building, cloth-making, and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be most correspondent to our wish, providing it received no impediment from without, and also what particular species of it is adapted to particular persons; for there are many probably who are incapable of enjoying the best form. So that the legislator, and he who is truly a politican, ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect in the abstract, but also that which is the best suited under any given circumstances.[1] There is, moreover, a third sort of polity, an imaginary one; and he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be able to discern how it would grow into being, and, when once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it for the longest time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the best form of government, or to be deficient even in what was necessary, or not to be as good as possible under existing circumstances, but something inferior. And, besides all this, it is necessary to distinguish what sort of government is best fitting for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject, however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have

The politician should study, not only theoretic, but practical excellence.

Fault of preceding writers.

[1] Boeck (in his Plat. Min. p. 65) says, that by these words Aristotle implies existing states. This is not quite true. By a *πολιτεία ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* or *καθ' ὑπόθεσιν*, he means, (to use the definition of Goëttling,) "respublica quæ optima fingitur latis quibusdam conditionibus," and the words, therefore, here as elsewhere, stand opposed to *ἡ ἁπλῶς κρατίστη πολιτεία*. See b. ii. chap. 6; iii. 3; v. 9; vii 4, 8, 12, etc., etc.

failed in describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to lay down scientifically what is best, but what can be put in practice. It should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, they seek out only the most subtle form of government, and one which needs many things to fill it up. Others again, choosing rather to treat of what is common, censure those which now exist, and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedæmonian, or some other. But every legislator ought to establish such a form of government, as from the present state, and disposition of the people who are to receive it, they will most readily submit to, and persuade the community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to correct the mistakes of an established government, than to form a new one; as it is equally difficult to recover what we have forgotten, and to learn any thing afresh. The politician, therefore, besides all that we have already said, ought to be able to remedy the faults of a government already established, as we have before mentioned. But this is impossible for a man who does not know the different forms of government: some persons think, that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy; but this is not true: so that no one should be unacquainted with the difference of these governments, how great they are, and in how many ways they are constituted. And together with this practical wisdom, he ought to perceive what laws are best, and what are most suitable to each particular government: for all laws ought to be framed, and are framed by all men, with reference to the state, and not the state with reference to the laws. For government is a certain ordering in a state, which respects the magistrates as to the manner in which they are regulated, where the supreme power shall be placed; and what is the final object which each community shall have in view. But laws are something different from what expresses the form of the constitution;[1] and according to them, the magistrate must rule and keep watch over those who transgress them. And

What the aim of a politician should be.

Hence the need of studying the various governments.

[1] What is the difference between *νόμοι* and *πολιτεία*, has been already incidentally explained above in the second book. Goëttling remarks. *νόμος*, est jus civile: *πολιτεία*, vel *τὰ δηλοῦντα τὴν πολιτείαν*, universæ reipublicæ constitutio.

hence it is evident, that the founders of laws should attend to the different kinds and to the number of governments; for it is impossible that the same laws should be fitted to all sorts of oligarchies and democracies; for of both these governments there are many species, and not one only.

CHAP. II.

Three kinds of government.

SINCE, then, according to our first method of treating the different forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, and the free state, and have shown their three corruptions respectively;—tyranny the corruption of monarchy; oligarchy of an aristocracy; and democracy of the free state;—and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and kingly governments;—(for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best, is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of them desires to be established upon the encouragement of virtue:)—and as moreover we have already determined wherein a monarchy and an aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be governed by a king,—it now remains that we examine into a free state, and also those other forms of government, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a tyranny. And it is evident, which of these three excesses must be the worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of the best and most divine must be the worst;[1] for it must necessarily happen either that the monarchy will have the name of king only remaining without a reality, or else that it will remain owing to the great excess of power on the part of the king; whence a tyranny will arise, the worst excess imaginable, as being a government the most contrary to a free state. The excess next most hurtful, is an oligarchy; for an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government; and that which is least hurtful is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one of those writers who have gone before me,[2]

Inquiry into the nature of a free state.

Tyranny the worst corruption

An oligarchy, the next worst.

[1] An illustration of the old proverb, "Corruptio optimi pessima fit perversio." Compare the well-known expression, ἢ θήριον ἢ θεός.

[2] Aristotle here refers to Plato, Rep. p. 303, A.

Plato's opinion.

though his views do not look the same way as mine; for he thought, that a democracy was the worst of all excellent constitutions, as a good oligarchy, or the like, but the best of all bad ones. Now I affirm that all these states without exception have fallen into excess; and also it is not well to say that one oligarchy is better than another, but that it is not quite so bad. But let us defer this question for the present. We must first inquire how many different sorts of free states there are; since there are many species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or if there is any other, aristocratic in its principles, and well-established; and also which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is preferable for particular persons;—(for, probably, some may suit better with a violent oligarchy than with a democracy, and others better with the latter than the former;)—and afterwards in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean the several species of democracy and of oligarchy. And, to conclude, when we shall have briefly made mention of every thing that is necessary, we must endeavour to point out the sources of corruption and of stability in governments, as well those which are common to all, as those which are peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly are wont to arise.

How many kinds of free states there are.

How governments are preserved and destroyed.

CHAP. III.

Why governments are of different kinds.

THE reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this, that each state consists of a great number of parts;[1] for, in the first place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and, again, out

[1] The cause of there being several kinds of polities, is the fact that there are so many different ingredients in the state; the *ἄποροι*, the *εὔποροι*, and the *μέσοι*, of whom the first is *ἄνοπλον*, the others are *ὁπλιτικόν*. And, again, there are other divisions of the citizens on a different principle. Now these parts, it is clear, may all partake of state privileges; and according as a larger or a smaller part of them has an actual share in the administration the complexion of the government itself will vary.

of the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the middle station; and that both of the rich and poor, some will be used to arms, and others not. We see also that some of the common people are husbandmen, while others attend the market, and others are artificers. There is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity which they maintain; for instance, in the number of their horses; for this cannot be supported without a large fortune. For this reason, in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse, became by that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions against the neighbouring states which were at war with them; as the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, and the Magnetians, who lived near the river Mæander, and many others about Asia. Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises from family and from merit; or, if there are any other distinctions which make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in treating of an aristocracy;[1] (for there we considered of how many parts each city must necessarily be composed;) and sometimes each of these have a share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more. It is evident, then, that there must be many forms of government, differing from each other in kind; for the parts of which they are composed, each differ from the other. For government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst them, as poverty, wealth, or something of which they both partake. There must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem chiefly to be two, as they say the winds are but two, namely, the north and the south; while all the others are declinations from these. And thus in polities, there is the government of the many, and the government of the few; or a democracy, and an oligarchy; for an aristocracy may be considered

As many forms of government as ranks in the state.

But resolvable into two main divisions.

1. That of the many.

2. That of the few.

[1] The reference of Aristotle here is to book iii. chapters 6 and 7.

as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the few; and what we call a free state, may be considered as a democracy; as among the winds, they consider the west as part of the north, and the east as part of the south. Thus, too, it is in music, according to some, who say that there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and who call all other species of composition after one of these names. Many people are accustomed to consider governments in the same light; but it is both more convenient and more in accordance with truth, to distinguish governments, as I have done, into two species: one of those established upon proper principles, so that while there are one or two sorts rightly constituted, the others are but excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to the best-tempered harmony; the oligarchic to the more violent and impassioned tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.[1]

CHAP. IV.

Objections against the current definitions of democracy and oligarchy.

We ought not, however, to define a democracy as some do now-a-days, who say simply that it is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for even in oligarchies every where the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should we define an oligarchy as a government where the supreme power is in the hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen hundred, and that of these, one thousand were rich, who would not permit the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although they were free, and their equals in every thing else; no one would say that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than themselves, no one would say that this formed an oligarchy; nor would any one call such a state an oligarchy, when the poor, though few in number, are superior in power to the rich, who have a majority.

Truer distinction between them.

We should rather say that the state is a democracy, when the supreme power is in the hands

[1] In this sentence it has been found impossible to adhere literally to the original text; but it is hoped that the paraphrase here given may be found adequately to express the meaning of our author. Ed.

of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich. It happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in the other the few; because there are many poor, and few rich. And if the offices of state were to be distributed according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is in Æthiopia,[1] or according to their beauty, then it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are tall or beautiful is small. Nor withal are those things which we have already mentioned, alone sufficient to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires that further distinction be made; as we cannot admit, that if a few freemen possess the supreme power over the many who are not free, this government is a democracy: as in Apollonia upon the Ionian Sea, and in Thera;[2] for in each of these cities the honours of the state were in the hands of some few distinguished families who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war. But a democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, are invested with the power of the state; and an oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble family, being few, possess it. We have now proved that there are various forms of government, and we have assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show, that there are even more than

A democracy defined.

An oligarchy defined.

[1] See Herod. iii. 20. An obvious parallel occurs in the case of Saul, the first king of Israel, who is said to have been taller than the rest of the people from his shoulders upward. (See 1 Sam. x. 23.) Compare also the words of king Priam to Helen, in Iliad, book iii. 226, 227,

Τίς τ' ἄρ' ὅδ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιὸς ἀνὴρ ἠΰς τε μέγας τε,
ἔξοχος Ἀργείων κεφαλήν τε καὶ ἐυρέας ὤμους;

[2] "Aristotle's survey of the Greek forms of government was founded" (as the reader of his Politics cannot fail to observe) "on a vast store of information which he had collected on the history and constitution of more than a hundred and fifty states in the mother country and the colonies, and which he had consigned to a great work now unfortunately lost. Our knowledge of the internal condition and vicissitudes of almost all these states is very scanty and fragmentary; but some of the main facts concerning them, which have been saved from oblivion, will serve to throw light on several parts of Grecian history." Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, vol. i. chap. .).

these, and what they are, and why; starting from the first principle which we have already laid down. We admit that every state consists not of one, but of many parts. For example, if it should be our purpose to comprehend the different species of animals, we should first of all note those parts which every animal must have, as certain of the organs of sense, as also what is fitted to receive and retain its food, as a mouth and a belly; and besides, certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these are the only parts of an animal, and there are differences between them, namely, in their various sorts of mouths, and bellies, and organs of sense, and besides these in their powers of motion; the number of all these combined together must necessarily make up different species of animals. For it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any very great deal of difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these possible combinations are collected together, they will make up various species of animals, which will be as many kinds as there are of these general combinations of necessary parts. Now the same thing is true of what are called polities; for a state is not made up of one, but of many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is those who supply provisions, called husbandmen; another called mechanics, whose employment is in the manual arts, without which the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is absolutely necessary, others about things which contribute to the elegancies and pleasures of life; the third sort are hucksters, I mean by these buyers, sellers, petty traffickers, and retail dealers; the fourth are hired labourers, or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not less useful than the other, unless the community choose to be the slaves of every invader. For doubtless a state which is naturally a slave, is unworthy of the name of a city; for a city is self-sufficient, but a slave is not. So that when Socrates says[1] that a city is necessarily composed of four sorts of people, weavers, hus-

The component parts of a state.

1. γεωργοί.

2. βάναυσοι.

3. ἀγοραῖοι.

4. τὸ θητικόν.

5. τὸ προπολεμοῦν.

An error in the Republic of Plato refuted.

[1] In Plato's Republic, book ii. p. 369, D., *εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν; φαίνεται.*

bandmen, shoemakers, and builders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and victuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if a city was established for necessity, and not for the sake of perfect life, or as if it was equally in need of shoemakers and husbandmen. Also he does not reckon the military as a part of the state, before its territory increases and brings about war, by touching on the borders of the neighbouring powers.[1] And even amongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any connexion with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to distribute justice, and to determine between man and man. Since, then, any one would hold that the mind is more truly a part of man than his body, one would regard such things as more properly belonging to his city than matters of every-day necessity: such things are the portion devoted to war and the administration of forensic justice; to which may be added those who are members of the council, which is the business of political sagacity. Nor is it of any consequence, whether these different employments are filled by different persons, or by one, as the same man is oftentimes both a soldier and a husbandman. So that if both the judge and the senator are parts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be so also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive employments at their own charge; and these are called the opulent. The eighth are those who in like manner execute the different offices of the state, and without these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that there should be some persons capable of governing and of filling the places in the city; and this either for life, or in rotation. The office of a senator, and of him who administers justice to litigants, alone now remain; and these we have already sufficiently defined. Since, then, these

6. τὸ βουλευτικὸν καὶ δικαστικόν.

7. τὸ λειτουργοῦν ταῖς οὐσίαις.

8. τὸ δημιουργικὸν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

[1] It must be remembered that Plato constituted his orders, as was theoretically necessary for the mere existence of the state, and that he did not look to practice. The soldiery will not be necessary, he says, until the state desires to increase its territory Still, granting this point, a judicial body nevertheless is necessary.

things are necessary for a state, to the end that it may be happy and just, it follows that citizens who engage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. Many persons think it possible that different employments may be allotted to the same person, as that of a soldier, a husbandman, and an artificer; as also, that others may be both senators and judges: but all men lay claim to political ability, and think themselves qualified for almost every department in the state. But the same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich. Moreover, since in general the one are few, the other many, they seem of all the parts of a city most clearly contrary to each other; so that as the one or the other prevail, they form different polities, and these two forms of polity are democracy and oligarchy. It has been already mentioned that there are many different states, and from what causes they arise; let us therefore now show that there are also different kinds both of democracy and oligarchy. Though this indeed is evident from what we have already said: for there are many different sorts of common people,[1] and also of those who are called the upper classes. Of the different sorts of the first are the husbandmen, artificers, and hucksters, who are employed in buying and selling; seamen, of whom some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in carrying goods and passengers, others in fishing;—(and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at Ægina and Chios, those who carry passengers at Tenedos;)—to these we may add those who live by their manual labour, and have so little property that they cannot live without some employ; and also those who are not free-born from citizens on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be. That which marks the upper classes, is their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any such like ex-

Different kinds of democracies and oligarchies.

[1] In summing up the *εἴδη δήμου*, Aristotle successively enumerates *τὸ γεωργικόν*, the *τεχνῖται*, (who are identical with the *βάνανσοι* above,) *ἀγοραῖοι, θαλάσσιοι, πορθμευτικοί, ἁλιευτικοί, χρηματικοί, πολεμικοί.* As to the *εἴδη τῶν γνωρίμων*, they are respectively *πλοῦτος, ἀρετή, εὐγένεια, παιδεία.*

cellence which is attributed to them. The most pure democracy[1] is that which is called so principally from the equality which prevails in it: for

Democracy is, 1. κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, the best.

[1] The reader will better understand a great part of what follows in this book on the subject of democracy, if he will give his attention to the subjoined account of Grecian democratical government, taken from Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. ch. 10. "The term democracy is used by Aristotle sometimes in a larger sense, so as to include several forms of government, which, notwithstanding their common character, were distinguished from each other by peculiar features; at other times in a narrower, to denote a form essentially vicious, which stands in the same relation to the happy temperament to which he gives the name of polity, as oligarchy to aristocracy, or tyranny to royalty. It must not be forgotten, that the body to which the terms oligarchy and democracy refer, formed a comparatively small part of the population in most Greek states, since it did not include either slaves or residing free foreigners. The sovereign power resided wholly in the native freemen; and whether it was exercised by a part or by all of them, was the question which determined the nature of the government. When the barrier had been thrown down by which all political rights were made the inheritance of certain families,—since every freeman, even when actually excluded from them by the want of sufficient property, was by law capable of acquiring them,—democracy might be said to have begun. Thus where the legislative, or, as it was anciently termed, the deliberative, branch of the sovereignty was lodged in an assembly open to every freeman, and when no other qualification than free birth was required for judicial functions, and for the election of magistrates, there the government was called democratical, though the highest offices of the state might be reserved to a privileged class. But a finished democracy, that which fully satisfied the Greek nation, was one in which every attribute of sovereignty might be shared, without respect to rank or property, by every freeman. More than this was not implied in democracy; and little less than this was required, according to the views of the philosophers, to constitute the character of a citizen, which, in the opinion of Aristotle, could not exist without a voice in the legislative assembly, and such a share in the administration of justice as was necessary to secure the responsibility of the magistrates. But this equality of rights left room for a great diversity in the modes of exercising them, which determined the real nature of a democratical institution. There were indeed certain rights, those which Aristotle considers as essential to a citizen, which, according to the received Greek notions, could, in a democracy, only be exercised in person. The thought of delegating them to accountable representatives, seems never to have occurred, either to practical or speculative statesmen. But still, even in the purest form of democracy, it was not necessary that all the citizens should take an equally active part in the transaction of public business, and the unavoidable inequality in the advantages of fortune, and of personal qualities, fixed a natural limit to the exercise of most political rights. But the principle of legal equality, which was the basis of democracy, was gradually constructed in a manner which inverted the wholesome order of nature, and led to a long train of pernicious

this is what the law in that state directs, that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich; and that the supreme power shall be not lodged with either of these, but that both shall share it alike. For if liberty and equality, as some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so, by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such a state must be a democracy. This then is one species of a democratic government. Another is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census, the standard of which is low; and where every one who possesses property ought to have a share in the government, but as soon as he has lost that property, he ought no longer. Another sort is, that in which every man who is not under ban has a share in the government, but where the government is in the law. Another, where every one, provided he be a citizen, has this right, but where the government is in the law. Another is the same with these in other particulars, but allows the people and not the law to be supreme; and this takes place when every thing is determined by a majority of votes, and not by a law; a thing which happens by reason of the demagogues. For where a democracy is governed by stated laws, there is no room for a demagogue, but men of worth fill the first offices in the state; but where

2. ἀπὸ τιμημάτων.

3. Where all rule who are ἀνυπεύθυνοι.

4. Where all share ἀρχαί.

5. Where the ψηφίσματα supersede the law.

consequences. The administration of the commonwealth came to be regarded, not as a service in which all were interested, but for which some might be qualified better than others, but as a property, in which each was entitled to an equal share. In proportion as the assembly, or large portions detached from it for the exercise of judicial functions, drew all the branches of the sovereignty more and more into their sphere, the character of their proceedings became more and more subject to the influence of the lower class of the citizens, which constituted a permanent majority. And thus the democracy, instead of the equality which was its supposed basis, in fact, established the ascendency of a faction, which although greatly preponderant in numbers, no more represented the whole state than the oligarchy itself; and which, though not equally liable to fall into the mechanism of a vicious system, was more prone to yield to the impulse of the moment, more easily misled by blind or treacherous guides, and might thus, as frequently, though not so deliberately and methodically, trample, not only on law and custom, but on justice and humanity. This disease of a democracy was sometimes designated by the term ochlocracy, or the dominion of the rabble."

the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues abound.[1] For there the people's voice becomes that of a king, the whole composing one body; for they are supreme, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity. Homer also says,

"Ill fares it, where the multitude hath sway;"

but whether he means this kind of democracy, or one where the many are individually supreme, is uncertain. Now, when the people possess this power, they desire to be altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law, and they grow despotical, so that flatterers are held in repute; and such a people become analogous to tyranny among the forms of monarchy; for their manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over better persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others' edicts; and a demagogue with them is like a flatterer among the others; but both these two classes abound with each, flatterers with tyrants, and demagogues among such a people. And to them it is owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not in written laws; for they bring every thing before them. And this they do because they have influence, on account of the supreme power being lodged in the people; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who inveigh against rulers are wont to say that the people ought to be the judges of their conduct; and the people gladly receive their complaints as the means of destroying all their offices. Any one therefore may with great justice blame such a government by calling it a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is not vested in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise, should be determined by the magistrates or by the state. If, therefore, a democracy is to be

Parallel between such a democracy and a tyranny.

A free state or polity only when the law is supreme.

[1] In such a case as this, the form of government would rather be called an *ochlocracy*, or, in the words of Thirlwall, a dominion of the rabble. A *ψήφισμα* was a mere resolution of the people, and only remained in effect for one year, like a decree of the senate at Rome. Nothing was a law at Athens, except what had passed before the *νομοθέται*. The democracy established by Solon, therefore, according to Aristotle, was one of that kind in which *κύριος ἦν ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλῆθος*. See Hermann, Pol. Antiq. § [illegible]

reckoned as one among free states, it is evident that any such establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot, properly speaking, be a democracy; for their decrees cannot be general in their extent. Let this, then, be our description of the several species of democracies.

CHAP. V.

Different kinds of oligarchy. 1. With a high census to shut out the many.

2. The same, but where the rulers are self-elected.

3. Hereditary.

4. Where the rulers, and not the law, are supreme.

But of the different species of oligarchies,[1] one is when the right to the offices is regulated by a certain census, so that the poor, although they are the majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included in it take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when the magistrates are men of very small fortune, and upon any vacancy themselves fill it up. Now if they do this out of the community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is when the power is in the same hands, and they are supreme instead of the laws; and this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a tyranny among monarchies, and to that particular species of democracy which we last mentioned; and this has the particular name of a dynasty.[2] So many, then, are the different sorts of oligarchies and democracies. It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet, in consequence of the established manners and customs of the people,

[1] "Whenever such a change took place in the character or relative position of the ruling body, that it no longer commanded the respect of its subjects, but found itself opposed to them, and compelled to direct its measures chiefly to the preservation of its own power, it ceased to be an aristocracy in the Greek sense; it became a faction, an *oligarchy*. . . . . In this strict sense, an oligarchy could only exist where there was an inferior body, which felt itself aggrieved by being excluded from the political rights which were reserved to the privileged few . . . In general, it was a gradual, inevitable change in the relative position of the higher and lower orders, which converted the aristocracy into an oligarchical faction, and awakened an opposition which usually ended in its overthrow." Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10.

[2] See Thucyd. iii. 62

may be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, among other people where a polity in accordance to the laws may really bend to a democratic form, still their customs and manners may be of an oligarchic tendency. And this chiefly happens when there has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one thing gains place from another; so that the ancient laws remain in force, while the power is with those who bring about a revolution in the state.

Tendency to preserve the form established.

CHAP. VI.

It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many species of democracies and oligarchies as the above; for of necessity, either all the aforesaid ranks of the people must have a share in the government, or some only, and others not. Now when the husbandmen and those only who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get their livings by their labour, they have but little leisure for public business: they will therefore establish fit laws, and call public assemblies when there is a necessity; and they will readily let every one partake with them in the administration of public affairs, as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires as a qualification. [And hence, by the way, it is in the power of every one who has any thing to have his share in the government.[1]] For to exclude any class would be a step towards oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend unless they have a subsistence, would be impossible. This form of government then, for the above reasons, is one species of democracy. Another species is distinguished by the prevailing mode of electing magistrates, in which every one is eligible to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is able to find leisure to attend. For this reason, in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws, as pay is not given. A third species is, where all freemen have a right to a share in the government, but where they will

One kind of democracy, when a state will be ruled by law.

Another kind.

A third kind.

[1] Great doubts are entertained as to the genuineness of this sentence. Accordingly we have placed it in brackets, with Bekker and Göttling.

not accept it for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also the supreme power will be in the law.

A fourth kind.

A fourth species of democracy is the last established in point of time in the states. For as the cities have been enlarged far beyond their original size, and as the public revenue has become considerable, the populace, on account of their numbers, are admitted to share in the management of public affairs, and even the poor are at leisure to attend to them, as they receive pay:[1] nay, they have the greatest leisure of all, as they are not hindered by having any care of their own property, as is the case with the rich, who on this account often take no part in the public assembly and the courts of justice; thus the supreme power is lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are the different sorts of democracies, and such are the causes which necessarily gave birth to them.

The first kind of oligarchy.

But as to the various kinds of oligarchy, the first is when the greater part are men of moderate means, and have not too large property; for this gives each man of property leisure for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body, it necessarily follows, that the supreme power must be in the laws, and not in the individuals; for in proportion as they are far from a monarchical government, and have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while they are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course determine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if

[1] "Democracy advanced, as the legal condition on which political rights were enjoyed was brought within the reach of a more numerous class; but it could not be considered as complete, so long as any freeman was debarred from them by poverty. Since, however, the ancient sovereignty contained several attributes which might be separated, the character of the constitution depended on the way in which these were distributed. The state was considered as partaking more of democracy than of oligarchy, when the most important of these rights were shared by all freemen without distinction, though a part was still appropriated to a number limited either by birth or fortune. . . . The principle of legal equality was more fully carried out, by the introduction of an expedient for levelling as far as possible the inequality of nature, by enabling the poor man to devote his time without loss, or even with profit, to public affairs. This was done by giving him wages for his attendance on all occasions of exercising his franchise; and as the sum which could be afforded for this purpose was necessarily small, it attracted precisely the persons whose presence was least desirable." Thirlwall, ubi supr.

the men of property in the state are fewer than in the former case, and if their property is large, then an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have power will claim a right to lord it over the others. And, to accomplish this, they will associate themselves with some who have an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not yet powerful enough to govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if they set themselves, as being fewer, to gain greater fortunes, the oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort, because they keep the offices of state in their own hands by a law, which directs the son to succeed upon the death of his father. But as soon as they extend their strength further by means of their wealth and powerful connexions, such a dynasty nearly approaches to a monarchy, and the men will be supreme, and not the law; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy, and it corresponds to the last-mentioned kind of democracy.

The second kind.

The third kind.

The fourth kind.

CHAP. VII.

THERE are also two other states, besides a democracy and an oligarchy, concerning the one of which all speak, and it is always esteemed one species of the four sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy, and the fourth, which they call an aristocracy. There is also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other four, namely, a Polity;[1] but as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped those who endeavour to enumerate the different forms of govern-

A fifth kind of government, or polity.

[1] "The form of government in which the possession of a certain amount of property was the condition of all, or at least of the highest political privileges, was sometimes called a *timocracy*, and its character varied according to the standard adopted. When this was high, and especially if it was fixed in the produce of land, the constitution differed but little in effect from the aristocratical oligarchy, except as it opened to those who were excluded a prospect of raising themselves to a higher rank. But when the standard was placed within reach of the middling class, the form of government was commonly called a *polity*, and was considered as one of the best tempered and most durable modification of democracy." Thirlwall, ubi supr.

ments, of which they admit four only, as does Plato in his Republic.[1]

What an aristocracy is. 1. First kind.

An aristocracy of which we have already treated in our first book, is rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most virtuous principles, and not (so called) according to any arbitrary definition of good men,[2] has alone a right to be called an aristocracy; for it is there only that the good man and the good citizen are identified; while in other states men are good only relatively to their own country. Moreover, there

2. Second kind.

are some other states which are called by the same name, that differ both from oligarchies and free states, wherein they choose men for office, not only according to their wealth, but according to their merit. Now this polity differs from both of the above, and is called an aristocracy; for in those governments wherein virtue is not their common care, there are still men of high worth and approved merit. Whatever state, then, as at Carthage, favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort of aristocracy: but when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at Lacedæmon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies over and above the first,

How it differs from a virtuous democracy.

3. Third kind.

which is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is to be found whenever any one of what are called free states inclines to the dominion of a few.

CHAP. VIII.

Free states and tyrannies.

It now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and we have thus arranged our method, because, although this, as well as the aristocracies already mentioned, do not seem excesses, yet, to speak truly,

[1] See Plato's Repub. book viii. chap. 1 and 2, where he describes the most perfect ideal state as an aristocracy, and then lays down timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, as the four perversions of it, or corrupted forms.

[2] That is, by absolutely good men, and not men who are so called arbitrarily and are adapted to this or that form of government.

they have all departed from a perfect government: and so they are reckoned among these, and these are their corrupted forms, as we said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the last of all governments, for it is of all others the least like a polity, but our treatise is on the subject of polities. We have said, then, why this arrangement has been made; but now we must explain what is meant by a free state. For we shall the better understand its positive nature now that we have already described an oligarchy and a democracy;[1] for a free state is indeed nothing more than a mixture of these, and it has been usual to call those which incline most to a democracy, free states, and those which incline most to an oligarchy, aristocracies, because rank and education are generally appendages of the wealthy. Besides, they enjoy those things which others are often guilty of crimes to procure; for which reason men regard them as men of worth, honour, and note. Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say that an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and honourable. Now it seems impossible that a state, where the government is in the hands of the good, should not be well governed, but ill; or well governed, where the power is in the hands of the bad. Nor is a government well constituted because the laws are such, unless they are observed; for the enforcement of obedience to the laws is one proof of a good constitution in the state: another is, to have laws by which they shall abide well made; (for even if they are improper they must be obeyed;) and this may be done in two ways, either by their being the best relatively to the particular state, or the best absolutely. An aristocracy seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on the virtuous; for virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an oligarchy, and liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the majority will prevail in each one of these three different states; and that which is esteemed by the greater part of those who compose the community will have the supreme power. Now what is called a free state prevails in most communities which are generally made up of rich and poor, riches and liberty: for among almost all men the

What is a free state?

The laws alone no test of a government.

[1] See note on the preceding chapter.

rich seem to maintain their position as worthy and honourable people. But as there are three things which claim an equal rank in the state, namely, freedom, riches, and merit,—(for the fourth, which is called nobility, is consequent on two of the others, since merit and riches are the origin of nobility)—it is evident, that the union of the rich and the poor makes up a free state; but that the union of all three tends to an aristocracy more than any other, except that state which is truly so, and which holds the first rank. We have already seen, then, that there are governments different from a monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy, and what they are; and also wherein both aristocracies differ from each other, and free states from an aristocracy; and it is evident, that these are not much unlike each other.

CHAP. IX.

How a polity arises.

NEXT in order to what has been said, let us state how that government which is peculiarly called a polity arises, beside a democracy and an oligarchy, and how it ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are the proper limits by which these governments are bounded; for we must mark out wherein they differ from one another, and then from each of these we must take as it were a contribution, and so combine them. There are three ways in which states may be blended and joined together; for, in the first place, we may take from both sides whatever the laws of each have ordered; as for instance, in matters of judicial trials. For in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do not serve as dicasts, but the poor are not paid for their attendance; but in democracies they are paid, while the rich are not fined for neglect. Now each of these points is a matter which belongs in common to both states; and hence they are adapted to a free state, which is composed of both. This, then, is one way in which they may be joined together.

Modes of blending states together. 1st mode.

2nd mode.

In the second place, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each state lays down; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the public assembly is either confined by no census at all, or by a low one; in an oligarchy it belongs only to those whose

standard of wealth is high: therefore, as these two practices are incompatible, a census between each may be established in such a state. The third method is compounded of two ordinances,[1] partly from the oligarchic principle and partly from the democratic. For instance, as it seems suitable to a democracy, that the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but to an aristocracy by vote; and it is oligarchical to choose them according to a census, while not to do so is democratical. To copy something from each other, then, is at once aristocratical and suitable to a free state; from an oligarchy, their choice of magistrates by vote, but from a democracy their refusal to impose a census. This is the way of blending them: but the best test of a happy mixture of a democracy and an oligarchy is, when a person may properly call the same state both a democracy and an oligarchy; for it is evident, that those who thus speak of it are led to do so, because both forms are there well blended together. And indeed this is common to all means, that the extremes of each side should be discerned in them; it is the case with the state of Lacedæmon; for many strive to maintain that it is a democracy, because it has many particulars which follow that form of government;[2] as for instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of their children. For the children of both rich and poor are brought up in the same manner; and they are educated in such a manner that the children of the poor may partake of it: and the same rules are observed when they are successively youths and men,

3rd mode.

Test of a free state or polity being well devised.

The Spartan constitution instanced.

[1] Upon the essentially *practical* character of the Politics of Aristotle, and the contrast which it presents to the Republic of Plato in this respect, see the Introductory Essay. The present chapter is a particular instance of this characteristic feature.

[2] Upon the constitution of Sparta and the legislation of Lycurgus, the reader will do well to consult the admirable summary of the subject given by Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 8. He says, inter alia, "At Sparta, as in *all other Greek republics*, the sovereign power resided in the Assembly of the people; where a Heracleid, however respected for his birth, had no advantage in his vote over the common Dorian. In later times we hear of two Assemblies, a greater and a lesser; but this appears to have been an innovation, connected with other changes to be hereafter described." The whole chapter is well worthy of an attentive perusal, to any one who wishes to gain a real insight into the polity of Sparta.

there is no distinction between a rich person and a poor one, and in their public tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear only such clothes as the poorest man might be able to purchase. Moreover, with respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, to one they have a right to elect, and to have a share of the other; for they elect the Senate[1] and partake in the Ephoralty. Others consider it as an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical points; as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by lot; in there being but a few who have a right to judge on capital causes, and in matters of banishment, and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of two others ought to show that it resembles them both, and yet is neither one nor the other. Such a state ought to have its means of preservation in itself, and not from without; and when I say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance of their neighbours, (for this may happen to a bad government,) but to the fact that every member of the community is unwilling that there should be the least alteration in its constitution. We have then spoken of the method in which a free state ought to be established, and likewise a so-called aristocracy.

A free state should be independent of its neighbours.

CHAP. X.

A tyranny.

It now remains for us to treat of a tyranny; not that there is much to be said on that subject, but still let it receive its proper place in our plan, since we have enumerated it also as one form of government. Now, in the beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government, where we entered into a particular examination of what was most properly called kingly sway, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what it should be, and whence and how established. We also divided tyranny into two species, when we were upon the

Of two kinds.

[1] The Spartan γερουσία, or senate, consisted of 30 members, one elected from each ὠβή, as its representative. The two kings seem always to have had seats in this representative body, and at most to have had the privilege of a casting vote, which belonged either to the two kings conjointly, or perhaps, (as Thirlwall is inclined to think,) to the king of the elder house alone Compare Herod. vi. 57, with Thucyd. i. 20.

subject of monarchy, because their power somehow or other easily passes into a kingly government, owing to the fact that they are both of them established by law; for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchs with absolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were some such, whom they called Æsymnetes. Now these have certain points of difference from each other; for they were kingly so far as they were regulated by law, ruled over voluntary subjects; but they were tyrannical, because they ruled despotically, according to their own will. There is a third species of tyranny, which seems to be most properly so called, the counterpart of kingly power; and this monarchy must needs be a tyranny, where one rules over his equals and superiors, without being accountable for his conduct,[1] and whose object is his own advantage, and not the advantage of those whom he governs. And hence he rules by compulsion; for no freeman will ever willingly submit to such a government.[2] These then, and so many, are the different species of tyrannies, owing to the above-mentioned causes.

A third kind of tyranny.

CHAP. XI.

What the best practical form of government.

We now inquire what form of government and what manner of life is best for communities in general, and for the greater part of men; not with reference to that superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or to that education which needs every advantage of nature and fortune, nor with reference to the merely imagin-

[1] *ἀνυπεύθυνος*. The *εὐθύνη*, or judicial account which every public officer at Athens, and generally throughout all the states of Greece, had to render to the people at the expiration of his office, was the *palladium* of civil and political freedom with the whole Hellenic race. Whatever power erected itself into a position where it was not thus responsible to the sovereignty of the people, was at once condemned as an infringement against the very first principles of liberty. The officers before whom these accounts used to be rendered, were called at Athens, *εὔθυνοι* or *λογισταί*: elsewhere they were also known by the names of *ἐξεταστα*ί or *συνήγοροι*. For further remarks on the *εὔθυνοι*, see below, book vi. chap. 5.

[2] "A tyranny, in the Greek sense of the word, was the *irresponsible* dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, ... nor on a free election . . . . but on force." Thirlwall, vol. i. ch. 10.

ary form of polity;[1] but let it be with reference to that mode of life in which the greater part of mankind can share, and that government of which most cities can partake. For as to those, so called, aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they either fall beyond the attainment of states,[2] or so nearly resemble that which is properly called a polity, that we shall treat of them both as one.

The opinions which we shall pass upon these subjects must depend upon the same principles: for if what we have said in our Ethics[3] is true, that a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue, and that virtue consists in a certain mean, of necessity the middle life must certainly be the happiest, the mean being supposed to be attainable by every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice must also necessarily be the same in a city and in a polity: for a polity is the very life of the city. In every state the people are divided into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and, thirdly, those who are between them. Since, then, it is universally admitted that the mean is best, it is evident, that even in point of fortune, a middle state is to be preferred; for that state is most apt to submit to reason. For those who are very handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich, or, on the contrary, those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with difficulty obey it. And this, because the one class is capricious and wicked

The middle state to be preferred.

[1] Aristotle here tacitly refers to the Ideal Republic of Plato, which professedly was intended as an Utopian outline, and even in the opinion of its author, could not be carried out into practice.

[2] "To constitute an aristocracy," (says Thirlwall, ubi supr.,) "it is not sufficient that the ruling few should be animated by a desire to promote the public good; they must also be distinguished by a certain *character*, for *aristocracy* signifies the rule of the *best* men. If this epithet is referred to an absolute ideal standard of excellence, it is manifest that an aristocratical government is a mere abstract notion, which has nothing in history or nature to correspond to it. But if we content ourselves with taking the same terms in a relative sense, . . . aristocracy will be that form of government in which the ruling few are distinguished from the multitude by illustrious birth, hereditary wealth, and personal merit."

[3] See Eth. Nicom. b. i. chap. 7, where happiness is defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*. In a perfect life, Aristotle meant, not only to include the development of life to the highest degree of perfection, but also the idea of a consistent and uninterrupted (*ἀνεμποδιστός*) perseverance in it from the beginning to the end.

on a large scale,[1] the other rascally and mean; and the crimes of each arise respectively from insolence and villany: nor will they hold office as chiefs of a phyle or presidents of the council;[2] and these things are both detrimental to the state. Besides, those who excel in strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how, nor are willing, to submit to command:—(and this begins at home when they are boys, for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to obey their preceptors:)—as for the very poor, their excessive want reduces them to a state too mean; so that the one know not how to command, but only to be commanded as slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command, but only to command with despotic power. A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and masters, not of freemen; where one party must hate, and the other despise; and this is very far removed from friendship and political community; for a community supposes affection, for men do not even on the road associate with their enemies. It is also the aim of a city to be composed as much as possible of equals; and this will be most so when the inhabitants are in the middle state; whence it follows, that that city must be best framed which is composed of those who we say are naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who are best assured of safety; for they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting against any one, and having any one to plot against them, they will live free from danger. For which reason Phocylides wisely prayed,

Equality to be aimed at.

[1] *μεγαλοπονηρόι.* "To sin as it were with a cart-rope." Isa. v. 18.

[2] The *φύλαρχοι*, generally, were the prefects of any state, as at Epidamnus, where the government was formerly vested in them. See book v. ch. i. At Athens the officers so called, after the age of Clisthenes, were ten in number, one for each of the tribes, and were specially charged with the command and superintendence of the cavalry. Herodotus (v. 19) informs us that Clisthenes, when he increased the tribes from four to ten, made ten Phylarchs instead of four. It is however probable that he there confounds the office of Phylarch with that of the *φυλοβασιλεῖς*, who were four in number. The word *βουλαρχεῖν* here is used apparently in a lax and popular sense, equivalent perhaps to *ἐπιστατεῖν*, to act as *ἐπιστατὴς* over the *πρόεδροι* or body of ten senators who presided over the rest for a week, one of whom was chosen for every day in the week to preside as chairman in the senate and the assembly of the people. During his day of office he kept the public records and seal.

"The middle state is best; that state be mine,
Whate'er my city be." [1]

The best state, where the mean out-numbers the extremes.

It is plain, then, that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank, and that those states can best be carried on, wherein these are the majority and outweigh, if possible, both the other classes; or, if that cannot be, at least then either of them separate; for being thrown into the balance it will prevent either excess from preponderating. It is therefore the greatest happiness of citizens to possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too much, and others nothing at all, the government must be either an extreme democracy, or else a pure oligarchy; or, from the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong democracy, or an oligarchy, but far more seldom when the members of the community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different states are likely to undergo. But it is clear that the middle state is the best, for it is alone free from seditions; for where the middle class is large, there is less of sedition and insurrection to disturb the community. And for the same reason extensive governments are least liable to these inconveniencies; for there the middle classes are very numerous; whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two extremes, so as hardly to have any in a middle state remaining, but the one half are rich, the other poor. And from the same principle it comes, that democracies are more firmly established, and of longer continuance than oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of the proper number of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses arise, and the government is soon at an end. We ought to consider as a proof of what we now advance, that the best lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life; amongst whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, (for he was not a king,[2]) and Charondas,

Why democracies more stable than oligarchies.

[1] Thus in Eurip. Ion, 632, the prayer occurs, εἴη γ' ἐμοὶ ζῆν μέτρια.

[2] As to the personality of Lycurgus, the reader will do well to consult the remarks of Thirlwall upon the history of that legislator. (History of Gr. vol. i. ch. 8.) According to Herodotus, (i. ch. 65,) it was during the minority of Leobotas, that Lycurgus, governing as regent, employed the power placed in his hands for the purpose of establishing his own institu-

and indeed most others. And what has been said will show us why of so many free states, some have changed to democracies, others to oligarchies; for whenever the number of persons in the middle state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the rich or the poor, always overpower them, and assume to themselves the administration of public affairs; and hence arises either a democracy or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state; but, as the record of their victory, they adopt one which inclines to their own principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.

Consequence of having too small a middle class.

And further, those who gained the leadership of Greece, had each of them an eye to the respective forms of government in their own cities, and established either democracies or oligarchies,[1] not considering what was serviceable to the state, but what was similar to their own. And for this reason a government has never, or very seldom, been established where the supreme power has been placed amongst those of the middle rank; and, amongst a few, one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded to give the preference to this arrangement. It is indeed an established custom with the inhabitants of most cities, not to desire an equality, but

Policy of the leading states of Greece.

tions at Sparta. This however, as Thirlwall remarks, runs contrary to the better attested tradition, which makes the lawgiver to have sprung from the Eurypontid line. It is most probable that Lycurgus was himself the son of Eunomus, the grandson of Eurypon, who was a king of Sparta, and of the house of Procles.

[1] Compare the assertion of Thucydides, i. 19, who says that the Lacedæmonians led out their allies "on oligarchic principles, shaping their line of policy so as to suit their own interests alone." (*κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν σφισὶν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσωσι θεραπεύοντες.*) The same words, or nearly so, occur again in the same book, chap. 76, where the Athenians accuse the Spartans of pursuing this line of policy for their own advantage; and again in chap. 144. One apparent instance to the contrary we find in the policy of Sparta, where that state, according to Herodotus, (v. ch. 64,) interfered in the internal affairs of Athens, and aided them in expelling their tyrant. But even in this case, it is clear that the Spartans hoped that the establishment of a democracy, in the place of a tyranny, at Athens, would be the downfal of that state, and so conduce to their own interests.

either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered to submit. Thus from what we have said, it is plain what is the best state, and why. But with regard to other polities, since we say that there are various forms both of democracy and oligarchy, it will not be difficult to judge to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and which in a consequent order is better or worse, now that the best form has been defined: for that must be the best which is nearest to this, and that the worst which is most distant from the mean, unless any one forms a mere imaginary standard. I mean by this, that it may happen, that though one form of government may be better than another, yet oftentimes nothing prevents another from being preferable to it in particular circumstances, and for particular purposes.

What is the best state, the next best, and the worst.

No abstract rule can be laid down.

CHAP. XII.

After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what and what kind of government is most suitable for particular cases. But first we must lay down the same maxim as applicable to all, that that party which desires to support the established policy of the state, ought to be superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and nobility, and by quantity the excess of its population. Now it may so happen, that quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed, and quantity in the other; thus, the number of the low-born may be greater than the number of those of family, and the number of the poor than that of the rich; but not so far that the quantity of the one shall outweigh the quality of the other. Hence these must be properly adjusted to each other; for where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion above-mentioned, there a democracy is wont to rise up, and the democracy will be of a particular species, according to that class of men which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should the number of husbandmen be excessive, it will be of the best kind; if of mechanics, and those

What government best suits particular cases.

States made up of quality and quantity.

These should be in due proportion.

Effect of disposition in these two elements.

who work for pay, of the worst; in the same manner it may be of any other set between these two. But where the rich and the noble prevail more in quality, than they fall short in quantity, there an oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy in like manner may be of different species, according to the nature of the oligarchical party which prevails. Every legislator in framing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in the middle rank of life;[1] for whether he intends an oligarchy, they should be the object of his aim; or whether a democracy, he ought to win these over to the laws. But whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or at least over one of them, it is possible to find stability in the constitution; for there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the other. But if any seek to fix the administration on a wider basis, they will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their distrust of each other. It is moreover allowed, that an arbitrator is the most proper person for both parties to trust to; and the middle class serve as an arbitrator.

The middle rank to be consulted,

as being a διαιτήτης.

Those too who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken, not only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in misleading the common people; for in length of time, out of unreal goods real evils must needs arise; for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state than those of the poor.

CHAP. XIII.

THERE are five particulars, in which, under fair pretences, they deal craftily with the rights of the people; and these are their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With regard to their public assemblies; in having them open to all, but in fining the rich only, or a far larger sum, for not attending: with respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not

Points in which the rich cajole the poor.

[1] This would seem, for instance, to have been the distinguishing feature in the legislation of Solon at Athens, and of king Servius at Rome.

granting this indulgence to those who come up to the census; with respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for non-attendance, but the poor not at all; or those a great deal, and these very little, as was done in the laws of Charondas. In some places every citizen who is enrolled, has a right to attend the assemblies and to try causes; and if they do not do so, a very heavy fine is laid upon them; that through fear of the fine, they may avoid being enrolled, and that through not being on the roll, they need not serve in the assembly or the courts. The same spirit prevails with those who regulate their bearing arms, and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if they have no arms, but the rich are fined; and the same method takes place if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, for there is no penalty laid on the one, but there is on the other: in order that the rich may be led to keep the one, and attend the other, while the poor, through fear of the penalty, do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances of oligarchical legislators. But contrary devices prevail in a democracy; for there they make the poor a proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give the rich nothing for so doing; and hence it is evident, that if any one would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one would share it, whereas at present the polity is in the hands of one part only. The citizens of a free state ought to consist of those only who bear arms: with respect to their income, it is not easy to determine exactly, and to say that it ought to be so much: but keeping quality in view, it is fit to make the franchise as extensive as possible, so that those who share in it shall out-number those who do not; for those who are poor, although they partake not of the offices of the state, are willing to live quietly, provided that no one disturbs them in their property. But this is not an easy matter; for it may not always happen that those who are at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time of war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity except they have provisions found them; but when they are provided, then indeed they are willing to fight. In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms, but also in those who have borne them.

The devices of a democracy.

Extension of the franchise.

Among the Malienses, the state was composed of these latter only, for to all the offices they elected soldiers who had served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded those where kingly power was established, were governed by the military. First of all they were governed by the horse,—(for at that time the strength and excellence of the army depended on the horse, as the heavy-armed foot were useless without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known to the ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse:) —but as the cities grew larger, and depended more on their foot-soldiers,[1] greater numbers partook of the freedom of the state; and for this reason, what we call republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments were properly oligarchical and monarchical; for on account of the few persons in each state, they had but a small number of the middle rank; so that being but few, and used to subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed. We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others different from those of which we have treated; (for there are more species of democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms;) as also what are their differences, and whence they arise; and besides this, we have shown which is the best form, at least in general; and which of the others is best suited for particular people.

Gradual rise of the power of the foot-soldiers.

CHAP. XIV.

Let us now again proceed to make some reflections, both general and particular, upon each form of government in due order, beginning with those principles which appertain to each. Now in all states there are three particulars, in which the careful legislator ought well to consider what is expedient to each form of government; and if these are in a proper con-

General remarks on polities.

Three points to be considered.

[1] Compare Thirlwall, History of Greece, i. ch. 8. "The strength of the Spartan army lay in its heavy-armed infantry; and no other service was thought equally worthy of the free warrior, because none called forth courage and discipline in the same degree. Hence little value was set on the cavalry; and though in the Peloponnesian war it was found necessary to pay greater attention to it, it never acquired any great efficacy or reputation."

dition, the state must necessarily prosper; and according to the variation of each of these, one state will differ from the other. The first of these is the assembly for public affairs; the second, the officers of the state; (that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be invested, and in what manner they should be appointed;) and the third, the judicial department. Now it is the proper business of the public assembly[1] to determine concerning war and peace, to make or break off alliances, to enact laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now these powers must necessarily be all intrusted to the citizens in general, or all of them to some, whether it be to one magistrate or to more; or different ones to different magistrates, or some to all, but others to some only. Now that all should be intrusted with all offices, is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at such an equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn and not all together, as was done by Telecles the Milesian in his state;[2] (for in other states the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates who meet together, and they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of tribes, wards, and by other small distinctions, till each goes through them;) and to provide that the whole community shall not meet together, except to enact new laws, or on some matter of state, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose. Another method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the comitia, of making laws, of determining concerning war or peace, and of inquiring into the conduct of the magistrates, while the remaining part of public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and

1. The ἐκκλησία.
2. The officers of state.
3. The judicial department.
The public assembly considered.
One method (democratical).
A second method.

[1] Upon the whole subject of the ἐκκλησία, or public assembly, at Athens, the reader will do well to consult that article in the Dictionary of Grecian and Roman Antiquities: as also Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. ii. chap. 11.

[2] Nothing is known to be recorded of Telecles the Milesian, "De Telecle Milesio aliunde non constat." (Goëttl.)

are chosen out of the whole community, by vote or by ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet for the choice of magistrates, and to examine into their conduct, and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances; but to leave all other things to the magistrates whoever happen to be chosen, and whose particular employments are such as necessarily require persons well skilled in them. A fourth method is for every person to meet and deliberate upon every subject, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, but only give their opinions first; and this is the method according to which the most pure democracy is carried on, which, we say, is analogous to the proceedings in a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy. These methods, then, are all democratical. But when the power is in the hands of part of the community only, it is an oligarchy; and this also admits of sundry varieties; for whenever the officers of state are chosen out of those who have a moderate fortune, and they are more in number, owing to the lowness of the standard, and when they do not alter that line which the law has laid down, but carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible, certainly the state is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of government from its moderation. And when the people in general do not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for that purpose, who govern according to law, as in the previous case; this also is an oligarchy. But when those who have the deliberative power elect each other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. But when different persons determine on different things, as when all decide matters of war and peace, and inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and while other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some things are decided by officers chosen by vote, and others by officers chosen by lot, out of the people in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if both the votes and the lots are open to all, that state is partly an aristocracy, and partly a free government itself. These, then, are the methods in which the de-

Third method.

Fourth method.

When the constitution is oligarchical.

When it is aristocratical, or tending to a free state.

liberative power is vested in different states, and each of them follows the distinctions laid down above.

Assemblies serviceable to a democracy.

It is advantageous, however, to a democracy in the pure sense of the word now-a-days, (by which I mean a state wherein the people at large have a supreme power even over the laws,) with a view to holding frequent public assemblies, to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; (for they fine those who are appointed to try causes, if they do not attend, and the poor in a democracy are rewarded for their attendance;) I say it is advantageous to the people to do the same in their assemblies; and their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the citizens with the nobles, and the nobles with the citizens. It is also advisable to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks, to take part in the council. It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject the greater part of them by lot. In an oligarchy they should either raise some of the common people to the council, or else, as is done in other states, establish a court of officers called a Provisional Committee, or Guardians of the Laws,[1] whose business it is to propose first what they shall afterwards enact. By this means the people will have a place in the administration of public affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose any thing contrary to it; or

How to act in an oligarchy as to assemblies.

[1] The term *πρόβουλοι* is often used in a looser sense, as applicable to any body of persons appointed to consult or take measures for the benefit of the people. In this sense the word is applied to the delegates sent by the twelve cities of Ionia to attend the Panionian assembly, (Herod. vi. 7,) and to those sent by the Greek states to the Isthmus (vii. 172). But the word is also used, like *νομοφύλακες*, to denote an oligarchical body, in whom the government of a state was vested, or who exercised at least a controlling power over the senate and popular assemblies. Such a body would seem to have existed at Megara, where, although democracy prevailed at an earlier period, the government became oligarchical before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. (See above, book iv. 12.) A body of men, ten in number, were appointed at Athens, at the expiration of the Sicilian war, to act as a committee of public safety under this title. They are mentioned by Thucydides (viii. 1).

they may give their advice, while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to follow a contrary practice to what is established in some democracies; for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning, but the cause should be referred back again to the magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in some republics; for the power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is always referred to the people at large. And thus let it stand determined concerning the deliberative power, and that which is supreme in the state.

CHAP. XV.

The choice of magistrates considered.

We now proceed to discuss the choice of magistrates; for this branch of public business contains many different parts, as to how many there shall be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how long each shall continue in place; (for some make it six months, others less, others for a year, others for a much longer time;) or whether they shall be perpetual, or for a long time, or neither; and also whether the same person may fill the same office several times, or may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once; and also with respect to the appointment of magistrates, from whom and by whom they should be chosen, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly to be able to distinguish as many different ways as may be followed; and then to show which of these is best suited to such and such governments. Now it is not easy to determine whom we ought properly to call a magistrate: for a government requires many persons in office; but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place; for these are to be considered as a very different body from civil magistrates: to these we may add the choragi,[1] and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are elected. There are too some civil em-

A magistrate defined, practically.

[1] The choragus was the person on whom fell the burden of one of the recurring (ἐγκύκλιοι) λειτούργιαι, called choragia, and was the person selected by the state to be its representative. He had to provide and to maintain the chorus, and to procure a χοροδιδάσκαλος, or teacher, whom he paid for instructing the choreutæ.

ployments which belong to the citizens; and these are either when they are all engaged on one business, as when as soldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are engaged, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and also some economic; for they often elect inspectors of the corn-market; others are servile; and for these, if they are rich, they employ slaves. But to speak simply, those are most properly called magistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or who decide causes, or are in some command; the last more especially, for to command is somewhat peculiar to magistracy. But, to speak the truth, this question is of no great practical consequence;[1] for as yet no decision has been given between those who dispute about the term. It admits indeed another speculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary to the being of a state, and how many, and what, though not necessary, may yet be advantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful controversy with respect to all states in general, as well as to small cities.

Whether one office should be given to more than one person.

In extensive governments indeed it is possible and proper too to allot one employment to one person; as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society, where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in office but once. And indeed every thing is better done which has the whole attention of one person, than when that attention is divided amongst many. But in small states it is necessary that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for, owing to the scantiness of their numbers, it is not convenient that many of them should be in office at the same time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small states too sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as large ones; but the one often want the same magistrates, but this happens in the others but once only in a long time; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each other; and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be necessary to make offices like a spit and candlestick in

[1] *οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τας χρήσεις*, as opposed to *πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν*, i. e theoretically and scientifically viewed. In other words, they do not differ for all practical purposes, and though distinguishable from each other they are not divisible

one. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every city, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we could then the better infer what different offices it is fitting to assign to one magistrate. It is also fitting to know what tribunals in different places should have different things under their jurisdiction, and also what things should always come under the cognizance of the same magistrate; for instance, as to decency of manners, whether the clerk of the market[1] shall take cognizance of it in the market, and another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate every where: or whether a distinction shall be made of the fact, or of the parties; as for instance, whether there shall be one judge of all decency, or one when a man is concerned and another when a woman.

What course is to be followed in different kinds of states.

Further also, in different states, shall the magistrates be different or the same in kind? for example, in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, shall the same officers have the supreme power, though not chosen from equals, or shall it be different in different governments; as in an aristocracy the officers of the state are allotted to the educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the freemen? Or shall the magistrates be different, as the communities differ? For it may happen that the very same magistracy may be sometimes proper, sometimes otherwise: in one state it may be necessary that the magistrate have great powers, in another but small. There are also certain magistrates peculiar to certain states; as the provisional committee is not proper in a democracy, but a senate is; for some order is necessary, whose business shall be to consider and prepare the bills beforehand, that the people may have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are

[1] The Agoranomi, or clerks of the market, were public functionaries in almost all the Greek states, whose occupations corresponded for the most part with those of the Roman ædiles. At Athens their number was ten; their principal duty was to inspect the market, and to see that all laws relating to it were duly observed. They had the power of inflicting summary punishment on all persons convicted of cheating, especially in the case of using false weights and measures; and on foreigners they had the right of inflicting corporal chastisement, for which purpose they would seem to have carried in their hands a whip, as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. Acharn. 688.

few in number, the state inclines to an oligarchy The provisional committee indeed must always be few, so that it is peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both these offices in the same state, this office is superior to that of the senator, the one having only a democratical power, the other an oligarchical. And indeed the power of the senate is lost in those democracies in which the people meet in one public assembly and take all the business into their own hands. And this is likely to happen when the community in general are either in easy circumstances or paid for their attendance; for they then have leisure often to meet together and determine every thing for themselves. A magistrate to control the boys[1] or women, or who takes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy, but not in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from appearing in public? Neither is such a magistrate met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And thus much for this subject at present; but we must endeavour to treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now they differ from each other in three ways, from which, when blended together, arise all the varieties of necessity. The first of these differences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment. And each of these three differ in three ways; for either all the citizens collectively, or some out of their whole

The *παιδόνομοι* and *γυναικόνομοι*, where necessary.

Three points of distinction.

Each of these again happen in three ways.

[1] The *παιδόνομος* at Sparta was a magistrate who had the general superintendence of the education of the boys. His office was held in very high esteem, and he was always chosen from the noblest citizens. He had to make a general inspection of the boys, and to punish those who were negligent and idle: those who were refractory he might even bring before the Ephors. The *γυναικόνομοι* were Athenian magistrates who superintended the conduct of Athenian women. There were no such officers at Sparta; whence arose perhaps the laxity of the women, (*γυναικῶν ἄνεσις,*) to which our author in the first book of his present treatise attributes such serious consequences. Some think that they were first instituted by Solon, but that their powers were afterwards extended so as to include the control of men as well, and of repressing all excesses and indecencies committed in private society. They would appear to have been ministers of the court of Areopagus, and in this capacity to have taken care that decency and moderation were observed in private as well as in public life.

body, or some out of a particular order in it, may appoint, according to fortune, nobility, or merit, or some other rule—(as at Megara, where the right of election was with those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of arms)—and this either by vote or lot. Again, these several modes may be differently formed together; as for instance, some magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole; some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision. For either all may elect all by vote, or by lot; and when all elect, they may either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot by all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all, others by the lot of all; there will then be twelve different methods of electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of these there are two forms adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote, or by lot, or by both; that is to say, some of them by lot, and some by vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: but to choose by lot is most suitable to that form of government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates should be chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, and those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not corre-

Or, combined.

Which form best in a democracy.

Which in a polity.

Which in an oligarchy.

Which in an aristocracy.

spondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons by vote. So many then are all the different ways of electing magistrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be established, and with what powers, shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers of a magistrate, such a province as the management of finance or the position of a guardian; for different magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of the army differs from the clerk of the market.[1]

CHAP. XVI.

The judicial department considered.

Of the three parts of a government, it remains to consider the judicial;[2] and this also we shall divide in the same manner as before, into three parts. And there are three points of distinction; of whom the judges shall consist, and for what causes, and how chosen. When I say of whom, I mean whether they shall be the whole people, or some individuals; by for what causes, I mean, how many different kinds of courts there shall be; and by how, whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine, how many different kinds of courts there ought to be. Now these are eight: the first, is the court of judicial scrutiny; the second, one to punish those who have injured the public; the third, to take cognizance of those causes in which the state is a party; the fourth, to decide between magistrates and private persons who appeal from a fine laid upon them; the fifth, to determine dis-

Eight different kinds of courts.

[1] See note above on the *ἀγοράνομοι*, p. 161.

[2] For an adequate explanation of the import of the terms *δικαστής* and *δικαστήριον*, the reader is referred to Smith's Dictionary of Grecian and Roman Antiquities. It is as well to add, that at Athens the Dicasts were elected by lot to their duties in the Heliastic courts; and that the conditions of eligibility were, that the individual should be, 1stly, a free citizen; 2ndly, in actual enjoyment of the franchise, in other words, not *ἄτιμος*; and 3rdly, at least thirty years of age. It is to be observed that Aristotle here tacitly approves the principle on which the Heliastic courts were founded, and that in fact the division here given is mainly based upon it.

putes which may arise concerning contracts of great value; and besides these there must be courts to judge between foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different species. And these may all be tried by the same judges or by different ones; for there are murders of malice prepense, and of chance-medley; there is also justifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, but the legality of it disputed. There is also a fourth, called at Athens the court of Phreatto,[1] which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has run away, to decide whether he shall be allowed to return; but such affairs happen very seldom, and then in large cities; the seventh court is to determine causes wherein strangers are concerned, one part if cause is between stranger and stranger, and another if between a stranger and a citizen. Over and above all these there is a court for small actions, ranging from one drachma to five, or a little more; for these ought also to be legally determined, and not to be brought before the whole body of the judges. But let us set aside these matters, both actions for murder, and those wherein strangers are the parties; and let us particularly treat of those courts which more particularly relate to the affairs of the community, and which, if not well conducted, occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, either all persons, appointed by vote or by lot, must judge of all these different causes, or all must judge of all causes, some of them chosen by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by lot. Thus there will be four modes of appointing judges. There will be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the people only; for again, either the judges of all causes must be chosen out of that part by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote; or some courts which have cognizance of the same causes must be formed partly by vote, and partly by lot; by which means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned. Besides, the same may be joined together; I

Four ways of appointing judges.

[1] Probably so called from its position, as being near a well or reservoir ἐπὶ φρεάτι. The Heliastic courts were many in number; and this was one of the five courts which had cognizance of matters of blood, and in general of all graver cases. The other four were the courts ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ, ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ, ἐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ, and that of the Areopagus.

mean that some may be chosen out of the whole people, or from part of them, or from both; as, for instance, in the same court, some of the judges may be chosen from all the people, others from a part only, and this either by vote, or by lot, or by both. And thus we have said how many sorts of courts it is possible to form. Of these appointments, that which admits all the community to be judges in all causes is most suitable to a democracy;[1] the second, which appoints that certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third, which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or a free state.[2]

Which mode is best suited to a democracy, an oligarchy, and an aristocracy.

BOOK V.[3]—CHAP. I.

What tends to preserve and destroy states.

WE have now nearly gone through all those particulars of which we proposed to speak; it remains that we next consider from what causes, and how many, and of what kinds, a change arises in governments, and what tends to the destruction of each state; as also from what form a polity is most likely to shift into another form, and what are the preservatives both of governments in

[1] "A further application of the same democratic principle of legal equality, which is the basis of democracy, was as much as possible to increase the number, and to abridge the duration and authority, of public offices, and to transfer their power to the people in a mass." Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 10.

[2] Although, theoretically, an aristocracy and a polity differed in principle, yet nevertheless in practice they would often approximate very closely, even if they did not become to some extent identical. For example, as Thirlwall remarks, "when the census or pecuniary standard of citizenship was high, and especially if it was fixed from the produce of land, the constitution differed little in effect from the aristocratic oligarchy, except as it offered to those who were excluded a prospect of raising themselves to a higher rank." (Vol. i. ch. 10.)

[3] This and the following book Gillies regards as supplemental to the rest; and accordingly in his translation, or rather paraphrase, he places them last in order, and calls them books vii and viii.

general, and of each state in particular; and what are the means of saving each form of government from corruption. And here we ought first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all of which approve of what is just and equal according to analogy,[1] and yet fail of attaining to it, as we have already mentioned. Thus democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in any one thing, are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal in liberty, they think themselves equal in every thing else; and oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing, are unequal in all; for they deem that when men are unequal in point of fortune, there can be no equality between them. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are equal with others endeavour to secure an equality with them in every thing; and those who are superior to others, endeavour to get still more; and it is this *more* which keeps the inequality. Thus though most states have some notion of what is just, yet they are almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not that share in the administration which answers to its expectations, it becomes seditious. But those who of all others have the greatest right so to act, are least disposed to do it, namely, those who excel in virtue; for it is most reasonable that they alone should be generally superior to the rest. There are too some persons of distinguished families, who, on account of that point of superiority, disdain to be on an equality with others: for those esteem themselves noble who can boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune; and these, to speak the truth, are the source and fountain-head from whence seditions arise. Accordingly, changes of government take place in two distinct ways; for at one time they raise seditions for the purpose of changing the state already established to some other form; as when they propose to erect an oligarchy instead of a democracy, or a democracy or free state in place of an oligarchy; or an aristocracy in place of these, or one of the latter instead of an aristocracy; and at another time without reference to the established government, which they wish to be still the same,

A principle laid down.

Two kinds of equality.

How states have come to fail of obtaining their end.

Desire of equality or superiority.

[1] For a further account of this relative justice, the reader is referred to the Nicomach. Ethics, book v., especially chaps. 3 and 7.

though they choose to have the sole management of it themselves, either in the hands of a few, or of one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree of power to be established; as, for instance, if the government is an oligarchy, and in the same manner if it is a democracy, to have it more purely so, or else to have it less so: and, in like manner, in the case of the other forms of government, changes arise either to extend or contract their powers, or else to make some alterations in some parts of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy; as some persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, and king Pausanias, that of the Ephors. Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the Phylarchs[1] they established a senate. It is also still necessary for all the magistrates at Athens to attend in the court of Heliæa[2] when any new magistrate is created: the power of the one Archon,[3] also, in that state partook of the nature of an oligarchy. Inequality is always the occasion of sedition, but among those who are not equal, an unequal treatment is not unfair. Thus kingly power is unequal when it is exercised over equals. Upon the whole it is this aiming after an equality which is the cause of seditions. But equality is two-fold, for it is either in number, or in desert. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or the same quantity; but equality in value is attained by proportion, as three exceeds two and two exceeds

Desire of carrying out the constitution to the furthest lengths.

Spirit of change.

Inequality another cause.

[1] See note on book iv. chap. 10.

[2] For some further notice of the courts of the Heliæa at Athens, see note on book iv. chap. 16, and compare Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iii. chap. 5, and the various references there given. The word ἡλίαια, according to Hesychius, is the same word with ἀλία, the usual name of a public assembly in the Doric states. This is the name by which the Spartan assembly is mentioned in Herodotus, vii. 134.

[3] "After the death of Codrus, the nobles, taking advantage perhaps of the opportunity afforded by the dispute between his sons, are said to have abolished the title of king (βασιλεύς), and to have substituted for it that of archon (ἄρχων). This change, however, seems to have been important, rather as it indicated the new and precarious tenure by which the royal power was held, than as it immediately affected the nature of the office. It was still held for life . . . . The archon was deemed a responsible magistrate, which implies that those who elected him had the power of deposing him." (Thirlwall, History of Greece, vol. ii. chap. 11.)

one by the same number; but by proportion four exceeds two and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four as one is of two, that is to say, they are halves. Now all agree as to what is absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said, they dispute concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in one respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all. Hence chiefly there arise two sorts of governments, democracy and oligarchy; for nobility and merit are to be found only amongst a few;[1] but their contraries, amongst the many; as there is not one man of nobility and merit in a hundred, but many without either are every where. But to establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is wrong; as is made clear by the example of those so established; for none of them have been stable. And the reason of this is, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in principle should not at last come to a bad result; and therefore in some things an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, the few in power conspiring either against each other, or against the people; but in a democracy, men conspire only against the few who aim at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of where the people have raised a sedition against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than to an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.

Neither principle of equality should prevail exclusively.

CHAP. II.

But since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions in governments, we must assume in general the first principles and causes of them. Now these, so to speak, are much about three in number; these we must first distinguish in outline from each

Three causes of sedition.

[1] Compare the words of Juvenal, (Sat. xiii. l. 26,) "Rari quippe boni;" and those of Æacus in the Ranæ of Aristophanes, (l. 783,)

ὀλιγον τὸ χρηστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε.

other, and then endeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition, and for what causes; and, thirdly, who are the sources of political troubles and mutual quarrels.

1. Under what circumstances men are seditious.

Now, the fact that they are thus or thus disposed towards a change in government, must be laid down as one cause, and is one which we have already mentioned. For some raise seditions through desire of equality, if they see those whom they esteem their equals possessed of more than they have themselves; others do the same by not being content with equality, but aiming at superiority, if they think, that while they deserve more than their inferiors, they have only an equal share with them, or less. Now, they may pursue their aim either justly or unjustly; justly indeed when those who are inferior raise sedition for the sake of equality; unjustly, when those who are equal do so for superiority. We have then mentioned the situations in which men will be seditious; but the causes for which they will be so are profit and honour, and their contraries; for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by fines, either on their own account or that of their friends, they are apt to raise commotions in the state. The sources and causes of commotions which dispose men in the way which we have mentioned, if we take them in one manner, are seven in number, but in another they are more. Now two of these are the same with what have been already mentioned, but they act in a different manner; for on account of profit and honour men rouse themselves against each other, not to get the possession of them for themselves, (as was said above,) but at seeing others, some justly, and others unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, envy of those whose fortunes are beyond their rank. There are also other things which in a different manner occasion revolutions, as contention, neglect, want of numbers, and too great disparity of circumstances.

2. For what reasons. (Final cause.)

CHAP. III.

The various causes of sedition considered.

Ill-treatment.

It is almost self-evident what influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how they are causes of sedition; for when the magistrates are haughty and grasping, they not only raise

seditions amongst each other, but against the state also which gave them their power; and this their avarice has two objects, either private property, or the property of the state. What influence belongs to honours, and how they may occasion sedition, is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary to his deserts, but justly when according to them. Excessive honours are also a cause of sedition, when one person or more are greater than accords with the state and the power of the government; for then a monarchy or a dynasty are usually established. On this account the ostracism[1] was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though it is better to guard against such excess of honours in the founding of a state, than to correct it afterwards when it has been permitted to take place. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of sedition through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an injury, that they may prevent it before it is inflicted; as was the case at Rhodes,[2] when the nobles conspired against the people, on account of the decrees which they expected would be passed against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have no share in the administration; for they fancy that they are superior. The rich also, even in democracies, thinking lightly of the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better themselves by the same means; as happened at Thebes, after the battle of Oenophyta,[3] where through bad administration the democracy was destroyed; as it was at Megara,[4] where the power of the people was lost through

Profit.

Honours.

Guilt.

Anticipation of injury.

Contempt.

[1] For a detailed account of the practice of ostracism at Athens, see note on book iii. chap. 13. At Syracuse a similar proceeding was styled Petalism.

[2] See the other allusion to Rhodes, a few lines below. Compare also below, (chap. 5,) the reference to the same state, where mention is made of *αἱ ἐπιφερόμεναι δίκαι*. All three passages refer to the same occasion in the opinion of Müller. But see Goëttling's note.

[3] Compare Thucyd. i. 108.

[4] The allusions here made to the internal history of Megara, Syracuse, Tarentum, and other Dorian states, will be made clear by a reference to Müller's Dorians, vol ii. chap. 9.

anarchy and disorder. The same thing happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelo, and at Rhodes before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in the state also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists of many parts, it ought to increase in due proportion, in order to preserve its symmetry, which will otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot were to be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might otherwise be changed into an animal of a different form, if it were to increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition of parts. So also a city consists of parts, one of which may often increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum a little after the Persian wars, where so many of the nobles were killed in a battle by the Iapyges, that from a free state the government was turned into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were killed in Hebdoma[1] by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several husbandmen[2] to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the unfortunate event of the war by land, the number of the nobles was much reduced by being chosen into the troops[3] in the war with Sparta. Revolutions also sometimes take place in a democracy, though more seldom; for where the poor increase faster than men of property, the state becomes an oligarchy or dynasty. Governments also sometimes alter without seditions: by petty contention, as at Heræa: for which purpose they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and thus got the contentious parties chosen: and by negligence, as when the citizens admit to state offices men who are not friends to the constitution: an event which happened at Orus, when the

Disproportionate increase.

Accident.

Governments changed without seditions;

[1] *ἐν τῇ Ἑβδόμῃ.* The meaning of these words is not quite certain. It is clear that the ancients were equally in the dark; some of them thinking that Aristotle here refers to the day on which the fight took place; others, again, that he alludes to the number slain, which according to Plutarch was 777. Perhaps the simplest interpretation is to suppose that the grove, which Herodotus mentions (vi. 78) as the scene of the encounter, may have been called Hebdoma, just as other places were called Trité and Tritæa. This is Goëttling's view of the subject; see his note.

[2] *τινες τῶν περιοίκων.* The *γυμνῆτες*, or lowest order, are here meant.

[3] Compare Thucyd. vi. 31; viii. 24.

oligarchy of the archons was suppressed at the election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a democratic free state. Moreover they change by little and little; and I mean by this that very often great alterations silently take place in the form of a government, when people overlook small matters; as at Ambracia, where the census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. A state also composed of different nations is liable to seditions until their differences are blended together; for as a city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every given time. For this reason all those republics which have hitherto been originally composed of different people, or have afterwards admitted their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable to revolutions; as when the Achæans joined with the men of Trœzen in founding Sybaris; for soon afterwards, the former grew more powerful than the Trœzenians, and expelled them from the city; (hence the Sybarites became under sentence of a curse;) and again, disputes from a like cause happened at Thurium, between the Sybarites and those who had joined with them in building the city; for claiming all the country as their own, they were driven out in consequence. And at Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The men of Apollonia[1] on the Euxine, having admitted their sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions; and the Syracusans, after the times of their tyrants, having enrolled strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens,[2] quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater part of them driven out of the city by them.

and gradually;

by diversity of race.

Historical examples.

[1] Apollonia was the only colony of the Corinthians that lay to the east of Greece. Its inhabitants were ordered by the Athenians to throw down their walls shortly before the Peloponnesian war.

[2] Compare Herod. vii. 156

Further causes. Fancied injustice.

Many persons occasion seditions in oligarchies, because they think themselves ill used in not sharing as equals in the honours of the state with their equals, as we have already mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because they have only an equal share with others who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion disturbances in the state, when the ground is not well adapted for one city; as at Clazomenæ, where the people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with those who lived in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians.[1] At Athens too the disposition of the citizens is not the same; for those who live in the Piræeus are more attached to a popular government than those who live in the city. For as the interposition of a rivulet, however small, breaks the lines of the phalanx, so any trifling disagreement becomes the cause of seditions. The greatest disagreement perhaps then lies between virtue and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in order, one difference being greater than another; and one of these is that which we have mentioned.

Local situation.

CHAP. IV.

BUT seditions in governments do not arise concerning little things, but from them; for men quarrel concerning something of moment. Now trifling quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences, when they arise between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the case with the Syracusans at a remote period: for a revolution in the government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other, who was a friend of his, seduced his mistress; he in his turn took offence at this, and persuaded his friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this they persuaded the whole city to take part either with the one or the other, and caused a complete rupture. Every one therefore at the beginning of such disputes ought to take care to avoid the consequences, and to smother up all quarrels which may arise

Great effects from trifling quarrels. Historical examples.

[1] Compare Thucyd. iii. 34.

amongst those in power; for the mischief lies in the beginning; for the beginning is said to be "half of the business,"[1] so that what was then but a little fault, will be found to bear its full proportion to errors in the other parts. Moreover, disputes between men of note involve the whole city in their consequences; as in Histiæa, after the Persian war, where two brothers had a dispute about their paternal estate; he who was the poorer, because the other had concealed some effects and some money which his father had found, engaged the popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of fashion. And at Delphi,[2] a quarrel about a wedding was the beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for a bridegroom there, being terrified by some unlucky omen, waited upon the bride, but went away without marrying her; in resentment for which her relations put some sacred money into his pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as a sacrilegious person. At Mitylenè also a dispute which arose concerning heiresses, was the beginning of great evils, and of a war with the Athenians, in which Paches[3] took their city; for a man of fortune named Timophanes left two daughters, and Doxander, being outwitted in procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and excited the Athenians against them, as he was a public guest of the city.[4] There was also a dispute at Phocæa concerning an heiress between Mnaseas the father of Mneson, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus; and this strife brought upon the Phocæans the sacred war. The go-

[1] See Zellius on Aristotle's Nicomach. Ethics, p. 39.

[2] Upon the constitution of Delphi, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9, sub finem.

[3] See Thucyd. iii. 2.

[4] Πρόξενος. Hospitality in ancient Greece was divided into *ξενία* and *προξενία*, respectively corresponding to the *hospitium privatum* and *publicum* of the Romans. This *προξενία* might exist either between two states, or between an individual or family on the one hand, and a state on the other. Of the latter kind was the *hospitium* existing between the family of the Pisistratidæ on the one hand, and the state of Sparta on the other. (See Arnold's note on Thucyd. ii. 29, and Göller's note on Thucyd. iii. 70.) Upon the honours and privileges enjoyed by a proxenus at the hands of the state with which he had formed that tie, the reader will do well to consult the very complete account contained in the Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities, Article *Hospitium*.

vernment of Epidamnus[1] too was changed from a marriage quarrel; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage, the father of the young man to whom she was contracted, being Archon, punished him; whereupon, in resent for the affront, he seditiously joined himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government.

Into what form governments may change.

A government may be changed either into an oligarchy, a democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any one part of the city, acquire great credit, or are increased in power; as the court of Areopagus[2] at Athens, which, having procured great credit during the Persian war, added firmness to the administration; and, on the other hand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the victory at Salamis,[3] by their power at sea got the lead in the state, and strengthened the popular party. And at Argos,[4] the nobles, having gained great credit by fighting the battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, endeavoured to

The Areopagus.

Growth of the popular power at Athens.

[1] Upon the constitution and history of Epidamnus, see Thucyd. i. 24, etc., and Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9, where the reader will also find information concerning the changes in the constitutions of Argos and Syracuse, mentioned below.

[2] "The venerable character," says Thirlwall, "of the court of Areopagus, seems to have determined Solon to apply it to another purpose; and . . . . to erect it into a supreme council, invested with a superintending and controlling authority, which extended over every part of the social system." It was the main anchor of the state against democratical influences. "The nature of its functions rendered it scarcely possible precisely to define their limits; and Solon probably thought it best to let them remain in that obscurity which magnifies whatever is indistinct." (vol. ii. ch. 11.) On its consequent aristocratical character, it would be needless to speak. The reader who desires further information will do well to consult the Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities. Upon the rise of the Athenian ἀρχή, as the immediate effect of the bravery shown by that state in the Persian wars, and of the policy of Themistocles in strengthening her maritime power, see Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. ii. chap. 16. Compare Thucyd. book i. chaps. 89—97.

[3] B. C. 480.

[4] "After the Persian war, Argos, which had previously been under a dynasty of the Heracleid family, became a democracy. When Argos began to aspire to the leadership of Greece after the peace of Nicias, it appointed a council of twelve, with full power to treat with such Greek states as would be willing to join them. It was natural however that this oligarchic body should endanger the democracy, which they over-

dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse, as the victory in their war with the Athenians was owing to the common people, they changed their free state into a democracy; and at Chalcis, the people having destroyed the tyrant Phoxus together with the nobles,[1] immediately seized the government; and at Ambracia also, the people, having expelled the tyrant Periander with his party, brought round the supreme power to themselves. And this in general ought not to be forgotten, that whosoever has been the real occasion of a state being powerful, whether private persons, or magistrates, a tribe, or any part of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, they become a cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or else on account of the dignity they have acquired, they themselves will not be content with their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions, when those parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach close to an equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be worth notice. For if the one party is so much more powerful than the other as to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the danger: for which reason those who are superior in merit never are the cause of seditions; for they are too few for that purpose when compared to the many. In general, then, the beginnings and causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and revolutions in them are brought about in two ways, either by violence or fraud; and if by violence, then either at first, or by compelling them afterwards to submit. They may also be brought about by fraud in two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived, willingly consent to an alteration in

Seditions arise in states when the middle class is small:

and from violence or fraud.

threw in concert with the Lacedæmonians after the battle of Mantinea, (B. C. 418,) having first put the demagogues to death. Their dominion however only lasted eight months, as an insurrection and battle within the city deprived them of their power, and reinstated the democracy; a change which Alcibiades afterwards completed by the expulsion of many of the oligarchs who still remained in the state." Compare Thucyd. v. 81—84.

[1] οἱ γνώριμοι, more generally known at Chalcis under the title of Hippobotæ. See Herod. v 77, with Baehr's note.

their government, but are afterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as for instance, when the four hundred[1] imposed upon the people, by telling them that the king of Persia would supply them with money for the war against the Lacedæmonians; and after they had been guilty of this lie, they endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are at first persuaded, and afterwards consent to be governed. By one or other, then, of the methods above mentioned, all revolutions in governments are brought about.

CHAP. V.

Whence seditions arise in a democracy.

We ought now to inquire separately into the events which will arise from these causes in each species of government. Democracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly by informing against men of property, and partly by rousing the common people against them, they induce them to join together, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies unite:—and this is what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island of Cos,[2] for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes,[3] the demagogues distributed bribes, and so prevented the people from paying the Trierarchs what was owing to them; and the latter were obliged by the number of actions brought against them, to conspire together and destroy the popular state. The popular state too was overthrown at Heraclea,[4] soon after the settlement of the city, by the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but afterwards the exiles banded together and returned, and overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscations, kept on driving out the nobles, until the number of those who were

Historical examples.

[1] Concerning the four hundred, see Thucyd. viii. 48, and following chapters: and Aristoph. Acharn. l. 103.

[2] For the allusions to Cos, Rhodes, Heraclea, Megara, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9.

[3] See above, note on chap. 3.

[4] Generally called, from its situation, Heraclea Pontica.

banished became considerable; and those returned and got the better of the people in a battle, and so established an oligarchy. The like happened at Cyme, during the time of the democracy which Thrasymachus destroyed; and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive that revolutions have arisen from the same causes. For often, to curry favour with the people, they drive the nobles to conspire together, either by dividing their estates, or by obliging them to spend them on public services, or by publicly impeaching them, that they may be able to confiscate the fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, whenever the same person was both demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and indeed most of the ancient tyrants were once demagogues. And there is a reason why such was the case at that time, but not now; for at that time the demagogues were of the soldiery; (for they were not as yet powerful by their eloquence;) but now that the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers lead the people;[1] but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as tyrants, if we except one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common than now, because great powers were more often intrusted to some magistrates then than now; (as to the Prytanes[2] at Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;) and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great extent, and the people in general lived in the country, employed in husbandry, the leaders of public affairs, if they had a turn for war, tried to make themselves tyrants. All this they did as soon as

The generals superseded by demagogues.

Tyrannies more frequent in ancient times, and why.

[1] In the later period of Athenian history, so paramount was the influence of oratory, and consequently of the demagogues, but the great generals frequently retired after successful campaigns, not to Athens, but to some parts of Egypt or Asia Minor. Thus Conon retired to Cyprus, Iphicrates to Thrace, Chares to Sigeum, Chabrias to Egypt, Timotheus to Lesbos.

[2] πρυτάνεις. "Officers called by this name were often intrusted with the chief magistracy in several states of Greece, as Corcyra, Corinth, and Miletus, (Wacksmuth, 1. i. 184,) and the title is sometimes synonymous with βασιλεῖς or princes, having apparently for its root the word πρῶτος or πρότατος. At Athens in early times, the Prytanes were probably a magistracy of the second rank in the state, next to the Archon, acting as judges in various cases, probably in conjunction with him, and sitting in the prytaneium." Dict. of Gr. and R. Ant.

they had gained the confidence of the people; and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediæans:[1] and of Theaganes in Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he had seized those who kept them by the rive-rside. Theagenes also, on account of having accused Daphnæus[2] and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a tyranny, for in consequence of these enmities, the people trusted him as a man of popular principles.

How a popular government becomes an ochlocracy.

Governments also alter from their ancient democratic form into one entirely new; for where magistrates are elected without a fixed income, and the election is with the people, the aspirants for office,[3] to flatter them, endeavour with all their power to make the people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which democracies are liable, and the causes from whence they arise.

CHAP. VI.

How changes arise in oligarchies. 1. By ill-treatment of the poor.

THERE are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a revolution in an oligarchy; one is, if the people are injuriously treated; for then every person is a ready champion of sedition, and more particularly if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis,[4] at Naxos, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this happened in Massilia,[5] and Ister, and Heraclea, and

2. By exclusion of the rich.

[1] See Herodot. i. 59, and Thucyd. ii. 55, 56

[2] See Diodor. Sic. xii. 91.

[3] *σπουδαρχιῶντες*. Compare Arist. Acharn. lib. 595, where Dicæopolis, in answer to the inquiry of Lamachus as to who he is, replies,

—— *πολίτης χρηστὸς, οὐ σπουδαρχίδης*.

[4] See Herod. i. 61, 64.

[5] For an account of the foundation of Massilia, see Herodotus, book i. chap. 166

in other cities. For those who had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes, till they were admitted to it; first the elder brothers, and then the younger also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the same time; in others, the elder and younger brother. In the first of these cities, the oligarchy verged upon a free state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, from being in the hands of a few, it came to consist of six hundred. At Cnidos,[1] the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles who quarrelled with each other because the government was in the hands of so few; (for there, as we have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not be; or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only;) for the people, taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the victory: for a government torn by seditions is weak.[2] And formerly at Erythræ, during the oligarchy of the Basilidæ, although the state flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because they were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so few, the people changed the form of government. Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in office therein, as well as from the quarrels of the leaders of the people. Demagogues are of two sorts; the one flatter the few when they are in power: for even among the few there are demagogues; such were Charicles and his followers at Athens,[3] who had great influence over the Thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus[4] over the Four Hundred. The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians[5] at Larissa, who flattered the

3. By quarrels among the rulers.

[1] Cnidos was a close aristocracy, or rather an oligarchy: at the head of the state was a council of sixty, chosen from the nobles, with powers almost identical with those of the Gerusia at Sparta: its members held office for life, and were irresponsible (*ἀνυπεύθυνοι*). Owing to the fact, that one only out of each family could be elected, some of the excluded members joined the popular faction, and the oligarchy was overthrown, probably but a very short time before the life of Aristotle, according to the opinion of Müller.

[2] "A house divided against itself, falleth." Matt. xii. 25.

[3] Compare Lysias contra Eratosth. p. 125.

[4] Compare Thucyd. viii. 68 and 90.

[5] It is uncertain to what period in the history of Larissa Aristotle here refers. The *πολιτοφύλακες* would seem to have been certain magistrates,

When this will happen.

people, because they were elected by them. And this will always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos. And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power, the demagogues favour the people in their causes, and so overturn the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus. And also when some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for those who endeavour to support an equality, are obliged to apply to the people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions, when the nobility spend their fortunes in luxury; for such persons are desirous of innovation, and endeavour either to be tyrants themselves, or to support others in becoming so, as Hipparinus supported Dionysius of Syracuse.[1] And at Amphipolis one named Cleotimus collected a colony of Chalcidians, and when they came, he set them to quarrel with the rich: and at Ægina, a certain person who brought an action against Chares, attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they try to raise commotions, sometimes they rob the public; whence they quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour to detect them; as was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the members of an oligarchy agree among themselves, the state is not very easily destroyed from within itself. Pharsalus is a proof of this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great power from the prudent use to which they turn it. An oligarchy also will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy within it; that is, when the management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, but unequally

4. By luxury.

5. By raising another oligarchy within it.

who exercised a superintendence over the admission of freemen, and were elected out of the whole body of the people; and hence they were led to court the people in a way unfavourable to the interests of the aristocracy. Goëttling, speaking of these offices, says that they seem to have resembled the *δημιουργοί* at Larissa, who may possibly be alluded to in book iii. chap. 2. See note above on that passage; and compare Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, vol. i. p. 438.

[1] On this passage, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9. It is to be observed that Cicero (De Republicâ iii. 31) denies that Syracuse, in the reign of Dionysius, was a Respublica at all.

divided, and when all of the few do not partake of the supreme power. This happened once at Elis,[1] where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a very few, and fewer still gained places in the senate, which consisted of but ninety, who held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to maintain a dynasty, like that of the senate at Lacedæmon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because, through a distrust in the citizens, the government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and the man to whom they give the command of the army often assumes the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth;[2] and if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably establish a dynasty among themselves; and sometimes, through fear of this, they let the people in general have some share in the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of confidence in each other, they will intrust the guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, a thing which happened at Larissa, when the Aleuadæ had the chief power at Samos.[3] The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, among which the party of Iphiades was one. Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy, if one party overbears and insults the other, or from their quarrelling about law-suits or marriages. How their marriages, for instance, will have that effect, has been already shown; and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the

6. By personal contests.

[1] In Elis the government resembled that of Sparta, and the Gerusia formed a very important part of the constitution. It consisted of ninety members, who were chosen for their lifetime from oligarchical families; but in other respects the election was the same as at Sparta, and therefore they were chosen by the whole people. There was also a larger council of six hundred, (see Thucyd. v. 47,) which may have been an aristocratical committee, selected from the popular assembly. Thus much is clear, that the power of the people was very limited; and that, as Aristotle here says, there was one oligarchy within another. Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 6.

[2] This must have been about the year B. C. 345. The tyranny of Timophanes was but a short interruption of the oligarchy in this city: he was put to death by Timoleon.

[3] Since, according to Herodotus, (vi. 130; vii. 6,) the Aleuadæ were princes of Thessaly, and not of Samos, some editors have suggested as the true reading here, *οἱ περὶ Ἰάσονα*, or *οἱ περὶ Σῖμον*. See the note of Goëttling.

oligarchy of the knights on account of a marriage quarrel. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's being found guilty of adultery; the punishment indeed which Eurytion suffered from the men at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies eagerly contended to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many oligarchies too have been destroyed by disaffected persons in the state, owing to their too despotic spirit: as the oligarchy at Cnidos, and at Chios. Changes also may happen by accident, in what we call a free state, and in an oligarchy, wherever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen according to a certain census. For it often happens, that what was fixed as the highest census suitable to that time, so that a few only could have a share in the government in an oligarchy, and those of moderate fortunes only in a free state, becomes so little as the city grows rich through peace or some other happy cause, that every one's fortune rises to many times the amount of the census, and so the whole community partake of all the honours of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little, and insensibly approaches, and sometimes more quickly. These are the revolutions and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into governments of a contrary form, but into other forms of the same government; as, for instance, from democracies and oligarchies which place the supreme power in the law, they come to vest it in the ruling party, and the contrary.

7. By being too despotic.

8. By accident.

CHAP. VII.

How seditions arise in an aristocracy. 1. By paucity of numbers.

COMMOTIONS also arise in aristocracies, partly because there are so few persons in power,—(a fact which, as we have already said, shakes oligarchies, because in a certain sense an aristocracy most nearly approaches to an oligarchy; for in both these states the administration is in the hands of a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though it is herein that an aristocracy seems to be oligarchical):—and these will neces-

sarily be most likely to happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited, as thinking themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedæmon, called the Partheniæ,[1] (for these were descendants of citizens,) who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were sent as colonists to Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, but to whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander, who was disgraced by the kings:[2] or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus, was chief mover of a conspiracy against the Spartans. And also when some are too poor, and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war; as was the case at Lacedæmon, about the time of the Messenian war. This is proved by a poem of Tyrtæus, called Eunomia; for some persons being reduced by war, desired that the lands might be divided. They arise also when some person of very high rank might still be higher if he could rule alone, which seems to have been the case of Pausanias at Lacedæmon, when he was their general in the Persian war, and that of Hanno[3] at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed by a departure from justice in the administration itself; the cause of this evil at first is the want of a due mixture of the democratic and oligarchic principle in a free state; and in an aristocracy from these causes, and also on account of merit; but chiefly from the former two, I mean, the undue mixture of the democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two things are what all free states, and many of those which we call aristocracies, endeavour to

2. By disgrace of great men.

3. By injustice.

[1] Παρθένιαι. Children born after marriage, but before the husband brought his bride into his own house, according to Müller, (Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. ch. 4,) were called by this name. They were in general considered in all respects equal to those born at home; but in the first Messenian war, particular circumstances seem to have made it impossible to provide them with lots of land; and hence they became the founders of Tarentum.

[2] For the account of Lysander, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. ch. 9.

[3] See the learned disquisition of Cluzius on Aristotle's statements concerning the constitution of Carthage, p. 200, etc.

Why a free state is more stable than an aristocracy.

blend into one. For aristocracies differ from what are called polities in this, the one form is less stable, and the other more so: for that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state. And on this account the latter is more secure than the former; for the greater power is the stronger, and men are more content to live where they have equality. But the rich, if the community gives them rank, often endeavour to insult and to tyrannise over others. On the whole, whichever way a government inclines, towards that it has a tendency to settle, each party supporting their own men. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an aristocracy, an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into a democracy, (for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take part with the contrary side,) and a free state into an oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys the equality which befits his merit, and fully possesses what is his own.

When a state may be called stable.

And that of which I have been speaking happened at Thurium; for the magistrates being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a lower one; and they were subdivided into more courts, but because the nobles possessed all the land, contrary to law; for the state was too much of an oligarchy, so that they were able to encroach on the people; but the people, being well inured to war, so far got the better of their guards, as to drive out of the country every one who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as all aristocracies are free oligarchies, their nobles are apt to grasp at too much power; as at Lacedæmon, where property is now in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they please, and to make such alliances as they please. Thus the state of the Locrians[1] was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; and this would not have happened in the case of a democracy or a well-tempered aristocracy. But aristocracies chiefly approach to a secret change through being destroyed by degrees, as we have already said of all governments in general. And this happens because changes are caused by something which is trifling; for when-

A change in an aristocracy generally gradual.

[1] Compare Diodor. Sicul. xiv. 44.

ever they throw aside any thing which in the least regards the state, afterwards they more readily change something else of a little more consequence, until they subvert the whole government. This happened in the state of Thurium; for as there was a law that its citizens should serve as soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs, and imagining that they could easily gain their end, first endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it declared lawful that the same person might continue in the military, perceiving that the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates appointed to this matter, who are called counsellors,[1] first joined together with an intention to oppose it, but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that, if that law was not repealed, they would permit the management of all other public affairs to be in their hands; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to restrain some from making fresh changes, they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or from without; from without, when a state whose policy is contrary to their own, is near, or even at a distance, if it has great power. This happened in the case of both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians; for the one every where destroyed the oligarchies, the other the democracies. What then are the chief causes of revolutions and of dissensions in governments, has been pretty accurately stated.

Governments destroyed from within, or from without.

CHAP. VIII.

It follows next that we consider the means of preserving both governments in general, and each state in particular. In the first place, then, it is evident, that if we are right as to the causes of their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for things contrary produce contrary effects; but destruction and preserva-

How governments are preserved.

[1] *σύμβουλοι*. The meaning of the term in this passage must not be confounded with the officers of the same name at Athens, who were assessors (*πάρεδροι*) to the three chief Archons.

Danger of neglecting lesser matters.

tion are contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires much care to watch that nothing be done contrary to law: and this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence; for a small transgression comes on with secret step, just as in a family small expenses when often repeated consume a man's income. For the understanding is deceived thereby, as it were by this sophism,[1] "if every part is little, then the whole is little." Now, this in one sense is true, but in another it is false, for the whole and all the parts together are large, though made up of small parts. This first step therefore in any matter is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place, no credit ought to be given to those arguments which are composed to deceive the people; for they are confuted by facts. But what we mean by the sophistical devices of states, has been already mentioned.

How a government is rendered stable.

You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government, but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them, and by introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office, and by never harshly disgracing those who are desirous of honour, or injuring the multitude for the sake of gain; towards themselves and those who have a share, by behaving justly towards each other. For that equality which the favourers of a democracy seek to establish in the state, is not only just, but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank. And for this reason, if the administration is in the hands of the many, several rules

By making the terms of office short.

which are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one continue in office longer than six months, so that all of the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort of democracy, for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up amongst them, as we have already mentioned. Besides, by this means both aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted into dynasties. And this, because

[1] This is the well-known fallacy of "Compositio et Divisio." See Whately's Logic, book iii. section 11.

it will not be easy for those who are magistrates for a short time, to do as much mischief as they could in a long time; for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one and the despots in the other, or else this is done by the chief magistrates when they are long in power. Governments are preserved, not only by having the means of their corruption at a great distance, but sometimes also by its being very near them; for those who are in continual fear, keep a stricter hand over the state;[1] for which reason it is necessary for those who have the care of the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they may preserve it, and not to be remiss in protecting the state, as a night watch, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain by law the quarrels and disputes of the nobles, as well as to prevent those who are not already engaged in them, from taking a part in them: for to perceive an evil at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or free state, on account of the census, if that happens to continue the same while the quantity of money is increased, it is useful to take a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the census is taken yearly, in larger communities once in three or five years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it was at the time when the census was first established in the state, let there be a law either to extend or contract it accordingly, if it increases making the census many times larger, and if it decreases, smaller. For if this latter be not done in oligarchies and free states, a dynasty is apt to arise in the one, an oligarchy in the other: if the former be not done, a free state will be changed into a democracy, and oligarchies into free states or democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one

By being very far from, or near to, the means of corruption.

By continual revision of the census.

By checking excessive honour,

[1] Compare the phrase of Thucyd., (ii. 13,) *τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν*.

acquire a rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour to confer moderate honours for a continuance, than great ones for a short time; (for the latter spoil men, and it is not every one who can bear prosperity:) but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours which were conferred all at once, be all at once taken away, but rather by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the law, that no one shall have too much power, by means either of his fortune or of his friends; but, if he has, for his excess therein, let it be contrived that he shall be removed from the country.

and excessive power.

Now, as many persons stir up seditions that they may enjoy their own manner of living, there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of all those whose lives are contrary to the interests of their own state, whether it be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any of the other forms of government. For the same reason, watch should be kept in turn over those who are most prosperous in the city; and the means of remedy for this is by appointing those who are in the opposite scale to the business and offices of the state. By opposite I mean, men of character and the common people, the poor and the rich. It is well also to blend both these into one body, and to increase the numbers of the middle ranks; and this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of condition. But above all, in every state, it is necessary, both by the laws and every other method, that matters be so ordered as to shut out venality from state offices; and this ought particularly to be studied in an oligarchy. For then the people will not be so much displeased when excluded from a share in the government—(nay, they will rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs)—as if they suspect that the officers of the state steal the public money; then indeed they grieve on two accounts, because they are deprived both of state honours and of profit. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an aristo-

By keeping watch over the citizens.

By increasing the middle rank.

By excluding venality.

Way of blending an aristo-

[1] The allusion is to honourable banishment.—An instance in point would be that of Pompey, who was sent out to clear the sea of pirates, as a pretext, but in reality because the citizens were afraid of his influence at Rome.

cracy at the same time, if any one should choose to form such a state;[1] for it would be possible to admit both the rich and the poor to enjoy what they desire. For to admit all to a share in the government, is democratical; but to reserve offices for the rich is aristocratical. This will be done by allowing no public employment whatsoever to be attended with any emolument; for the poor will not desire to be in office when they can gain nothing by it, but had rather attend to their own affairs; the rich however will choose it, as they want nothing which belongs to the community. Thus the poor will increase their fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be delivered out openly in the face of all the citizens, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in the different wards, tribes, and divisions. But, as the magistrates execute their offices without pay, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich should be protected, not only by not permitting their lands to be divided, but not even the produce of them, which in some states is done imperceptibly. It would be also better if the people would prevent them, when they offer to exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive entertainments[2] of plays, torch-races, and the like. But in an oligarchy it is necessary to take great care of the poor, and to allot them public employments which are profitable; and, if any of the rich insult them, to let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own

cracy and a democracy together.

[1] An instance of this, perhaps, may be found in the Roman state as soon as the commonalty attained their full rights and privileges. The same might be said of Athens, with some limitation, as in fact it is said by Plato in the Menexenus, (ch. viii.,) Καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι ᾧ ἂν χαίρῃ· ἐστὶ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. Βασιλεῖς γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡμῖν εἰσὶν, οὗτοι δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκ γένους τότε δὲ αἱρετοί. Ἐγκρατὲς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος· τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς διδοῦσι καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς ἀεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἶναι.

[2] Upon the λειτουργίαι, both encyclic and extraordinary, see the article on that subject in the Dictionary of Greek and Rom. Antiquities, as also the note above on book iii. 6, and iv. 15. The λαμπαδαρχία here mentioned was the superintendence of the λαμπαδηφορία, one of the five ordinary or encyclic Liturgies. See also Boeck, Public Economy of Athens, ii. 199, etc., and Hermann, Pol. Antiq. § 161, etc.

rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not by gift; and not to permit the same person to have more than one; for by this means property would be more equally divided, and a greater part of the poor would rise into better circumstances.

By studying equality among the citizens.

It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy, to allot those who take less part in public affairs, an equality, or a preference in other things, (as to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy,) except the principal offices of state; but to intrust these only, or mostly, to those who are statesmen.

CHAP. IX.

Qualifications of a statesman.

THERE are three qualifications necessary for those who intend to fill the first departments in government; first of all, an affection[1] for the established constitution; in the second place, abilities wholly equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state in which they are placed; for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there must be different species of it. There may be some doubt, when all these qualifications do not meet in the same person, in what manner the choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is an accomplished general, but a bad man, and no friend to the constitution, while another is just, and a friend to it, how ought the choice to be made? We should then consider, of two qualities, which of them the generality possess in a greater, and which in a less, degree. For this reason, in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than his character, as the more uncommon quality; as fewer men partake of military skill than of virtue: but, to protect the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these require greater virtue than that which the generality possess, but mere knowledge is common to all. It may be questioned, if a man has abilities for statesmanship, and is well affected to the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since

Of the choice of a general;

of that of a statesman.

[1] Compare Thucyd. ii. chap. 60, where Pericles lays claim to the possession of εὔνοια, φρόνησις, and ἀρετή, the three causes of ἠθικὴ πίστις according to Aristotle. See Rhet. ii. 1.

these two things alone are sufficient to render him useful to the public? But it is of use, because those who possess the above qualities are often deficient in prudence; for, as men often neglect their own affairs, though they know them, and love themselves, so nothing will prevent them from being disposed towards the commonwealth in the same manner. In short, whatever is contained in the laws, and which we allow to be useful to states, all contributes to preserve the state; but its principal support (as has been often urged) is to secure that the number of those who desire to preserve it shall be greater than of those who wish to destroy it. Above all things, one must not be forgotten, though it is forgotten by many governments which are now corrupted, namely, the mean. For many things which seem favourable to a democracy, destroy a democracy, and many which seem favourable to an oligarchy, tend to destroy it. Those who think this the only virtue, extend it to an excess; for they do not consider that as a nose which varies a little from perfect straightness, either towards being aquiline or flat, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at, but that still if any one extend this variation too far, first of all the properties of the part itself will be lost, till at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking—that thus, I say, it is with other parts of the human body. So also the same thing is true with respect to the other states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may vary somewhat from their most perfect form, and yet be well constituted; but if any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will make the government worse, but at last he will bring it to no government at all.[1] The lawgiver and the politician, then, should know well what preserves and what destroys the democracy of the people or the oligarchy of the few; for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue without both rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of circumstances prevails, the state must necessarily become of another form; so that those who destroy these laws [2] which

He should regard the middle class.

He should study what preserves a state.

[1] See above note on book ii. chap. 5.

[2] *τοὺς νόμους*. See Goëttling's note, where he defends this reading against the proposed emendation, *χαίροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις*.

authorize an inequality, destroy the government. Errors are also made both in democracies and oligarchies: in democracies, when demagogues make the common people superior to the laws; for thus, by setting them at variance with the rich, they divide one city into two; whereas they always ought to incline to speak in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, the oligarchic party should speak in favour of the people. The oaths also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary, and openly to signify in their oaths that they will not injure the people. But of all things hitherto mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is, what is now most despised, to educate children with reference to the state; for the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of no service, if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that form is by law established; or an oligarchy, if it be an oligarchy. For if there is such a thing as incontinence in an individual, there is also in a city. But to educate a child in a way fitting to the state, is not to do such things as will gratify those who have the power in an oligarchy, or who desire a democracy, but to do those things whereby they will be able to conduct respectively either of these forms of governments. But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up delicately, and the children of the poor are made hardy with exercise and labour; so that they are both desirous of change, and able to promote it. In democracies of the purest form a method is pursued which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is that they define freedom wrongly. Now, there are two things which seem to be the limits of a democracy, that the people in general are supreme, and enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to be equal, and it is just that what the people determine should be supreme. Now, their freedom and equality consists in every one's doing as he pleases. So that, in such a democracy every one

Education of the young a great preservative.

And to be directed towards the good of the state.

What true liberty is.

may live as he likes; "as leads his bent,"[1] to use the words of Euripides. But this is wrong, for no one ought to think it slavery, to live in conformity with government, but protection. The causes, then, of corruption in different states, and the means of their preservation and continuance, to speak simply, are such as we have related.

CHAP. X.

Of monarchy.

It now remains that we speak of monarchy, the causes of its corruption, and the means of preserving it. And indeed almost the same things which have been said of other governments are incident to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a kingdom partakes of the nature of an aristocracy; but a tyranny is formed from the worst species of oligarchy and democracy. For this reason it is the most injurious to its subjects, as being composed of two bad forms, and retains all the corruptions and the defects of both these states. Now the source of these two kinds of monarchy arises from principles contrary to each other: for a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort of people against the multitude, and a king is appointed out of the better sort, who are chosen either for their superior virtue, and actions flowing from virtuous principles, or else from their superiority of noble descent; but a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest populace, as an enemy to the higher class, that the common people may not be oppressed by them. And this is clear from experience. For the generality of tyrants were indeed mere demagogues, who gained credit with the people by inveighing against the nobles. Some tyrannies were established in this manner, when the cities were already considerably enlarged; others, before that time, by kings who exceeded their hereditary power, from a desire of governing despotically; while others were founded by those who were elected to the superior offices of state; (for formerly the people appointed officers for life to be at the head of civil and religious affairs;) and some were

A tyranny embodies two bad principles.

Who tyrants are; and how they gain their power.

[1] This reference to Euripides is uncertain at the best. Aristotle may possibly be referring to Iphig. in Aul. l. 1017,

εἰ γὰρ τὸ χρῆζον ἐπίθετ' οὐ τοὔμὸν χρεὼν
χωρεῖν.

founded by the oligarchs, who chose one out of their body, with the supreme power over the highest magistrates. By all these means it was easy to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at hand, because they were either kings, or else in possession of the honours of state.

Historical examples.

Thus Pheidon[1] at Argos and others became tyrants, having enjoyed originally the kingly power; while Phalaris,[2] and others in Ionia, from holding state honours. Panætius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired their tyrannies by having been demagogues. A

How monarchies are gained.

kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to private worth, or character for virtue, or rank, or beneficent actions, or to these joined with power. For all persons have gained this power as having benefited cities and states, or as being able so to do; some by preventing a people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, and some by freeing them from it, as Cyrus; or by having founded cities or colonized a country, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and the Molossians. A king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may suffer no wrong, and that the people in general may live free from injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the common good, except for his own advantage. His only object is pleasure, but that of a king is virtue. A tyrant therefore is ambitious of engrossing wealth, but a king rather of honour. The guards too of a king are citizens, but those of a tyrant

Symptoms of a tyranny.

are foreigners. That a tyranny contains whatever is bad both in a democracy and an oligarchy is evident; from an oligarchy it has gain for its end, (for thus only will the tyrant be sure of the continuance of his guards and his luxuries;) and it puts no confidence in the people, and therefore deprives them of the use of arms: it is also common to both an oligarchy and a tyranny to persecute the people, and to disperse the population. It borrows

[1] Pheidon of Argos must not be confounded with Pheidon the Corinthian legislator, who is mentioned in book ii. chap. 5. For the history of this Pheidon, see Müller's Dorians, vol. i. book i. chap. 7, § 15.

[2] For the history of Phalaris at Agrigentum, see Müller's Dorians, book iii. chap. 9, note.

from a democracy its quarrels with the nobles, and the fact that it destroys them publicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and an obstacle to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies, as the one party desires to govern, and the others are not willing to be slaves. Hence the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus to take off the tallest stalks,[1] hinting thereby, that it was necessary from time to time to make away with the most eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already said, to account for the changes which are incident to a monarchy, from the same causes which produce them in other states; for it is on account of injury, terror, and contempt, that many of its subjects conspire against a monarchy. But of all wrongs, injurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose; sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes. The dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same; for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are desirous to obtain. Of plots, some aim at the life of those who govern, but others at their government. Those formed on account of injury aim at their persons. Injury may be owing to many causes, and either of these is a sufficient cause to excite anger; and most of those who are led by anger join in a conspiracy, for the sake not of their own advancement, but of revenge. Thus the plot against the children of Pisistratus arose from the fact that they affronted the sister of Harmodius, and insulted him also;[2] for Harmodius resented the injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius. A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because while drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him if he were as yet with child by him. Philip[3] too was slain by Pausanias, for permitting him to be affronted by Attalus, as was Amyntas the Little, by Dardas, for insulting him on account of his age; and the Eunuch,[4] by Evagoras the Cyprian, for in revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him, he slew him as having been injured by him.

The same causes destroy a monarchy as destroy other states.

Historical examples.

[1] Herod. i. ch. 20.

[2] The story is told by Herodotus (book v. ch. 55, etc.); compare Thucydides (vi. 54).

[3] See Diodor. Sicul. xvi. 93.

[4] Ibid. xv 47

And many attacks have been made on tyrants owing to some such personal insult offered by them, as that of Cratæus[1] on Archelaus; for his familiarity always disgusted him; so that even a small pretext became a sufficient plea, namely, that he did not give him one of his daughters to wife, as he had promised. For being entangled in a war against Sirrha and Arrhabæus, he gave his elder daughter to the king of Elimæa, and his younger to the son of Arnagentas, thinking that he would thus have less strife with the son of Cleopatra. But the real origin of his estrangement was his disgust at certain familiarities. And Hellanocrates of Larissa joined with him in his attack for the same reason; for when, in his intercourse with him, he did not fulfil his promise, he thought that the intercourse took place as an act not of affection but of insult. Parrhon and Heraclides of Ænos, too, slew Cotys, in order to be revenged for the injury offered to their father; and Adamas revolted from Cotys, considering that he had been insulted; for he had been castrated by him when a boy.

Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes, through resentment have either killed or conspired against their injurers, even when they were in office and in possession of royal dynasties; as, at Mitylene, Megacles joined with his friends and killed the Penthelidæ, who used to go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times, Smerdis killed Penthilus, for whipping him and permitting his wife to drag him by the feet. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against Archelaus, for he was the first to urge others to the assault: the occasion of his resentment was his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for Euripides was greatly offended with him, for having said something of the foulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired against for such reasons as these. In like manner through terror: for terror is one of the causes mentioned above, and this as well in monarchies as in other states. Thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through fear of being accused to him about Darius, whom he had hung without his orders, supposing that he would obtain pardon, and that the king would forget the matter, on account of the splendid banquet which he gave him. Some kings have been killed through contempt; as some one conspired against Sar-

[1] Compare Plato, Alcib. ii. 7

danapalus, having seen him spinning with his women, if the story be true which historians relate of him; but if it is not true of him, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired against Dionysius the Younger, because he saw his subjects desirous of the deed, and that he himself was always drunk. And even some of a man's friends will do this if they despise him; for from being trusted by him, they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king somehow or other through contempt; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the danger, on account of their strength, they will readily attempt it. Thus generals at the head of an army will endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages,[1] despising both his manner of life and his forces; because the latter were inactive, and his life effeminate: thus Seuthes the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus,[2] conspired against him. Sometimes men enter into conspiracies, on account of more than one of these reasons, as through contempt and desire of gain; as Mithridates conspired against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, on this account of all others most frequently engage in sedition; for strength and courage united inspire great bravery: when therefore these join in one person, he will be ready for conspiracies, as he will easily conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through ambition, have a different motive in view from what we have already mentioned; for they do not attack tyrants as some do, seeing before them great gains and vast honours; it is not thus that any of those who conspire through ambition engage in the dangerous enterprise, but the others do so for the aforesaid reason, while these engage in this, as they would in any other noble action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished among others, and so destroy a tyrant, not wishing to gain a tyranny, but renown. No doubt the number of those who act upon this principle is very small, for we must suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed; and they must embrace the opinion of Dion, (which few can do,) when he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said,

[1] See Herodot. book i. ch. 127—129.
[2] Compare Xenoph. Anab vii. 2.

that let the advantage he made be ever so little, it would satisfy him to have gained it; and that should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in his country, he should think this death glorious. A tyranny also is exposed in one way to destruction, just as each of the other states are, from without, if there be some hostile power superior to it. For it is evident that th wish to subvert it will exist, owing to the opposition of prin ciples, and all who can, will carry into effect what they desire. And some states are opposed to others, as a democracy to a tyranny; as says Hesiod,[1]

A tyranny destroyed by external violence;

"Potters with potters clash;"

for the extreme of a democracy is a tyranny; a kingly power is opposed to an aristocracy, from their different forms of government. For this reason the Lacedæmonians destroyed very many tyrannies; as did the Syracusans, during the prosperity of their state. And in one way they are destroyed from within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a revolution, as that which happened to Gelo, and lately to Dionysius; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who flattered Gelo's son, and urged him to lead a life of pleasure, that he might govern himself; but the family joined together, and endeavoured to support the tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those of them who combined together seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first expelled him, and afterwards was killed. As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to conspire against tyrannies, namely, hatred and contempt, one of these, namely, hatred, seems necessarily to belong to tyrants, but contempt also is often the cause of their destruction. For though, for instance, those who have raised themselves to the supreme power, have generally preserved it, still those who have received it from them, to speak the truth, almost immediately all lose it; for, by falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon grow despicable, and offer many opportunities to conspirators. Part of their hatred we may very fitly ascribe to anger; for in some cases it becomes their motive to the same

and from within.

[1] See Op. l. 25.

actions; for it often urges them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater vehemence against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under the direction of reason. But it happens that persons especially yield to this passion on account of injury; a matter which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratids and of many others. But hatred is still more powerful; for anger is accompanied with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free from grief. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction of a pure and unmixed oligarchy, and of an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for these are distinct forms of tyranny. But a kingdom is very seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason it is generally very stable; but it has the greatest number of causes of subversion within. Of these, two are especial causes; the one, when those who share in the regal power excite a sedition, the other, when they endeavour to establish something more like a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them. A kingdom, indeed, is never erected in our times, but rather monarchies[1] and tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its power is supreme in great matters: but now a days many are equal, and there are none in any respect so much better than others as to be qualified for the greatness and dignity of government over them. On this account, then, these equals will not willingly submit to be commanded; but if any one assumes the government, either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny. But in the case of hereditary kingdoms, we must add one cause of destruction to that which we have mentioned above; namely, that many who enjoy it are proper objects of contempt, and that they are insolent, though the power which they have gained is not despotic, but merely kingly. Such a state is soon destroyed; for a king ceases to exist if the people will not obey, but a tyrant still rules, though

Why a kingdom seldom destroyed by external violence.

Why kingdoms are seldom met with.

An additional cause of ruin to hereditary kingdoms.

[1] What Aristotle means by a kingdom, as distinct from a monarchy, is clear from this passage. The test of a kingdom is the *voluntary* submission of its subjects;

——volentes
Per populos dare jura. Virg. Georg. iv

they will not. These and other such like things are the causes of the destruction of monarchies.

CHAP. XI.

How monarchies are preserved; by due limitation.

But, to speak simply, it is clear that monarchies are preserved by means contrary to these. But to speak of each separately: a kingdom will stand by keeping the king's power within moderate bounds. For by how much the less extensive their power is, by so much the longer will their entire government of necessity continue; for they become less despotic, and more upon an equality of condition with their subjects; and on that account they are the less envied by them. It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so long, and that of the Lacedæmonians,[1] owing to the fact that their government from the beginning was divided into two parts, and also to the moderation introduced into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and especially to his establishment of the Ephors; for by taking something from the power, he increased the duration of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less but greater. As they say he replied to his wife,[2] when she asked him if he was not ashamed to deliver down his kingdom to his children less than what he had received from his ancestors; "No," answered he, "for I give it them more lasting." But tyrannies are preserved in two ways most opposite to each other, one of which is, when the power is delegated from one to the other; and in this manner most tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is conducive, as far as any thing can be, to the preservation of a tyranny, namely, to keep down those who rise too high, to take off those who are of an aspiring tone, to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nor any thing at all, but to guard against every thing which is wont to give rise to high spirits or mutual confidence; not to suffer schools or learned meetings of those who have leisure for discussion, and to endeavour by every means possible to keep all the people

Tyranny is to be preserved by the disunion of its subjects;

[1] See above, book ii. chap. 2. [2] See Plut. Lyc. 7.

strangers to each other; for knowledge increases mutual confidence;[1] and to oblige all strangers to appear in public, and to live near the city gate,[2] that all their actions may be sufficiently seen, and that by being kept like slaves they may be accustomed to be humble. In short, to imitate every thing which the Persians and Barbarians do, to support slavery; (for all their policy is the same;) and to endeavour to know what every single subject chooses to do and say, and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women whom the Syracusans called Ποταγωγίδες.[3] Hiero also used to send out listeners, wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one speaks out, there is the less chance of concealment; and to endeavour that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the rich with each other. It also suits a tyranny to reduce its subjects to poverty, that they may not be able to compose a guard, and that, being employed in procuring their daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their tyrants. The pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive edifices of the Cypselidæ, and the temple of Olympian Zeus built by the Pisistratidæ, and the works

by keeping the people poor and employed;

[1] It was for this reason that the policy prevailed so extensively with the Persians and other Eastern despots of transferring whole tribes from their original homes to another locality. The phrase expressing this is *ἀνασπαστοὺς ποιεῖν*, which occurs so often in Herodotus, as in iii. 93; iv. 204, etc. The cases of Eretria, Cyrene, Miletus, the Ionians, and the Pæonians (v. 12) are well known in profane history; not to mention the case of the Israelites in the Old Testament. With regard to the sentiment that "knowledge inspires confidence," compare the words of Butler, Analogy, Part i. chap. 3,) "If the soul be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress to a future one, ... good men may naturally unite not only amongst themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous beings in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who are endued with it *and known to each other*."

[2] See Xenoph. Cyr. vii. 8.

[3] See Plutarch Dion. 28. They were eaves-droppers and busy-bodies, who hung about the court and person of a tyrant, and reported to him the secrets and feelings of the people. The word is derived from *πόρτις* (Doric for *πρὸς*) and *ἄγω*. They were called by the above name at Syracuse only, as it would seem, but elsewhere were known as *ὠτακουσταί*

of Polycrates at Samos; for all these have the same effect, to keep the people well employed and poor.[1] It is necessary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse in the time of Dionysius,[2] who in five years collected all the private property of his subjects into his coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war, that they may have employment and may be for ever dependent upon their general. A king is preserved by his friends; but it is the part of a tyrant to place no confidence in friends, as every one desires to dethrone him, and these have it specially in their power. All those things also which belong to an extreme democracy may be done in a tyranny; as for example, the giving great licence to the women in the house, that they may reveal their husbands' secrets, and great indulgence to slaves for the same reason. For neither slaves nor women conspire against tyrants; but when they are treated with kindness, both of them are of necessity favourers of tyrants and to extreme democracies; and the people too in such a state desire to rule alone. For which reason, flatterers are in repute with both; the demagogue in the democracy, for he is the proper flatterer of the people; and among tyrants, the man who will servilely bend to them; for this is the business of flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love bad men, for they rejoice in being flattered, a thing to which no man of a liberal spirit will submit; for the virtuous love others, but they flatter none. Bad men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like,"[3] as the proverb says. A tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he thinks that no one deserves these names but himself; for he who supports his own dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as

[1] The Cloaca Maxima at Rome, built under the tyranny of the Tarquins, would be another example in point; as also the vast sepulchre of Alyattes in Lydia, mentioned by Herodotus, i. 93.

[2] It is probable in the opinion of Coraës, that there is some latent mistake here; for in his Economics (ii. 1) Aristotle predicates this of Cypselus, not of Dionysius, and speaks of ten years and not five as the period. See however Goëttling's note, in which he defends himself for not agreeing with the above view.

[3] See Eustath. ad Il. p. 126, where this passage is quoted from Aristotle

destructive to their government. A tyrant also should rather admit strangers than citizens to his table and familiarity, for the latter are his enemies, but the others have no design against him. These and such like matters are marks of a tyranny, and tend to preserve its power, for it has no lack of villany. But all these things, so to say, may be comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens shall be of abject dispositions; for men of abject spirits never would conspire against any one. The second is, that they shall have no confidence in each other; for while none feel confidence in themselves, the tyrant is safe from overthrow. For which reason they are always at enmity with men of merit, as hurtful to their government; not only because they scorn to be governed despotically, but also because they are trustworthy towards themselves and towards others, and because they will not inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that they shall be without the means of doing any thing; for no one undertakes what is impossible for him to perform; so that without power a tyranny can never be destroyed. [These then are the three objects to which the wishes of tyrants incline; for all their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these ends, that their people may have neither mutual confidence, nor power, nor boldness of spirit.][1] Such, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies, the other proceeds in a way nearly contrary to what has been already described; and it may be discerned from considering the causes which destroy a kingdom: for as one cause of that lies in bringing the government nearer to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in making the government more nearly like that of a king; taking good care of only one thing, namely, the power; that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, shall submit to it; for if he once lose this, his tyranny is at an end. This, then, must be kept as the foundation, but in other particulars the tyrant ought partly to act and partly to affect to seem like a king; first, by appearing to pay attention to what belongs to the public, and

by preferring strangers to citizens.

The three objects of a tyrant.

Another method of preserving a tyranny;

by affecting the style of a king.

[1] Schneider, Coraës, and Goëttling all agree in considering these lines as a spurious addition by some grammarian of a later date.

not making such profuse presents as will offend the people, while the money is taken out of the hard labour of their own hands, and given in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and actors; as also by keeping an exact account both of what they receive and pay, a practice which some tyrants ere this have followed, though ruling on this plan they seem rather masters of families than tyrants; nor need a tyrant ever fear lest he shall lack money, while he have the supreme power in his own hands. It is also much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom, to go without money, than to leave behind them the money which they have hoarded; for their regents will be much less desirous of making innovations; and these guardians are more to be dreaded than the citizens by tyrants while absent: for some of the citizens go out with him, but these regents are left behind. He should also endeavour to appear to collect taxes and to require public services only for purposes of the state, that whenever they are wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care that he appear to collect and keep them, not as his own property, but as that of the public. His appearance also should not be harsh, but noble, so that those who meet him shall look on him with veneration rather than with fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is easily despised. If, therefore, he will not study to acquire any other virtue, yet he ought to aim at political ability, and at impressing on others that opinion of himself. He should also take care not to appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty towards the young of either sex, neither himself, nor any of those who are about him: and not to permit the women of his own family to treat others haughtily, for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many tyrannies. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to act apart, directly contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not only continually indulge themselves in them from early morning, and for many days together, but they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of their conduct, that they may admire them as happy and fortunate. But the tyrant ought especially to be moderate in these, and, if not, at least to appear to others to avoid them; for it is not the sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard; not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct

The private character of a tyrant.

in general should also be contrary of almost all that is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant. Moreover, he ought always to seem to pay particular attention to the worship of the gods, for from persons of such a character, men entertain less fears of suffering any thing contrary to the law, while they suppose that he who governs them is religious and reverences the gods;[1] and they will be less inclined to raise seditions against such a tyrant, as one who has the gods on his side: but this must be so done as to give no suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also show such respect to men of merit in any line, that they shall not think that they could be more honoured, if their fellow-citizens were members of a free state. He should also distribute all such honours from himself, but every censure should come through other officers and the courts of law. It is also a common preservative of all monarchies not to make one person too great; but if any, then more than one; for they will act as a guard upon each other. If however it is necessary to intrust any large powers to one person, then he should take care that he be not one of an ardent spirit; for such a disposition is upon every opportunity most ready to rebel; and, if it should seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, it is well to do it by degrees, and not to reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all kinds of insolence, more particularly from corporal punishment, and from wanton conduct towards young men. And especially must he be careful in this respect with regard to men of honour; for as those who love money are touched to the quick when any thing affects their property, so are men of honour and principle when they receive any disgrace. Therefore a tyrant ought either never to employ personal punishment, or if he does, he should let it be only in a paternal manner, and not with insult. His intercourse too with young men should arise from amatory causes and not from authority; and upon the whole he should atone for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and guarded against, who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so that they can but destroy him;

A tyrant should abstain from acts of violence.

[1] *δεισιδαίμων*. See Acts, chap. xvii. 22.

they ought therefore to beware of those who think either themselves affronted, or those who are dear to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge, regard as nothing their own persons; for, as Heraclitus[1] says, it is dangerous to fight with an angry man, for he will purchase his object with his life. As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the poor, it is necessary that both these should think that they are equally protected by him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself that party which is the most powerful. For if he does this, he will have no occasion either to set free his slaves, or to deprive the citizens of their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his own will be enough to render him superior to any conspirators.—But it would be superfluous to go through all such particulars as these; for the rule of conduct which the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough; and that is, to affect the character not of a tyrant, but of a guardian and king; not the plunderer, but the protector of his subjects; and to aim at the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others; he should, therefore, associate his nobles with him, and flatter his people. For thus his government will not only be of necessity more honourable, and worthy of imitation, (as it will by ruling over men of worth, and not abject wretches, who perpetually both hate and fear him,) but it will be also more durable. Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be in accordance with virtue, or at least half good, and not wholly wicked, but only in part.

A tyrant should side with the powerful party.

CHAP. XII.

Oligarchy and tyranny of short duration.

Examples.

INDEED an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest duration. The tyranny at Sicyon, it is true, was the most lasting; for it remained in the hands of Orthagoras[2] and his

[1] See Zellius ad Arist. Eth. Nicom. ii. 3, p. 67.

[2] See Müller's Dorians, vol. i. book i. ch. 8. "In the instance of Sicyon, as in many others, the tyrant was the leader of the lower classes, who were opposed to the aristocracy. It was in this character that Orthagoras came forward, who, not being of an ancient family, was called

sons for a hundred years. The reason of this fact was, that they ruled their subjects with moderation, and were in many particulars obedient to the laws; Clisthenes too was an able general, and so never fell into contempt; and they took great care in most matters to be popular. Clisthenes, at any rate, is reported to have presented a person with a crown, who adjudged the victory to another; and some say, that it is the statue of the judge who so decided which is placed in the Agora. They say also that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned upon a charge into the court of Areopagus. The second in duration was the tyranny of the Cypselidæ at Corinth, which continued seventy-three years and six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Gordias, three years.[1] And the reason of this was that Cypselus was a popular man, and continued in his government without guards; and Periander ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an able general. The third was that of the Pisistratidæ[2] at Athens; but it was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled during his tyranny; so that out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son eighteen; so that the whole time amounted to thirty-five years. Of the rest we shall mention that of Hiero and Gelo at Syracuse;[3] but even this did not

by the nobles a cook. But, notwithstanding its low origin, the family of this person maintained a supremacy at Sicyon longer than any other; according to Aristotle, for a century; as they did not maltreat the citizens, and upon the whole respected the laws: their succession is Orthagoras, Andreas, Myron, Aristonymus, and Cleisthenes; of whom, however, the second and fourth never ascended the throne, or only reigned for a short time. This series, however, is not quite certain, as Herodotus (vi. 126) goes only as far as Andreas."

[1] In order to make the total of years agree with the duration of the reigns of the Cypselidæ, as given in the text, some editors have read ἑπτὰ instead of τρία. Others have cut out the τεττάρα after the forty years assigned to Periander: but Goëttling prefers to keep the text as it originally stood, and adduces reasons for believing that the true solution of disagreement is to be found in the fact that Psammetichus was not one of the Cypselidæ, and hence is not reckoned in the computation of Aristotle here. For an account of the Cypselid dynasty at Corinth, see Herodot. v. 92, seq., and Müller's Dorians, vol. i. book i. ch. 5, and also ch. 8, § 3.

[2] For an account of the Pisistratidæ, see Herod. book v. ch. 63, seq and Thucyd. book vi. chap. 53.

[3] For the internal history of Syracuse, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9

continue long, for both their reigns together were only eighteen years; for Gelo, having reigned seven years, died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth. Thrasybulus too was expelled in his eleventh month, and the greater part of other tyrannies have continued a very short time.

We have now gone through nearly all the general causes of corruption and means of preservation both in free states and monarchies. In the Republic of Plato[1] Socrates treats upon the changes incident to different governments; but his discourse is faulty; for he does not particularly mention to what changes the best and first form of polity is liable; for he only assigns the general cause, that nothing is immutable, but that in a fixed course of time every thing alters;[2] and that the principle of these changes is to be found in those things of which the sesqui-tertian progeny, conjoined with the pentad [and thrice increased], affords two harmonies. He says also that this happens when the number of this diagram becomes solid, in consequence of nature producing sometimes bad men and sometimes those who are made better by education.[3] And in saying this, probably, he is not wrong; for it may be that there are some persons, whom it is impossible by any education to make into good men. But why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things that exist? And with respect to time, which he assigns as the cause of the alteration of all things, we find, that things which did not begin to exist at the same time, cease to be at the

Why great men seldom arise.

Plato's cycle of governments faulty.

[1] See Plato's Rep. viii.

[2] Plato asserts, what Aristotle probably would not deny, that there is a sort of fixed cycle or *περίοδος* in all human matters, and that consequently great men, like comets, appear upon the stage of the world only at distant intervals. The same sentiment apparently is placed in the mouth of Solon by Herodotus, (i. 32,) where he says to Crœsus, *πᾶς ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφορή*, words which, as Baehr well observes, do not imply that man's life is nothing but calamity. "De fortunâ ejusque *vicissitudinibus* intelligendum esse et ipsa voculæ notio et universa hujus loci ratio docere videtur." (See Baehr's note in loco.)

[3] Upon this obscure passage, the editor has followed very closely the translation of Taylor, but he must refer the reader to the appendix to this volume for an attempted solution of the difficulties which it involves. The well-informed reader will not need to be reminded of the proverb, "Numeris Platonicis nihil obscurius."

same time; so that, if any thing came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be changed into the Lacedæmonian? for, in general, when governments alter, they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other changes; for he says, that from the Lacedæmonian form it changes into an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy into a tyranny: but yet sometimes the contrary change takes place; as from a democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect to a tyranny, he omits to say whether there will be any change in it or not, and for what reason; or, if so, into what other state it will pass. But the reason of this is, that that could not easily have laid the matter down, for a tyranny is an indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to alter into the first and most perfect form; for thus the continuity and circle would be preserved. But one tyranny often changes into another; as at Sicyon, from Myrc to Clisthenes; or into an oligarchy, as did that of Antileon at Chalcis; or into a democracy, as that of Gelo at Syracuse; or into an aristocracy, as that of Charilaus at Lacedæmon, and at Carthage. An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny: such was the rise of almost all the ancient tyrannies in Sicily: at Leontium, into the tyranny of Panætius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to suppose that a state is changed into an oligarchy, because those who are in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who are by far richer than their fellow-citizens think it unfair that men who have nothing should have an equal share in the state with themselves who possess so much; for in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is allowed, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of the poor, and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them more than to the Lacedæmonians, or to any other state where all possess not equal property, or where all are not equally

Further defects in his theory.

good? For though no one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet an oligarchy may change to a democracy, if the poor chance to outnumber the rest; and from a democracy to an oligarchy, if the rich chance to be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and the other industrious: and though these changes are owing to many causes, yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury and payment of interest; as if at first they were all rich, or the greater part of them. But this is false. The truth is, that when some of the principal rulers lose their fortunes, they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do so, nothing of consequence will follow; nor when such states alter, do they change into a democracy more than into any other form. Besides,[1] if they share not in the honours of the state, or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise seditions and bring about a revolution, although they may not squander their fortunes, that they may be allowed to do as they like: and the cause of this, as Plato says, is too much liberty. Although there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet, in treating of their changes, Socrates speaks of them as if there was but one of each sort.

The real mistake of Socrates.

BOOK VI.[2]—CHAP. I.

IT has been already shown, then, what and how great variations there may be in the supreme deliberative council of a state, and in the appointment of the different magistracies; and also as to the judicial department, what is best suited to each state; and also from what causes and sources both the destruction and preservation of governments arise.

As there are very many species of democracy as well as of

[1] ἔτι δε . . . ποιεῖν. These are to be regarded as the words of Aristotle himself, not quoting the sentiments or words of Plato, but adding his own account of the corruptions of governments, which Plato had forgotten to mention.

[2] The present book continues the subject of the changes incident to forms of government, with a recapitulation of the points which have already come under discussion.

the other states, it will not be amiss at the same time to consider any thing which remains to be said[1] concerning either of them, and to assign to them that mode of conduct which is peculiar and advantageous to each; and also to inquire into the combinations of all the different modes of government which we have mentioned; for as these are blended together, governments shift their form, so as from an aristocracy to become an oligarchy, and from a free state to become a democracy. Now, by those combinations[2] of governments which ought to be examined, though as yet we have not done so, I mean, whether the deliberative department and election of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an oligarchy, and the judicial to an aristocracy, or this and the deliberative part only like an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates like an aristocracy; or whether in any other manner every thing is not regulated in conformity to the nature of the government. We have already considered indeed what particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of the other states, what is advantageous to each. But nevertheless it is also necessary, not only to show clearly which of these governments is best for a state, but also briefly to inquire how we ought to arrange both these and the other forms of government. And, first, let us speak of a democracy; this will at the same time show clearly the nature of its opposite, which some persons call an oligarchy; and in doing this we must take into account all the parts of a democracy and every thing that is connected therewith. For from the manner in which these are compounded together, different species of democracies arise; and hence it is that they are more than one, and of various natures. Now, there are two causes whence it arises that there are many kinds of democracy; one

Different combinations of governments.

The component parts of a democracy.

[1] Having stated the contents of the preceding books, Aristotle goes on to consider the different kinds of governments distinguished by the same specific name, and also "to consider any thing which remains to be said concerning them"—words sufficient to show (according to Gillies) that this and the preceding book are supplemental. The present editor however considers it best to adhere to the old-established order.

[2] Aristotle says that the results of these *συνδυασμοί*, or combinations of different elements, constitute a subject which was not sufficiently attended to in his time.

of which is that which we have already mentioned, namely, there being different sorts of people · for in one country the people are husbandmen, in another mechanics and hired servants. Now, if the first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or worse, but in the fact that it is no longer the same government. The other cause is that of which we are now about to speak. The different matters which are connected with democracies, and seem to be proper to this form of government, by being combined together, produce changes in democracies; for some few particulars will attend on one form, on another more, and on a third all. It is useful also to be acquainted with each particular, if any one would found any state of which he may happen to approve, for the purpose of amending it. For all founders of states endeavour to comprehend within their own plan every thing of nearly the same kind with it; but in doing this they are mistaken in the manner which we have already described in treating of the preservation and destruction of governments. I will now speak of the first principles, and character, and aims of such polities.

These differ in different countries.

CHAP. II.

Liberty the end of a democracy.

Now the very foundation[1] of a democratical state is liberty, and people have been accustomed to say this, as if under this government alone could men have a share of liberty; for they affirm, that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But it is one element of liberty to govern and be governed in turns; for, according to the justice which prevails in a democracy, equality is measured by numbers, and not by worth; and, as justice is such, it is necessary that the supreme power should be vested in the people, and that what the majority determine should be deemed final and just; for they say that every single citizen ought to possess equality. So that in a democracy the poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater number,

[1] *ὑπόθεσις.* This word is used in the same sense in book ii. chap. 5, where Aristotle says that the faulty reasoning of Socrates arises on account of *τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν.* "He is wrong in his first principle at starting."

and that which is decreed by the majority is supreme. This, then, is one mark of liberty, which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion of that state: another is, that every one may live as he likes; for this, they say, is a right peculiar to liberty, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then, is the second criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be under no subjection to any one upon any account except by rotation. This also is conducive to that equality which is in accordance with liberty. These things being premised, and such being the government, such rules as the following must be observed in it: that all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all; that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot to all offices, except perhaps to those only which require some particular skill and experience; that no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any office; that no one should be employed in the same office twice, or very seldom, only in few posts except in the army; that all their appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible; that the judges shall be chosen from the whole community for all causes, or for most, even those of the highest importance; as for example, that concerning the magistrates' accounts and public affairs, as well as private contracts, the popular assembly shall be supreme in all matters; and that no magistrate but that of the highest authority shall be supreme in any point, or only in the most trifling matters.[1] Of all magistracies a popular assembly is best suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for attendance; for in that case it gradually loses its power; for if they be well paid, the people bring all causes before themselves by appeal, as we have already mentioned in the preceding part of our treatise.[2] In the next place, the citizens should be paid, all of them, if possible, as members of the assembly, or as judges, or magistrates; but, if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges, the senators, and

Tests of a democracy.

Rules for the administration of a democracy.

The ἐκκλησία.

Public pay.

[1] This is the only intelligible reading of the passage as it stands in Bekker's text: but Goëttling rejects as interpolated the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων Κυρίαν.

[2] He refers to books ii. chap. 12 and iv. 14.

members of the supreme assembly, as also those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table, ought to be paid.[1] Moreover, as an oligarchy is defined by the nobility, fortune, and education of its members; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a government in the hands of men of low birth, poverty, and vulgar employments.[2] In this state also no office should be held for life; but if any such should remain after the government has been long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish its power, and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things then, appertain to all democracies; and they arise from that kind of justice which is suited to those governments; (that is, that all its members shall enjoy an equality according to number;) which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the people. For it is held to be fit that the rich should have no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that all should be equal according to number; for thus, they think, the equality and liberty of the state is likely to be best preserved.

Eligibility of all to office.

Limited periods of office.

Equality the means to liberty.

CHAP. III.

How equality to be brought about.

In the next place we inquire, how they shall attain this equality.[3] Shall the fortune of five hundred be divided amongst a thousand, and these

[1] Aristotle here enumerates *τὰς ἀρχὰς*, *τὰ δικαστήρια*, and *τὴν βουλήν*, that is, magistrates invested respectively with executive, judicial, and deliberative powers; who, as well as the citizens at large, convened in their *ἐκκλησίαι κύριαι*, or stated assemblies, ought, according to the principles of simple democracy, to be paid for their political labours. But if the public revenues cannot suffice for this profusion of expense, then those magistrates at least must be remunerated, whose uninterrupted functions require that they should mess together. And with them it would appear that Aristotle means to class, as to this particular, the citizens convened in their stated and periodical assemblies.

[2] By the word *βαναυσία* Gillies would argue that Aristotle means here "that condition of manners and morals resulting from the degrading state of labour, generally known by that term." But this, after all, is a question of little moment, as in common conversation things which stand in the mutual relation of cause and effect are often confounded.

[3] It is to be remembered here that the Greeks always employed proportion to answer the purpose of fractions.

thousand have equal power with the five hundred? or shall we establish our equality in another manner, dividing as before, and afterwards taking an equal number both out of the five hundred and the thousand, and then investing them with the power of creating the magistrates and judges? Is this state then established according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that is just which the majority approve of; but the favourers of an oligarchy say, that that is just which seems right to the wealthier part; and that we ought to be directed by the amount of property. But both the propositions are unequal and unjust, for if we agree with what the few propose, we erect a tyranny;—(for if it should happen, that one individual has more than the rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice this man alone has a right to the supreme power;)—but if superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice will then be done, by confiscating the property of the rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality shall be, which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition of right which is common to them both; for they both say, that what the majority of the state approves ought to be established.[1] Be it so, but not entirely; but, since a city happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which is approved of by both of these, or by the greater part; but, should contrary sentiments arise, let that be established which shall be approved of by the greater part, and by those who have the greater property. For instance, if there should be ten rich men and twenty poor, and six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together is greater, should determine which opinion shall be law;[2] and should these happen to be equal, it should be re-

By vote of the majority.

[1] Compare the following passage taken from Cicero's fragmentary treatise de Republicâ, book iii. "Respublica res est populi. Populus autem non omnis cœtus multitudinis, sed cœtus juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus."

[2] Niebuhr, in his History of Rome, (vol. i. p. 263,) considers that Aristotle is here speaking of symmories, (*συμμορίαι*,) and not of private citizens. For some satisfactory reasons for venturing to doubt whether that

garded as a case similar to the assembly or a court of justice now-a-days dividing equally upon any question that comes before them; for in such cases they must determine it by lot or some other such method. But although, with respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do so, than to persuade those who have it in their power to encroach upon others, to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the powerful pay no regard to it.[1]

CHAP. IV.

Democracy of four kinds.

The best kind.

THERE are four kinds of democracies. The best of them is that which is first in order, as has been said in a former place; and this also is the most ancient of them all. I call that the first which every one would so place, if he were to divide the people; for the best part of these are the husbandmen. A democracy may be framed where the majority live by tillage or pasturage: for, as their property is but small, they have no leisure perpetually to hold public assemblies, but are continually employed in following their own business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor are they desirous of what another enjoys, but prefer to follow their own business rather than meddle with state affairs, and accept offices which will be attended with no great profit. For the greater part of mankind are desirous of riches rather than honour. And here is one proof: for they submitted to tyrannies in ancient times, and now they submit to oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon get rich, and others are removed from poverty. Besides, their right of electing magistrates and of calling them to account, will satisfy them, if they feel any desire of honours.

The right of αἵρεσις and εὐθύνη.

great historian has here exactly understood the meaning of Aristotle, see Goëttling's note in loco.

[1] This lamentation is often made by the historians of Rome. Compare for instance Liv. iii. 65: "Sed alter semper ordo gravis alterius modestiæ erat. Adeò moderatio tuendæ libertatis, dum æquari velle simulando ita se quisque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili est: cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro se efficiunt: et injuriam a nobis repulsam, tanquam aut facere aut pati necesse sit, injungimus aliis."

For in some democracies, though the right of electing the magistrates is not in hands of the commonalty, yet it is invested in part of that body chosen to represent them, as was the case at Mantinæa; and it is sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power. Now this we ought to consider as a species of democracy; and for this reason it is proper and also customary for that democracy of which we have now been treating, to have a power of choosing their magistrates, and of censuring them, and of sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates should be elected according to a certain census, higher according to the rank of their office, or else not by a census at all, but merely according to their abilities. A state thus constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will always be filled with the best men; for the people will acquiesce, and will feel no envy against their betters; and these and the nobles should be content with this part in the administration; for they will not be governed by their inferiors. They will also rule justly, as others will censure their conduct; for it is serviceable to the state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever they choose; for the power of doing whatever a man pleases affords no possible check against that evil particle which is in every man. It is necessary, therefore, and useful to the state, that its offices shall be filled by the principal persons whose characters are unblemished, and that the people shall not be oppressed. It is now evident that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because the people are of a particular character. In order to turn the populace to husbandry, some of those laws which were observed in many ancient states are all of them useful: as, for instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell his original lot of land. There is also a law, which they call a law of Oxylus,[1] the effect of which is, to forbid any one to add by usury to his income arising from land. We ought also to steer by the law of the Aphytæans,[2] as useful towards our

A census desirable in the chief magistracies.

Why this is the best democracy.

A community of husbandmen;

[1] King of the Elians.

[2] In some editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch, in Lysand. p

present purpose. For they had but very little ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, and so did not include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a manner, that, according to the census, the poor had more power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds, where they live off their herds; for they have many things in common with husbandry, and by their habits of life they are excellen ly qualified to make good soldiers, being stout in body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of the people of whom the other democracies are composed, are much worse than these; for their lives are wretched, nor is there room for virtue in any business which they take in hand, whether they be mechanics, petty traders, or hired servants. And, moreover, as all this sort of men frequent the exchange and the citadel, in a word, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet together, nor are they as desirous as the others of meeting thus. When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good democracy, or a free state,[1] for the people in general is obliged to form its settlements in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy, though there may be a town population near, never to hold an assembly unless the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown, then, in what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it will be equally evident as to the rest; for it is necessary to make a correspondent deviation, always separating the worst of the people from the rest. But the last and worst form is that which gives a share to every citizen; a thing which few cities can bear, nor is it easy to preserve it for long, unless well supported by laws and manners.

and of shepherds.

Other kinds worse.

The best site for a good democracy.

The worst form of democracy.

444, calls them Aphygæi. They inhabited the peninsula Pallene in the region of Chalcis, on the coast of Thrace or Macedon. See Strabo Excerpt. l. viii. p. 330.

[1] Aristotle says, that such people may establish an useful democracy and a πολιτεία, which he has before explained to be a mixed government, and the best form of republicanism.

We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to establish it, and to make the people powerful, by collecting together as many persons as they could, and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, on the father or mother's side. This method is better suited to this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have been wont to manage. They ought, however, not to collect thus any longer than the common people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then to stop; for, if they proceed further, they will make the state disorderly, and excite the nobles to feel indignant at the power of the common people; which was the cause of the insurrection at Cyrene:[1] for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes great, it strikes the eye. It is moreover very useful, in such a state, to adopt the means which Clisthenes used at Athens, when he was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities, and to reduce the religious rites of private persons to a few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever practice belongs to a tyranny, seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; (for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state;) and also to overlook every one's living as they choose. For many will support such a government as this: for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than with moderation.

Methods by which this form is brought about.

CHAP. V.

It is also the business of the legislator, and all those who would establish a government of this sort, not to make it too great a work or too perfect, but to aim only at rendering it stable. For, let a state

Stability to be chiefly consulted.

[1] This state flourished as a monarchy, and as an aristocracy, but decayed when it became altered into a democratic form.

be constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing for two or three days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful, and framing such laws, both written and unwritten, as shall contain those things which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; and they should not suppose that any thing is useful either for a democratic or an oligarchic form of government, which contributes to make it more purely so, but what will contribute to its duration. But our demagogues at present, to flatter the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts. For which reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should act on the opposite side, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses. For those who are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to condemn those on whom they sit in judgment, when they are about to get nothing by it. They should also take care that the causes which are brought before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the utmost severity those who bring an action against any one without cause; for it is not the commons, but the nobles, whom they are wont to prosecute. But in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to each other, or at the least not to treat those who have the chief power in it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common people to attend the public assemblies unless they are paid for it, this is against the interest of the nobles, when there is not a sufficient public revenue. For the deficiencies must be necessarily made up by taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice: things which have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then, the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public assemblies; and the courts of justice should have extensive jurisdiction, but continue sitting a few days only; for by this means the rich will not fear the expense, although they receive nothing

Faults in existing democracies.

Regulations to be observed in popular assemblies.

for their attendance, though the poor do; and judgment also will be given much better; for the rich will not choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly be so for a short time. And, when there are sufficient revenues, a different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money amongst the poor; these receive it, and again want the same supply; while the giving such help to the poor is like pouring water into a sieve. But the true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority are not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government. He should endeavour, therefore, that they may enjoy a lasting plenty; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then divided at once among the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to purchase a little field; or, if that cannot be done, at least to give each of them enough to procure the implements of trade and husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at once, then to divide it acording to tribes, or any other allotment. In the mean time, let the rich pay them for the necessary attendance, and cease from lavishing them on useless shows. And something like this was the manner in which they manage at Carthage, and so preserve the affections of the people; for, by continually sending some of their community into colonies, they procure plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and to induce them to work by supplying them with what is necessary; or to imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum:[1] for by permitting the poor to partake in common of every thing which is needful for them, they gain the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed. It is also possible to accomplish the same thing, if of the same magistrates some are chosen

Each of the poor should be made independent.

Election of magistrates.

[1] Upon the constitution of Tarentum, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. chap. 9.

by vote, and others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies ought to be established.

CHAP. VI.

The constitution of an oligarchy.

FROM what has been already said, it will be almost manifest how an oligarchy ought to be founded. For it is right to draw conclusions from things which are contrary, and to frame every species of oligarchy by a kind of analogy, corresponding to some opposite species of democracy.

The best kind.

The purest and best-framed oligarchy is one which approaches most nearly to what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different standards of income, the one made high, the other low. From those who are within the latter, the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the former, the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a part of the administration who is within the census; which should be so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should, by that means, be made superior to those who have no share in the government. For those who are to take their share in public affairs ought always to be chosen out of the better sort of the people.

The next kind.

Much in the same manner ought the next kind of oligarchy to be established, by drawing the rule a little tighter; but as to that which is most opposite to a pure

The worst.

democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it. For as bodies of sound and healthy constitutions, and ships which are well manned and well adapted for sailing, can bear many defects without perishing thereby, while a diseased body, or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew, cannot support the least shock; just so the worst-established governments want the most careful attention. A number of citizens is

Tests of stability in a democracy and an oligarchy.

the preservation of a democracy; for they are a body opposed to those rights which are founded in rank; while on the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the different orders in the society.

CHAP. VII.

Where an oligarchy can be established.

As the greater part of the community is divided into four sorts of people, husbandmen, mechanics, petty traders, and hired servants; and, as those who are useful in war may likewise be divided into four sorts, the horseman, the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor; wherever the nature of the country admits of a great number of horse, there a powerful oligarchy may be easily established. For the safety of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune. Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an inferior oligarchy may be established; for a heavy-armed force is composed more out of the rich than the poor, but the light-armed and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy. But where the number of these is very great, and a sedition arises, the other parts of the community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed. For it is in this way that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an insurrection; for being lighter, they are easily a match for the horse and the heavy-armed. So that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops from these is to form one against itself. But as a city is composed of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they are still very young, the light and easy exercises; and when they are grown up from childhood, they should be perfected in warlike exercises in general. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the government, as I said before, should be either regulated by a census, or else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased from any mechanic employment; or as at Massalia, where they are chosen according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect to the magistrates of the highest rank, which it may be necessary to have in the state, their services to the public should be strictly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous of a share, and also to induce them to regard their magistrates

How to regulate the admission of the people to office.

with favour, as men who pay a large price for their honours. It is also fitting that the magistrates, upon entering into office, should make magnificent sacrifices, and erect some public structure, that the people, partaking of the entertainment, and seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: the nobles will thus gain lasting records of their generosity. But now this is not the conduct of those who are at present at the head of an oligarchy, but quite the contrary; for they are not more desirous of honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more properly be called little democracies. Let it then suffice to have laid down thus much as to the principles on which a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.

CHAP. VIII.[1]

What magistracies are necessary.

AFTER what has been said, it follows next to distinguish accurately concerning the magistracies; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without the necessary magistrates no state can exist, nor without those who contribute to its dignity and good order can it exist happily. Now it is necessary, that in small states the magistrates should be few, in large ones many; it is well also to know what offices it is suitable to join together, and what ought to be separated.

Inspectors of the market.

The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulations in the markets; for which purpose a certain officer should be appointed, to inspect all contracts, and to preserve good order; for, of necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers, to supply each others' mutual wants, and this is the readiest means towards independence; for the sake of which men seem first to have joined together in one community.[2] A second

[1] The learned Schneider admonishes the reader that there is evidently an omission here, and that in this place we ought to look for Aristotle's complete statement of doctrine with reference to the constitution of aristocracies, free states, and monarchies. But the reader has already been warned of the fragmentary character of the present treatise of our author.

[2] Compare book i. chap. 2, and Nicom. Eth. book v. chap. 6.

care, and nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in the city, that they may be ornamented; and also to take care of all buildings which are likely to fall, and of the repair of highways; and also to see that the land-marks between different estates are preserved, that they may live free from disputes, and all other business of a like nature. Now such an office as this is called by most an inspectorship of the city, and the business itself may be divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another the fountains, and another the harbours. There is a third office, most necessary, and very like the last, and conversant nearly about the same objects; only its sphere lies in the country and the suburbs of the city. These officers some persons call inspectors of the lands, and others, inspectors of the woods; these then are three matters of care. But there must also be another magistracy appointed, to receive the public revenue, from whose safe-keeping it is to be delivered out to those who are in the different departments of the state; these are called receivers or quæstors. There must also be another, before whom all private contracts and sentences of courts shall be enrolled; and before these same, as well as the magistrates, must be brought all indictments and openings of pleadings. Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called proctors, notaries, and other like names. Next to these is an officer, whose business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult; namely, the exaction of penalties from those who are condemned, the recovery of fines, and the charge of the persons of prisoners. This office is very difficult, on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage in it unless it is made very profitable, nor, if he does, will he be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause, except that judgment is carried into execution; for if human society cannot subsist without actions at law, it certainly cannot exist without the infliction of penalties. For this reason it is best that this office should not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of other courts.

Of the public buildings, etc.

Of lands.

Quæstors.

Notaries, etc.

Court for the recovery of fines.

In like manner, endeavour should be made that the levying of fines which are ordered by the judges, shall be divided amongst different persons. And further, that different magistrates shall judge different causes; new judges trying novel matters in preference; and as to those which are already ruled, let one person pass sentence, and another see it executed; as, for instance, let the curators of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of the markets have passed, and conversely in other cases; for in proportion as less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much the easier will they gain their proper end. Therefore for the same persons to pass the sentence and to execute it, will subject them to double hatred; and if the same judges pass sentence in all cases, they will be considered as the enemies of all. And in many places a different magistrate has custody of the prisoner, while another sees execution done upon him; as the eleven at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate these offices, and to seek out a plea for arranging this matter. For it is no less than any matter of care already mentioned; for it so happens that men of character will decline accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot properly be intrusted with it, as being themselves rather in want of a guard, rather than qualified to guard others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from others; nor should it be permanently allotted to any individuals, but to the young men; and where there is a band of young men or a city guard, the youths ought in turns to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be first mentioned; next to these are others no less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great skill and fidelity. Such would be those magistrates which have the guard of the city, and provide every thing necessary for war; whose business it is, both in war and peace, to defend the walls and gates, and to take care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer; thus, in little cities there is one supreme over all, whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes place over each of these distinct commanders, called navarchs, hipparchs, and

Warders of the city.

Military officers.

taxiarchs; who again have others under them, as trierarchs, lochagi, and phylarchs, according to their different divisions; all of which join together to make one body, appertaining to the military department. But since some of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money, it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment shall be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and to correct any mismanagement therein; and these they call auditors, or logistæ, or inquisitors, or scrutineers. But, besides all these magistrates, there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own power the disposal both of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over the people, when the supreme power is in them; for the magistrate who has a power to summon them together, must be supreme head of the state. These are sometimes called probuli, because they preadvise; but, where there are many, they are more properly called a council. These are nearly all the civil magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other persons, whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and those who have to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever else belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes intrusted to one person, as in small cities; in others it is delegated to many, and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed to have the general care of all the public sacrifices, which the law does not intrust to the priests, but which have their high rank as being offered on the common hearth of the city; and some call them archons, some kings, and others again prytanes. To sum up in few words the different magistracies which are necessary in these matters, these are either concerned with religion, with war, with taxes and expenditure, with markets and public buildings, with harbours and highways. Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes, to enrol private contracts; and there must also be some to see to executions, and guards over the prisoners; there are also courts of inquiry and scrutiny, to pass the magistrates' accounts; and lastly, others to watch over the deliberative element

The premier.

Probuli.

Priests.

Various others.

of the state.[1] But separate states which are peculiarly happy, and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very attentive to good order, require particular magistrates; such as those who have the government of the women, who are to see the laws are executed; who take the care of the boys, and preside over their education. To these may be added, those who have the care of the gymnastic exercises, the theatres, and every other public spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these however clearly do not concern the people at large, as the governors of the women; for the poor are obliged to employ their wives and children in servile offices, for want of slaves. But as there are three magistrates to whom some states intrust the supreme power, namely, guardians of the laws,[2] preadvisers,[3] and senators; guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much has been said by way of an outline concerning all magistrates.

Superintendents of the women, youths, and education.

What officers suit the three forms of government.

[1] In this obscure and difficult passage, in which Aristotle seems to alternate between loose and technical terms, the editor has followed the reading of Bekker, with the single exception of rejecting the *καὶ* before the words *πρὸς εὐθύνας*. This he prefers to the proposed reading of Goëttling, *καὶ προσευθύνας*. In the earlier part of the sentence Schneider, followed by Coraës and Goëttling, read *ἀπολογισμοὺς* instead of *ἐπιλογισμούς*. But in a later edition G. recalls his assent in the following terms, which are here transcribed. "Aristoteles hic de magistratu loquitur, cujus fidei commissa est exquisitio gesti a ceteris magistratibus muneris. Magistratus autem in defendendis (*ἀπολογισμοῖς*) iis occupatus esse non potest, a quibus administrationis rationes accipit."

[2] *νομοφύλακες*. The Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities states that this name denotes certain magistrates of high authority, who exercised a control over the whole body of the magistrates and people, and whose duty was to see that the laws were dnly administered and obeyed Mention is made of this office at Sparta and elsewhere; but no such body existed at Athens, as it would have been incompatible with the democratic genius of its constitution, at least when vested in the hands of a single person. The office of guardian of the laws, in part at least, seems to have been discharged at Athens by the Areopagus. At a later period an inferior office under this name is said to have been devised at Athens.

[3] *πρόβουλοι*. These officers Gillies compares with the "lords of articles" in the old Scottish constitution. For further remarks on the word, the reader will do well to refer to note on book iv. chap. 14.

BOOK VII.[1]—CHAP. I.

The most eligible life to be considered by the politician.

HE who proposes to make the fitting inquiry as to which form of government is the best, ought first to determine what manner of living is most eligible ;[2] for while this remains uncertain, it will also be equally uncertain what government is best. For, unless some unexpected accident interfere, it is probable that those who enjoy the best government, will live best according to existing circumstances ; he ought, therefore, first to come to some agreement as to the manner of life which, so to speak, is most desirable for all ; and afterwards, whether this life is the same or different in the individual and the member of a

[1] This and the following book are placed by Gillies as the fourth and fifth. The fifth and sixth books (called by him the seventh and eighth) are regarded by him as supplemental to the rest. He thus defends his rearrangement of the treatise, and traces the connexion between its several parts. "In the first book of his Politics, Aristotle examines the origin of society and government, the essential distinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and the best plans of political economy. In the second, he describes the most admired schemes of policy, either delineated by philosophers or instituted by legislators. In the third, (of which a considerable part is now lost,) he explains the nature and principles of the various governments existing in Greece and in the ancient world, whether republican or monarchical ; bestowing just and liberal praise where praise seemed to be due ; but declaring himself not to be completely satisfied with any thing that philosophers had devised, legislators prescribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in this fourth (commonly published as the seventh) book, to exhibit the result of his own reflections concerning the great question, what form of government is the best ? This problem, he observes, cannot be solved abstractedly ; because government being an arrangement, the best government must be the best arrangement, and this must be that form which the materials to be arranged are the best fitted to receive and to preserve."

[2] In order to find what is *αἱρετωτάτη πολιτεία*, Aristotle considers first the practical question on which it must depend, viz. what is *αἱρετώτατος βίος*. In both the one and the other, that will be the best which is the best under existing circumstances. Now in his Rhetoric, (book i. chap. 5,) to which he here alludes as one of his exoteric treatises, Aristotle divides all goods into, 1. *τὰ ἐκτός*. 2. *τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι*. 3. *τὰ ἐν τῇ ψύχῃ*. Each and all of them, though they do not constitute happiness, are yet necessary to its perfection, as every one but a fool will admit : the only difference will be concerning the proportion of each kind which is necessary.

state. Deeming then that we have already sufficiently shown what sort of life is best, in our popular discourses on that subject, we must now make use of what we there said.[1] Certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as there are three kinds of things good for man, namely, what is external, what belongs to the body, and to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make men truly happy. For no one would say that a man was happy who had nothing of fortitude or temperance, justice or prudence, but was afraid of the flies that flew round him; or who would abstain from nothing, if he chanced to be desirous of meat or drink, or who would murder his dearest friend for a farthing; or, in like manner, one who was in every particular as wanting and misguided in his understanding as an infant or a maniac. These truths are so evident that all must agree to them, though some may dispute about the quantity and the degree: for they may think, that a very little amount of virtue is sufficient for happiness; but as to riches, property, power, honour, and all such things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds. But to such we say, that it is easy to prove, from what experience teaches us concerning these cases, that it is not through these external goods that men acquire virtue, but through virtue that they acquire them.[2] As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or in virtue, or in both, certain it is that it belongs more frequently to those whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings are best cultivated, and who preserve moderation in the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess a sufficiency of external good things,

Three kinds of goods necessary for happiness.

The truly happy life depends on virtue and wisdom.

[1] He refers to Rhet. book i. chap. 5.

[2] That virtue is more essential than external goods to εὖ ζῆν, is proved in two ways:

1. Practically: τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά are caused and preserved by virtue, not virtue by them.
2. Theoretically: (α) τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά have a limit and excess; not so virtue.
   (β) The soul is superior to the body; but qualities differ in relative importance according to the importance of the subject in which they reside.
   (γ) External goods exist for the sake of the soul, not the contrary. For happiness depends upon the exercise of ἀρετὴ and φρόνησις.

but are deficient in the rest. And that such is the case will be clearly seen by any one who views the matter with reflection. For whatsoever is external has its boundary, as a machine; and whatsoever is useful is such that its excess is either necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor. But every good quality of the soul, the higher it is in degree, becomes much the more useful, if it is permitted on this subject to adopt the word "useful" as well as "noble." It is also evident that the best disposition of each thing will follow in the same proportion of excess, as the things themselves, of which we allow they are accidents, differ from each other in value. So that if the soul is more noble than any outward possession, or than the body, both in itself and with respect to us, it must be admitted, of course, that the best disposition of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the sake of the soul that these things are desirable, and it is on this account that wise men should desire them, and not the soul for them. Let us therefore be well agreed that so much of happiness falls to the lot of every one as he possesses of virtue and wisdom, and in proportion as he acts according to their dictates; since for this we have the example of the God Himself, who is completely happy, not from any external good, but in Himself, and because He is such by nature. For good fortune is something of necessity different from happiness, as every external good of the soul is produced by chance or by fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is just or wise. Hence it follows, as established by the same reasoning, that the state which is best, and acts best, will be happy: for no one can fare well who acts not well; nor can the actions either of man or city be praise-worthy without virtue and wisdom. But valour, justice, and wisdom have in a state the same force and form as in individuals; and it is only as he shares in these virtues that each man is said to be just, wise, and prudent.

The best and happiest state.

Thus much then may suffice to be said by way of introduction; for we cannot refrain from touching on this subject in our discourse, though we could not go through all the details which belong to it; for that business properly belongs to another inquiry. But let us at present lay down so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and as a citizen, is a life of virtue, so far accompanied by external goods as to

be able to perform virtuous actions. But if there are any who still dispute the matter, and are not persuaded by what we have said, we will consider them hereafter, but at present we shall proceed according to our intended method.

CHAP. II.

The happiness of the individual and of the state the same.

It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual and of a city[1] is the same or different. But this also is evident; for all would confess that it is the same. For whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the happiness of the city in riches, if it possesses them; those who prefer a life which enjoys tyrannic power, will also think that the city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus, also, if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy city the happiest. But here there are two particulars which require consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs; and also what form of government and what disposition of the state we ought to consider the best; whether the whole community should be eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and some only. As this, therefore, is a subject of political examination and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and as this is the view which we have at present chosen, the one of these would be foreign to our purpose,[2] but the other is proper to our present design.

Two questions.
1. Is political or private life the better?

2. What is the best form of government?

The former deferred.

[1] The object of Plato in his Republic was to arrive at what is good for the individual through the medium of what is good for the state; the method of Aristotle would be as nearly as possible the converse of this. We do not, however, accurately know how far Plato all along had in view a different object, namely, to disprove the sophistical notion that happiness and virtue depend mainly on keeping up the outward semblance of it.

[2] As not being strictly in accordance with the practical character of the present treatise. Still Aristotle enters into the question as a *πάρεργον*. Since virtues are twofold, 1. Political or practical, 2. Theoretical or contemplative, is a political or contemplative life preferable? The man who follows the latter kind of life objects to the politician, that his life is

Now it is evident that that government must be the best, which is so established that every one therein may have it in his power to act most virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable, a public life of active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without, and spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a philosopher. And one of these two different modes of life, both now and formerly, seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most ambitious of virtue; I mean the political or the philosophic life. And yet it is of no little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense must naturally direct his aim to the better mark; and not only individuals, but the state also, should do the same. Some think that a tyrannical government over our neighbours is accompanied with the greatest injustice; but that a political rule over them is not unjust: but that still is a restraint on the tranquillity of political life. Others chance to hold, as it were, the contradictory opinion, and think that an active and political life is the only life for man; for that private persons have no opportunity of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in the public management of the state. These are their sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of government is the only happy one; for even among some free states the object of their laws seems to be this, to tyrannise over their neighbours. So that political institutions, wheresoever dispersed among the greater part of mankind, if they have any one common object in view, all of them aim at this, to conquer and govern. As for example, at Lacedæmon and in Crete, the education of their children and the generality of the laws was directed towards a state of war. Besides, among all nations, those who have power enough to enslave others, are honoured on that account;[1]

Different opinions on the latter question.

attended with injustice in certain cases. He answers, that it is only in political life that scope for certain particular virtues is found. Others hold that despotic rule over as many subjects as possible is the best thing. But this surely cannot be true; for no other art endeavours to effect its end by force, but to provide fit and proper means.

[1] "The institutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Aristotle, who flourished towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were distinguished

as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls; and with some there are laws whose end is to excite the virtue of courage; thus they tell us, that at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedon, that a man who had not himself killed an enemy, should be obliged to wear a halter round his neck. Among the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of the cup which was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they erect as many columns upon a man's tomb as he has slain enemies; and among different nations different things of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom. Probably it may seem absurd to those who are willing to inquire, whether it is the business of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not. For how can that which is itself unlawful belong either to the politician or legislator? but it is unlawful to rule not only justly but unjustly also; for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the other sciences; for it is the business neither of the physician nor of the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his passengers. And yet many seem to think that a despotic government is a political one, and what they do not allow to be just or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over others; for they endeavour to be justly governed themselves, but think it of no consequence whether others are ruled justly or not:[1] and this is absurd except where there are beings which nature intended to rule, and others which as naturally obey. And therefore, since this is the case, no one ought to assume it over all in general, but over those only who are the proper objects of it;[2] just as no one should hunt men either for food or sacrifice, but

above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffusion, of military honours." (Gillies.)

[1] As an instance in point, it would be apposite to quote the principle adopted by the Romans in their conduct towards foreign states.

[2] "Aristotle here dwells on what is often repeated in other parts of this work, the injustice of any kind of authority not derived from nature; the differences between the power or jurisdiction of masters, fathers, and husbands, and the evils resulting from confounding the limits of governments specifically different." (Gillies.)

only what is fit for this purpose; and these are such wild animals as are eatable.

A city with good internal regulations is happy.

But withal, a city which is well governed may be very happy in itself, while it enjoys a good system of internal laws, though its constitution be not framed for war or conquest over its enemies; for it would then have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that all the business of war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine carefully into his state, and the nature of man, and every community, and to see how they may partake of a virtuous life, and of the happiness which results from it. In this respect some laws and customs differ from others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring states, to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or how he shall conduct himself suitably to each. But as to what should be the final end at which he should direct the best government, may possibly meet with due consideration hereafter.

War to be regarded as a means only.

CHAP. III.

Different opinions as to complete freedom.

We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it, addressing ourselves to both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible: while others, again, think that the life of a citizen is the best; and that it is impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong; thus, it is true that the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave, for a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing noble; for the common servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing honourable in them. But, on the other hand, it is not true that a submission to every sort of government is slavery; for the government of freemen differs not less from the

Not all submission is slavery.

government of slaves, than slavery and freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they differ has been already mentioned in our first book.[1] To prefer idleness to activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in action,[2] and many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme power is of all things best, for thus is a man enabled to perform very many useful services. So that he who can obtain this power ought not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for his son, or the son for his father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most eligible: but to be in prosperity is the best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme good were certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others. But it is most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere false supposition: for it does not follow, that their actions are honourable who thus assume the supreme power over others, unless they are by nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave. So that he who so far forsakes the path of virtue can never return back so far as he has departed from it. For amongst equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but that equals should not share with equals, or like with like, is contrary to nature; and whatever is contrary to nature is not right. If, therefore, there is any one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, and him it is right to obey: but he must have not virtue alone, but also the power according to which he may be capable of acting. If, then, we are right in what we have now said, it follows, that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that with respect to the state, as well as to the individual, an active life is the best. Not that an active life must necessarily refer to other persons,[3] as

Who is by nature fitted to rule.

[1] See book i. chaps. 5, 6, and 7.

[2] The two imaginary disputants concerning virtue are evidently partly right and partly wrong: the advocate of the contemplative life is *right* in supposing that a life of mere contemplation is better than to rule over slaves; *wrong* in imagining (as he would seem to imagine) that all ἀρχή is of necessity despotic in its nature.

[3] It is not true to assert that practical life needs to have reference to

some think, or that those studies alone are practical which are pursued for the sake of what results from acting. But this is much more true of those self-dependent contemplations and discursive energies which subsist for their own sakes. For virtuous activity is their end, so that it is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive; for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each other; and there are many opportunities for this among the different citizens. The same thing is true in like manner of every individual; for, were it otherwise, neither could the God nor the universe be perfect; but neither of these can have any external actions, over and above their own proper energies. Hence it is evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual, is happy also for the state and for every member of it.

In what the happiness of a state consists.

CHAP. IV.

As what has already been said finishes the preface of this subject, and as we have considered at large the nature of all other states,[1] it now remains that I should first say what ought to be the form laid down as that of the state which is in accordance with our idea; for no good state can exist without a proportionate supply of

Constitution of the ideal state.

others, or that the best *διάνοιαι* lead to some result beyond themselves; for the best are complete in themselves, and look to no further object. So also states, though isolated, need not therefore be *ἄπρακτοι*, because they have few or no external relations. The deity himself has none, and yet he is not without an object for his energies.—It must be remarked here that the Christian religion, by unfolding the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, shows us how God, though perfect in His own nature, finds an object in Himself; and by the doctrine of the Atonement, has taught us further still, that God has an external object of His love in man.

[1] Aristotle here refers to the third book of this present treatise, where he gives the *formal* cause of the best form of government. He now considers its *material* cause (*ἐκ τίνων*), the number of its citizens, its territory, etc. The practical character of his inquiry is marked by the words *μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον*.

what is necessary. Many things therefore ought to be previously laid down as objects desirable, but none of them such as are impossible; I mean, relative to the number of citizens, and the extent of the territory. For as other artificers, such as the weaver and the shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for their work, (since in proportion as they are better, by so much superior will the work itself necessarily be;) so also ought the legislator and politician to endeavour to procure proper materials for the business they have in hand. Now the first and principal instrument of the politician is the number of the people; he should therefore know how many and what they naturally ought to be; in like manner as to the country, how large and of what kind it ought to be. Most persons think, that it is necessary for a city to be large in order to be happy;[1] but even should this be true, still they cannot tell what is a large one, and what a small one. For they estimate its greatness according to the multitude of its inhabitants; but they ought rather to look to its strength than to its numbers. For a state has a certain object in view, so that the state which is most able in itself to accomplish this end, this we ought to consider the greatest; as a person might say that Hippocrates was a greater physician, though not a greater man, than one who was taller than him in person. But even if it were proper to determine the strength of the city from the number of its inhabitants, it should never be inferred from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it—(for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and foreigners)—but from those who are really part of the state, and properly constitute the members of it. A multitude of these is indeed a proof that the city is large, but where a large number of mechanics dwell, and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for a great city and a populous one are not the same thing. This too is evident from the fact that it is very difficult, if not impossible, properly to govern a very numerous body of men; for of all the states which appear well governed, we find not one

The number of the people,

that is, of the citizens.

[1] The proper size of a city is to be judged by considering its ἔργον, namely, the making its members happy and independent, and whether it is fitted to accomplish this end.

where the rights of a citizen are laid open to the entire multitude.[1] And this is also made evident by proof from the nature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law is of course a certain good order; but too large a multitude is incapable of this. For this is in very truth the prerogative of that Divine Power which comprehends the universe. Not but that, as quantity and greatness are usually essential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in its being large, if only consistent with that order already mentioned. But still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well as every thing else, whether animals, plants, or machines; for each of these have their proper powers, if they are neither too little nor too large; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly constructed,—(as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of two furlongs length, but only when it is of a fit size; for either from its smallness or from its largeness, it will make all sailing hopeless;)—so is it with a city. One that is too small has not in itself the power of self-defence, but this power is essential to a city: one that is too large is capable of self-defence in what is necessary, in the same way as a nation, but then it is not a city; for it will be very difficult to find a form of government for it. For who would choose to be the general of such an unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a Stentor? The first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of the lowest numbers which will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live happily in their political community. And it follows, that the more the inhabitants exceed that necessary number, the greater will the city be. But, as we have already said, this must not be without bounds; but what is the proper limit of the excess,[2] experience will easily show, and this

It should not be too large nor too small;

but such as will enable the inhabitants to live happily,

[1] The evil arising from having cities of too great a size is here proved in two ways. 1st, practically; no well ruled cities are over large. 2nd, from the nature of the case: it is impossible for a city of excessive size to be well and adequately superintended by human means; and when this is the case, the city becomes out of all proportion. Like beauty, and like the plot of a poem,—(see Poetics, chap. vii.)—a city should be as large as possible, consistently with being *εὐσύνοπτος*, and not so small as to fail in being self-dependent (*αὐτάρκης*).

[2] The *ὅρος τῆς ὑπερβολῆς* to be fixed with reference to the due administration of justice in matters of law, and to the fit distribution of offices

experience is to be collected from the actions both of the governors and the governed. Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates and to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine causes with justice, nor issue their orders with propriety, without they know the characters of their fellow-citizens: so that whenever this happens to be impossible in these two particulars, the state must of necessity be badly managed; for in both of them it is unjust to determine too hastily, and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the case where the number of the citizens is too many. Besides, it is more easy for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they will easily escape detection owing to the greatness of the multitude. It is evident then, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the numbers are the greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient in themselves, while they are not too large to be under the eye of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the extent of a city.

and independently.

CHAP. V.

The best state would be one self-dependent for provisions;

THE above may readily be applied to a country; for as to what soil it should have, it is clear that every one will praise it in proportion as it is sufficient in itself. For which purpose such a country must of necessity supply its inhabitants with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty, without any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom and temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit to the territory, shall be considered more minutely hereafter,[1] when we come particularly to inquire into property, and as to the amount of fortune requisite, and how and in what manner a

and of adequate extent.

To this end it is necessary that all the citizens should be known. This will be found a good test in practice.

[1] The author here promises to examine more accurately hereafter, what ought to be the limits of national wealth; but in the work as it now stands, this promise is not fulfilled. Several other questions are started by Aristotle in his Politics, which are not any where answered; which proves that performance to have come down to us in an imperfect state.

man ought to employ it. For many doubts are started as to this question, while men strive to bring it on either side to an excess, the one of severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the country should be, is not difficult to determine; but in some particulars respecting this point, we ought to be advised by those who are skilful in military affairs. It should be difficult of access to an enemy, but easy of egress to the inhabitants; and, as we said that the number of inhabitants ought to be such as can come under the eye of the magistrate, so should it be with the country; for by that means the country is easily defended. As to the position of the city, if one could place it to one's wish, it ought to lie well both for sea and land. One situation which it ought to have has been already mentioned; for it should be so placed as easily to give assistance to all parts, and also to receive the necessaries of life from every quarter; as also it should be accessible for the carriage of wood, or any other materials of the like kind which may happen to be in the country.

Its situation.

CHAP. VI.

Drawbacks of a maritime position.

But with respect to placing a city in communication with the sea, there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful to well-regulated states;[1] for they say, that it becomes the resort of persons brought up under a different system of government, and so is far from serviceable to the state, towards the preservation of law and the increase of population; for a multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from trading backwards and forwards upon the seas, which will hinder the city from being well governed. But if this inconvenience does not arise, it is evident that it is better both for safety, and also for the acquisition of the necessaries of life, that both the city and the country should be near the

Its advantages.

[1] Intercourse with foreign nations is apt to create a desire of change, and to bring into the country a large admixture of foreigners. But if none of these ill effects arise, it is better on other accounts for a state to have the sea within reach, for the sake of a ready supply of necessary articles; besides, it affords a double chance in time of war. The foreign traffic, however, should be confined as nearly as possible to the necessaries of life.

sea. For in order to bear up against wars, it is necessary to be able to bring up forces both by land and by sea; and in order to damage the invaders, if it is not possible to do so both ways, still either course is available if they possess both. It is also necessary for them to import from abroad what does not grow in their own country, and to export the superfluous productions; for a city ought to traffic to supply its own wants, and not the wants of others: for those who themselves furnish an open market for every one, do it for the sake of gain; but as to the city which ought not to take part in this ambitious trading, it ought not to encourage the growth of such a mart. Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and harbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who frequent them have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too far off, but are surrounded by walls and other such-like fortifications, it is evident, that, if any good arises from such an intercourse, the city will perceive it, but if any thing hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by a law; declaring and deputing who ought to have a trading intercourse with each other, and who ought not. As to a naval power, it is by no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain degree; and this not only for the sake of the city itself, but also because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as by land. But in order to know how great that power should be, we must look into the condition of the state, and if it shall show such vigour as to enable her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her force should correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of people which arises around a maritime power, they are by no means necessary to a state, nor ought they to make a part of the citizens.[1] For the mariners and infantry who have the chief

Naval power, how great.

[1] "Maritime power was so grossly abused by the ancient republics, that it is continually branded by moralists as producing vile and versatile manners, ἤθη ποίκιλα καὶ φαῦλα, Plato de Legg. sub. init. The surprising of defenceless cities, the desolating of unguarded coasts, attacks without glory, and retreats without shame, were represented as operations not less inconsistent with true courage, than incompatible with humanity and justice. See Isocrates, Orat. de Pace, and Plato de Legg. ubi supra. The ancient republics intrusted arms to those only who had a property to defend. Their soldiers were levied from the first classes, or privileged

command at sea, are freemen, and upon these depends a naval engagement. But when there are many of the surrounding inhabitants and husbandmen, there they will always have a number of sailors: as we now see happens to some states; at Heraclea, for instance, where they man many triremes, though the extent of their city is much more easily measured than some others. And thus let it suffice that we have determined concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a maritime power: as to the number of the citizens, we have already said what the limit ought to be.

CHAP. VII.

The disposition of citizens.

We now proceed to point out of what natural disposition the citizens ought to be: but this surely any one would easily perceive who casts his eye over those states of Greece which bear a high repute, and indeed over all the habitable world, as it is divided among the nations. Those who live in cold countries,[1] as the north of Europe, are full of courage, but wanting in understanding and in art; therefore they remain free for a long time; but, not being versed in the political science, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power. But the Asiatics, whose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and therefore they continue to be always conquered, and the slaves of others. But the Greeks, placed as it were between these two parts, partake of the nature of both, so as to be at the same time both courageous and intellectual; for

Advantages of the Grecian states in this respect.

orders, of society. But sailors were taken from the promiscuous crowd, and generally from the meanest populace. This practice, which prevailed equally in Greece and Rome, was founded on sound policy. The exertions of sailors, being naturally directed against foreign enemies, are less likely to prove dangerous to the internal stability of government." (Gillies.)

[1] The remarks which Aristotle here offers, respecting the advantages enjoyed by Greece in comparison with the countries which lie far to the north or to the south of it, may be applied now, after a lapse of more than 2000 years, to the whole of Europe, except perhaps the very northernmost parts. For some remarks on the advantageous influence of the temperate zone in the formation of national character, the reader is referred to Professor Heeren's First Essay on the Political History of Greece and to Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. i. chap. 1.

which reason Greece continues free, and governed in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the whole world, could it be combined into one system of policy.[1] The races of the Greeks have the very same difference among themselves: for part of them possess but one of these qualities, whereas in the other they are both happily blended together. Hence it is evident, that those persons ought to be both intelligent and courageous who will be readily obedient to a legislator, whose object is virtue.——As to what some persons say, that the military must be friendly towards those whom they know, but severe towards those whom they know not, it is courage which makes any one lovely; for that is the faculty of the soul on account of which we most admire. As a proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and acquaintance than against those whom we know not: for which reason Archilochus, properly accusing his friends, addresses the irascible part of his soul, and says, "Art thou not strangled by these friends?" The spirit of freedom and command also is inherited by all who are of this disposition; for courage is commanding and invincible. It also is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those you know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who are of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only towards injurers; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them. And this is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done them, they consider what they are deprived of. Hence the saying,

The military.

"Cruel the wars of brethren are;"

[1] "Aristotle maintained in a former chapter that a commonwealth had its limits in point of populousness; and endeavoured to point out with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes what these limits were. In the passage before us he says, *γένος Ἑλλήνων δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τύγχανον πολιτείας*, 'That the Greeks would be able to command all nations, if they had the same form of government.' In fact, the extreme difference in the forms of government in Greece, was the great obstacle to their national union in one political confederacy; which is the thing here intended by Aristotle; since, according to the principles above explained, Greece was far too populous to be happily united in one commonwealth." (Gillies.)

and this,

"Those who have greatly loved do greatly hate."

And thus we have nearly determined how many the members of a state ought to be, and what their natural disposition; as also how large, and of what sort, their country should be; and I say "nearly," because we ought not to require the same accuracy in matters of reasoning as in those which are the objects of the senses.

CHAP. VIII.

Many things necessary to a state, but are not parts of it.

As in other naturally constituted bodies, those things are not admitted to be parts of them without which the whole would not exist; so also it is evident, that in a political state every thing that is necessary thereunto is not to be considered as a part of it, nor of any other community, from whence one genus is made. For one thing ought to be common and the same to the community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the other uses it. As, for instance, between any instrument employed in making any work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus property is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state, though many species of it have life; but a city is a community of equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life possible. But happiness is the best: and this consists in the perfect practice of virtuous energies. As, therefore, some persons have great, others little or no share in this, it is evident, that this is the cause of the difference which exists between the different cities and communities there are to be found; for while each of these seeks after what is best by various and different means, they give rise to different modes of living and different forms of government. We are now to consider what those things are without which a city cannot possibly exist, for what we call parts of the city must of necessity be inhe-

Property a case in point.

Things necessary to a state.
1. Food.
2. Arts.
3. Arms.

rent in it. And this we shall more plainly understand, if we know the number of things necessary to a city. First, the inhabitants must have food: secondly, arts, for many instruments are necessary in life: thirdly, arms, for it is necessary that the community should have an armed force within themselves, both to support their government against the disaffected of themselves, and also to defend it from those who seek to attack it from without: fourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the internal necessities of the state, as for the business of war: fifthly, and indeed chief of all, the care of the service of the gods: sixthly in order, but most necessary of all, a court to determine both civil and criminal causes. These things are matters which are absolutely required, so to speak, in every state; for a city is a number of people, not accidentally met together, but with a purpose of insuring to themselves sufficient independency and self-protection; and if any thing necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is impossible that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is necessary therefore that a city should be composed with reference to these various trades; for this purpose a proper number of husbandmen are necessary to procure food; as also artificers and soldiers, and rich men, and priests, and judges,[1] to determine what is necessary and beneficial.

4. Revenue.
5. Religion.
6. Courts.

CHAP. IX.

Ought all to share these employments, or not?

HAVING determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all ought to share these different employments; (for it is possible for the same persons always to be husbandmen, artificers, judges, or counsellors;) or whether different persons ought to be appointed to each of those employments which we have already mentioned; or whether some of them should be appropriated to particular persons, and others common to all. But this does not take place in every state; for, as we have already said, it is possible that all may be shared by all, or not by all,

[1] Under the term "judges," our author intends to comprehend, not merely those who take cognizance of matters of contention between individuals, but also those who are engaged in questions of public expediency.

but only by some; and this makes one government to differ from another: for in democracies the whole community partakes of every thing, but in oligarchies it is different.

Trades and arts to be forbidden to the noble.

Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and as it is admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy, and that, as we have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue; it follows, that in the best governed states, where the citizens are really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should be permitted to exercise any low mechanical employment or traffic,[1] as being ignoble and destructive to virtue: neither should they who are destined for office be husbandmen; for leisure is necessary in order to improve in virtue, and to perform the duty which they owe to the state. But since the soldiery, and the senate which consults, and the judge who decides on matters of law, are evidently necessary to the community, shall they be allotted to different persons, or shall they both be given to the same person? This too is clear: for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in others they should be different; for where the different employments require different abilities, as when practical wisdom is wanting for one, but energy for the other, there they should be allotted to different persons. But where it is evidently impossible that those who are able to do violence and to impede matters, should always be under command, there these different employments should be trusted to one person; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option whether the supreme power shall remain or no.

Different qualifications for a soldier, senator, and judge.

When and how they may be combined.

It remains, then, that we should intrust the government to these two parties; but not at the same time, but as nature directs; what requires energy, to the young; what requires practical wisdom, to the old. Thus each will be allotted the part for which they are fit according to their different merits. It is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these men; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are the

[1] In the best state, happiness is the chief object. This cannot be attained except by individual virtue. And virtue, according to Aristotle, cannot belong to any one who leads a life of any servile kind, as such an one can have no leisure for acquiring virtue.

men proper for citizens; for no low mechanic ought to be admitted to the rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people, whose employment is not productive of virtue. This is evident from our first principle; for to be happy it is necessary to be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy so long as he considers only one part of its citizens, but he must look to the whole body. It is evident, therefore, that the landed property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to have for husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains of the classes of the people already enumerated, one only, that of the priests; for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for the priests are by no means to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen or the mechanics; for it is fitting that the gods should be reverenced by the citizens. And since the citizens have been divided into two orders, namely, the military and the council, and since it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is necessary that those who are employed in their service should have nothing else to do, let those who are ripe in years be set aside for the business of the priesthood. We have now shown what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what parts it consists; and that husbandmen, mechanics, and the class of mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that the parts of it are the soldiery and the councillors. Each of these also is separated from the other; the one indeed always, but the other only in part.

The order of priests to be distinct.

CHAP. X.

It seems neither now nor very lately to have become known to those philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to be divided by families into different orders of men; and that the husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other; a custom which is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete also; Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. The common meals seem also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been established in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period in Italy. For it is said by those who are the best versed in the annals of the people who dwell

there, that one Italus was king of Ænotria,[1] and that from him the people changed their names, and were called Italians instead of Ænotrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy, which is bounded by the Scylletic gulf on the one side, and the Lametic[2] on the other, the distance between which is about half a day's journey. Now this Italus, as they relate, made husbandmen of the Ænotrians, who were formerly shepherds, and gave them other laws, and especially was the first who established the common meals; for which reason some of his descendants still use them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are and formerly were called Ausonians. The Chaonians inhabited the part toward Iapygia and the Ionian Sea, which is called the Syrtis. These Chaonians were descended from the Ænotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but the separation of the citizens into different families came from Egypt: for the reign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think that most other things were often found out in a long time, nay, times without number—(for reason teaches us that want would make men first invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then those things which were requisite for the conveniencies and ornament of life)—so should we conclude the same with respect to a political state. But every thing in Egypt is a proof of the great antiquity of these customs; for the people of Egypt seem to be the most ancient of all others, and yet they have acquired laws and political order. We should therefore make a proper use of what is told us concerning states, and endeavour to find out what others have omitted.[3] We have

[1] Comp. Virg. Æn. i. l. 530:

Est locus, Hesperiam Graii cognomine dicunt;
* * * * * * * * *
Ænotri coluêre viri, nunc fama minores
Italiam dixisse, ducis de nomine, gentem.

Upon the subject of the Ænotrians, the reader will do well to consult the learned remarks of Niebuhr in the first volume of his History of Rome.

[2] Niebuhr, in his History of Rome (sub. init.), calls this the "Napetic" gulf, not the "Lametic." Polybius also is said to mention the same part of the Mediterranean Sea under that name.

[3] Aristotle here signifies his intention to fill up the deficiencies of others who have gone before him; in allusion, perhaps, to his last work

The husbandmen a separate order.

already said, that the landed property ought to belong to the military and those who partake of the government of the state; and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people; and how large, and of what nature, the country ought to be. We will therefore first treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many, and of what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold that property ought to be common, as some persons have said,[1] but only by way of friendship it should be made common, so as to let no citizen want subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed that they are proper in well-regulated cities; but on account of what reasons we also approve of them shall be mentioned hereafter. They are things of which all the citizens ought to partake; but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to contribute as much as is enjoined, and to supply their own house besides. The expense also of religious worship should be defrayed by the whole state. Of necessity therefore the land ought to be divided into two parts, one of which should belong to the community in general, the other to the individuals separately. Each of these parts should again be subdivided into two: and half of that which belongs to the public should be appropriated to maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support the common meals. Half of that which belongs to the individuals should be at the extremity of the country, the other half near the city; so that these two portions being allotted to each person, all would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and right; and induce them to act more in concert in any war with their neighbours. For when the land is not divided in this manner, one party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a matter of too much consequence, and more than is fair. For which reason, in some places there is a law, which forbids the inhabitants of the borders to have any vote in the

The land to be divided into public and private.

The situation of that which is in private hands.

upon the constitutions of the various states of Greece. His remark above, to the effect that most things have been invented and have been suffered to fall into disuse, will remind the reader of the wise saying of Solomon, that there is "nothing new under the sun."

[1] He alludes here to Plato, de Republ. book v. See above note on p. 14.

council when they are debating upon a war made against them, as their private interest might prevent their voting impartially. Thus, therefore, the country ought to be divided, and for the reasons before mentioned. But those who are to act as husbandmen, if choice be allowed, should by all means be slaves, nor all of the same nation, nor men of any spirit: for thus they will probably be industrious in their business, and safe from attempting any novelties. Next to these, barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition to those we have already mentioned. Of these, some who are to cultivate the private property of the individual, should belong to that individual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory should belong to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for what reason it is very proper that they should have liberty held out to them as a reward for their services, we will mention hereafter.

The tillers of the ground should be kept as serfs.

CHAP. XI.

We have already mentioned, that the city should communicate both with the continent and the sea, and with the adjoining territory equally, as much as possible. There are these four things of which we should be particularly desirous in the position of the city with respect to itself. In the first place, as to health, as the first thing necessary. Now a city which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow from thence is esteemed most healthful; next to this a northern position is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should next be contrived, that it may have a proper situation for the business of government, and for defence in war; that in war the citizens may have easy access to it, but that it may be difficult of access to the enemy, and hardly to be taken. In the next place, that there may be a suitable supply of water and rivers near at hand; but if those cannot be found, very large and immense cisterns must be prepared to save rain water, so that there may be no want of it when cut off from the country in time of war. And as great care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing to be attended to is that the city should have a good situation and a good position; the second

The situation of the city should be chosen with regard to, 1. Health.

is, that they may have good water to drink, and this must not be taken care of as a secondary matter. For what we chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the body, must principally contribute to its health; and this is the influence which the air and water naturally have. For this reason, in all wise governments, the water ought to be appropriated to different purposes if they are not equally good; and, if there is not a plenty of both kinds of water, that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for other uses. As to fortified places, what is suitable to some governments is not equally suited to all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy, but a city built upon a plain suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are thought to be best, and most useful for their different purposes, which are separate from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of Hippodamus. But for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should be built as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers could not easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to them such as an enemy who assailed them could with difficulty find. A city, therefore, should have both these sorts of buildings; and this may easily be contrived, if any one will so regulate them as the planters do their rows of vines; not making the buildings throughout the city detached, but only in some parts of it; for thus elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls, those who say that a courageous people ought not to have any, form their ideas from antiquated notions; particularly, as we may see those cities which pride themselves herein confuted by facts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly equal, to the enemy, to endeavour to save themselves by taking refuge within their walls; but since it is possible, and very often happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if they would be saved, and not encounter much suffering and insolence, it must be thought the part of a good soldier to make the fortification of the walls such as to give the best protection, more especially since so many missile weapons and machines have been ingeniously invented to besiege cities. In

2. Strength of position.

Fortification necessary.

deed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as though an individual should not have a wall to his house, as if those who dwelt in it were likely to be cowards. Nor should this be left out of our account, that those who have a city surrounded with walls, may act both ways, either as if it had, or as if it had not; but where it has not, they cannot do this. If this be true, not only is it necessary to have walls, but care must be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a defence in time of war, not only according to the old methods, but also according to modern improvements. For as those who make offensive war seek by what means they can gain advantages over their adversaries, so for those who are upon the defensive, some means have been already found out, and others they ought scientifically to devise, in order to defend themselves; for people seldom attempt to attack those who are well prepared.

CHAP. XII.

Syssities on the ramparts.

Temples.

An open square for the nobles.

Gymnastic exercises.

And as it is necessary that the citizens in general should eat at public tables, and as it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and towers at proper distances, it is evident that the nature of the case demands that they prepare some of the public tables in the towers. And these indeed any one could arrange for this purpose ornamentally. But the temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the chief magistrates, ought to be built in proper places, and contiguous, except those temples which the law or the oracle from the god orders to be separate from all other buildings. And the site of these should be so conspicuous, that they may have an eminence which will give them the advantage of distinction, and this, too, near that part of the city which is best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large square, like that which they call in Thessaly the square of freedom, in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no low mechanic or husbandman, or any such person, should be permitted to enter, unless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an ornament to this place, if the gym-

nastic exercises of the elders are performed in it. For it is proper that for the performance of these exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes, according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the magistrates; for the presence of the magistrates before their eyes would greatly inspire true modesty and ingenuous fear.

Another square for trade.

There ought to be another square separate from this, for buying and selling, which should be so situated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea and by land. As the citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests, it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who preside over contracts, indictments, and such like, and also over the markets and the public streets, should be near the square, or some public way, I mean the square where things are bought and sold; for we intend the other for those who are at leisure, and this for necessary business.

The surrounding country.

The same order which I have directed here, should be observed also in the country; for there also their magistrates, such as the surveyors of the woods, and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have their common tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection against an enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places, both to the gods and the heroes. But it is unnecessary to dwell longer and most minutely on these particulars; for it is by no means difficult to plan these things, but it is rather so to carry them into execution; for the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must depend upon fortune; for which reason let us dismiss the matter without saying any thing further upon such subjects.

CHAP. XIII.

The population.

But concerning the state itself, we must say of what numbers and of what sort of people it ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered. As there are two particulars on which the perfection of every thing depends, one of these is, that the object and end of the actions proposed should be proper;

the other, to find the courses of conduct which lead to that end. For it may happen that these may either agree or disagree with each other; for sometimes the end which men propose is good, but in taking the means to obtain it they may err; at other times they may have all the proper means in their power, but they have proposed to themselves a bad end; and sometimes they may mistake in both: as in the art of medicine, physicians sometimes do not know in what condition the body ought to be, in order to be healthy; and sometimes they do not hit well upon the means which are productive of their intended aim. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge, namely, as to the proper end, and as to the means of obtaining it. Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well, and be happy; but that some have the means of so doing in their own power, others not; and this either through nature or fortune. For much external assistance is necessary to a happy life; but less to those who are of a good, than to those who are of a bad, disposition. There are others who, though they have the means of happiness in their own power, do not rightly seek for it. But since our proposed object is to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that state would seem best administered where the people are the happiest, it is evident that the nature of happiness is a thing which ought not to escape us. Now, we have already said in our treatise on Ethics,[1] (if there be any use in what we there said,) that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of virtue,[2] and this not relatively, but simply. I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good in itself. Of the first sort are just punishments and restraints in a just cause; for they arise from virtue, and are necessary, and on that account are virtuous: (though it is more desirable, that neither any state or any individual should stand in need of such things:) but

What happiness is.

[1] Aristotle's reference is to Ethic. Nicom. book i. chap. 7.

[2] If the excellence of the state depends on the attainment of *happiness* by the citizens who are its members, we must then know what happiness is. Now it is defined elsewhere as ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν: and these words clearly imply and suppose some external advantages. Many consequently suppose that these external things constitute happiness.

those actions which are directed to procure either honours or wealth are simply best. For the one are eligible as tending to remove an evil: these actions, on the contrary, are the foundation and means of producing relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents, with a noble mind, but happiness consists in the contrary to these. Now we have already determined in our treatise on Ethics,[1] that he is a man of worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous, as what is simply good: it is evident, therefore, that the using these things in such a manner must be worthy and simply good. This has led some persons to conclude that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should attribute to the lyre itself a brilliant and noble performance, and not to the art itself. It necessarily follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the legislator: for which reason, we earnestly wish that the constitution of the state may have those things which are under the dominion of fortune—(for over some things we admit her to be supreme);—but for a state to be worthy and great is not the work of fortune only, but of knowledge and deliberate choice as well. But for a state to be worthy, it is necessary that those citizens who are in the administration should be worthy also: but in our city every citizen has a share in the state. And so we must consider how a man may become worthy. For if the whole body could become worthy, and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would follow, that what might be done by one, might be done by all.[2] Men are worthy and good in three ways; and these are, by nature, by custom, by reason. In the first place, each one ought to be born a man, and not any other animal; that is to say, he ought to be of a particular disposition both in body and soul. But as to some things, it avails not to be born with

How far virtue is necessary, and how far external goods.

Influence of nature, habit, and reason on mankind.

[1] Aristotle refers here to the Nicom. Ethics, book ii. chap. iv.

[2] It is better for the state that its citizens should possess these virtues in their individual, than in their collective, capacity. For upon their possession individually it will soon follow that they will be in the possession of all. A somewhat similar form of expression occurs in Thucydides, (ii. 60,) in the speech of Pericles, who speaks of the condition of a city, *καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐποανοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην*

them, for custom makes great alterations: for there are some things in nature capable of alteration either way, and which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of mere nature, and in very few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason also, with which he alone is endowed; wherefore he ought to make all these accord with each other: for if they are persuaded that it is best to follow some other way, men oftentimes act contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, in order to make good subjects in a legislative community, we have already determined; the rest of this discourse, therefore, shall be upon education: for some things men learn by habit, others by hearing them.

Hence the need of education.

CHAP. XIV.

Education.

As every political community consists of those who govern and those who are governed, we must next consider whether both the rulers and the ruled ought to be the same persons for life, or different; for it is evident that the mode of education should follow in accordance with this distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much as we believe the gods and heroes differ from men, in the first place being far their superiors in the body, and secondly in the soul, so that the superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident beyond a doubt, it is certain, that it would be better for the one always to govern, the other always to be governed.[1] But, as this is not easy to obtain, and as kings are not so superior to those they govern as Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident, that for many reasons it is necessary that all in their

A previous question: ought the rulers and the ruled always to continue so?

[1] The sum is this; although abstractedly it would be the best thing for a state that it should be ruled by some one manifestly superior to the rest, like a god or a hero, yet practically,—as it is impossible to find such a person,—in ordinary cases the citizens ought to take their turns in ruling and being ruled. Still, no doubt, the ἄρχοντες ought to differ in virtue from the ἀρχόμενοι. And nature, by the analogy of other cases, solves this difficulty, for she distinguishes the old from the young by a variety of excellencies.

turns should share both in governing and in being governed; for it is just that those who are equal should have every thing alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is founded in injustice. For all those in the country who are desirous of innovation, will apply themselves to such persons as are under the government of the rest; but it is impossible that the number of individuals in a state will be so great as to get the better of all these. But that the governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator therefore ought to consider, how this shall be, and how it may be contrived that all shall have their equal share in the administration. Now with respect to this point we have already spoken. For nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying down the self-same distinction, when she has made some young, others old; the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter to command. For no one when he is young is offended at his being under government, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive the same tribute, when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others they are different; it is therefore necessary that their education should be in some respect the same, in others different: just as they say that he who will be a good governor, ought first to learn to obey. Now, of governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the sake of him who commands, others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each other. Now, some things which are commanded differ from others, not in the business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works, even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end proposed, and in the reason for which they are undertaken. Since, then, we have determined that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor is the same as of a good man, and that every one before he commands should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legis-

To some extent, but not wholly.

Consequently the education of the two classes will be partly the same and partly not.

lator to consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is necessary to that purpose, and what is the ultimate object of the best-spent life.[1] Now the soul of man may be divided into two parts;[2] that which has reason itself, and that which has not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be good. But in which of these the end subsists, will not be difficult for those to determine who adopt the division which we have already given; for the inferior always exists for the sake of the superior; and this is equally evident both in the works of art, as well as in those of nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it, namely, the theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary for this part also. The same analogy holds good with respect to actions; of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by those who have it in their power; for that is always most eligible to every one, which is the highest attainable end. Now life is divided into labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do, the objects are partly necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference to these, that we do to the different parts of the soul, and its actions; as war to procure peace; labour for the sake of rest; and the useful for the noble. The politician, therefore, who composes a body of laws, ought to extend his legislation to every thing, the different parts of the soul, and their actions; more particularly to those things which are of a superior nature, and ends; and, in the same manner, to the lives of men, and their different actions. They ought to be fitted both for

Education the province of the legislator, and why.

The politician ought to be acquainted with the whole nature of man.

[1] The connexion is as follows. "Since the virtue of the best ruler is, to some extent at least, the same as that of the best subject, we must see what course of instruction will tend to make him good. Now as the soul is divided into two parts, the irrational and the rational, the latter is superior; and this is again divided into two parts, the theoretic and the practical, of which the latter is inferior to the former, and consequently must be made subservient to it. So also ἀσχολία must contribute towards σχολή, and war towards peace. This is the right principle to be kept in view in the education of the young, but it is neglected in almost all states."

[2] For this two-fold division of the soul, the reader must refer to Aristotle's Nicom. Ethics, book i. chap. 13.

Education should tend to what is noble as well as what is useful.

labour and war, but rather for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but still more what is noble. It is to those objects that the education of the children ought to tend, and that of all those ages which require education. But those of the Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who founded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view to the best end, nor to every virtue, in their laws and education; but meanly to have attended to those which are useful and productive of gain. And nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written lately; for, by praising the Lacedæmonian state, they show that they approve of the intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of his government.[1] But that this is contrary to reason, is easily proved by argument, and has already been proved by facts. But as the generality of men desire to have command over the many, because thus they have every thing desirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and each of those others who have written on the state of Lacedæmon seem to approve of their legislator, for having procured them an extensive command, by inuring them to all sorts of dangers. And yet it is evident, since the Lacedæmonians no longer have the supreme power, that neither are they happy, nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous, that while they preserved an obedience to his laws, and no one opposed their being governed by them, they have thrown away the means of living honourably. But these people understand not rightly what sort of government it is which the legislator ought to hold in esteem; for a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought happy, nor should a legislator be commended on this account, because he has trained the people so as to overpower their neighbours. For in this there is a great inconvenience: since it is evident, that upon this principle every citizen who can, must endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own

Wrong end of the Spartan constitution.

[1] Upon the merits and demerits of the Spartan constitution, the reader will do well to bestow a very careful attention on the immortal work of the great historian and apologist of the Dorians, Müller; especially vol. ii. chaps. 1, 6, 7, and 8

city; and this is the crime of which the Lacedæmonians accuse Pausanias, though he enjoyed such great honours. But no part of such reasoning and such laws is either political, or useful, or true: but a legislator ought to instil into the minds of men those laws which are most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. As to training a people for war, this ought to be the care of a legislator, not in order that they may enslave their inferiors, but that they may not themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In the next place, he should take care, that they seek to take the lead for the benefit of those who are under them, and not to exercise a despotism over all. In the third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing, that all the attention which the legislator pays to the business of war, and all other rules which he lays down, should have for their object rest and peace. Since most of such states as the above are preserved by war; but, as soon as they have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are ruined. For during peace, like a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of which lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.

True end of all warlike training.

CHAP. XV.

As there seems to be the same end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen, and as of necessity a good man and a good citizen must have the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, and of labour, rest. But both those virtues whose object is rest, and those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things, in order that we may be at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance and justice at both times; but these chiefly in

Rest and peace an end to states as to individuals.

time of peace and rest. For war obliges men to be just and temperate, but the enjoyment of pleasure and peaceful repose is more apt to produce insolence. Those indeed who are easy in their circumstances, and enjoy every thing that can make them happy, have great occasion for the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus, if there are, as the poets tell us, any inhabitants in the Happy Isles, to these a higher degree of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live at their ease, in the full plenty of all such pleasures. It is evident therefore, that a share of these virtues is necessary in every state that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear good only by labour and being at war, but while at peace and at rest, the meanest of men. And for this reason virtue should not be cultivated as among the Lacedæmonians; for they do not differ from others in considering different things from others as the chiefest good, but in imagining that this good is to be procured by one particular virtue. But since these are greater goods, hence it is evident that the enjoyment of these is greater than that of those virtues, and that it is so for its own sake; but how and by what means this is to be effected, must now be scientifically considered. We have already assigned three causes on which it will depend, nature, custom, and reason, and we have shown what sort of men nature must produce for this purpose; it remains then as to education, that we determine with which we shall first begin, reason or custom. For these ought always to conspire in the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen, that reason may miss the best end proposed, and yet be corrected by custom. In the first place, then, it is evident that in this, as in other things, its beginning arises from some principle, and its end also arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us, reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production, therefore, and the care of our habits, ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and unreasoning, with their habits; and these are two in number, one belonging to each part, namely, appetite and intelligence; and, as the body is in

Peaceful virtues therefore superior to warlike ones.

Our lower faculties to be re-

production before the soul, so is the unreasoning part of the soul before the reasoning. And this is evident; for anger, will, and desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but reason and intelligence spring up as they go on to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily demands our care previous to the soul; next the appetites, for the sake of the mind; the body, for the sake of the soul.

garded before, and for the sake of, our higher ones.

CHAP. XVI.

Since then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the children are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be given to matrimony; at what time and in what condition it is proper that the citizens should engage among themselves in the nuptial contract. Now, with respect to this alliance, the legislator ought to consider the parties and their time of life, that they may correspond in their ages, and that their bodily powers may not be different; that is to say, the man being still able to beget children, but the woman too old to bear them; or, on the contrary, the woman being young enough to produce children, but the man too old to be a father; for from such a situation discords and disputes continually arise. In the next place, with respect to the succession of children, there ought not to be too great an interval of time between them and their parents; for, when there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child's affection, or the child any advantage from his father's protection. Neither should the difference in years be too little, as great inconveniences may arise from it; for proper reverence is not shown to such parents, by a boy who considers his father as nearly his equal in age, and disputes are wont to arise in the management of the family. But, to return to the point of our digression, care ought to be taken that the bodies of the children may be such as will answer the expectations of the legislator; and this also will be effected by the same means. Since the season for the production of children is determined, generally speaking, at seventy years of age for the man, and for the woman at fifty, the entering into the marriage state, as far as time is concerned, should be regulated within these periods. It is extremely bad

Marriage an object of consideration.

Fit age of the parties.

for the production of children that the father be too young; for in all animals whatsoever the offspring of the young are imperfect, and they are more likely to beget females than males, and diminutive also in size. The same thing of course necessarily holds true with regard to men; as a proof of this, in those cities where the men and women usually marry very young, the people in general are very small and ill-formed; in childbirth also the women suffer more, and more of them die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle at Trœzen should be explained, as if it referred to the many women who were destroyed by too-early marriages, and not to their gathering their fruits too soon. It is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who marry early are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies of men from acquiring their full size, if they marry before their growth is completed; for there is a determinate period, beyond which there is no further increase. For this reason the proper time for a woman to marry is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they will also together cease to have children at a proper time. And moreover with respect to the succession of the children, if they have them at the time which may reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving at perfect manhood when their parents are sinking down under the load of seventy years. Thus much then we have said as to the time which is proper for marriage; but moreover a proper season of the year should be observed, as many persons do now, appropriating the winter for this matter. The married couple ought also to regard the precepts of physicians and naturalists, for physicians speak sufficiently as to the periods of the year which suit the body, and philosophers praise the northern rather than the southern winds, both of whom have treated on the procreation of children. As to what is the fit disposition of body for the children which are to be born, we will now set aside the question, as it will better suit to speak of it when we treat of the education of children; but it is enough to draw out a slight sketch at present. Now, the habit of body belonging to a wrestler is not suited to political life, nor to health, nor to the procreation of children; nor is an infirm habit or too much dispirited by misfortunes, but one between

Proper season of the year,

and condition of the body.

both of these. The man ought to have a habit of labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that be confined to one object only, as that of a wrestler; but to such things as are proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for men and women. It is right also that women with child should take care of their bodily health, not living without exercise, nor using too spare a diet; and this it will be easy for the legislator to effect, if he commands them once every day to repair to the regular worship of the gods who are honoured as presiding over matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the body, the mind ought to be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants partake of the nature of the soil, so do children receive much of the disposition of the mother. With respect to the exposing or bringing up of children, let it be a law, that nothing imperfect or maimed shall be brought up; but to avoid an excess of population, let some law be laid down, if it be not permitted by the customs and habits of the people, that any of the children born shall be exposed; for a limit must be fixed to the population of the state. But if any parents have more children than the number prescribed, before life and sensation begins, an abortion must be brought about; for what is right and contrary to right in such a case is determined by sensation and life. And as the proper time has been pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the marriage state, so also let us determine how long it is advantageous for the community that they should continue to beget children; for as the children of those who are too young are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose parents are too old are weak in both. While therefore the intellect continues in perfection, which (as some poets say, who reckon the different periods of life by sevens) is up to fifty years, or four or five more, the children may be equally perfect; but when the parents are past that age, it is better they should abstain from sexual intercourse, openly at least; but after that time intercourse should be continued only for the sake of health or some other cause. With respect to any connexion between a man and a woman, when either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter detestation on any pretext whatsoever; but should any one be proved guilty of such a

Checks to population.

thing after the marriage is consummated, let his infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.[1]

CHAP. XVII.

The rearing of children.

1. Bodily.

But when a child is born, it must be supposed that the strength of its body will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will examine into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who are very desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will find that they feed them chiefly with abundance of milk, as being best accommodated to their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers. Those motions also which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and to prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their extreme ductility, some people even now use particular machines in order that their bodies may not be distorted. It is also useful to inure them to the cold when they are very little; for this is very serviceable for their health, and also most useful for the business of war. For this reason it is customary with many of the barbarians to dip their children in rivers, when the water is cold; with others, to clothe them very slightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is possible to accustom children to, it is best to accustom them to it from the first, but to do it by degrees. Besides, children have naturally a habit of loving the cold, on account of their natural heat. The earliest age, then, ought to be regarded with such and similar attention. During the next period to this, which continues till the child is five years old, it is best to teach him nothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it should hinder his growth; but he should be accustomed to use so much motion as to avoid an indolent habit of body; and this he will acquire by various means, and among others by play; his play also ought to be neither illiberal, nor too laborious, nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors also should take care what sort of tales and stories it may be proper for them to hear; for all these ought to pave the way for their future

2. Mental.

[1] To this chapter Aristotle refers by anticipation in book ii. chap. 10, where he says, "whether he (Minos) in this did well or ill, we shall have another opportunity of considering."

instruction; for which reason the generality of their play should be imitations of what they are afterwards to do seriously. They too do wrong who forbid by laws the disputes and little troubles between boys, for they contribute to increase their growth. For they act as a sort of exercise to the body, and the struggles of the heart, and the compression of the spirits, give strength to those who labour, which happens to boys in their disputes. The preceptors also ought to have an eye upon their manner of life, and those with whom they converse; and to take care that they are as little as possible in the company of slaves. At this time and till they are seven years old, it is necessary that they should be educated at home. It is also very proper to banish, both from their hearing and sight, every thing which is illiberal and the like. Indeed it is as much the business of the legislator, as any thing else, to banish every indecent expression out of the state; for from a permission to speak whatever is shameful, very quickly arises the doing it, and this particularly with young people. For which reason let them never speak nor hear any such thing; but if it appears that any freeman has done or said any thing that is forbidden, before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the common meals, let him be punished by disgrace and stripes; but if a person above that age does so, let him be treated as you would a slave, on account of his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking every thing which is forbidden, it is necessary that he neither see obscene stories or pictures;[1] the magistrates therefore are to take care, that there are no statues or pictures of any thing of this nature, except only to those gods to whom the law permits them, and to which the law allows persons of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themselves, their wives, and children. It should also be forbidden by law for young persons to be present either at Iambics or comedies, before they are arrived at that age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of the table; indeed a good education will preserve them from drunkenness and from all the evils which attend on these things. We have at present just cursorily

Home training.

Every thing indecent to be kept from children.

Plays.

[1] Compare Juv. Sat. xiv. l. 44:

"Nil dictu fædum visuve ea limina tangat
Intra quæ puer est."

touched upon this subject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to it, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or, if necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only mentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodorus, the tragic actor, was not a bad one, "That he would permit no one, not even the meanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might first engage the ear of the audience." The same thing happens both in our connexions with men and things; what we meet with first pleases best. And for this reason children should be kept strangers to every thing which is bad, more particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to good manners. When five years are accomplished, the two next may be very properly employed in being spectators of those exercises which they will afterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which education ought to be divided, according to the age of the child; the one is, from his being seven years of age to the time of boyhood; the other, from thence till he is one and twenty. For those who divide ages by the number seven are in general wrong; it is much better to follow the division of nature; for every art and every instruction is intended to complete what nature has left defective. We must first then consider, if any regulation whatsoever is requisite for children; in the next place, whether it is advantageous to make it a common care, or that every one should act therein as he pleases, as is the general practice in most cities; and, in the third place, what it ought to be.

Two periods of education.

BOOK VIII.—CHAP. I.

The neglect of education prejudicial to the state.

No one can doubt that the legislator ought greatly to interest himself in the care of youth; for, where it is neglected, it is hurtful to the city.[1] For every state ought to be governed according

[1] The indispensable nature of education for the young is proved by the fact that many states have suffered from the absence of it. And it must

to its particular nature; for the character of each government is that which peculiarly marks it, and as this originally established it, so it usually preserves it. For instance, a democratic character preserves a democracy, the oligarchic an oligarchy, but universally the best character tends to produce the best government. Besides, as in every business and art there are some things necessary to the performance of their several works which men must learn first, and to which they must be accustomed; so it is evident that the same thing is necessary towards the practice of virtue. As there is one end in view in every city, it is evident that education ought to be one and the same in all; and that this should be a common care, and not that of each individual, as it now is, when every one takes care of his own children separately, and each parent in private teaches them as he pleases, but the training of what belongs to all ought to be in common. Besides, no one ought to think that any citizen belongs to him in particular, but to the state in general; for each one is a part of the state, and it is the natural duty of each part to regard the good of the whole; and for this the Lacedæmonians may be praised, for they give the greatest attention to education, and they make it public.[1] It is evident then, that laws should be laid down concerning education, and that it should be public.

Education the same in all states.

The Spartan system praised.

CHAP. II.

WHAT education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what should be well known; for

Shall we educate with a

be regulated and directed with a view to the character or genius of the state itself. The citizens, consequently, will not all be educated to one and the same end, but fashioned to the good of that particular system of which they chance to be members.

[1] "The constitution" (of Dorian states), says Müller, "was formed for the education as well of the old as of the young; and in a Doric state, education was upon the whole a subject of greater importance than government. . . . . Every thing could be traced to a desire of making the Spartans courageous warriors, and Sparta a dominant and conquering state. . . . . The Doric state was a body of men, acknowledging one strict principle of order, and one unalterable rule of manners; and so subjecting themselves to this system, that scarcely any thing was unfettered by it, but every action was influenced and regulated by the recognised principles." (Dorians, vol ii. book iii. chap. 1.)

view to utility, or to virtue?

now-a-days there are doubts concerning the business of it, as all people do not agree in those things they would have a child taught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue, and a happy life: nor is it clear, whether the object of it should be to improve the intellect, or to rectify the morals. The view gained from the present mode of education is confused, and we cannot determine with certainty whether it is right to instruct a child in what will be useful to him in life; or in that which tends to virtue, and is really excellent: for all these things have their separate defenders. As to virtue, there is no particular in which they all agree: for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it reasonably follows that they will not cultivate the same. It is evident, that out of the number of useful things, what is necessary ought to be taught to all: but that which is necessary for one is not necessary for all; for as there ought to be a distinction between the employment of a freeman and a slave, the freeman should be taught every thing useful, which will not make him who knows it mean.[1] But every work is to be esteemed mean, and every art, and every discipline as well, which renders the body, the mind, or the understanding of freemen unfit for the habit and practice of virtue. For which reason all those arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all those employments which are exercised for gain; for they take off from the leisure of the mind, and render it sordid. There are also some liberal arts, which are not improper for freemen to apply to in a certain degree; but all sedulous endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them, is exposed to the faults I have just mentioned. For there is a great deal of difference in the reason for which any one does or learns any thing: for it is not illiberal to engage in it for the sake of oneself, or of one's friend, or in the cause of virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of another, may seem to be acting the part of a servant and a slave. The modes of instruction which now prevail, as we said before, seem to partake of both these parts.

Freemen to be debarred from illiberal arts.

[1] The test to be applied is the tendency of any thing to incapacitate for virtue those who learn it. But even illiberal sciences may be pursued up to a certain point; so long as the motive on which they are studied is a liberal one, and they are not pursued for the sake of gain.

CHAP. III.

Four things to be taught children.

THERE are as nearly as possible four things which it is usual to teach children:[1] reading, gymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the fourth place) some add painting. Reading and painting they teach as being both of them of great and various use in life, and gymnastic exercises, as tending to produce courage. As to music, some persons may entertain a doubt, since most persons now use it for the sake of pleasure: but those who originally made it part of education, did so because, as has been already said, nature requires not only that we should be properly employed, but that we should be able to enjoy leisure honourably: for this (to repeat what we have already said) is of all things the principal. But, though both labour and rest are necessary, yet the latter is preferable to the former; and by all means we ought to learn what we should do when at rest: for surely we ought not to employ that time in play; for then play would be the necessary business of our lives. But since this cannot be, play is more necessary for those who labour than for those who are at rest; for he who labours requires relaxation; and this play will supply. For as labour is attended with pain and continued exertion, on this account it is necessary that play should be introduced, under proper regulations, as a medicine: for such an employment of the mind is a relaxation to it, and combines ease with pleasure. Now rest in itself seems to partake of pleasure, and happiness, and an agreeable life: but this cannot be theirs who labour, but theirs who are at rest; for he who labours, labours for the sake of some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an end which all persons think is attended with pleasure, and not with pain. Now all persons do not agree in making this pleasure consist in the same thing; for each one has his particular standard, corresponding to his own habits; but the best man proposes the best pleasure, and that which arises from the noblest actions. So that it is evident, that to live a life of rest, there are some things which a man must learn

Music to be taught, as a means of employing leisure well.

Different standards of pleasure.

[1] Compare Diodorus Siculus, vol. i. p. 486.

and be instructed in; and that the object of this learning and this instruction is only their acquisition: but the learning and instruction which is given for labour, has for its object other things. For this reason the ancients made music a part of education; not as a thing necessary, (for it is not of that nature,) nor as a thing useful, as reading is, towards the common course of life, or for managing of a family, or for learning any thing as useful in public life. Painting also seems useful, to enable a man to judge more accurately of the productions of the finer arts. Nor is it like the gymnastic exercises, which contribute to health and strength; for neither of these things do we see produced by music. There remains for it, then, to be the employment of our rest, and this is the end which they had in view who introduced it; for they thought it a proper employment for freemen, and to them they allotted it; as Homer sings:

Music taught among the ancients.

"How right to call Thalia to the feast!"[1]

and, addressing some others, he says:

"The bard was call'd, to ravish every ear:"

and, in another place, he makes Ulysses say, that the happiest part of man's life is,

"When at the festal board in order placed,
They listen to the song."[2]

A liberal education over and above mere utility.

It is evident then, that there is a certain education in which a child may be instructed, not as useful, nor as necessary, but as noble and liberal; but whether this is one or more than one, and of what sort, and how it is to be taught, shall be considered hereafter. We have now gone so far on our way as to show that we have the testimony of the ancients in our favour, by what they have handed down to us upon education; for music makes this plain. Moreover, it is necessary to instruct children in what is useful, not only on account of its being useful in itself, as, for instance, to learn to read, but also as the means of acquiring other different sorts of instruction. Thus, they

[1] This line, as well as the following, does not occur in the Homeric poems as they have come down to us at the present d

[2] Hom. Odyss. ix. 7.

should be instructed in painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in purchasing pictures, or in buying or selling of vases, but more particularly as it makes them judges of the beauties of the human form; for to be always hunting after the profitable ill agrees with great and freeborn souls. But as it is evident that a child should be taught morals before reasoning, and that his body should be cultivated before his intellect, it is plain that boys should be first put under the care of the different masters of the gymnastic arts, both to form the constitution of their bodies and to teach them their exercises.

Painting why useful.

CHAP. IV.

Now of those states which seem to take the greatest care of their children, some aim at producing in them a habit framed by athletic exercises, though these both prevent the growth, and hurt the form of their bodies.[1] But into this fault the Lacedæmonians did not fall; for they made their children fierce by painful labour, considering this to be chiefly useful to inspire them with courage. Though, as we have already often said, this is neither the only thing, nor the principal thing, necessary to attend to. And even with respect to this, they do not thus attain its end; for we do not find either in other animals, or in other nations, that courage necessarily attends the most cruel, but rather the milder, and those who have the dispositions of lions. For there are many people, who are eager both to kill men, and to devour human flesh, as the Achæans, and Heniochi[2] in Pontus, and many others in Asia; some of whom are as bad, and others worse, than these, who indeed live by freebooting, but are men of no courage. Nay, we know that the Lacedæmonians themselves,

Bodily training of children.

Its end.

[1] The Spartans do not indeed hurt the growth of the bodies of their youth; but still, by exclusive attention to bodily training, they brutalize their citizens; and this is not productive of the higher kind of bravery. To neglect all mental training is to render the citizens mean and vile: but with children, the body and the mind must not be exercised at the same time. Upon the general subject of Spartan education, see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. chap. 5.

[2] Comp. Müller's Orchomenus, p. 282. Aristotle's Eth. Nicom. viii. 5; and Herod. iv. 18, 106. (Goëttling.)

while they continued those painful labours, were superior to all others, though now they are inferior to many, both in war and gymnastic exercises; for they did not acquire their superiority by training their youth to these exercises, but because, being disciplined themselves, they were opposed to those who were not disciplined at all. What is fair and honourable ought then to take the foremost place in education; for it is not a wolf, nor any other wild beast, that will brave any noble danger, but rather a good man. So that those who permit boys to engage too earnestly in these exercises, while they do not take care to instruct them in what is necessary to do, render them too mean to speak the truth, and accomplished only in one duty of a citizen, but in every other respect good for nothing, as reason evinces. Nor should we form our judgments from past events, but from what we see at present: for now they have rivals in their mode of education, whereas formerly they had not. That gymnastic exercises, then, are useful, and in what manner, is admitted; for during youth, it is very proper to go through a course of those which are most gentle, omitting that violent diet and those painful exercises which are prescribed as necessary; that there may be nothing to prevent the growth of the body. And it is no small proof that they have this effect, that amongst the Olympic victors we can scarce find two or three who have gained a victory, both when boys and men, because the necessary exercises they went through when young deprived them of their strength. When they have allotted three years from the time of boyhood to the other parts of education, they are then of a proper age to submit to labour and a regulated diet. For it is impossible for the mind and body both to labour at the same time; as each labour is productive of contrary evils; the labour of the body preventing the progress of the mind, and the mind of the body.

Not to be severed from mental training.

Age for bodily training.

CHAP. V.

Doubts respecting music.

WITH respect to music we have already suggested some doubts; so that it will be proper to go over again more particularly what we then said, which

may serve as an introduction to what any person may choose to say upon it by way of remark.[1] For it is no easy matter distinctly to point out what power it has, nor on what accounts one should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, like sleep or wine; —(for these are nothing serious, but pleasing, and the "killers of care," as Euripides says;[2] for which reason they class them in the same order, and use for the same purpose all these, namely, sleep, wine, and music; and to these some add dancing;)—or shall we rather suppose that music has a tendency to produce virtue, having a power, as the gymnastic exercises have, to form the body in a certain way, and to influence the manners, so as to accustom its professors to rejoice rightly? Or shall we say, that it is of any service in the conduct of life, and an assistant to prudence? for this also is to be regarded as a third property attributed to it. Now it is evident that boys are not to be instructed in it as play; for those who learn do not play, for to learn is accompanied by pain: neither is it proper to permit boys at their age to enjoy perfect leisure; for to cease from education is by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect. But it may be thought that the earnest attention of boys is bestowed on this art for the sake of that amusement which they will enjoy when they come to be men and completely formed; but, if this is the case, why are they themselves to learn it, and not follow the practice of the kings of the Medes and Persians, who enjoy music by hearing others play, and so gain a share of pleasure and instruction? For of necessity those must be better skilled therein, who make this science their particular study and business, than those who have only spent so much time at it as is sufficient just to learn the principles of it. But if it is fit that children should toil at such matters, they ought also to learn the art of cookery; but this is absurd. The same doubt occurs, if music has a power of improving the manners; for why should they on this account themselves learn it, and not learn to rejoice rightly and

1. Is it to be regarded as a mere pastime?

2. Or has it any moral effects?

[1] There is here a possible allusion to the Poetics of Aristotle, where the question is further considered. See chapter 1.

[2] The allusion possibly is to his play of the Bacchæ, l. 382, etc.

μετὰ τ' ἀυλοῦ γελάσαι,
ἀναπαῦσάι τε μερίμνας.

to be able to form a judgment, by hearing others, as the Lacedæmonians? For without having ever learnt music, they are yet able to judge accurately, as men say, what melody is good and what is bad. The same reasoning may be applied if music is supposed to be the amusement of those who live an elegant and easy life; for we ask why should they learn themselves, and not rather enjoy the benefit of others' skill?

Analogy drawn from the gods.

Let us here consider what is our belief of the immortal gods in this particular. Now we find the poets never represent Jupiter himself as singing and playing; nay, we ourselves treat the professors of these arts as mean people, and say, that no man would practise them but a drunkard or a buffoon. But probably we may consider this subject more at large hereafter. The first question is, whether music is or is not to make a part of education? and of these three things which have been started in discussion, which is it able to effect? Is it to instruct, to amuse, or to employ leisure? Now all three ends are properly allotted to it, for it appears to partake of them all: for play is necessary for relaxation, and relaxation is pleasant, as it is a medicine for that uneasiness which arises from labour. It is admitted also that a happy life must be an honourable one, and a pleasant one too, since happiness consists in both these; and we all agree, that music is one of the most pleasing things, whether alone or accompanied with a voice; as Musæus says,

"Music, man's sweetest joy:"

for which reason it is justly admitted into every company and every happy life, as having the power of inspiring joy. So that from this any one may suppose that it is fitting to instruct young persons in it. For all those pleasures which are harmless are not only conducive to the final end of life, but serve also as relaxations; and, as men but rarely attain that final end, they often cease from their labour, and apply themselves to amusement, with no further view than to acquire the pleasure attending it. It is therefore useful to enjoy some such pleasures as these. There are some persons who make play and amusement their end, and probably that end has some pleasure annexed to it, but not what should be: but while

It is harmless and conducive to the end of life.

men seek the one, they accept the other for it. Because there is some likeness in human actions to the end: for the end is pursued for the sake of nothing else that attends it, but for itself only; and pleasures like these are sought for, not on account of what follows them, but on account of what has gone before them, as labour and grief. For this reason they seek for happiness in these sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason any one may readily perceive. That music should be general, not on this account only, but also as it is very serviceable towards relaxation from labour, probably no one doubts. We should also inquire, then, whence this arises; for it is too noble in its nature to be ultimately intended for this purpose; and we ought not only to partake of the common pleasure arising from it—(of which all have the sensation, for music naturally gives pleasure, and therefore the use of it is agreeable to all ages and all dispositions);—but also to examine if it tends in any way to improve our manners and our souls. And this will be easily known, if we feel our dispositions any way influenced thereby: and that they are so is evident from many other instances, as well as from the music at the Olympic games; and this confessedly fills the soul with enthusiasm: but enthusiasm is an affection of the soul which strongly agitates the disposition.[1] Besides, all those who hear any imitations sympathize therewith; and this when they are conveyed even without rhythm or verse. Moreover, as music chances to be one of those things which are pleasant, and as virtue itself consists in rightly enjoying, loving, and hating, it is evident that we ought not to learn, or accustom ourselves to any thing so much as to judge right, and to rejoice in honourable manners and noble actions. But anger and mildness, courage and modesty, and their contraries, as well as all other dispo-

Moral effects of music.

The power of imitation,

[1] Music clearly has a moral effect upon our souls; for (1.) *ποῖοί τινες γιγνόμεθα δι' ἀυτῆς*. For instance, we feel inspired with enthusiasm by some music; and this a moral feeling. (2.) From imitation we are taught to feel sympathy; now virtue is concerned with the feelings of love, hatred, etc. Now music gives us *ὁμοιώματα* of these; so that by taking pleasure in music, we come to be affected by those same feelings of which they are *μιμήσεις*, or expressions. And this is so, because when a person takes pleasure in a representation as being like the original form, it is likely that he will be pleased with that which it represents.

sitions of the mind, are most naturally imitated by music and poetry. This is plain from experience, for when we hear these our very soul is altered; and he who is affected either with joy or grief by the imitation of any objects, is in very nearly the same situation as if he was affected by the objects themselves. Thus, if any person is pleased with seeing a statue of any one, on no other account but its beauty, it is evident that the sight of the original, from whence it was taken, would also be pleasing. Now it happens that in the other senses there is no imitation of manners; that is to say, in the touch, and the taste; in the objects of sight, a very little: for these are merely representations of things, and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common to all. Besides, statues and paintings are not properly imitations of manners, but rather signs and marks which show that the body is affected by some passion. However, the difference is not great, yet young men ought not to view the paintings of Pauso, but of Polygnotus, or any other painter or statuary who expresses manners.[1] But in poetry and music there are imitations of manners; and this is evident, for different harmonies differ from each other so much by nature, that those who hear them are differently affected, and are not in the same disposition of mind when one is performed as when another is; the one, for instance, occasions grief, and contracts the soul, as the mixed Lydian: others soften the mind, and as it were dissolve the heart: others fix it in a firm and settled state. Such is the power of the Doric music only; while the Phrygian fills the soul with enthusiasm, as has been well described by those who have written philosophically upon this part of education; for they bring examples of what they advance from the things themselves. The same holds true with respect to rhythms; some fix the disposition, others occasion a change in it; some act more violently, others more liberally. From what has been said it is evident what an influence music has over the disposition of the mind, and how variously it can fascinate it: and if it can do this, most certainly it is what youth ought

to be found only in the hearing.

The Lydian, Doric, and Phrygian measures.

[1] Compare our author's Poetics, chap. 6. *οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος· ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐθὲν ἔχει ἦθος.*

to be instructed in. And indeed the learning of music is particularly adapted to their disposition; for at their time of life they do not willingly attend to any thing which is not agreeable, but music is naturally one of the most agreeable things; and there seems to be a certain connexion between harmony and rhythm; for which reason some wise men held the soul itself to be harmony, others, that it contains it.

CHAP. VI.

Should children be taught to sing and play?

We will now determine, whether it is proper that children should be taught to sing and play upon any instrument, a matter of doubt which we started before. Now it is clear that it makes a great deal of difference in qualifying persons for any art, if the person himself learns the practical part of it; for it is a thing very difficult, if not impossible, for men to be good judges of what they cannot do themselves. It is also very necessary that children should have some amusing employment. For which reason the rattle of Archytas seems well contrived, which they give children to play with, to prevent their breaking those things which are about the house; for owing to their youthful age they cannot sit still. This therefore is a toy well adapted to infants, and instruction ought to be their rattle as they grow up; hence it is evident, that they should be so taught music as to be able to practise it. Nor is it difficult to say what is becoming or unbecoming of their age, or to answer the objections which some make to this employment as mean and low.[1] In the first place, since it is necessary for them to practise in order that they may be judges of the art, this, then, should be done when they are young; but when they are grown older they may be spared the practical part, while they are able to judge of excellence in the art, and to take a proper pleasure in it, from the knowledge they acquired of it in their youth.

They need amusement.

Reasons why music is suited to children.

Popular objection to music answered.

[1] These two answers may be put thus: 1. It is not *βάναυσον* to learn, for it is well for the young to be able to judge of music, though they do not practise it when they grow up. 2. It does not make them *βάναυσοι* to learn; for such a branch of education will not be and must not be, allowed to interfere with other branches, or to render the body unfit for warlike exercises.

Another popular objection answered.

As to the censure which some persons throw upon music, as making men mean and low, it is not difficult to answer it, if we will but consider how far we propose that those who are to be educated so as to become good citizens, should be instructed in this art, and with what music and what rhythms they should be acquainted; and also on what instruments they should learn to play; for in these there is probably a difference. Here then is the proper answer to that censure, for it must be admitted, that in some cases nothing can prevent music being attended to a certain degree with the bad effects ascribed to it; it is therefore clear, that the learning of it should never prevent the business of riper years, nor render the body ignoble and unfit for the business of war or the state; so that it should be practised by the young, and used by the aged as a means to further instructions. And what we want would happen in reference to music, if they are not employed in those parts of it which are the objects of dispute between the masters in that science, and perform such pieces as excite wonder from the difficulty of their execution; and which, transferred from the public games, are now become a part of education. But let them learn so much of it as to be able to receive proper pleasure from excellent music and rhythms, and not that common part of music in which some of the brute animals take delight, and also slaves and boys. It is therefore plain what instruments they should use: thus, they should never be taught to play upon the flute, or any other instrument which requires great skill, as the harp, or the like, but on such as will make them good judges of music or any other branch of instruction. Besides, the flute is not a moral instrument, but rather one that will inflame the passions, and is therefore rather to be used when the soul is to be animated, than when instruction is intended. Let me add also, that there is something therein which is quite contrary to what education requires; as the player on the flute is prevented from speaking. For this reason our forefathers very properly forbade the use of it to youth and freemen, though they themselves at first used it; for when their riches procured them greater leisure, they grew more animated in the cause of virtue; and both before and after the Persian wars,

Limitations necessary.

Why the flute and harp are not proper for children.

their noble actions so exalted their minds that they attended to every part of education; selecting no one in particular, but endeavouring to collect the whole. And hence they introduced flute-playing also, and joined it with their other branches of instruction. At Lacedæmon[1] the choragus himself played on the flute for his choir; and it was so common at Athens, that almost every freeman understood it; as is evident from the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he was choragus, but afterwards they rejected it as dangerous; for they had become better judges of what tended to promote virtue, and what did not. For the same reason many of the ancient instruments were thrown aside, as the magadis and the lyre; as also such as tended to inspire those who played on them with pleasure, and all which required a scientific finger. What the ancients tell us by way of fable, of the flute, is indeed very rational; namely, that after Minerva had found the flute she threw it away; nor are they wrong who say, that the goddess disliked it because it deformed the face of him who played on it; not but that it is more probable that she rejected it, as the knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the improvement of the mind. Now, we regard Minerva as the inventress of arts and sciences. As we do not approve that a child should be taught to use and play on instruments like a master,—(and by this we mean that which is suited for contests in the art; for he who plays in this way plays not to improve himself in virtue, but to please those who hear him, and this in a common way,)—therefore we think the practice of it unfit for freemen, but then it should be confined to hired persons; for it usually gives people sordid notions, as the end they have in view is bad. For the impertinent spectator is accustomed to make them change their music, so that it forces the artists who attend to him to mould their manners and their bodies according to his motions.

CHAP. VII.

Harmony and rhythm.

We must now further enter into an inquiry concerning harmony and rhythm; whether all sorts of these are to be employed in education, or

[1] On the subject of the Doric chorus see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. chap. 7.

whether a selection must be made; and also whether we should give the same distinctions for those who are engaged in music as part of education, or whether there is something different from these two. Now, as all music consists in melody and rhythm,[1] we ought not to be unacquainted with the power which each of these has in education; as also whether we should rather choose music in which melody prevails, or rhythm. But as we consider that many things have been well written upon these subjects, not only by some musicians of the present age, but also by some philosophers, who are perfectly skilled in that part of music which belongs to education; we will refer those who desire a very particular knowledge of it to those writers, and shall only treat of it in general terms, speaking only in outline concerning it.

Common division of melody.

Melody is divided by some philosophers, of whose notions we approve, into moral, practical, and that which fills the mind with enthusiasm; they also allot to each of these a particular kind of harmony which naturally corresponds to it; and we say that music should not be applied to one purpose only, but to many; both for instruction, and purifying the soul;—(we now use the word purifying at present without any explanation, but shall speak more at large of it in our Poetics;)—and in the third place, as an agreeable manner of spending the time and a relaxation from any uneasiness of the mind. It is evident, then, that all harmonies are to be used, but not for all purposes; the most moral, in education; but the most active and enthusiastic, to please the ear, when others play. For that passion, which is to be found very strong in some souls, is to be met with also in all; but the difference in different persons consists in its being in a less or greater

Harmonies expressing moral feelings to be used.

[1] As to the difference between melody and rhythm, compare Aristotle's Poetics, chap. iv. It will be well to append here the note which stands in Buckley's edition. "Rhythm differs from metre, inasmuch as rhythm is proportion applied to any motion whatever; metre is proportion applied to the motion of words spoken. Thus in the drumming of a march, or in the dancing of a hornpipe, there is rhythm, though no metre. In Dryden's celebrated ode there is metre as well as rhythm, because with the rhythm the poet has associated certain words. And hence it follows, that though all metre is rhythm, yet all rhythm is not metre." See Harris's Philol. Inquiries, (p. 67,) where he also observes, very truly, that no English word expresses rhythmus better than the word *time*. (Twining on Arist. Poet.)

degree, as pity, fear, and enthusiasm; the latter of which is so powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and yet we see those persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe their mind, rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed the art of the physician. Now this very same thing must necessarily happen to the compassionate, the fearful, and all those who are subdued by their passions; nay, all persons, as far as they are affected with those passions, admit of the same cure, and are restored to tranquillity with pleasure. In the same manner, all music which has the power of purifying the soul, affords man a harmless pleasure. Such therefore should be the harmony and such the music which those who contend with each other in the theatre should exhibit. But as the audience is composed of two sorts of people, the free and the well instructed, the rude, the mean mechanics, and hired servants, and a whole herd of the like, there must be some music and some spectacles to please and soothe them. For as their minds are as it were perverted from their natural habits, so also is there an unnatural harmony and overcharged music which is accomodated to their taste: but what is according to nature gives pleasure to every one; and therefore those who are to contend upon the theatre, should be allowed to use this species of music. But in education a moral kind of melody and harmony should be used; and this is the Doric, as we have already said, or any other which is approved by those philosophers who are skilful in that music which is to be employed in education. But Socrates, in the Republic of Plato, is very wrong, when he permits only the Phrygian music to be used besides the Doric,[1] particularly as amongst other instruments he banishes the flute. For the Phrygian music has the same power in harmony as the flute has amongst the instruments; for they are both pathetic and raise the mind. This is proved by the practice of the poets, for in their Bacchanal songs, or whenever they describe any violent emotions of the mind, the flute is

The music which purifies the soul is good.

The error of Socrates in this respect.

[1] See Plato, Rep. book iii. chap. 10. These two strains are mentioned together by Horace, (Epod. ix. 5, 6,)

"Sonante mixtum tibiis carmen lyrâ,
Hâc Dorium, illis barbarum."

Upon the subject of the Dorian, Lydian, and Phrygian measures, it will be of advantage to the general reader to consult Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. book iv. chap. 6

the instrument which they chiefly use; and the Phrygian harmony is most suitable to these subjects. Now, it is allowed by general consent, that the Dithyrambic measure is Phrygian; and those who are conversant in studies of this sort bring many proofs of the fact. As, for instance, when Philoxenus endeavoured to compose Dithyrambic music for Doric harmony, he naturally fell back again into Phrygian, as being best fitted for that purpose. Now every one indeed agrees, that the Doric music is most serious, and fittest to inspire courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between the two extremes, and the Doric has this relation with respect to other harmonies, it is evident that in this rather than in any other should the youth be instructed. There are two points to be taken into consideration, both what is possible, and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour to possess himself of those things which contain both these qualities. But this is to be regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not easy for those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music as require very high notes, for nature points out to them those which are gentle and require little strength of voice. For this reason some who are skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates,[1] because he would forbid the youth to be instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like wine, it would intoxicate them. It does not, however, cause men to be Bacchanals, but languid, for it is wine rather which renders men Bacchanals. These, therefore, and such-like melodies, are what should employ those who are grown old. Moreover, if there is any harmony which is proper for a child's age, as being at the same time elegant and instructive, as the Lydian of all others seems chiefly to be, [this is to be adopted also.] These then are to be laid down as it were the three boundaries of education, namely, moderation, possibility, and decency.

The Dithyramb.

Character of Doric music.

The three boundaries of education.

[1] Socrates was wrong upon his own principles in retaining the Dorian and Phrygian music, as they were of a very opposite character; especially as he rejected the flute, which was the instrument most nearly corresponding to the Phrygian melodies, both being of an Orgiastic nature; whereas the Dorian is a grave melody, and is calculated to inspire a bold and manly character.

THE

ECONOMICS OF ARISTOTLE,

IN TWO BOOKS.

ARISTOTLE'S ECONOMICS.

BOOK I.—CHAP. I.

Difference between οἰκονομική and πολιτική.

THE economical and political science[1] differ not only in the same degree as a house and a city, (for these constitute the subject matter of them both,) but also in that political rule involves a plurality of governors, while economic rule is monarchical. Now in some of the arts a division is made, and it does not belong to the same art to make a thing and to use what is made, as for example, a lyre and flutes. It is however the province of the political science to constitute a city from the very first, and when constituted to turn it to a proper use; so that it is clear that it would naturally be the province of economic science both to found a house and to make use of it. Now a city[2] is such a collection of these houses and land and wealth, as brings about an independent and happy life. And this is clear from the fact that whenever the citizens are unable to attain this end, the community is dissolved. And further, this is the end for which they combine: but that for the sake of which any thing exists and is produced, is its essence; so that evidently economics are prior to politics in the order of nature, for their end is prior, and a house or family is a part of a city. We must therefore look into the economical science, and see what is its end.

A πόλις and an οἶκος contrasted.

[1] For a full explanation of the word πολιτική, and the relation in which οἰκονομική stands to it, the reader is referred to the note above on Pol. i. 1, and also to the excellent remarks contained in Professor Browne's translation of the Ethics. (See Analytical Introduction, p. v., etc.)

[2] With this compare the more precise statement and definition contained in Pol. i. chap. 2.

CHAP. II.

The component parts of an οἶκος.

THE component parts of a house are a man and property. But since the nature of any thing is first scientifically seen in its minutest parts,[1] the same would be the case with regard to a house; so that according to Hesiod it will be requisite that there should be,

"First house, then wife, then oxen for the plough;"[2]

for of these the first is requisite for the sake of food, and the other two belong to freemen. So that it would be necessary to lay down good regulations concerning the association of a wife; and this is to provide one of a fit and proper character. But with regard to property, the first attention should be paid to that which is in accordance with nature; but by nature agriculture is first, next come all those things which are derived from the earth, such as mining and other arts of the like kind. But agriculture should be ranked first because it is just;[3] for it does not derive its profits from men, either with their consent, like petty traffic and the mercenary arts, or without their consent, like the arts which pertain to war. Further also, agriculture is natural, for naturally every existing thing derives its nourishment from its mother, and so consequently men derive it from the earth.[4] Moreover

Need of rules respecting a wife.

Why agriculture to be first attended to.

[1] Compare the opening words of Pol. i. chap. 2, "Now if any one would watch the parts of a state from the very first as they rise into existence, as in other matters, so here, he would gain the truest view of the subject." This inductive method of entering upon his treatises is eminently practical and characteristic of our author, as we have before remarked.

[2] This verse, which is also quoted in Pol. i. 2, is taken from Hesiod's "*Opera et Dies*," book ii. line 23.

[3] Syllburg would transpose the words, and read *ἡ δὲ γεωργία, ὅτι μάλιστα δικαία*, "And agriculture is *κατὰ φυσίν*, because it is most just."

[4] This idea is very common in the Greek poets. Compare Æsch. Sept. c. Th. 16—19,

———*γῆ μητρὶ, φιλτάτῃ τροφῷ·*
ἡ γὰρ νέους ἔρποντας εὐμενεῖ πέδῳ,
ἅπαντα πανδοκοῦσα παιδείας ὅτλον,
ἐθρέψατ' οἰκιστῆρας ἀσπιδηφόρους.

and again Choeph. 127, *καὶ γαῖαν αὐτὴν, ἣ τὰ πάντα τίκτεται.*
and Prom. v. 90, *παμμῆτορ γῆ.*
So also Soph. Phil. 392, *ὀρεστέρα παμβῶτι Γᾶ, μᾶτερ αὐτοῦ Διός,*
σὲ κἀκεῖ, μᾶτερ πότνι', ἐπηυδώμαν.

it contributes much towards fortitude; for it does not make the body unserviceable, like the illiberal arts, but renders it fit to live and labour in the open air, and to run the risks of war against assailants. For husbandmen are the only persons whose possessions lie outside of the city walls.

CHAP. III.

The necessity of a wife.

But as to man, the first object of his care should be respecting a wife; for the society which exists between the male and female is above all others natural. For it is laid down by us elsewhere,[1] that nature aims at producing many such creatures as the several kinds of animals; but it is impossible for the female to accomplish this without the male, or the male without the female, so that the society between them exists of necessity. In all other animals indeed, this association is irrational, and exists only so far as they possess a natural instinct, and for the sake of procreation alone. But in the milder and more intelligent animals, this bond more nearly approaches perfection; for there seem to be in them more signs of mutual assistance and good-will, and of co-operation with each other. But this is especially the case with man, because the male and female here co-operate not only for the sake of existence, but of living happily. And the procreation of children is a means not only of subserving nature, but also of solid benefit; for the labour which they expend during their season of vigour upon their helpless young is given back to them in the decay of age, from their children who are then in vigour. And at the same time, by this continual cycle, nature provides for the continuance of the race as a species, since she cannot do so numerically. Thus divinely predisposed towards such a society is the nature of both the male and the female. For the sexes are at once divided, in that neither of them have powers adequate for all purposes,

The conjugal tie.

Distinct duties of the sexes.

A commentary on the idea may be found in the story of L. Junius Brutus, as related in Liv. i. 56. "Ex infimo specu vocem redditam ferunt Imperium summum Romæ habebit, qui vestrum primus, o juvenes, osculum matri tulerit . . . . Brutus, alio ratus spectare Pythicam vocem, velut si prolapsus cecidisset, *terram* osculo contigit; scilicet, *quod ea communis mater omnium mortalium esset.*"

[1] He alludes probably to Pol. i. chap. 2.

nay, in some respects even opposite to each other, though they tend to the same end. For nature has made the one sex stronger and the other weaker, that the one by reason of fear may be more adapted to preserve property, while the other, by reason of its fortitude, may be disposed to repel assaults; and that the one may provide things abroad, while the other preserves them at home. And with respect to labour, the one is by nature capable of attending to domestic duties, but weak as to matters out of doors; the other is ill-adapted to works where repose is necessary, but able to perform those which demand exercise. And with respect to children, the bearing of them belongs to one sex, but the advantage of them is common to both; for the one has to rear them, and the other to educate them.

CHAP. IV.

The husband's duty towards his wife.

FIRST of all, then, certain laws are to be observed towards a wife, and especially to refrain from injuring her; for thus neither will a man be injured himself. And this is suggested by the common law of nature, (bidding us,) as the Pythagoreans say, "not to injure a suppliant torn away from the hearth;" but the injuries inflicted by a husband are his *liaisons* out of doors. But as to intercourse, the wife ought to be able to rest in the absence of her husband, and accustomed to be content whether he is with her or away from home. Well then has Hesiod said,

> "A maiden wed, and wholesome laws instil;"[1]

for dissimilarity of manners is most apt to interrupt affection. With respect to ornament, however, they ought not to approach each other with any studied affectation in their manners or in their persons; for the society which is accompanied with studied ornament differs in no respect from that of tragedians with each other on the stage.[2]

[1] Opera et Dies, book ii. l.

[2] Bekker ἐν τῇ σκευῇ. Syllb. retains the same, but in a note suggests the emendation of Camerarius, ἐν τῇ σκήνῃ. But the former word is used in the same sense in Herod. i. 24, and Aristoph. Ranæ, 108.

CHAP. V.

But of property, the first and most necessary part is that which is best and chiefest; and this is man. Hence it is necessary to obtain worthy slaves. But there are two kinds of slaves, a steward and a drudge. But since we see that modes of education form the characters of the young, it is necessary when you have procured them to rear up those to whose care liberal offices are to be committed.[1] And the conduct of a master towards his slaves should be such as not to suffer them to be insolent or negligent; and to those who are more liberal than others, he ought to give a share of honour, and to the working slaves a sufficiency of food. And since the drinking of wine makes even freemen insolent, and since many nations even of freemen abstain from it, (as the Carthaginians when on service,) it is clear that they should be allowed to partake of it either not at all or very seldom. But as there are three things [to be regarded], work, punishment, and food, to give them food unaccompanied by work or punishment, is wont to cause insolence; but to give them labour and punishment without food is tyrannical, and makes them unable to work. It remains, therefore, to give them employment and sufficient food; for it is not possible to rule over them without giving a recompence; but the recompence of a slave is his food. But as other men become worse when they get nothing by being better, and when no rewards are given for virtuous or vicious actions, so it is with slaves. And hence we must look closely into their character, and distribute or withhold every thing according to merit, both food and clothing, leisure and punishments; imitating both in word and in deed the faculty of physicians, by way of a remedial measure, considering that food, owing to its being continual, has nothing remedial in it. But those races of slaves will be best adapted for work which are not excessively cowardly or daring, for both of the latter act injuriously towards their masters: those who are very cowardly will not endure to work, and the high-spirited are

Good slaves also necessary.

Their treatment.

Need of encouraging slaves.

[1] The Oxford edition, following the text of Sylburgius, has πρυσαστέον But the sense is scarcely affected by the change of words.

not easily ruled. It is likewise requisite that an end should be defined to all things; it is therefore right and expedient that freedom should be proposed to them as a reward; for they will be willing to labour when a prize and a definite space of time is laid down. It is right also to bind them as hostages by their families, and not to have too many slaves of the same nation; and to appoint sacrifices and holidays, more for the sake of slaves than of the free; for the latter possess more of these advantages, and it is on this account that such things were devised.

How to bind them to the master's family.

CHAP. VI.

How to acquire and how to preserve property.

But there are four qualities pertaining to the master of a household which he ought to possess respecting riches. For he ought to be able to procure them, and also to preserve them; but if not, then there is no profit in procuring them; for this is but "to draw water in a sieve and a perforated tub," as the proverb has it. Moreover he ought to be apt in applying what he possesses to the purposes of ornament and use, for it is on this account that we need such a thing as wealth. The several kinds of his possessions ought moreover to be divided, and there ought to be more of them fruitful than unfruitful. His employments also ought to be so divided as not to incur risks with all his property at the same time. And for the purpose of preserving his property, it is expedient to use the Persian and Lacedæmonian customs. The Athenian economy also is useful, for they sell their produce, and buy [what they want]; and so there is no need for storing and warehousing in families of small means. The Persian custom is that the master shall order and inspect every thing with his own eye, as Dion said of Dionysius; for no one takes the same care of what belongs to his neighbour as he does of his own property; so that it is necessary for a master himself to inspect every thing as far as possible. The saying of the Persian and the African too is to the purpose; for the former, on being asked what was the best thing to fatten a horse, answered, "The eye of his master;" and the African being asked what was the best manure, replied, "The foot-

The customs of various countries considered.

A master should superintend all things.

steps of the landowner." Some things therefore should be inspected by the master himself, and some by his wife, according as the employments of housekeeping are divided between them. And this is to be done but seldom in small establishments, but often in those where a steward is employed. For it is not possible to imitate well, unless a good model is proposed, either in other things or in the matter of a stewardship; so that it is impossible for stewards to be careful, where the masters are careless. But since these things are both honourable in respect of virtue, and useful towards economy, it is requisite that masters should rise before their slaves and go to rest later, and that a house, like a city, should never be left unguarded; and what ought to be done should be omitted neither by day nor by night. It is likewise well to rise before daybreak; for this contributes to health, wealth, and wisdom. Where then the establishment is small, the Athenian method of disposing the fruits of the earth is useful; but in great ones a division must be made between the yearly and monthly expenditure; and in like manner with respect to vessels in daily or occasional use; and these things must be given over to the stewards. And besides this, these matters should be reviewed at intervals of time, that it may be known what is preserved and what is wanting. But with respect to the possessions themselves, the house should be furnished with a view to both health and comfort. And by "possessions," I mean what is advantageous towards producing crops and clothing, and what suits for preserving dry or moist fruits; and by other possessions, what places are accommodated to the reception of animate and inanimate things, whether slaves or freemen, women or men, strangers or citizens. And with reference to comfort and health, the house should be situated so as to be airy in summer, and sunny in the winter. But this will be effected, if it is exposed to the north, and has less depth than width. And in great establishments a doorkeeper would seem to be useful; he may be one who is useless for other employments, except to watch over what is brought in or carried out of the house. And for the ready use of utensils the Lacedæmonian method is serviceable; for every thing there must lie in its own place, for thus it will be ready at hand, and not have to be sought after (when wanted)

Useful effects of early rising.

Watchfulness and close inspection.

Situation of a house.

CHAP. VII.[1]

Portrait of a good wife.

A GOOD and perfect wife ought to be mistress of every thing within the house, and to have the care of every thing according to fixed laws; allowing no one to come in unbidden by her husband, and especially keeping on her guard against every thing which can be noised abroad relating to a woman's dishonour. So that if any mischance has happened within doors, she alone ought to know about it; but when those who have come in have done any thing wrong, the husband should bear the blame. And she should manage the expenses laid out upon such festivals as her husband has agreed with her in keeping, and make an outlay of clothes and other ornaments on a somewhat lesser scale than is encouraged by the laws of the state; considering that neither splendour of vestments, nor pre-eminence of beauty, nor the amount of gold, contributes so much to the commendation of a woman, as good management in domestic affairs, and a noble and comely manner of life; since all such array of the soul is far more lovely, and has greater force (than any thing besides), to provide herself and her children true ornament till old age. A wife therefore ought to inspire herself with confidence, and perpetually to be at the head of domestic affairs. For it is unseemly for a man to know all that goes on in the house; in all respects indeed she ought to be obedient to her husband, and not to busy herself about public affairs, nor to take part in matrimonial concerns. And when it is time to give

Her conduct towards her husband.

[1] The first book of the Economics of Aristotle is clearly imperfect, as it only opens the subject of economy so far as it appertains to domestic affairs, and then concludes most abruptly. The Greek text of the latter part of the book which follows here, would seem to have perished at a very early period; and accordingly this part of the treatise has existed only in the shape of a Latin translation made from the original text by Aretinus, which has been rendered back into Greek by Tussanus, and is retained in both languages in the Oxford edition of Aristotle's Politics and Economics which issued from the Clarendon press in 1810, from the text of Syllburgius, with the Latin version of D. Lambinus. As the following chapters are necessary to complete the imperfect remains of the treatise as it generally stands, they have been translated and appended in the present edition.

his daughters in marriage, or to get wives for his sons, by all means in these respects she should obey her husband. And she ought to show herself a fellow-counsellor to her husband, so as to assent to what pleases him, remembering that it is less unseemly for a husband to take in hand domestic matters, than for a wife to busy herself in affairs out of doors. But the well-ordered wife will justly consider the behaviour of her husband as a model of her own life, and a law to herself, invested with a divine sanction by means of the marriage tie and the community of life. For if she can persuade herself to bear her husband's ways patiently, she will most easily manage matters in the house; but if she cannot, she will have greater difficulty. So that it will be seemly for her to show herself of one mind with her husband, and tractable, not only when her husband is in good luck and prosperity, but also when he is in misfortune; and when good fortune has failed him, or sickness has laid hold of his bodily frame, or when he has been deprived of his senses, she ought gently and sympathetically to yield in any matter which is not base and unworthy; but if her husband has been ailing and made a mistake, she ought not to keep it on her mind, but to lay the blame on disease or ignorance. For in proportion as she is now more careful to give way, so much the more gratitude will her husband feel towards her, when his ailment has passed by; and if she fails to obey him when he commands something which is unseemly, he will be able to pardon her with a better grace when he recovers. Observing such rules as these, the wife ought to show herself even more obedient to the rein than if she had entered the house as a purchased slave. For she has been bought at a high price, for the sake of sharing life and bearing children; than which no higher or holier tie can possibly exist. Further, if the husband with whom she has lived should fare amiss, her merit would not otherwise reach the same pitch of fame and of good report. It is no small thing indeed to make a good use of prosperity, but it is a far greater thing to endure the contrary lot in a fitting manner. For in every way it is the mark of a lofty mind to show no signs of depression under great sufferings and injuries. It is indeed much to be desired that nothing of the kind should happen to her husband; but if any thing of an adverse nature should surprise him, she ought straightway

In adversity.

to consider that she will gain far higher praise if she directs matters successfully; recalling to her mind the fact that neither would Alcestis have gained such renown, nor Penelope have been deemed worthy of so much praise, had they respectively lived with their husbands in prosperous circumstances; and that it is the sufferings of Admetus and Ulysses which have given to them an everlasting fame. For by preserving faith and justice in the midst of their own husbands' misfortunes, they have gained a deserved reputation. For it is easy to find persons who will share prosperity; but, except a very few and very good ones, women are not willing to share misfortunes. For all these reasons it behoves each woman above all things to honour her husband, and not to despise him if a sacred sense of respect and wealth, which, according to Orpheus, is "the child of confidence," does not attend him. A wife, then, ought carefully to preserve herself in such customs and laws as these.

Examples of noble matrons.

CHAP. VIII.

Conduct of a husband towards his wife.

But the husband in his turn should find out certain laws to regulate his treatment of his wife, as one who entered the house of her husband to share his children and his life, and to leave him a progeny destined to bear the names of her husband's parents and her own. And what in the world could there be more holy than these ties? or what is there about which a man in his sound senses could strive more earnestly, than to beget the children who shall hereafter nurse his declining years, from the best and most praiseworthy of wives; for they are to be, as it were, the best and most pious preservers of their father and mother, and guardians of the entire family. For it is probable that they will turn out good, if they have been reared uprightly by their parents in the habitual practice of what is just and holy; but if the contrary should be the case, they will suffer the loss themselves. For unless parents afford their children a fit pattern of life, they will leave them an obvious excuse to quote against themselves. And this is to be feared, that if they have not lived well, their sons will disregard them, and neglect them in their old age. On this account nothing is to be omitted which tends to the fit

Education of females.

education of a bride, so that the children may be born of the best possible mother. For the husbandman neglects nothing so as to cast his seed upon the richest and best wrought ground, considering that it is from such a soil that he will hereafter reap the fairest fruits; and if any violence threatens, he fights against his enemy, and deliberately chooses to die rather than endure to see it ravaged; and such a disposition as this is praised by most persons. And as such is the care which is spent by us on the support of our bodies, what manner of men ought we to show ourselves on behalf of our children and of the mother that is to rear them? Ought we not most readily to strain every nerve? For in this way alone does the constitution of man's nature, which is mortal, attain to prosperity, and the prayers of parents all tend to this one end. And hence, whoever cares not for this, is sure to be regardless of the gods. It was for the sake of the gods, then, who were present to him when he offered the marriage sacrifice, that he not only took to himself a wife, but also (what is far more) gave himself over to his bride to honour her next to his own parents. But that which is most precious in the eyes of a prudent wife, is to see her husband preserving himself entirely for her, thinking of no other woman in comparison with her, and regarding herself, above all other women, as peculiarly his own, and faithful towards him. For in proportion as a wife perceives that she is faithfully and justly cared for, so much the more will she exert her energies to show herself such. Whoever therefore is prudent, will not fail to remember with how much honour it becomes him to requite his parents, his wife, and his children, in order that he may gain the name of one who is just and upright in distributing to each their due. For every one is indignant beyond measure at being deprived of that which belongs to himself in a peculiar manner; and there is no one who is content at being deprived of his own property, though one were to give him plenty of his neighbour's goods. And in very truth nothing is so peculiarly the property of a wife as a chaste and hallowed intercourse. And hence it would not befit a prudent man to cast his seed wherever chance might take it, lest children should be born to him from a bad and base stock, on an equality with his legitimate sons; and by this the wife is robbed of her con-

Sanctity of marriage.

Evils of promiscuous intercourse.

jugal rights, the children are injured, and above all, the husband himself is enveloped in disgrace. He ought therefore to approach his wife with much self-restraint and decency, and to maintain modesty in his words, and in his deeds a regard to what is lawful and honest, and in his intercourse he should be true and discreet. And to little errors, even though they be voluntary, he ought to vouchsafe pardon; and if she has made any mistake through ignorance, he ought to advise her, and not to inspire her with fear, except such as is accompanied with reverence and respect. For such treatment would be more suited to mistresses at the hands of their gallants. Yet, nevertheless, justly to love her husband with reverence and respect, and to be loved in turn, is that which befits a wife of gentle birth, as to her intercourse with her own husband. For fear is of two kinds; the one kind is reverent and full of respect; such is that which good sons exhibit towards their parents, and well-ordered citizens towards those who rule them in a kindly spirit. But the other kind is attended by hatred and aversion: such is that which slaves feel towards their masters, and citizens towards unjust and lawless tyrants. Furthermore, the husband ought to choose the best course out of all that we have said above, and so to conciliate his wife to himself, and to make her trustworthy and well disposed, as that whether her husband be present or absent, she will be equally good, while he can turn his attention to public matters: so that even in his absence she may feel that no one is better, nor more suited to herself, nor more nearly bound to her, than her own husband: and that he may always direct his energies to the public good, and show from the very first that such is the case, even though she may be very young and quite inexperienced in such matters. For if the husband should ever begin such a course of conduct as this, and show himself to be perfect master of himself, he would be the best guide of the entire course of his life, and he would teach his wife to adopt a similar mode of action.

Reverence and fear.

CHAP. IX.

Homer joins love and reverence.

For even Homer would not praise either love or fear apart from respect, but every where he in-

troduces friendship accompanied with modesty and reverence. At all events he represents Helen as regarding Priam with this kind of fear: for he says,

"Step-father dear,
Thou in mine eyes art honoured and revered:"[1]

and by this he means nothing else except that her love is accompanied with respect. And again, Ulysses thus addresses Nausicaa,

"Lady, I do admire thee and revere."[2]

Homer accordingly considers that these are the mutual terms on which a husband and wife should stand. For no one admires and reverences his inferior; but such feelings arise only in regard to beings superior to each other in nature, and more friendly disposed; and further, in the case of persons inferior to others in wisdom towards their superiors. Such were the sentiments which Ulysses cherished towards Penelope, and long as he was absent from his home, he did not fail in his duty. Agamemnon, indeed, for the sake of Chryseis, did err against his own wedded wife, for he dared to say in the assembly of the Greeks, that a captive lady, and in no way distinguished for her natural qualities, but rather (to speak plainly) sprung of barbarian origin, was in no way inferior to Clytemnestra:[3] and as he already had sons born of her, he would seem to have acted amiss in this matter. And how could he have been right, considering that he took to himself Chryseis by force as a concubine, even before he could know how she was disposed towards him? But, Ulysses, when the daughter of Atlas earnestly besought him that he would remain with her, promising that she would render him immortal, was not willing even for the sake of this boon to give up the love and affection and confidence of his wife, considering that immortality would be a severe infliction upon him as the price of living on with villany.[4] No, nor did he choose to live on

Agamemnon.

Ulysses.

[1] Il. iii. 172. [2] Od. vi. 168.

[3] This refers to the well-known lines in Il. A. l. 113, etc.

καὶ γὰρ ῥα Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα,
κουριδίης ἀλόχου· ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ἐστὶ χερείων,
οὐ δέμας, οὐδὲ φύην οὔτ' ἄρ φρένας, οὐδέ τι ἔργα.

[4] Calypso. See Od. book i. .. 14.

with Circe,[1] although she promised to restore his companions; but he answered that nothing in his own eyes could be more sweet than his country, rough and rugged though it were; and he desired far more to behold his mortal wife and child, than himself to possess immortality: and thus he continued to preserve fidelity towards his wife firm and inviolate. So that, as we might expect, he received a like return from his wife. And further, too, in his speech addressed to Nausicaa, the poet shows that he praises above all things the chaste intercourse between a husband and wife. For he there[2] prays the gods that they will grant to her both her husband and home and concord, and this of no common kind, but perfect. For he says,

> "There is no fairer thing,
> Than when the lord and lady with one soul
> One home possess."[3]

Here then, as is clear, the poet praises the mutual concord of husband and wife, and that too not the mere agreement upon servile matters, but that which is justly and harmoniously based on intellect and prudence. For the words "possessing one home with one soul," show this. Again, the same hero says, that while such concord flourishes between a husband and his wife,

> "Comes many a tear to foes, much joy to friends."[4]

Advantages of domestic concord.

And the generality agree with him as speaking truly. For when a man and his wife harmoniously co-operate in the same concerns, it needs must follow that the sentiments of both are the same. And in the next place, gaining power by concord, they deprive their enemies of all hope of success, and they can assist their friends; but when they are at variance with each other, then their friends too are divided, and they especially feel their powerlessness. And hence the poet clearly admonishes the husband and wife that they ought by no means to join together in matters of villany and shame, but in matters just and right to assist each other, by unity of purpose; and first of all in every way to take care of their parents, the man regarding those of his wife no less than his own, and the wife those of

[1] The story of Circe is given by Homer in Odyss. book x. 136—574.
[2] Od. vi. 181 [3] Od. vi. 182—185. [4] Ibid.

her husband. In the next place, it would be necessary for both to take care of their children, friends, and fortunes, and of the entire household, as being their common property, endeavouring to outstrip each other in zeal and attentiveness, that each may become the author of as much good as possible, and may prove himself better and more scrupulously just: as also to dismiss all haughtiness, and to adopt habits of industry, and so with gentle and kindly rule to regulate the house; so that when they are now arrived at old age, having bade farewell to the duties of economy, and being freed from their passions, they may be able to give, each to the other and to their children, an account of their stewardship, as to which of the two has throughout bestowed greater attention to the management of their home, and so may know at once whether misfortune has come by chance or success by merit. And whichever has excelled in these respects, will obtain from the gods one gift, the greatest of all. For, as Pindar says,

> "Sweet hope that cheers the heart, bears company,
> And proves the nurse of age."[1]

And also he will obtain another piece of good fortune, namely, to be cherished in old age by his children. On this account, both in public and private life, it would become the man who would pass a happy life, to have a regard for all the gods and his fellow-men, and especially for his wife, his children, and his parents.

BOOK II.—CHAP. I.

The character of an economist.

HE who purposes duly to manage any branch of economy, should be well acquainted with the locality in which he undertakes to labour, and should be naturally clever, and by choice industrious and just; for if any one of these qualities be wanting, he will make many mistakes in the business which he intends to take in hand. Now, to speak by way of general distinction, there

[1] This passage of Pindar (Fr. 233) is also quoted by Plato in his first book of the "Laws"

Four kinds of economy.

are four kinds of economy, the regal, the satrapical, the political, and the domestic; for all others, as we shall find, fall under one or other of these heads. But of these the greatest and most simple is the regal; the most varied and easiest is the political; but the private is of all of the least importance and most various. They must of necessity have very many points in common with each other; but we must look to those points which belong to each of them distinctively. First, then, let us consider the regal. This kind, indeed, is general in its force, and it contains four species, one concerning money, another concerning exports, a third concerning imports, while a fourth relates to expenditure. And to speak of these severally; by that which concerns money I mean, what coin should be raised or lowered in price, and when; and by that which refers to exports and imports, when and what it will be profitable to receive from the satraps in office, and to dispose for sale; and as to expenditure, I mean what retrenchments must be made and when, and whether we must contribute money towards expenses, or those articles which are purchaseable by money.

The regal.

The satrapical.

Its six divisions.

And secondly, the satrapical. This embraces six kinds of revenue, from the soil, from the peculiar productions of the country, from trade, from tolls, from cattle, and from all other sources. And of these kinds the best is that concerned with the produce of land, (and this is what some call tithe,[1] and others tenths;) while next ranks that which is concerned with peculiar productions, as for example, with gold, or silver or brass, where they are severally found; thirdly comes that which has to do with traffic; fourthly, that which arises from vegetable produce and market tolls; while fifth is that which is concerned with cattle, and which is called usufruct or tithe; and last in order is that derived from other sources, and which is known by the names of a poll tax, or handicraft tax. But thirdly, [let us consider] the political economy: and of this, the best is the income which arises from the peculiar productions of the soil; next, that which comes from traffic and carriage of goods; and then, that which is derived from matters of every-day life. Fourth and last

The political.

[1] In this sense the word occurs in Herod. iv. 198, *ἐκφόρια τοῦ κάρπου*.

comes the domestic economy; and this is the reverse of simple, owing to the fact that a house cannot of necessity be managed with a view to one single aim, and it is the least of all, because its incomings and outgoings are on a small scale. And under this kind of economy the least is an income derived from land, secondly, from matters of daily life, and thirdly, from money. And apart from these points (there is) a matter which belongs in common to every kind of economy, and which we must regard not as a casual matter, but as one which specially belongs to this last kind; namely, that the expenses do not exceed the incomings.

Practical considerations.

Since, then, we have mentioned the divisions (of economy), next we must again ascertain, as to the satrapy or the city about which we are considering, whether it is able to bear all these kinds of expenditure which we have just now distinguished, or the greatest of them. After this, which of the means of revenue either do not exist at all, but yet may be made available, or are at present small, and yet are capable of augmentation; and out of the present expenses, which and what amount may be removed without doing harm. We have spoken, then, as to the various kinds of economy and their separate parts: but whatever has been effected by any ancient writers as to the supply of wealth, or whatever they have skilfully contrived, of this we have collected together all that we conceive to be worthy of mention: for among these there are some matters which a man will be able to accommodate to any such business as he may take in hand.

CHAP. II.

Story of Cypselus.

CYPSELUS of Corinth made a vow to Zeus, that, if he should gain the supreme power in the state,[1] he would dedicate to the god all the property of the Corinthians. So he ordered them to give in a written list of it; and when they had done so, he took a tenth part away from each individual, and ordered them to earn money with the remainder. And when the year came round again he did the very same thing; and so in ten years the result was,

[1] See Pol. v. 11, note, page 204.

that he possessed every thing which he had vowed to dedicate, while the Corinthians had gained other money instead.

CHAP. III.

Of Lygdamis.

LYGDAMIS of Naxos expelled certain exiles; and when no one was willing to buy their property except at a very low price, he sold it to the exiles themselves. And as for all their offerings, which they had lying by them half-wrought in their workshops, he sold them to the exiles and to any one else who chose to buy them, so as to enrol the names of the buyers upon the register.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Byzantines.

THE Byzantines being hard-pressed for money, sold the public lands; part of them, which were fruitful, for a certain number of years; but the unfruitful for ever in fee simple: both those which belonged to a Thiasus [1] or a clan, and likewise whatever lay in the hands of private individuals; for those to whom the other property belonged, bought them at a high price. But to the members of the Thiasi (were given) other grounds belonging to the public, which lay near the gymnasium, or the agora, or the harbour. And as for the market-places in which any thing used to be sold, and the fishery of the sea, and the salt-market, and the places belonging to persons who were employed as conjurers, and soothsayers, and drug-venders, and other such occupations, they ordered them to pay the third part of their gains by way of tax. And they sold the profits of the money-changers at one table; and no one besides had any thing to sell to another, nor to buy from another; but if he had, he was immediately deprived of it. And as there was a law among them to the effect that no one should be deemed a citizen who was not sprung from a citizen on both father's

[1] This word originally signified any company of persons met together for a religious purpose, such as a choir of Bacchanals, or a party met to celebrate a festival. In the democratic state of Greece, there were religious associations called by this name, who clubbed together, kept a common fund, purchased land, etc., for religious purposes. A member of such a Thiasus was called a *θιασώτης*. The word is derived from *σιός*, Doric for *θεός*.

and mother's side, they decreed that whoever had one parent a citizen might become a citizen upon laying down 30 minæ. And being in want both of food and money, they brought back their ships from the Euxine Sea: and after a time, as the merchants were indignant, they paid them a tenth by way of interest, and ordered that those who purchased any article should pay a tenth over and above the actual price. And when certain Metœci had lent money on property already mortgaged, and when they could not get payment, they passed a decree that every one's property should be safe, who paid to the state the third part of the debt.

CHAP. V.

The story of Hippias.

HIPPIAS of Athens sold those parts of the upper stories which projected into the streets, and the steps and palisades before the houses, and the doors which opened outwards; these were bought by those who had property, and thus a large sum of money was collected. And the coin which was current at Athens he proclaimed spurious; and setting upon it a fixed price, he ordered them to bring it back to him; and when they met together for the purpose of devising a new coinage, he gave them back the same money as they had brought him. And whenever any one was about to act as a trierarch or phylarch, or to give a chorus, or to expend money upon any other such liturgy,[1] he laid upon him a small fine, and bade him pay this if he was willing, and then enrolled his name among those who had discharged a liturgy. And he bade them offer to the priestess of Athena in the Acropolis, on behalf of every one who died, one chœnix of barley and another of wheat, and an obol besides; and that the same offering should be made by every one to whom a child should be born.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Athenians of Potidæa.

THE Athenians who dwelt at Potidæa being in want of money for the war, agreed to order all the citizens to enrol their properties, not collectively each in his own deme, but each property separately where it

[1] See notes on Pol. iv. 15, and v. 8.

lay, that the poor might be able to make an assessment of their property; but that any one who had no property at all, should assess their own persons at 2 minæ. From this proceeding they contributed the sum enjoined, to the preservation of their city.

CHAP. VII.

Of an Antissæan.

A MAN of Antissa, when the city was in want of money, as the citizens were accustomed to celebrate the Dionysia with splendour, providing for that festival many yearly shows and costly sacrifices, persuaded them when the feast was near at hand, to vow that they would give double the following year, and to collect together and sell what they had in hand. Accordingly a large sum of money was collected by them to meet their necessity.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the people of Lampsacus.

THE people of Lampsacus, when a large body of triremes was expected to come against them, the medimnus of corn being at 4 drachmæ, ordered the retail dealers to sell it at 6; and when the gallon of olive oil was at 4 drachmæ and 3 obols, and wine and other provisions in like manner. So the individual got the accustomed value (for his goods), while the city gained what was over and above, and so became well supplied with money.

CHAP. IX.

THE people of Heraclea, not being well furnished with money, sent forty ships to the tyrants about the Bosphorus, and bought up from the merchants all the corn, oil, and wine, and the rest of their provisions. And when the time came round at which they were to pay the purchase money, and it was to the advantage of the merchants not to sell their wares by retail, but wholesale, they[1] . . . . . did not set before them money,

[1] The common reading here is διδόντες δι' ἄλλην which clearly is absurd and meaningless. The suggestion of Camerarius is original and bold, διδόντες σκυτάλην, "bringing with them a tally," (see Liddell and Scott, v. σκυτάλη.) Such things, as it is known, were in frequent use

out made a mart on board of the vessels, and over each of the ships they set a man to dispense it. And on their arrival at the enemy's land, the soldiers bought the whole from them. The money therefore was collected before the generals gave back the pay, and so the result was that the same money was given until they returned home.

CHAP. X.

Of the Samians and Lacedæmonians.

When the people of Samos besought the Lacedæmonians to give them money in order to effect their return, the latter decreed that they would go fasting for a single day, themselves, their servants, and their beasts of burden,[1] and that they would give to the Samians the amount which each of them would otherwise have expended.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Chalcedonians.

The citizens of Chalcedon, having a great number of foreign mercenaries in their city, were unable to give them their pay. They proclaimed therefore, that if any one of the citizens or metœci either had or wished to have a pledge from either the state or private persons, they should enrol their names. And when many had enrolled themselves, they plundered the vessels which were sailing into the Euxine on a specious pretence. And they appointed a time at which they said that they would give account concerning them. And when a large amount of money had been collected, they dismissed the soldiers, but went to law concerning the pledges. And the city out of its revenues gave back what they had lost to those who had been unjustly plundered.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Cyzicenes.

The people of Cyzicus being at variance, the popular party prevailed; and having taken the rich men prisoners, they decreed that as money was

between debtors and creditors, but the editor has thought it best to omit the words as spurious.

[1] Compare Jonah iii. 7, 8.

owing to the soldiery, they would not put their prisoners to death, but that they would free them and banish them.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Chians.

THE Chians, as they had amongst them a law ordering them to enter a register of their debts in the public treasury, decreed that all debtors should pay back their debts to the state, and that the city out of its revenues should give interest to those who had advanced the money, until they should reach their former pitch of prosperity.[1]

CHAP. XIV.

Of the tyrant Mausolus.

MAUSOLUS, tyrant of Caria, when the king sent to him to pay his tribute, collected together the wealthiest men in the country, and said that the king asked for the tribute, but that he himself had no supply of money. And certain persons, whom he had suborned, declared to them how much each of them must contribute. And when this was done, the wealthy individuals, partly through shame and partly through fear, promised and contributed a far larger sum than was specified. Being again in want of money, he called an assembly and told the Mylassians that their city, which was the metropolis, was without walls, and that the king was about to march against it. He therefore bade the Mylassians to contribute as much money as possible, saying that by what they should now contribute, they would save the rest. And when a considerable sum had been contributed, he kept the money himself, and said that the god would not allow him immediately to build the wall.[2]

CHAP. XV.

Of Condalus.

CONDALUS, a deputy of Mausolus, whenever any one brought him a sheep, or pig, or calf, as he passed through the country, used to mark down the name of

[1] The emendation of Sylburgius here is probably correct, ἕως ἂν καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκπορίσωσι, until they should pay the sum originally due.

[2] After οἰκοδομεῖν, the word ἐᾷν, or some other of similar meaning, must be supplied to fill up the sense, which clearly requires it.

the donor and the time, and ordered him to carry it back home and keep it until he should come back; and when a suitable time seemed to have arrived, he used to reckon up the profit and demand it back with the usufruct besides. And as to such trees as projected over or fell upon the king's highways, he sold their preits. And if any of the soldiers died, he exacted a drachma as a toll for the body passing the gate; accordingly he made money by the matter and at the same time the rulers did not deceive him as to when the soldier died. And as he saw that the Lycians were fond of wearing long hair, he said that letters had been received from the king, bidding them send away their hair to make false fronts, and that accordingly he had been bidden by Mausolus to shave them. He said that therefore he would send for hair from Greece, if they would be willing to give him a specified sum as a poll-tax. They willingly gave him what he demanded, and a considerable quantity of money was collected from a large multitude.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Aristotle of Rhodes.

ARISTOTLE of Rhodes, governor of Phocæa, being in want of money, as he saw that the Phocæans were cut into two factions, secretly came to an agreement with one of the factions, saying that their opponents were about to offer him money, on condition that he would put matters into their hands; but that he himself preferred to receive money from the former party, and to give the city into their hands for them to manage. And upon hearing this, those who were present at once furnished money, and gave him as much as he commanded them. Then, again, he showed the others what he had received from their opponents; and they said they would give him just as much. And having thus taken a bribe from both parties, he reconciled the factions together. And seeing that law-suits were rife among the citizens, and that there were many injuries of long standing, he held a court, and laid down[1] a law

[1] The text from this point to the end of the chapter is very suspicious, and the various emendations proposed are but unsatisfactory at the best. It is perhaps almost necessary to regard as interpolated the words *προεῖπεν ἔσυι ἂν μὴ δικάσωνται*, and to reject them as a marginal gloss upon *νόμον*

that judgment should no longer be given in the case of all out-standing charges. Then by the deposits made in numerous suits, and by reserving in his own hands those which involved damages, and by taking bribes from each party through the instrumentality of the other, he collected together no small amount of money.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Clazomenians.

THE people of Clazomenæ, too, being afflicted with famine and in want of money, decreed that those private individuals who had any oil should lend it to the city at a certain interest: now this fruit abounds in their country. And having hired vessels from the lenders, they sent them off to the marts from which they had their supply of corn, leaving the value of the oil as a pledge. And as they owed their soldiers pay to the amount of twenty talents, and were not able to furnish it, they gave the generals four talents a year by way of interest. But when they cut off nothing from the former debt, and were always expending money to no purpose, they coined some money of iron to stand in place of silver to the amount of twenty talents, and giving silver to all the richest men in the state upon a proportionate scale, they took back from them an equivalent. So the private citizens had money to spend upon their daily wants, and the city was freed from its debt. And, secondly, out of their revenues they paid them the interest due, and continually dividing it they gave a share to each, and called in the iron coinage.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Selybrians.

THE Selybrians were in want of money; and as there was a law among them not to export corn in a season of famine, and they had stores of corn of the preceding year, they passed a decree that private persons should give up their corn to the state at the fixed price, each leaving behind a year's supply: then they gave leave to any one who chose to export it, affixing to it such a price as seemed good to them.

ἔθηκε, κ. τ. λ. In that case the conjunction δὲ must be expunged, and for παραβολή, or παραβόλον, we must read παραβολῇ.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the citizens of Abydos.

THE citizens of Abydos,—when their country was lying fallow on account of the prevalence of faction, as their metœci did not give them any thing, owing to the fact that they were still in debt,—passed a decree that any one who chose might lend money to the husbandmen, in order to induce them to work, as they themselves would get the first-fruits of the soil, and the others from what was left.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Ephesians.

THE Ephesians, being in want of money, passed a law that their women should not wear gold, but should lend to the state all that they then possessed, and having ordered them to pay the sum of silver which was necessary from the pillars of the temple, they allowed the name of him who gave the silver to be inscribed as if he had offered it.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Dionysius at Syracuse.

DIONYSIUS of Syracuse, wishing to collect together some money, called an assembly, and said that he had seen Demeter, who bade him offer at her temple the ornaments of the women. He said that he for his part had done this with the ornaments of the women in his own family, and he urged the others to do the same, lest some vengeance from the gods should befall them; and as for the man who refused to do thus, he declared that he should be deemed guilty of sacrilege. And when all had brought whatever they possessed, through fear of the goddess and himself, he dedicated all the ornaments to the goddess, and took it back himself as a loan from the goddess. And as time went on, and the women were beginning to wear gold again, he ordered that all women who wished to wear it should offer a certain specified sum at the temple. And being about to build some triremes, he knew that he should be in want of money. So he convened an assembly, and said that a certain city was

on the point of being betrayed to him, but that he wanted money for that purpose; and he urged the citizens each to bring him 2 staters: and they brought them. And after an interval of two or three days, he pretended to have failed of his purpose, and having praised them, he gave back to each what they had brought. And by so doing, he gained over the citizens to his cause. Then they brought contributions again, thinking that they should get back their money; but he took them and kept them for the purpose of his ship-building. And when he was short of money he coined some of tin, and having convened an assembly, he spoke much on behalf of the new coinage: and they passed a decree, even against their will, that each would consider what he should take of it as silver, and not a baser metal. Again, being in want of money, he urged the citizens to bring in their contributions: but they said that they had nothing to give. Accordingly he brought out the domestic utensils from his own house, as though obliged to do so for want; and when the Syracusans bought them, he wrote down what each bought, and as soon as they had put down the money, he ordered them each to carry back the vessel which he had bought. And as the citizens, owing to the property taxes, were unable to keep cattle, he said that he now had enough for such and such a purpose, and that therefore those who had any cattle should henceforth be free of tax. And when many of them soon got cattle under the idea that they should have them free of tax, as soon as he thought a fit occasion was come, he ordered them to assess their value and laid a tax upon them. The citizens accordingly were indignant at the deceit of Dionysius, so they began to slaughter and sell them. And when, to meet this, he ordered them to slaughter only as much as was wanted from day to day, they in turn accounted them as victims; but he forbade them to sacrifice any female. Again, when he was in want of money, he bade all the families of orphans to send him in a list of their property; and when others had sent in their inventory, he was satisfied with the enjoyment of their property until they severally arrived at full age. And having surprised Rhegium, he collected an assembly, and said that they might very justly have been reduced by him to slavery, but that now he was willing to let them off on receiving the amount which they had spent upon the war, and 3 minæ besides for each

individual. But the Rhegians brought to light all their hidden treasures, and the poor borrowed from the rich and from the strangers, and so brought him the money which he demanded. And when he had taken this from them, he nevertheless sold their persons, and seized upon all their disclosed treasures which up to that time had been concealed. And having borrowed money from the citizens upon a promise of restoring it, when they began to demand it back, he bade them bring him all the silver that they each possessed, threatening them with death as the punishment, in case they failed to do so. And when the money was brought, he stamped it anew, and gave out the drachma of the value of two drachmas, and they brought back to him the debt which was previously owing. And sailing to Tyrrhenia with a hundred ships, he took out of the temple of Leucothea gold and silver, and other ornaments, to no inconsiderable amount. And the sailors brought it all back, supposing that when they had brought half of it, they would have the rest without being disturbed. But as soon as they had received it, he ordered them to go back and fetch the rest.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Mendeans.

THE Mendeans expended on the regulation of their city the income arising from harbour-dues and other tolls, and they did not exact the tribute arising from land and houses, but entered on a register those who had property, and, whenever they wanted money, those who owed it paid it. They made a profit accordingly during the time which had elapsed, being satisfied with their money for which no interest was paid. But on making war against Olynthus, and finding themselves in want of money, as they had a stock of slaves, they passed a decree to leave each man a male and female slave, and to sell the rest to the city, so that individuals might lend out their money to the city at interest.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Callistratus.

WHEN the harbour-dues in Macedonia were being farmed for the most part at twenty talents,

Callistratus caused them to fetch double of that amount; for as he saw that the rich men always purchased them, because it was necessary to make men worth one talent at least bail for every twenty talents, he issued a proclamation, that any one who wished might become a purchaser, and that bail should be given for a third part only, and at any rate that they severally might be able to obtain.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Timotheus.

TIMOTHEUS, an Athenian, making war on the Olynthians, and being in want of silver, coined some brass money and gave it to the soldiers; and when the soldiers were indignant, he said that the merchants and petty dealers would all sell to them in the same way as before. And he proclaimed to the merchants, that if any of them should receive brass money, he should buy with it the marketable produce of the land, and whatever was gathered from the plains; and that whatever brass money they should have left about them they should bring back to him and take silver instead. And being at war about Corcyra and finding himself in a strait, as his soldiers began to demand their pay, refusing to obey him, and threatening to go off to the enemy, he convened an assembly, and said that owing to the storms his money could not be sent to him, but that he had such an abundant supply that he would give them the city which had been betrayed, as provisions for three months, free of cost. And imagining that Timotheus would never promise them so large a store of money, if he did not really expect that the money would come to him, they said nothing about the pay, until he had arranged matters as he wished. And besieging Samos, he sold back to the Samians their fruits and what was on their fields, so that he had a plentiful supply of money to pay his soldiers. And when there was a scarcity of provisions in the camp, owing to the influx of new comers, he forbade them to sell their corn ground, or any measure of it less than a medimnus, or any thing less than a metrete of liquids. The taxiarchs accordingly, and the captains of companies, bought it wholesale and distributed it to the soldiers, and they came up and carried off with them their provisions;

and whenever they departed back, they sold whatever they had over: so that it came to pass that the soldiers had a good supply of provisions.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Didales.

DIDALES, a Persian, having soldiers under him, was able to supply them with their daily rations from the enemy's land; but as he had no money to give them, and he was asked for it at the time when it became due, he made the following contrivance. He called an assembly and said that he had no lack of money, but that he had it at a certain place, specifying where. And harnessing his mules, he went towards the spot; but when he came near to it, and going forward into it, he took out from among the sacred things stored up, all the silver plate that was there, and then went his way having so arranged his mules as if they were really conveying coined silver and exhibiting it. And when the soldiers saw this, they thought that it was all silver which they were carrying, and took courage as though they were about to gain their pay. But he said that they must come to Amisus and signify their approval. Now the journey to Amisus was one of many days and difficult; so accordingly, during that time he satisfied the army by merely giving them their provisions. But he himself kept in hand the artificers in the camp, and those who traded in any articles of merchandise; and no one else was permitted to set himself to any thing of this kind.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Chabrias.

CHABRIAS, an Athenian, advised Taos, the king of the Egyptians, when he was going out on an expedition and was in want of money, to take one of the priests and a quantity of the victims, and to say to the priests that they must be discharged on account of the expense. And when the priests heard it, each of them wished the victim to be in their own hands, and so they each offered money separately for themselves. And when he had received money from them all, he bade them give them an order, that they should set down to the account of the temple and himself, the tenth part of the

expense which they had previously incurred, and to lend the rest to him until the war against the king should be brought to an end. And he ordered them all to bring in a contribution from every family, fixing the requisite sum, and likewise a fine upon every head. And when corn was sold, he ordered that the buyer and seller should deduct from the actual price, and give him an obol out of every artabé, and from the shipping and the manufactories, and from those who had any other employment, he bade that the tenth part should be paid. And when he was about to lead his army out of the country, if any one chanced to possess any uncoined gold or silver, he ordered him to bring it to him; and when most had brought what they had, he bade them make use of it; but those who lent it he placed together with his captains, so that he could pay them out of the tribute.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Iphicrates.

IPHICRATES an Athenian, when Cotys had collected together some soldiers, furnished him with money as follows. He bade one of the men over whom he ruled to sow for him some land with three medimni of corn; and when this was done, a large store of corn was collected. Accordingly he brought down his stock to the sea, and gained an abundance of wealth.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Cotys.

A THRACIAN, named Cotys, wished to borrow of the Perinthians some money for the purpose of collecting soldiers; but the Perinthians would not give it to him. He claimed of them, therefore, at all events to grant him some men out of the body of citizens as guards for certain strongholds, that he might be able to make the most out of the soldiers who were then on guard there. They speedily did so, as they deemed that they would themselves gain the post. But Cotys having made a garrison with those who were sent out, ordered them to be gone, as soon as they had sent back the money which he had borrowed of them.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Mentor.

THE younger Mentor, having arrested Hermias and got possession of his possessions, left those who had been placed there by Hermias, where they were to guard them. And as soon as they were all in good heart, and had got into their houses whatever they had hidden or secretly removed, he seized them, and stripped them of every thing which they possessed.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Memnon.

MEMNON of Rhodes having made himself master of Lampsacus, being in want of money, laid upon the richest of the people a certain amount of silver, and said that they might gather it from the rest of the citizens; but when the other citizens had given their contributions, he bade them lend him them also, fixing upon a time at which he would restore it back. And again being in want of money, he ordered them to contribute, saying that they should be repaid out of the tribute; but they gave in their contributions, considering that the repayment would be speedy; and when the time came for laying down the money, he said that he had need of this also as well, but that he would hereafter repay them with interest. And the soldiers who were with him he deprived of their provisions and their pay for six days every year, saying that on these days they need not keep watch, or make any expedition, or incur any expense, meaning the days superfluous in the calendar.[1] And during the previous time he gave to the soldiers their provisions on the second of the month, thus omitting three days in the former month, and five in the following; and in this manner he went on until he came to the thirtieth day.

[1] ἐξαιρέσιμοι ἡμέραι, days that were taken out of the calendar, so that some months were of only twenty-nine days each, in order to make the solar and lunar year agree. The word has the exactly opposite meaning to ἐμβόλιμος, or intercalary, see Herod. i. chap. 32. Compare also Cic. Verr. ii. 52. The reader will do well to refer to the full explanation of the term given in the Dictionary of Greek and Rom. Antiquities, Art. "Calendar Gree

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Charidemus.

CHARIDEMUS of Orus, being in possession of certain places in Æolis, asked for money to pay his soldiers, as Artabazus was leading an army against him. At first indeed they gave in their contributions, but afterwards they said that they could do so no longer. But Charidemus bade the place which he considered the richest, to send off into another place whatever they possessed in coin or any other valuable property, saying that he would give them an escort; and further he showed that he was ready to do so. And when the men were persuaded, he led them a little way out of the city, and having inquired how much they had, he took all that he had need of, and sent them back again to the place. And having issued a proclamation in the cities under his command, that no one should possess in his house any kind of arms, but that if he did so he should pay a specified fine, he disregarded the matter and made no further concern of it. And the citizens beginning to think that the proclamation had been made as a dead letter, kept what each of them chanced to have as before. But on a sudden he made a search into their houses, and enacted the fine from all those in whose houses he found any arms.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Philoxenus.

PHILOXENUS a Macedonian, being satrap of Caria, and being in want of money, said that he was about to celebrate the Dionysia, and appointed as choragi the richest of the Carians, and ordered them to prepare what was necessary. And when he saw that they bore it ill, he secretly sent some messengers and asked them what they would give to be freed from their liturgy. But they said that they would give much more than what they thought would be the probable expenditure, in order to be freed from the trouble, and from absence from their property. And having taken money from these, he fixed on others, until he got from them too whatever he wanted; and so with each of them he made a profit

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Evæses.

Evæses, a Syrian, being Satrap of Egypt, perceiving that the nomarchs were about to revolt from him, called them into the palace and hung them all; and bade the servants tell their relatives that they were in safe keeping. Each of the relatives accordingly began to collect money for the ransom of each, desiring to redeem the captives with money. But he came to an agreement with each, and having received from him the specified sum, gave him back the dead body.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Cleomenes.

Cleomenes of Alexandria being Satrap in Egypt, forbade the exportation of corn during a season of famine, in which other parts suffered severely, and Egypt to a lesser extent. And as the nomarchs said that they should not be able to pay their tribute, owing to the non-exportation of corn, he allowed it to be exported, but put a high price upon the supply of food; so that in the end, though but little was exported, he received a large sum, and the nomarchs themselves were deprived of their excuse. And as he was sailing through those parts where the crocodile is regarded as a god, one of his slaves was seized by the monster. Accordingly he called the priests together and said, that as he had been injured first, he would punish the crocodiles, and he ordered them to hunt them. But the priests, fearing that their god would be despised, collected together and gave him as much gold as they were able, and so he desisted from his purpose. And when king Alexander enjoined upon him to found a city near to Pharos, and there to establish the mart which was hitherto at Canopus, he sailed down to Canopus to the priests and the wealthy individuals, and said that he had come there for the purpose of removing their settlement. But the priests and inhabitants contributed to give him a sum of money that he might leave their mart as it was. He took it and at that time departed, but afterwards, having sailed down, when he had every thing ready for building, he asked them for money to an immense

amount: for that this was the matter which concerned him, whether the mart should be there or not. And when they said that they could give him nothing, he removed them elsewhere. And having sent a person to purchase something, and perceiving that he had hit upon it very cheap, and was about to reckon it to himself at a very high price, he told the friends of the purchaser that he had heard that he had made his purchase very dear, and so that he would not have any thing to do with it: and at the same time, with assumed anger, he reproved him for his doltishness. But, on hearing this, they said that he ought not to believe those who said any thing against him, until he should come before him and render an account himself. And when the purchaser came, they told him what they had heard from Cleomenes; and wishing to show them and Cleomenes what he had done, he brought back the money with which he had made the purchase. And when corn was being sold in the country for ten drachmæ, he called the corn-factors to him, and asked them on what terms they would negociate with him; and they said that they would sell to him for less than the price at which they sold to the merchants. But he ordered them to give him corn at the same price as they sold to others, and then sold it himself, fixing the price at thirty-two drachmæ. He also called the priests together, and said, that the expenditure upon the temples in the country was too great: and that consequently the greater part of the temples and of the priests must be put down. But the priests, both singly and collectively, gave him the sacred treasures, fancying that this was what he was about to take, and each wishing that his own temple should remain as it was before, and that he should himself be continued in the office of a priest.

CHAP. XXXV.

Of Antimenes.

ANTIMENES of Rhodes being intrusted by Alexander with the charge of the roads about Babylon, thus collected money. There was an ancient law in Babylon, that a tenth part should be paid on all imports; and no one had enforced this law. Accordingly he watched the time when all the satraps and the soldiers were expected, and several legates and artificers bringing others with them, and

journeying from home on their own account, and when many gifts were likely to be brought, and then he exacted a tenth part according to the established law. And when again he was seeking to provide money, he ordered every one who pleased to enter the names of the slaves in the army at such a price as he chose, and that they should pay him eight drachmæ a year; and if the slave should run away, he promised that the value enrolled upon the slave should be restored then. Accordingly, a great body of slaves were enrolled, and he gained a considerable sum of money. But if any slave ran away, he used to order the satrap of the part in which the camp stood, either to recover him, or pay the amount to the owner.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of Opheles.

OPHELES, an Olynthian, having established a procurator over the district of Arthriditis, when the nomarchs of that region came to him and said that they wished to pay him a larger tribute, and entreated him to dismiss their present procurator, asked them whether they would be able to pay what they promised; and when they said that they could pay, he left the procurator where he was, and bade him exact from them the whole amount of tribute at which they had assessed themselves. He did not think it right to disgrace the magistrate whom he had set over them, nor to lay on them a heavier tribute than they had themselves fixed; but he collected a far larger sum of money.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of Pythocles.

PYTHOCLES, an Athenian, advised the Athenians that the city should take out of private hands the lead which came from Tyre at 2 drachmæ, the price at which they sold it, and then to sell it themselves, fixing its price at 6 drachmæ.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Chabrias.

CHABRIAS, having manned one hundred and twenty vessels, while Taos had need of only sixty,

ordered the companies of the sixty vessels which would remain behind, to supply two months' provisions to the crews who sailed, or else to go on the expedition themselves. But as they wished to remain behind and take care of their own property, they did as he ordered.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Of Artimenes.

ARTIMENES ordered the satraps to fill up the treasures which lay along the royal highways according to the custom of the country; and whenever the army or any other company passed by, even without the king, he sent some one of his retinue and sold the contents of the stores.

CHAP. XL.

Of Cleomenes.

WHEN the new moon came, and it was full time to give the soldiers their rations, Cleomenes purposely went on board his ship; and as the month went on, he disembarked and distributed the rations, and then on the following month he deferred giving the rations until the next new moon. The soldiers accordingly kept themselves quiet, owing to having recently received their provisions; while he omitted one month in every year, and so continually deprived his soldiers of a month's pay.

CHAP. XLI.

Of Stabelbius.

STABELBIUS,[1] (king) of the Mysians, when he owed his soldiers pay, having called together the generals, told them that he had no need of the private soldiers; but giving money to each of the generals, he said that whenever he should be in want of privates, he would send them to collect mercenaries, saying that he would more gladly pay to the generals the money which was due to them. He ordered them therefore each to dismiss his own company from out of

[1] Camerarius reads Σταβέβιος, ὀφείλων στρατιώταις μισθόν. Raphaelis Volaterani Epitome. Σταβέλβιος, ὁ Μυσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὀφείλων στρατιώταις μισθὸν, τοὺς ἡγέμονας συγκαλέσας. (Syllburgius.) The reading of Bekker is clearly faulty, and cannot be rendered into English; that of Syllburgius has been retained in the present translation.

the country. The generals accordingly supposing that they would have an opportunity of making money, sent the soldiers away as he ordered. And after a brief interval, and having collected them together, he said that neither a flute-player without a chorus, nor a general without private soldiers, was of any service; accordingly he bade them depart from the country.

CHAP. XLII.

Of Dionysius.

DIONYSIUS, going round the temples, wherever he saw any table standing of gold or silver, ordered them to pour out a draught for good luck, and to carry them away; and if any of the statues held forward a cup in its hand, he would say, "I pledge you," and bid them to remove it. And the gilded garments and the crowns he stripped from off the shrines, saying that he would give them others, lighter and more fragrant; and then he clothed them with white robes and crowns made of white poplar.

APPENDIX.

[*Note on Book V., Chap.* 12. *See page* 210.]

THE passage of Plato here referred to by Aristotle, occurs in book viii. chap. 3, and is thus rendered in Mr. Burges's recent translation. "It is hard indeed for a state thus constituted to become disturbed; but as every thing generated is liable to corruption, even such a constitution as this cannot abide for ever, but must be dissolved; and its dissolution is as follows. Not only as regards terrestrial plants, but likewise terrestrial animals, a fertility and sterility both of soul and body take place; when

the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their respective orbits, which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrariwise to the contrary; and with reference to the fertility and sterility of your race, though those are wise whom you have trained as governors of the state, yet they will never, by intellect and sense united, observe the proper season for procreation, but let it slip by, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. To that, however, which is divinely generated, there is a period which is comprehended by the *perfect number*; whereas, to that generated by man, there is one, in which the augmentations of the surpassing and surpassed, after having received three separations and four boundaries of things similar and dissimilar, increasing and decreasing, will render all things correspondent and rational; *of which the sesquitertian root conjoined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affords two harmonies;* one of these, the equally equal, just a hundred times as much; while the other, of equal length indeed, but of oblong shape, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of the pentad, each wanting one, two of which are irrational, and of a hundred cubes of the triad. And the whole of this geometric number, having such an influence, is concerned with worse and better generations. Now, if our governors be ignorant of this, and join our couples together unseasonably, the children will neither possess talent nor be fortunate either." Mr. Burges remarks in a note that this passage of Plato, descriptive of the *geometric* or *fatal* number, has baffled the ingenuity of every commentator; but he gives, in an appendix at the end of his volume, the views of Baroccius, Schneider, and others, at the same time pronouncing them one and all to be most unsatisfactory. We may observe that the passage of Aristotle which we have before us, though involving a most obscure quotation from Plato, is passed over without note or comment (as hopeless) by Sylburgius in his edition of the Politics (Oxford, 1810); but Lambinus translates it thus, "Horum autem esse principium ea quorum radix sesquitertia numero quinario juncta, duos concentus efficit: quod futurum est, (inquit) cum hujus descriptæ figuræ numerus solidus factus fuerit, proinde quasi natura malos homines, et nullâ disciplinâ sanabiles, aliquando gignat." Taylor translates it nearly as I have done in the text. Mr. Burges tells us that "Baroccius considers the sesquitertian progeny (ἐπίτριτος ἐπυθμήν), to be a root or prime number, and fixes on the number *seven* as its representative ($4 + 3 = 7$). Further, by the two harmonies, he (Baroccius) supposes Plato to mean the connexion between the *square* and *cube* of twelve, —which is itself made up of seven and five, (ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς)—i. e. 144 and 1728—*twelve* being a number often mentioned by Plato as not only perfect, but the type of perfection. If this be granted, the geometric, or perfect, or fatal number may be considered to be 1728, the cube of 12. This opinion, however, is opposed by Schneider, who conceives it to be 216, i. e. 6^3, which is made up of three other cubes, viz. 27, 64, and 125, i. e. 3^3, 4^3, and 5^3. Others again have considered the root to be 9, the cube-root of 729."

Taylor takes a different view of the matter; and I have thought it best to give here a large portion of his note entire. "By the sesquitertian progeny, Plato means the number 95; for this number is composed of the addition of the squares of the numbers 4 and 3, which form the first sesquitertian ratio, (viz. 25,) and the number 70, which is composed of 40 and 30, and

therefore consists of two numbers in a sesquitertian ratio. This number conjoined with 5, and thrice increased, produces ten thousand and a million. For $100 \times 100 = 10{,}000$, and $10{,}000 \times 100 = 1{,}000{,}000$. But it must here be observed, that these two numbers . . . appear to be considered by Plato as analogous to two parallelopipedons; the former, namely, ten thousand, being formed out of $10 \times 10 \times 100$, and the latter, a million, from $1000 \times 10 \times 100$. These two numbers are called by Plato 'two harmonies,' for the following reason: Simplicius, in his Commentary on Aristotle's book De Cœlo, informs us that a cube among the Pythagoreans was denominated 'harmony,' because it consists of 12 bounding lines, 8 angles, and 6 sides; and 12, 8, and 6 are in harmonic proportion. For the difference between 12 and 8 is to the difference between 8 and 6, i. e. 4 is to 2, as the first term is to the third, viz. as 12 is to 6; which, as is well known, is the law of harmonic proportion. As a parallelopipedon, therefore, has the same number of sides, angles, and bounding lines as a cube, the reason is obvious why the numbers 10,000 and 100,000 are called by Plato harmonies. Hence, also, it is evident why he says that the other of these harmonies, viz. a million, is of equal length indeed, but more oblong: for if we call 100 the breadth and 10 the depth, both of 10,000 and 1,000,000, it is evident, that the latter number, when considered as produced by $1000 \times 10 \times 100$, will be analogous to a more oblong parallelopipedon than the former.

"Again, when he says that the number 1,000,000 consists of a hundred numbers from effable numbers of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two that are ineffable, and from a hundred cubes of the triad, his meaning is as follows. The number 1,000,000 consists of a hundred numbers, i. e. of a hundred such numbers as 10,000, each of which is composed from effable diameters of pentads, etc. But in order to understand the truth of this assertion, it is necessary to understand that there are certain numbers which are called by arithmeticians effable diameters. These, also, are two-fold; for some are the diameters of even squares, and others of odd squares. And the diameters of effable even squares, when multiplied into themselves, produce square numbers double of the squares of which they are the diameters with an excess of unity. Thus for instance, the number 3 multiplied into itself produces 9, which is double of the square number 4 with an excess of unity, and therefore 3 will be the diameter of the even square 4. But the diameters of effable odd square numbers are in power double of the squares of which they are diameters by a deficiency of unity. Thus, the number 7, multiplied into itself, produces 49, which is double of the odd square number 25 by a deficiency of unity. This being premised, it follows that the number 10,000 will consist of a certain number of heptads; for 7 is the effable diameter of the square number 25; and from what follows, it will be found that this number is 1386.

"But the number 10,000 not only consists of 1386 heptads, but Plato also adds, 'from two numbers that are ineffable;' viz. from two numbers the roots of which cannot be exactly obtained or expressed either in whole numbers or in fractions, such as the roots of the numbers 2 and 8. The numbers 15 and 13 also are of this kind, and appear to be the numbers signified by Plato. In the last place he adds, 'and from 100 cubes of the triad,' viz. from the number 270; for this is equal to a hundred

times 27, the cube of 3. The numbers then which form 10,000 are as below.

1386
7

9702
15
13
270

10,000

viz. 1386 heptads, two ineffable numbers, (15 and 13,) and a hundred times the cube of 3, (270); and so the whole geometric number is 1,000,000." But in asserting that 270 is a hundred times the cube of 3, Taylor is obviously at fault; for the cube of 3 is 27, and this number multiplied by 100 becomes 2700, not 270. Unless, then, some error lies in the text of Plato, (which is hinted in no edition of the Republic that I have been able to consult,) this one mistake is fatal to Taylor's theory. It is quite clear that he has chosen a million as the perfect number quite arbitrarily; and that in order to make his figures come right, he has done his sum backwards, taking 1386, as being the 7th part of the excess of 10,000 above 298. It is curious, however, that 1386, as well as 9702, is divisible by 7.

While so little certain information concerning the Pythagorean numbers has been handed down to us, or been discovered by the researches of antiquarians and mathematicians, it is impossible to pronounce a decisive opinion upon the main difficulty in the text of Aristotle, who of course is borrowing the language of Plato, inherited by him again from the old Pythagorean school of philosophy. For further information the reader will do well to consult Taylor's note on the fifth book of the Politics, and the references given by Mr. Burges in the Appendix to vol. ii. of his translation of Plato.

INDEX.

(N. B. The references to the Economics are distinguished by the letter E. The other references are to the Politics.)

Abydos, E. ii. 19.
Achilles, iii. 5.
Act of the state, what, iii. 3.
Actions, their original spring, i. 1.
Administration, what it is, iii. 6.
Administration, whether to be shared by the whole community, vii. 2.
Æsymnetes, iii. 14; iv. 10.
Æthiopia, in what manner the power of the state is there regulated, iv. 4.
Agriculture, the first thing to be attended to, E. i. 2.
Alterations in governments, whence they arise, v. 1.
Ambracia, the government of, changed, v. 4.
Andromadas Rheginus, a lawgiver of the Thracian Chalcidians, ii. 12.
Animals, tame, why better than wild, i. 5.
Animals, their different provisions by nature, i. 8.
Animals, intended by nature for the benefit of man, *ib.*
Animals, what constitutes their different species, iv. 4.
Antimenes, E. ii. 35.
Antissa, E. ii. 7.
Arbitrator and judge, their difference, ii. 8.
Arcadians, ii. 2.
Archytas, his rattle, viii. 6.
Areopagus, senate of, ii. 12.
Argonauts refuse to take Hercules with them, v. 7.
Aristocracies, causes of commotions in them, iii. 13.
Aristocracies, chief cause of their alteration, v. 7.
Aristocracies, may degenerate into oligarchies, iii. 7.
Aristocracy, what, iii. 7.
Aristocracy, treated of, iv. 7.
Aristocracy, its object, iv. 8.
Aristophanes, quoted from Plato's Symposium, ii. 4.
Aristotle of Rhodes, E. ii. 16.
Art, works of, which most excellent, i. 11.
Artificers and slaves, their difference, i. 13.
Assembly, public, its proper business, iv. 14.
Assemblies, public, advantageous to a democracy, *ib.*
Athens, different dispositions of its citizens, v. 3.
Athens, its constitution composed of various elements, ii. 12.
Barter, its origin, i. 9.
Being, what the nature of every one is, i. 2.
Beings, why some command, others obey, i. 2.
Body by nature to be governed, i. 5.
Body requires our care before the soul, vii. 15.
Byzantines, E. ii. 4.
Callistratus, E. ii. 23.
Canopus, E. ii. 34.
Carthaginian government described, ii. 11.
Census in a free state should be as extensive as possible, iv. 13.
Census, how to be altered, v. 8.
Chabrias, E. ii. 26, 38.
Chalcedon, E. ii. 11.
Chalcis, the government of, changed, v. 4.
Charidemus, E. ii. 31.
Charondas, ii. 12.
Charondas, supposed to be the scholar of Zaleucus, *ib.*

Chians, E. ii. 13.
Child, how to be managed when first born, vii. 17.
Child should be taught nothing till he is five years old, *ib.*
Child, how then to be educated, *ib.*
Children, the proper government of, i. 2.
Children, what their proper virtues, i. 13.
Children, what they are usually taught, viii. 3.
Chryseis, E. i. 9.
Cities, how governed at first, i. 2.
Cities, the work of nature, *ib.*
Cities, prior in contemplation to a family, or an individual, *ib.*
City may be too much one, ii. 2, 5.
City and confederacy, their difference, ii. 2.
City and confederacy, wherein they should be one, *ib.*
City, what, iii. 1, 9.
City, when it continues the same, iii. 3.
City, for whose sake established, iii. 6.
City, its end, iii. 9.
City, of what parts made up, iv. 4.
City best composed of equals, iv. 11.
City of the best form, what its establishment ought to be, v. 4.
City, wherein its greatness consists, *ib.*
City may be either too large or too small, vii. 4.
City, what should be its situation, vii. 5.
City, ought to be divided by families into different sorts of men, vii. 10.
Citizens must have some things in common, ii. 1.
Citizens, their privileges different in different governments, iii. 1.
Citizens, if illegally made, whether illegal, iii. 2.
Citizen should know both how to command and obey, iii. 4.
Citizen, who is one? iii. 1, 2.
Citizens should be exempted from servile labour, ii. 9.
Citizens, who admitted to be, iii. 5.
Citizens in the best states ought not to follow merchandise, vii. 9.
Clazomenæ, E ii. 17.
Cleomenes, E. ii. 34—40.
Clisthenes, vi. 4.
Clytemnestra, E. i. 9.
Command amongst equals should be in rotation, iii. 16.
Common meals not well established at Lacedæmon—well at Crete, ii. 9.
Common meals, the model from whence the Lacedæmonian was taken, *ib.*
Common meals inferior to it in some respects, *ib.*
Community of wives, its inconveniences, ii. 2.
Community of goods, its inconveniences, ii. 3.
Community of goods destructive of modesty and liberality, ii. 5.
Community, its recommendations deceitful, *ib.*
Community of children, ii. 3, 4.
Community of children, inconveniences attending it, ii. 4.
Community, into what people it may be divided, vi. 7.
Concord, domestic, E. i. 9.
Condalus, E. ii. 15.
Conjugal relation, the, E. i. 3.
Contempt, a cause of sedition, v. 3.
Cotys, E. ii. 28.
Courage of a man different from a woman's, iii. 4.
Courts, how many there ought to be, iv. 16.
Courts of justice should be few in a small state, vi. 5.
Crete, the government of, ii. 10.
Crete, description of the island, *ib.*
Cretan customs, similar to the Lacedæmonian, *ib.*
Cretan assembly open to every citizen, *ib.*
Cretans, their power, *ib.*
Cretans, their public meals how conducted, *ib.*
Customs at Carthage, Lacedæmon, and amongst the Scythians and Iberians, concerning those who had killed an enemy, vii. 2.

Cypselus, E. ii. 2.
Cyrene, vi. 4.
Cyzicus, E. ii. 12.
Dædalus's statues, i. 4.
Delphi, an account of a sedition there, v. 4.
Demagogues, their influence in a democracy, iv. 4.
Democracy, what, iii. 8.
Democracies arose out of tyrannies, iii. 15.
Democracy, its definition, iv. 4.
Democracy, different sorts of, iv. 4—6.
Democracy, its object, iv. 8.
Democracies, whence they arose, v. 1.
Democracy, how subverted in the isle of Cos, v. 5.
Democracies, when changed into tyrannies, *ib.*
Democracy and aristocracy, how they may be blended together, v. 8.
Democracies, their different sorts, vi. 1, 4.
Democracies, general rules for their establishment, vi. 2.
Democracies should not be made too perfect, vi. 5.
Democratical state, its foundation, vi. 2.
Despotic power absurd, vii. 2.
Didales, E. ii. 25.
Dion, his noble resolution, v. 10.
Dionysia, E. ii. 7.
Dionysius, his taxes, v. 11.
Dionysius of Syracuse, E. ii. 21, 42.
Dissolution of kingdoms and tyrannies, v. 10.
Domestic concord, E. i. 9.
Domestic economy, E. ii. 1.
Domestic employments of men and women different, iii. 4.
Domestic government, its object, iii. 6.
Domestic society, the first, i. 2.
Doric melody, viii. 7.
Draco, ii. 12.
Dyrrachium, government of, iii. 16.
Early rising, its benefit, E. i 6.
Economics, how different from Politics, E. i. 1.
Economist, character of the good, E. ii. 1.
Economy, of four kinds, E. ii. 1.
Education of children & slaves, i. 13.
Education of women, E. i. 8.
Education necessary for the happiness of the city, iii. 13.
Education, of all things most necessary to preserve the state, v. 9.
Education, what it ought to be, *ib.*
Education, the objects of it, vii. 14.
Education should be taken care of by the magistrate, viii. 1.
Education should correspond to the nature of government, *ib.*
Education should be a common care, *ib.*
Education should be regulated by laws, *ib.*
Egypt, iii. 70.
Employments in the state, how to be disposed of, iii. 12.
Employments, whether all should be open to all, vii. 9.
Employment, one to be allotted to one person in an extensive government, iv. 15.
Ephesians, E. ii. 20.
Ephialtes abridges the power of the Senate of Areopagus, ii. 12.
Ephori, at Sparta, their power too great, ii. 9.
Ephori, improperly chosen, *ib.*
Ephori, flattered by their kings, *ib.*
Ephori, the supreme judges, *ib.*
Ephori, manner of life too indulgent, *ib.*
Epidamnus, an account of a revolution there, v. 4.
Equality, how twofold, v. 1.
Equality in a democracy, how to be procured, vi. 3.
Euripides quoted, iii. 4, viii. 5.
Evæses, E. ii. 33.
Family contrasted with a state, E. i. 1.
Family government, of what it consists, i. 3.
Fathers should not be too young, vii. 16.

Females, wherein they differ from slaves, i. 2.
Females and slaves, why upon a level amongst Barbarians, i. 2.
Forfeitures, how to be applied, vi. 5.
Fortune, improper pretension to power, iii. 13.
Freemen in general, what power they ought to have, iii. 11.
Free state treated of, iv 3.
Free state, how it arises out of a democracy and oligarchy, iv. 9.
Friendship weakened by a community of children, ii. 4.
General, the office of, how to be disposed of, iii. 15.
God perfectly happy, vii. 1.
Gods, why supposed subject to kingly government, i. 2.
Good and evil, the perception of, necessary to form a family and a city, i. 2.
Good fortune something different from happiness, vii. 1.
Good, relative to man, how divided, *ib.*
Governments, political, regal, family, and servile, their difference from each other, i. 1, etc.
Government of the master over the slave, sometimes reciprocally useful to both, i. 6.
Government should continue as much as possible in the same hands, ii. 2.
Government, in what manner it should be in rotation, *ib.*
Government, what it is, iii. 1.
Governments, how different from each other, iii. 6.
Governments, whether more than one form should be established, iii.
Governments should endeavour to prevent others from being too powerful. Instances of it, iii. 13.
Government, which best, of a good man or good laws, iii. 15.
Governments, how compared to music, iv. 3.
Government, good, to what it should owe its preservation, iv. 9.
Governments in general, to what they owe their preservation, v. 8.
Government, what the best, vii. 13.
Governors and governed, whether their virtues are the same or different, i. 13.
Governors and governed, whether they should be the same persons or different, vii. 14.
Grecians, their superiority over other people, vii. 7.
Guards of a king, natives, iii. 14.
Guards of a tyrant, foreigners, *ib.*
Guards of a king, v. 10.
Gymnastic exercises, when to be performed, vii. 12.
Gymnastic exercises, how far they should be made a part of education, viii. 4.
Γυναικονομία, vi. 8.
Happy life, where most likely to be found, vii. 1.
Happiness, wherein it consists, vii 3.
Happiness of the individual and the state identical, vii. 2.
Harmony, whether all kinds of it are to be used in education, viii. 7.
Hebdoma, v. 3, *note.*
Heiresses at Sparta, ii. 9.
Helots troublesome to the Lacedæmonians, *ib.*
Heniochi, viii. 4.
Heraclea, E. ii. 9.
Herdsmen, a democracy of, vi. 4
Hesiod quoted, E. i. 4.
Hippias, E. ii. 5.
Hippodamus the Milesian, an account of, ii. 9.
Hippodamus the Milesian, his plan of government objected to, *ib.*
Homer quoted, iii. 14, iv. 4, viii. 3, and E. i. 9.
Honours, an inequality of, occasions seditions, ii. 7.
Horse, strength of the army originally consisted in them, iv. 14.
Horse most suitable to an oligarchy, vi. 7.
House or family, its component parts, E. i. 2.
Houses, best site for, E. i.

Houses, private, their best form, vii. 11.
Human flesh devoured by some nations, viii. 4.
Husband, his duty towards his wife, E. i. 4.
Husbandry, art of, whether part of money-getting, i. 8.
Husbandmen compose the best democracy, vi. 4.
Husbandmen will choose to govern according to law, iv. 6.
Iapygians, v. 7.
Injury of a wife, her husband's amours, E. i. 8.
Inspectors of the market, of education, of lands, etc., vii. 8.
Instruments, their difference from each other, i. 4.
Instruments, wherein they differ from possessions, *ib.*
Iphicrates, E. ii. 27.
Islands of the Blest, vii. 15.
Italus, *ib.*
Italy, anciently called Œnotria, vii. 10.
Jason's declaration, iii. 4.
Judge should not act as an arbitrator, ii. 8.
Judge, which is best for an individual, or the people in general, iii. 15.
Judges, many better than one, iii. 16.
Judges, of whom to consist, *ib.*
Judges, how many different sorts are necessary, iv. 16.
Judicial part of government, how to be divided, *ib.*
Jurymen, particular powers sometimes appointed to that office, iii. 1.
Justice, what, iii. 12.
Justice, its course impeded in Crete, ii. 10.
Justice, different in different situations, iii. 4.
Kingdom, what, iii. 7.
Kingdoms, their object, v. 10.
Kingdoms, causes of their dissolution, *ib.*
Kingdoms, how preserved, v. 11.
Kingly government in the heroic times, what, iii. 14.
Kingly power regulated by the laws at Sparta in peace, iii. 14.
Kingly power absolute in war, *ib.*
King, the guardian of his people, v. 10.
Kings formerly in Crete, *ib.*
Kings, their power afterwards devolved to the Κόσμοι, ii. 10.
King's children, what to be done with, iii. 15.
King's power, what it should be, *ib.*
King's power, when unequal, iii. 10.
Kings, method of electing them at Carthage, ii. 11.
Kings, from whom to be chosen, *ib.*
Kingdoms, how bestowed, v. 10.
Knowledge of the master and slave different from each other, i. 7.
Κόσμοι, allowed to resign their office before their time is elapsed, ii. 10
Κόσμοι, their powers and number, *ib.*
Κόσμοι, wherein inferior to the Ephors, *ib.*
Lacedæmonians, wherein they admit things to be common, ii. 5.
Lacedæmonian revenue badly raised, ii. 9.
Lacedæmonian customs similar to the Cretan, *ib.*
Lacedæmonian government much esteemed, ii. 6.
Lacedæmonian government, the faults of it, ii. 9.
Lacedæmonian government calculated only for war, *ib.*
Lacedæmonian government, how composed of a democracy and oligarchy, iv. 9.
Lampsacus, E. ii. 8.
Land should be divided into two parts, vii. 10.
Λαριοσσοποίος, iii. 2.
Law makes one man a slave, another free, i. 3.
Law, whether just or not, i. 6.
Laws, when advantageous to alter them, ii. 8, 9.
Law at Thebes respecting tradesmen, iii. 5.
Law, nothing should be done contrary to it, v. 8

Laws of every state will be like the state, iii. 11.
Laws, whom they should be calculated for, iii. 13.
Laws decide better than men, iii. 16.
Laws, moral preferable to written, *ib.*
Laws must sometimes bend to ancient customs, iv. 5.
Laws should be framed to the state, iv. 1.
Laws and government, their difference, *ib.*
Laws, the same suit not all governments, *ib.*
Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, ii. 7.
Legislator ought to know not only what is best, but what is practical, iv. 1.
Liberty, wherein it partly consists, vi. 2.
Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, iv. 11.
Life, how divided, vii. 14.
Locrians forbid men to sell their property, ii. 7.
Lycophron's account of law, iii. 9.
Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, ii. 9.
Lycurgus made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, *ib.*
Lycurgus, some of his laws censured, *ib.*
Lycurgus spent much time at Crete, ii. 10.
Lycurgus, supposed to be the scholar of Thales, ii. 12.
Lydian measure, viii. 7.
Lygdamis, E. ii. 3.
Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, v. 1.
Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, ii. 11.
Magistrates, when to an aristocracy, *ib.*
Magistrates at Athens, from whom to be chosen, ii. 12.
Magistrates to determine those causes which the laws cannot be applied to, iii. 11.
Magistrates, to whom that name is properly given, iv. 15
Magistrates, whether their power is to be the same, or different in different communities, iv. 15.
Magistrates, how they differ from each other, *ib.*
Magistrates, in those who appoint them, *ib.*
Magistrates should be continued but a short time in democracies, v. 8.
Magistrates, how to be chosen in a democracy, vi. 2.
Magistrates, different sorts and employments, vi. 8.
Making and using, their difference, i. 4.
Malienses, their form of government, iv. 13.
Man proved to be a political animal, i. 2.
Man has alone a perception of good and evil, *ib.*
Man without law and justice the worst of beings, *ib.*
Marriage, sanctity of, E. i. 8.
Master of a family, should inspect every thing himself, E. i. 6.
Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, i. 3.
Matrimony, when to be engaged in, vii. 16.
Mausolus, E. ii. 15.
Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, vii. 10.
Meals, common, expense of, should be defrayed by the whole state, *ib*
Mechanical employments useful for citizens, iii. 4.
Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, iii. 5.
Mechanics cannot acquire the practice of virtue, *ib.*
Mechanics admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, *ib.*
Medium of circumstances best, iv. 11.
Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments of the state, iii. 13.
Members of the community, what natural dispositions they ought to be of, vii. 7.
Memnon of Rhodes, E. ii. 30.
Men, some distinguished by nature

for governers, others to be governed, i. 5.
Men, their different modes of living, i. 8.
Men become worthy in three ways, vii. 13.
Mendeans, E. ii. 22.
Mentor, E. ii. 29.
Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, i. 11.
Metœci, E. ii. 4.
Middle rank of men make the best citizens, iv. 11.
Middle rank of men most conducive to the preservation of the state, *ib.*
Middle rank of men should be particularly attended to by the legislators, iv. 12.
Military, how divided, vi. 7.
Mitilenè, an account of a dispute there, v. 4.
Monarch, absolute, iii. 16.
Monarchies, their nature, iii. 14.
Monarchies, sometimes elective, *ib.*
Monarchies, sometimes hereditary, *ib.*
Monarchies, whence they sometimes arise, v. 3.
Monarchies, causes of corruption in them, v. 10.
Monarchies, how preserved, v. 11.
Money, how it made its way into commerce, i. 9.
Money first weighed, *ib.*
Money afterwards stamped, *ib.*
Money, its value dependent on agreement, *ib.*
Money-getting considered at large, *ib.*
Money, how gained by exchange, i. 10.
Monopolizing gainful, i. 11.
Monopolizing sometimes practised by cities, *ib.*
Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, *ib.*
Music, how many species of it, iv. 3.
Music, why a part of education, viii. 3.
Music, how far it should be taught, viii. 5.
Music, professors of it considered as mean people, *ib.*
Music imitates the disposition of the mind, viii. 5.
Music improves our manners, *ib.*
Music, Lydian, softens the mind, *ib.*
Music, pieces of, difficult in their execution, not to be taught to children, viii. 6.
Nature requires equality amongst equals, iii. 16.
Nausicaa, E. i. 9.
Naval power should be regulated by the strength of the city, vii. 6.
Necessary parts of a city, what, vii. 8.
Nobles, the difference between them, iv. 3.
Nobles should take care of the poor, vi. 5.
Νόμοι θετικοί, ii. 12.
Νομοφύλαξ, vi. 8.
Oath, an improper one in an oligarchy, v. 9.
Œconomy and money-getting, their difference, i. 9.
Œnophyta, v. 3.
Officers of state, who they ought to be, iv. 15.
Officers, how long to continue, *ib.*
Officers, who to choose them, *ib.*
Offices, distinction between them, iii. 1.
Offices, when subversive of the rights of the people, iv. 13.
Offspring, an instance of the likeness of, to the sire, ii. 3.
Oligarchy admits not hired servants to be citizens, iii. 5.
Oligarchy, its object, iii. 7.
Oligarchy, what, iii. 8, 9.
Oligarchies arise where the strength of the state consists in horse, iv. 3
Oligarchy, its definition, iv. 4.
Oligarchy, different sorts of, iv. 5, 6
Oligarchy, its object, iv. 8.
Oligarchies, whence they arose, v 1
Oligarchy, how it ought to be founded, vi. 6.
Olympic victors, viii. 4.
Onomacritus, ii. 12
Opici, vii. 10.
Ostracism, why established, ii. 13, v. 3.
Ostracism, its power, iii. 13.

Ostracism, a weapon in the hand of sedition, iii. 13.
Oxylus, vi. 4.
Pæderastia of Spartans, ii. 9.
Painting, why it should be made a part of education, viii. 3.
Pancœtius, v. 10.
Particulars, five, in which the rights of the people will be undermined, iv. 13.
Pausanias wanted to abolish the Ephori, v. 1.
Penelope and Ulysses, E. i. 7, 9.
Penestæ, ii. 5.
Pentacosiomedimni, ii. 12.
People, how they should be made one, ii. 4.
People should be allowed the power of pardoning, not of condemning, iv. 14.
People of Athens assume upon their victory over the Medes, ii. 12.
People, what best submit to a kingly government, iii. 17.
People, what best submit to an aristocratic, *ib.*
People, what best submit to a free state, *ib.*
Periander's advice to Thrasybulus, iii. 13, v. 10.
Pericles introduces the paying of those who attended the court of justice, ii. 12.
Phalaris, v. 10.
Pharsalian mare, ii. 3.
Pheidittia, ii. 11.
Philolaus, a Theban legislator, quits his native country, ii. 12.
Philolaus gives *νόμοι θετικοί*, *ib.*
Philoxenus, E. ii. 32.
Phocylides, iv. 11.
Phorea, an account of a dispute there, v. 4.
Phrygian measure, viii. 7.
Phrygian melody different from the Dorian, iii. 3.
Physician, his business, iii. 11.
Physicians, their mode of practice in Egypt, iii. 15.
Physicians, when ill, consult others, ii. 16.
Pindar, quoted, E. i. 9.
Piræus, ii. 8.
Pisistratus, v. 10.
Pisistratidæ, *ib.*
Pittacus, ii. 12.
Plato would allow a certain difference in private property, ii. 7.
Plato censured, v. 12.
Πόλις, iii. 1, *note.* Political and contemplative life compared
Political economy, E. ii. 1.
Poor excused from bearing arms and from gymnastic exercises in an oligarchy, iv. 13.
Poor paid for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, *ib.*
Potidæa, E. ii. 6.
Power of the master, its object, iii. 6.
Power, supreme, where it ought to be lodged, iii. 10.
Power, supreme, why with the many, iii. 11.
Powers of a state, different methods of delegating them to the citizens, iv. 14.
Preadvisers, court of, *ib.*
Priesthood, to whom to be allotted, vii. 9.
Prisoners of war, whether they may be justly made slaves, i. 6.
Private property not regulated, the source of sedition, ii. 7.
Phaleas would have it equal, *ib.*
Phaleas, how he would correct the irregularities of it, *ib.*
Πρόβουλοι, what, iv. 14, *note*, vi. 8.
Property, how to be acquired, E. i. 6.
Property, its nature, i. 8.
Property, how it should be regulated, ii. 5.
Property, the advantages of having it private, *ib.*
Property, what quantity the public ought to have, ii. 7.
Property, vii. 8; ought not to be to be common, vii. 10.
Prudence necessary to the politician, iii. 4.
Public assemblies, when subversive of the liberties of the people, iv. 9.
Public money, how to be divided, vi. 5.

Public tables on the ramparts, vii. 12. (*See also* Syssitia.)
Quality of a city, what meant by it, iv. 12.
Qualifications necessary for those who are to fill the first departments in government, v. 9.
Quantity, *ib.*
Rattle of Archytas, viii. 6.
Regal economy, E. ii. 1.
Rest, not for slaves, vii. 15.
Rest and peace the proper objects of the legislator, vii. 15.
Revolutions in a democracy, whence they arise, v. 5.
Revolutions in an oligarchy, v. 6.
Rhythm, what, viii. 7, *note.*
Rich fined in an oligarchy for not bearing arms and attending the gymnastic exercises, iv. 13.
Rich receive nothing for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, *ib.*
Rights of a citizen, whether advantageous or not, vii. 2.
Samians, E. ii. 10.
Satrapical economy, E. ii. 1.
Sciences, illiberal, not to be learned by the free-born, viii. 2.
Scylax, vii. 14.
Seditions sometimes prevented by equality, ii. 7.
Seditions, their causes, v. 2, 3.
Seditions, how to be prevented, v. 8.
Selybrians, E. ii. 18.
Senate suits a democracy, viii. 5.
Sesostris, vii. 10.
Sexes, their respective duties, E. i. 3.
Shepherds compose the second-best democracy, vi. 4.
Slave, his nature and use, i. 4.
Slave, a chattel, *ib.*
Slave by law, what, i. 6.
Slaves, an inquiry into the virtues they are capable of, i. 13.
Slaves difficult to manage properly, ii. 9.
Slaves, their different sorts, iii. 4.
Slaves, their character, E. i. 5.
Slaves to be rewarded with freedom, *ib.*
Slaves, their treatment, *ib.*
Slavery not founded in nature, but law, as some think, i. 3.
Society, civil, the greatest blessing to man, i. 2.
Society necessary to man, iii. 6.
Society, civil, different from a commercial intercourse, iii. 9.
Socrates, his mistakes on government, ii. *passim.*
Socrates, his comparison of the human species to different kinds of metals, ii. 6.
Socrates, his division of the inhabitants, *ib.*
Socrates would have the women go to war, *ib.*
Socrates, Aristotle's opinion of his discourses, *ib.*
Socrates, his city would require a country of immeasurable extent, *ib.*
Socrates's account of the different orders of men in a city imperfect, iv. 4.
Sojourners, their situation, iii. 1.
Solon's opinion of riches, i. 8.
Solon's law for restraining property, ii. 7.
Solon alters the Athenian government, ii. 12.
Soul by nature the governor over the body, and in what manner i. 5.
Soul of man, how divided, vii. 14, 15.
Spartan system, faults of, vii. 14.
Spartan education, viii. 1, *note.*
Speech, a proof that man was formed for society, i. 2.
Square of freedom, vii. 12.
Stabelbius, E. ii. 41.
State defined, iii. 1.
State, each, consists of a great number of parts, iv. 3.
State, its disproportionate increase the cause of revolutions, v. 3.
State, firm, what, v. 7.
Stealing, how to be prevented, ii. 7.
Submission to government, when it is slavery, vii. 3
Supreme power should be ultimately vested in the laws, iii. 16.
Syllogisms, contentious, ii. 3.

Syracuse, the government of, languid, v. 4.
Syssitia, whence derived, vii. 10.
Syssitia, originally called Pheidittia, ii. 9.
Syssitia, called Andria in Crete, ii. 10.
Taos of Egypt, E. ii. 26.
Temperance in a man different from a woman, iii. 4.
Temples, how to be built, vii. 12.
Tenedos, iv. 4.
Thales, his contrivance to get money, i. 11.
Thales, supposed to be the companion of Onomacritus, ii. 12.
Thalia, viii. 3.
Theodorus, vii. 17.
Thibron, vii. 14.
Things necessary to be known for the management of domestic affairs, i. 11.
Things necessary in the position of a city, vii. 11.
Thrasybulus, iii. 13, v. 10.
Timotheus, E. ii. 24
Tithe, E. ii. 1.
Tribunals, what different things they should have under their jurisdictions, iv. 15.
Tyranny, what, iii. 8.
Tyranny, not natural, iii. 17.
Tyranny, whence it arises, iii. 11.
Tyranny, treated of, iv. 10.
Tyranny contains all that is bad in all governments, *ib.*
Tyrannies, how established, v. 10.
Tyrannies, how preserved, v. 11.
Tyrannies of short duration, v. 12.
Tyrannies, instances of, vi. 2.
Tyrant, from whom usually chosen, v. 10.
Tyrants, many of them originally enjoyed only kingly power, *ib.*
Tyrant, his guards, *ib.*
Tyrant, his object, *ib.*
Tyrants, the causes of their being conspired against, *ib.*
Tyrants always love the worst of men, v. 11.
Ulysses and Penelope, E. i. 7, 9.
Uses of possessions, two, i. 9.
Usury to be detested, i. 10.
Venality to be guarded against, v. 8
Village, what, i. 2.
Virgins to be preferred to widows, E. i. 4.
Virtues different in different persons, i. 13.
Virtues, whether the same constitute a good man and a valuable citizen, iii. 4.
Virtue of a citizen has reference to the state, ii. 4.
Virtue of a citizen different in different governments, *ib.*
Walls necessary for a city, vii. 11.
War, what is gained by it, in some degree a natural acquisition, i. 8
War, not a final end, vii. 2, 14.
Wife, the proper government of, i. 12.
Wife, her character, E. i. 2.
Wife, need of, E. i. 3.
Wife, portrait of a good, E. i. 7.
Women, what their proper virtue, i. 13.
Women not to be indulged in improper liberties, ii. 9.
Women had great influence at Lacedæmon, *ib.*
Women of great disservice to the Lacedæmonians, *ib.*
Women, why indulged by them, *ib.*
Women, their proper time of marrying, vii. 16
Women, how to be managed when with child, *ib.*
Zaleucus, legislator of the western Locrians, ii. 12.
Zaleucus, supposed to be the disciple of Thales, *ib.*
Ζευγῖται, *ib*

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